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Executive Summary 
 
• This report presents the results of the research project “Pass-Through of Unfair Trading 
Practices in EU Food Supply Chains: Methodology and Empirical Application”. The 
research was funded by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC).  
• The purpose of the project is to design and test a monitoring system of unfair trading 
practices (UTP) along the agri-food supply chain. The investigation has special focus on 
assessment of the “pass-through effect”, defined as the consequences for the entire 
supply chain of UTPs adopted in a specific transaction. 
• The research report includes 
o a review of the economic literature for a better understanding of the economic 
principles of UTPs (chapter 2). 
o a review of available data sources and past experiences in UTP monitoring 
(chapters 3 and 4).  
o the illustration of two alternative approaches for UTP monitoring: B-SEA (broad-
scope empirical analysis, chapter 7) and IDEA (in-depth analysis, chapter 6). The 
B-SEA approach is designed to support ex post evaluation of public intervention, 
measuring the ability of the regulation to reduce the occurrence, impact and pass-
through of a specific list of UTPs. The IDEA approach is meant to assist policy 
design, supporting policymakers in determining the most important UTPs and their 
corresponding economic rationale, possible contribution to the efficiency of the 
supply chain and pass-through effects. 
o a test application of the two approaches to the EU fresh fruit sector. The IDEA is 
applied to the Agro-Pontino kiwifruit netchain (Italy) and the Lake Constance apple 
netchain (Germany) (chapters 11‒15). The B-SEA is applied to the Slovak fruit 
supply chain (chapter 8). 
o a comparative analysis of the IDEA and B-SEA results (chapter 16). 
o a discussion of the implications of our research (chapter 17). 
• We grouped the main findings of our research into four areas of interest: i) understanding 
UTP economics, ii) design of a UTP monitoring system, iii) analysis of UTPs in the EU fruit 
industry, and iv) application of Directive 2019/633 by Member States. 
 
• Understanding UTP economics. We achieved important advancements in the 
understanding of UTPs compared to the 2017 JRC literature review on unfair trading 
practices in the EU food supply chain. Our analysis concluded that 
o contract theory is a useful framework for the economic analysis of UTPs. In 
particular, relational contracts can explain the emergence of several UTPs in the 
EU fruit supply chains (chapter 12). 
o UTPs are heterogeneous, interdependent, multidimensional and transaction-
specific (chapter 2). This means that: 
§ many UTPs may coexist in the same supply chains and firms can be 
exposed to different subsets. Therefore, a ban on specific practices may 
affect firms in the same supply chain differently. 
§ the same practice may have a different impact and different “degree of 
fairness” depending on the nature of the transaction, including other (fair 
or unfair) adopted practices. 
§ the banning of one practice—because practices in the same transaction are 
interdependent and jointly determined—might cause a change in the 
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overall organization of the entire transaction. The re-organization might 
result in a change in the efficiency of the supply chain and adoption of new 
practices (unintended consequences are possible). The assessment of the 
consequences of the regulation must consider explicitly the difference 
between the status quo ante and the emerging re-organization 
(counterfactual approach). An evaluation of a ban on given practices 
without a counterfactual approach (i.e., “keeping all other factor constant”) 
is likely to provide biased results.   
§ in a supply chain, the organization of a transaction depends on the 
governance of upstream and downstream segments. This vertical 
interdependence originates the pass-through effect. The adoption of a UTP 
in a given segment of the supply chain is expected to trigger re-
organization in the upstream and downstream segments. The actual nature 
and intensity of the pass-through effect depend on specific characteristics 
of the transaction. 
§ UTPs involve several aspects of the supply chain (including efficiency, 
sustainability, innovation, etc.). This multidimensional nature implies that 
scalar indicators are unable to give a complete representation of UTP 
impact and pass-through. The use of more comprehensive approaches 
results in a more precise, but less immediate, assessment. The lack of 
scalar indicators makes cross-chain comparison and policy evaluation more 
complex. 
 
• Designing a UTP monitoring system. In the recent past, there were few initiatives to 
investigate UTP empirically. Existing surveys (such as the YouGov-GCA survey in the UK) 
focus mainly on detecting the occurrence of UTPs and making an overall assessment of 
impact (chapter 4). In this report, we illustrate innovative strategies for monitoring UTPs. 
Our goal is to design a system able to identify trends over time and support the decisions 
of policymakers and stakeholders. 
o The design of the monitoring system depends on the objective of the investigation 
(chapter 5). We considered two possible goals: 
§ Assessment of protection from UTPs on a given list (ex post evaluation of 
existing regulation). In this case, the investigation assesses the occurrence 
and impact of a given set of UTPs over time (for example, the list of 16 
black and grey practices from Directive 2019/633). This type of monitoring 
system can assess whether the regulation is able to reduce the occurrence 
of the target UTPs. We designed the B-SEA approach to meet this objective. 
§ Assessment of overall protection from UTPs (support to policy design). In 
this case, we assume that an ex ante list of UTPs either does not exist or 
is under consideration for updating by the regulator. Without a defined list, 
identification of UTPs becomes an issue that must be dealt with. Also, the 
investigation must estimate the possible unintended consequences of a ban 
on the identified practices, so that regulators can make informed decisions. 
Consequently, extensive information and use of economic theory are 
required. We designed the IDEA approach to meet this objective. 
o The B-SEA investigation is based on a set of sample surveys targeting various 
segments of the supply chain (chapter 7). We designed a monitoring system that 
minimises the use of a priori information and sector-specific solutions. This 
approach is motivated by our goal to make B-SEA applicable to heterogeneous 
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sectors with comparable results. The main design issues are related to the drafting 
of the questionnaires. In fact, a complete assessment of impact and pass-through 
requires an extensive questionnaire resulting in extreme respondent fatigue. In 
section 14, we illustrate a typical B-SEA set of questionnaires. 
o The IDEA approach is based on a mix of in-depth interviews, expert panels, sample 
surveys and economic modelling (chapter 6). The composite structure is the 
consequence of the complexity of the objectives. Expert panels are used to identify 
the main UTPs; in-depth interviews provide information about occurrence, impact 
and pass-through; sample surveys generalise the results; and economic theory is 
used to summarise the results in a consistent framework to be used for policy 
analysis. Given the composite structure of the investigation, reporting 
heterogeneous information in a compact and clear way is one of the main 
challenges. 
o Measurement of UTP occurrence, impact and pass-through (OIP) is a main issue. 
In our implementation of the two approaches we opted for subjective assessments 
based on respondents’ personal evaluation using a 5-point Likert scale. Alternative 
measures based on objective data (such as accounting or contractual data) proved 
to be unfeasible with the available resources. In the use of subjective measures, 
we faced three main possible sources of bias: fear factor, self-representation and 
strategic response (section 17.1.3 ).  
o Our research concludes that IDEA and B-SEA are not alternative approaches. In 
section 17.1.4  we illustrate the organization and possible benefits of a monitoring 
system exploiting the complementarities between IDEA and B-SEA. 
 
• Analysis of UTP in the EU fruit industry. Parts III and IV of this report illustrate the 
results of an empirical investigation of the EU fresh fruit industry. We applied the IDEA 
protocol in Germany and Italy and the B-SEA approach in Slovakia. In total, we surveyed 
327 firms (272 farmers, 45 middlemen and 10 retailers) between June and September 
2019. 
o In general, UTPs in Directive 2019/633 occur at the middleman level. Large buyers 
are leading firms that possibly impose UTPs on cooperatives, private traders and 
other middlemen.  
o We found evidence of pass-through effects. Middlemen who are subjected to UTPs 
may decide to change the organization of their procurement. The decision depends 
on the nature of the UTPs and characteristics of the trade relationship. For 
example, Italian firms do not pass-through the misuse of confidential information 
but do pass-through late payments. UTPs at the retailer-middleman level result in 
three main vectors of impact on farmers (section 15.2 ): i) sales with prices to be 
determined, ii) on-farm investments and iii) price pressure. A fourth vector 
(strategic quality testing) was detected in IDEA semi-structured interviews, but it 
was not supported by the sample surveys.  
o The impact vectors include UTPs as well as a set of practices that—although not 
considered in Directive 2019/633—may have similar effects on farmers. In 
general, we found that the Directive list of UTPs does not fully capture unfairness 
at the farmer level in the fresh fruit supply chain. 
o We identified three degrees of pass-through. In first degree pass-through, a firm 
suffering a UTP imposes the same practice on the suppliers (for example, a 
middleman pays farmers only after being paid by the final buyer). In second 
degree pass-through, a firm suffering a UTP imposes a different UTP on suppliers 
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(for example, a middleman unilaterally renegotiates price with suppliers after 
being charged for product waste/loss at the final buyer’s premises). Finally, in 
third degree pass-through, the firm reacts to a UTP by adopting fair practices (for 
example, farmers are asked to adopt strict quality standards to reduce future 
losses/waste). We found that firms may adopt a mix of different degrees of pass-
through. Consistent with theory, firms may decide to pass-through only part of 
the cost of the UTP. 
o UTPs are extremely frequent at the middleman level. Eighty-two percent of 
surveyed middlemen stated that they suffered from at least one of the 16 UTPs. 
The figures vary across the three countries, with Italy having 47% UTP occurrence 
and Germany and Slovakia being close to 100%.  
o The most frequent UTPs are late payments and misuse of confidential information 
in Italy; grey practices and liability for loss/waste at the buyer’s premises in 
Germany; and late payments and liability for loss/waste at the buyer’s premises 
in Slovakia.  
o UTPs are heterogeneous across space. For example, misuse of confidential 
information is not considered a major issue in Slovakia and Germany, and grey 
practices are not a main concern in Italy. We found heterogeneity within the same 
area as well, with high variance in firms’ evaluations of the impact of the practices. 
These results confirm the theoretical findings that UTPs are heterogeneous and 
transaction-specific. 
o Cooperatives and producer organizations are subjected to similar practices as 
private traders, but there are differences in the pass-through effects. The principle 
of economic participation allows cooperatives to incorporate the effects of 
downstream UTPs into the determination of end-of-year prices (facilitating third-
degree pass-through). A noticeable consequence is that private traders may be 
perceived as more reliable and transparent with regards to price determination 
(when price is determined at delivery).  
o The application of IDEA in Italy and Germany identified two possibly unfair 
practices not considered in Directive 2019/633: discretionary/unpredictable 
orders and imposition of unnecessary production standards.  
§ Stakeholders complain that large buyers can place orders without notice 
and strategically in such a manner as to “keep suppliers on their toes”. This 
practice was reported by 100% of German middlemen, 13% of Italian 
middlemen and 31% of Slovakian middlemen. 
§ Seventy-five percent of Slovakian middlemen and 67% of German 
middlemen consider at least some of the production standards required by 
large buyers to be unnecessary (i.e., not important for consumers and not 
imposed by regulation). Noticeably, only 7% of Italian middlemen share 
this concern.  
o We calibrated a contract theory model using the empirical results of IDEA. We 
found that several UTPs can play a critical role in the organization of the fresh fruit 
supply chain and in the management of supply, demand and procurement risk. In 
particular, renegotiation, arbitrary contract termination and unnecessary and 
upfront access costs (payments or investments) can increase the efficiency of 
large buyers’ procurement systems. These practices can be used to implement 
well-known coordination mechanisms such as implicit threat and self-
selection/screening. In this way, leading firms ensure that risks such as demand 
or production fluctuations are borne by the firms most efficient in preventing the 
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unfavourable event (regardless of the degree of risk aversion). This organization 
protects leading firms from possible opportunism (moral hazard and adverse 
selection), allowing them to “select and motivate the most efficient suppliers”. The 
model concludes that banning UTPs may trigger a change in the organization of 
the fresh fruit supply chain, with possible unintended consequences for efficiency. 
 
• Implications for the implementation of Directive 2019/633 by Member States. 
o The empirical analysis found important differences in UTPs in the fruit netchains 
of different Member States (sections 14.3  and 14.4  and chapter 16). This result 
supports the decision allowing flexible implementation of the Directive. 
o The theoretical model suggests that a UTP ban may have unintended 
consequences (chapter 12). Member States considering an expansion of the list 
of banned practices might want to support the decision with extensive economic 
analysis in order to avoid undermining the efficiency of the supply chains. 
o Comparing the results of our investigation of the fresh fruit netchains with 
previous studies in other sectors (JRC dairy industry investigation), we found 
remarkable differences in the organization of transactions and in occurrence of 
UTPs. Also this result supports the decision to allow for flexible implementation of 
the Directive. Member States considering an expansion of the list of banned 
practices might want to target specific practices in one sector without imposing 
unnecessary constraints in other ones. 
o Our analysis concludes that enforcement plays an important role in determining 
the outcome of the UTP regulation. Section 12.7.1  provides a detailed discussion 
of how decisions about the scope of enforcement (yearly contract or entire long-
term trade relationship) can affect the degree of supplier protection. In this 
regard, the harmonization of enforcement across Member States is an important 
issue. Heterogeneous enforcement strategies might result in possible distortion of 
trade within the single market.  
o Effective enforcement requires harmonization of the legal frameworks of Member 
States. In this perspective, coordination during the adoption period would be 
highly advisable. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Carlo Russo  
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) 
 
1.1  Objective of the investigation 
 
This report illustrates the results of the research project “Pass-Through of Unfair Trading 
Practices in EU Food Supply Chains: Methodology and Empirical Application” (ref 
JRC/SVQ/2018/D.4/0009/NC.). The main goal of the project is to define strategies for monitoring 
unfair trading practices (UTP) along the agri-food supply chain. The main focus of the 
investigation is the “pass-through” effect, i.e., the effects of a UTP on the entire supply chain for 
a given transaction. 
The report was commissioned by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission 
in November 2018, during the final phase of the political debate about UTPs and a few months 
before the final approval of Directive (EU) 2019/633 (henceforth, “Directive 2019/633” or “the 
Directive”). The invitation followed previous JRC reports covering literature reviews and empirical 
analysis and explicitly asked for advancements in the understanding of the economics of UTPs 
and the development of theory-grounded, reliable monitoring systems. The demand is motivated 
by the emphasis that Directive 2019/633 puts on reporting the effectiveness of the regulation. 
In fact, the policy debate not only identifies a clear and present need for effective protection of 
farmers and small-and-medium size enterprises (SMEs) from UTPs but also expresses concern 
about the possible unintended consequences of regulation (including reduction in supply chain 
efficiency, overregulation, and detriment of consumer welfare). As a consequence, our research 
focuses on two main issues: how to measure the effectiveness of protection and how to identify 
possible unintended consequences of regulation. 
The JRC invitation required an empirical application of the monitoring system. The trial 
implementation aims to prove the practical feasibility of the proposal. The report illustrates the 
results of the empirical analysis and the contribution the monitoring system can make to the 
debate about the implementation of Directive 2019/633 by Member States. 
 
1.2   Two approaches for monitoring UTPs 
 
In order to achieve the research objective, we developed two alternative approaches to the 
investigation of UTPs: an in-depth analysis (IDEA) and a broad-scope survey (B-SEA). The two 
approaches serve different purposes. 
B-SEA is designed as an ex post evaluation of existing policies. The main focus is on the 
assessment of the effectiveness of protection with respect to a given set of UTPs. In practice, it 
tests occurrence, impact and pass-through (OIP) of a predetermined list of UTPs (for example, 
the 16 practices in Directive 2019/633).  
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IDEA is a tool for supporting policy design. It measures the general effectiveness of promoting 
fairness in supply chains and assesses the possible unintended consequences. It identifies 
existing UTPs regardless whether they are considered by existing regulation. The approach uses 
economic modelling to explain the role of UTPs in supply chains, identifying the possible 
unintended consequences of a ban. IDEA has more ambitious objectives than B-SEA. In chapter 
16 we conclude that such ambitious objectives are achieved at the cost of more complexity in 
the organization of the investigation and less general results. 
 
1.2.1  A trial application of the two approaches 
 
In order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches, we provide applications 
to the European fruit sector. IDEA is applied to the German apple and Italian kiwi industries. B-
SEA is applied to the Slovak fruit sector.  
 
Figure 1-1: The UTP monitoring system 
 
Figure 1-1 illustrates the structure of the monitoring system. The investigation strategy follows 
a typical process-tracing approach. This technique is particularly useful to investigate the process 
of causal diffusion of a phenomenon along a complex system. In our case, the phenomenon is 
the UTP, the system is the agri-food netchain, and the process is the pass-through effect. 
Background information is used to create a consistent framework for the interpretation of the 
process and consequent design of the empirical investigation. A key difference between B-SEA 
and IDEA is the amount of required background information. The former uses a minimum amount 
of specific background information, while the latter heavily relies on expert panels, interviews 
and other specific sources of information to design the analysis. As a consequence, B-SEA 
provides general results, while IDEA provides a detailed analysis of specific cases. 
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The collection of empirical evidence is used for describing the phenomenon at various stages 
(descriptive inference). B-SEA uses questionnaire surveys for this purpose. IDEA is based on a 
mix of surveys and semi-structured interviews, addressing the organization of the supply chain 
and OIP of UTPs. Unlike B-SEA, IDEA is designed to investigate specific transactions in order to 
study UTPs in context. 
The data collected in the descriptive inference step are examined jointly in order to identify the 
causal effect (causal inference). In B-SEA, this result is obtained with a simple comparison of 
the survey outcomes at different segments of the supply chain. In IDEA, we use economic 
modelling and analysis of individual transactions to understand the OIP of UTPs. 
The results of causal inference are discussed in the evaluation phase. Our contribution pertains 
to four key areas: i) advancements in the understanding of UTP economics, ii) analysis of the 
EU fresh fruit supply chain, iii) implementation of a UTP monitoring system and iv) implications 
for the implementation of Directive 2019/633 by Member States. 
 
1.3  Organization of the report 
 
The report has five parts. In Part I we summarise background information regarding UTPs. We 
provide a review of the existing literature and a survey of existing data sources that can be used 
for UTP analysis. The objective of Part I is a consistent presentation of existing knowledge about 
UTPs. 
Part II illustrates the design of the two monitoring approaches. We propose a review of existing 
empirical investigations of UTPs in chapter 4. Then, we illustrate the organization of IDEA and 
B-SEA in detail.  
Parts III and IV report the results of the trial implementation of B-SEA and IDEA, respectively. 
In these parts, we discuss issues with the actual application of the monitoring strategies, 
including measurement problems, generality of results and information bias. The illustration of 
results provides insights into the organization of the fresh fruit industry. 
We summarise our conclusions and the main findings of our research in Part V, which is 
composed of two chapters. In chapter 16 we provide a comparative assessment of IDEA and B-
SEA, assessing the strengths and weakness of each one. In chapter 17 we describe the 
implications of our findings for the future implementation of a UTP monitoring system and the 
adoption of Directive 2019/633 by Member States. 
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2 Unfair Trading Practices: A Review of the History and 
Literature 
 
Senne Vandevelde1, Hyejin Lee, Jo Swinnen  
(CEPS Centre for European Policy Studies &  
LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven) 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
Unfair trading practices (UTPs) in the agricultural sector have come to the forefront of European 
policymaking in recent years, culminating in the approval of a European UTP Directive in March 
2019. UTPs are defined as practices that “grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, are 
contrary to good faith and fair dealing and are unilaterally imposed by one trading partner on 
another” (European Commission 2013). They apply to business dealings between suppliers in 
the agri-food sector and their buyers. The practices included under the banner of UTPs vary 
considerably depending on the source, but the most prominent examples are late payments, 
unilateral changes to contracts, inclusion of ambiguous or incomplete contract terms, unfair 
termination or disruption of contracts and improper use of confidential information.  
There are a wide variety of issues that policymakers, researchers, stakeholders and the general 
public perceive as “UTPs” when confronted with the concept. Literature making explicit mention 
of UTPs is, however, limited. This is a consequence of the relatively recent use of the concept of 
“unfair trading practices”. That said, the issues underlying the concept of UTPs are the subject 
of a vast amount of literature going back many decades and covering fields including contract 
theory, industrial organization, supply chain governance, etc.    
We begin in section 2.2 with an overview of the history of the UTP concept and related initiatives 
in EU policymaking, starting from the initial discussions in 2009 until the introduction of EU-wide 
regulation in 2019. We discuss the studies, publications and analyses specifically associated with 
UTPs.   
In section 2.3, we discuss the concept of “(un)fairness”, since this is a crucial element for the 
discussions and analyses, as well as the rest of this review and report. In spite of its central 
position within discussions on UTPs, a generally agreed upon definition for conceptual and 
empirical purposes has, so far, been absent. 
We focus in section 2.4 on another concept central in the discussion and analysis of UTPs and in 
every study related to the occurrence, impact and pass-through of UTPs: (differences in) 
bargaining power. There is a vast literature about bargaining power, and we review the key 
insights instrumental for discussions about UTPs. 
                                         
1 This report is based on research conducted before Senne Vandevelde joined the European Commission. Any opinions expressed 
in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective institutions. 
 
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
 15 
In section 2.5, we review useful insights from the literature regarding specific “business 
practices” that are often mentioned as UTPs. Specifically, we focus on four broad categories of 
UTPs: (i) unfair use of contract terms, (ii) excessive transfers of costs and risks, (iii) misuse of 
confidential information and (iv) unfair termination or disruption of contracts. We identify strands 
of literature in (business) economics that pertain to each of these and assess them based on 
their relevance for theory, empirical analysis and pass-through analysis, respectively.  
Finally, in section 2.6, we outline some key implications and lessons for the remainder of the 
project and, more broadly, future analysis of UTPs. 
 
2.2  History of UTPs 
 
2.2.1  Structural changes and the emergence of the UTP discussion 
 
The history of UTPs is related to several structural changes in the policies and market conditions 
facing EU farms and agri-food chains more generally. 
First, past reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—especially the 1993 and 2003 
reforms—have secured farm income support for European farmers, but they have also increased 
farmers’ sensitivity to market fluctuations. By replacing instruments such as price supports and 
import tariffs with direct income support, global price fluctuations now have a larger impact on 
the prices received by EU farmers.   
Second, changes to CAP have coincided with major volatility in global agricultural and food 
markets after 2006—specifically, the so-called food price crises of 2007 and 2008 with large 
price spikes, followed by strong declines in 2009 and resurging prices in 2010 and 2011. These 
price fluctuations were felt strongly at the farm level in particular, much more than in the 
processing and retail sectors (Swinnen, Knops and Van Herck 2014). Farmers complained about 
asymmetric price transmission, arguing that downward shifts in consumer prices were passed 
on to them in full while upward consumer price movements resulted only in marginal farmgate 
price increases—although the empirical evidence for this is mixed (see McCorriston 2015 for a 
review).  
Third, concentration in downstream sectors of the EU agri-food chain has increased significantly 
in recent decades. While concentration up until the 1980s was mostly in the processing sector, 
technological innovations and major megers and acquisitions (M&As) led to strong concentration 
in the retail sector, which is still the case today (Swinnen and Vandeplas 2010). At the time of 
the price fluctuations, market shares of the top three retailers in several EU countries were 
already higher than 50 percent (FoodDrinkEurope 2011).   
The combination of these factors triggered proposals for regulations to protect farmers in the 
food chains. For example, Copa-Cogeca, the primary EU farm organization, tabled an action plan 
aimed at rebalancing power in the food chain in 2007 (Copa-Cogeca 2007). 
At that time, the main EU regulation that farms and other companies could refer to was the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD, 2005/29/EC). While this directive regulated only 
interactions between businesses and their consumers and did not relate to dealings between 
businesses, it did introduce the notion of “fairness” in commercial relationships. As a result, 
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actors who were feeling unfairly treated by their business partners saw the UCPD as a potential 
avenue for having their grievances addressed. 
 
2.2.2  EU and Member State initiatives 
 
The European Commission—in particular, the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW)—started in 2009 to discuss UTPs as a potential problem 
in the food supply chain. DG GROW took two initiatives: It published a communication titled “A 
better functioning of the food supply chain in Europe” (COM(2009)591) and established a High 
Level Forum on the topic.  
The debate was fuelled by an initial and important survey, commissioned by the European Brands 
Association (AIM) and conducted by Dedicated Research (2011), which showed (based on a 
sample size of 686) that 96.4 percent of respondents across the food and non-food retail supply 
chains had experienced UTPs. This number has since been cited often in communications 
concerning UTPs. The study further developed the legal basis for EU-wide UTP legislation by 
exploring existing legislation in the different Member States and examining linkages between 
possible UTP legislation and other areas of competition and consumer law. 
Member States did not wait for EU-level regulation and began to introduce their own legislation 
or launch voluntary initiatives. For example:  
• Countries like France and the UK had already introduced, or were in the process of 
introducing, specific legislation. In France, the most important piece of legislation 
regarding UTPs is the “Droit des pratiques restrictives” which is a part of the commercial 
code (Renda et al. 2014). It is specifically aimed at dealing with unfair practices in vertical 
relations.  
• Other Member States did not resort to new legislation, preferring to stretch their existing 
competition laws to apply to vertical business-to-business (B2B) relations. For instance, 
the German authorities expanded existing legislation to address UTPs: The Act Against 
Unfair Competition, which at first was only applicable to relations between companies and 
end consumers, was extended to include relationships between companies and their 
suppliers.  
• Some Member States opted to tackle UTPs with voluntary initiatives. In Belgium, a 
scheme was established in the context of the so-called Agro Food Chain Consultation, 
which brings together representatives of all the different stages in the agricultural value 
chain, from farmers and input suppliers to processors to retailers. The Agro Food Chain 
Consultation started its operation in 2009, and the Code of Conduct for fair relationships 
between suppliers and purchasers was signed in the subsequent year (Agro Food Chain 
Consultation 2010).  
• Other Member States, such as Denmark, did not take any specific measures.  
The result was a large heterogeneity of UTP regulations and voluntary initiatives at the Member 
State level. 
In the meantime, EU-level discussions and analyses continued. In 2013, DG GROW (2013) 
published the Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and 
Non-Food Supply Chain in Europe (COM (2013) 37). This document included the first official 
definition of UTPs. UTPs are defined as “practices that grossly deviate from good commercial 
conduct, are contrary to good faith and fair dealing and are typically imposed in a situation of 
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
 17 
imbalance by a stronger party on a weaker one and can exist from any side of the B2B 
relationship and at any stage in the supply chain” (European Commission 2013, page 3). The 
publication opened the debate to the wider public. Providing a series of 25 questions, the Green 
Paper would serve as the basis for a public consultation, which would increasingly crystallize 
different parties’ positions. Importantly, the Green Paper concluded that the best way forward 
was to combine existing national legislation with voluntary initiatives at the EU level.  
This conclusion was consistent with the findings of the High-Level Forum, which continued its 
operation from 2012 until 2014. Its final outcomes (European Commission 2014b) included a 
set of measures and insights that would ultimately serve further discussions and research into 
the topic. Among other things, the Supply Chain Initiative (SCI) was established, a voluntary 
code of conduct based on a range of principles of good practice aimed at bringing actors across 
the food supply chain together to address UTPs. Companies were free to register with the SCI, 
after which they had to follow a set of steps before their registration became official. Dispute 
resolution mechanisms were also provided: Both bilateral and aggregated disputes could be 
handled. Additionally, the report gave rise to new avenues for deeper research into the issue of 
UTPs.  
In that context, several reports on the issue of UTPs were commissioned (by a variety of actors) 
and published, some of which are mentioned here. Two influential studies were conducted by 
Renda et al. (2014) and Gentile et al. (2016), both of which were prepared for DG GROW.  
Renda et al. (2014) were mainly concerned with providing an overview of the possible legal 
treatments of the UTP issue. They analysed in great detail the different legal treatments existing 
at the Member State level, with the help of a survey sent to relevant authorities across the EU. 
They concluded by offering policymakers several recommendations, mostly to take into 
consideration the considerable fragmentation of rules that exists across Member States. 
Gentile et al. (2016), on the other hand, took a more empirical approach to assess the 
implementation of the different initiatives to tackle UTPs at both the Member State level and 
European level (most notably, the Supply Chain Initiative). They found, among other things, 
that UTPs occur across all Member States and at all stages of the food value chain, yet there is 
still a degree of vagueness surrounding the issue.  
They also argued that a majority of participants in the Supply Chain Initiative are satisfied, but 
at the same time a clear preference for more far-reaching legislation at the European level is 
present among the different stakeholders (especially among primary food producers).  
Another study, published during the same time period by the Bureau for Appraisal of Social 
Impact for Citizen Information (BASIC 2015), links the increasing market power of retailers to 
the existence of UTPs in the banana value chain. It is one of the first studies to explicitly 
demonstrate how UTPs not only impact suppliers within Europe but also in third countries (most 
notably, developing countries). 
One of the most relevant studies on UTPs, also published around the same time period, is by 
Maglaras, Bourlakis and Fotopoulos (2015), who explored the drivers of retailers’ commercial 
practices in the Greek food chain. The identified practices nearly match with the UTPs that were 
under discussion at the EU level at that time. They surveyed items for “upfront payments”, as 
well as “unanticipated changes in agreements”, but only looked at the drivers for a composite 
indicator which encompassed those practices. There are two important limitations to this study: 
namely, it looked at practices from the perspective of power imbalance, and the survey only 
included suppliers of branded, packaged food products, thus excluding primary producers. 
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2.2.3  The 2019 EU Regulation 
 
Over the course 2015, the UTP debate took on a greater urgency, partly as a result of falling 
prices for certain agricultural commodities and the Russian import ban on agricultural products 
(European Commission 2016). Combined with a general oversupply on world markets, these 
factors increased the attention on farmers. The result was mounting pressure to further deal 
with UTPs from farmers and different actors across the political spectrum, and this pressure 
eventually created an unstoppable impetus towards EU legislation.  
A first push in this direction came in May 2015 from agriculture ministers of seven Eastern 
European Member States (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). In a joint statement, they asked the European Commission to continue its work on 
UTPs and move decidedly in the direction of EU-wide legislation. The Commission, taking this 
advice to heart, published a new report on UTPs in January 2016 (following the one from 2014). 
The report (European Commission 2016) focused especially on the diverse UTP regulatory 
landscape in the EU and included a preliminary evaluation of the SCI and other voluntary 
initiatives in the Member States. Overall, compared to the Commission’s previous report 
(2014a), this report took a more open stance towards the need for EU legislation, thus effectively 
paving the way for further steps in that direction. 
Around that same time, the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG 
AGRI), which increasingly took over the UTP file from DG GROW, created an Agricultural Markets 
Task Force (AMTF), a group of 12 experts tasked with finding ways to enhance the position of 
farmers in the food supply chain. The AMTF finished its proceedings towards the end of 2016, 
and the final report (AMTF 2016) concluded that voluntary initiatives (the SCI in particular) had 
insufficiently addressed the fear factor. It called for the introduction of “framework legislation at 
the EU level”, going considerably beyond any other official EU communication published up until 
that point. The proposed EU framework would need to cover a baseline of certain UTPs and make 
sure that enforcement was conducted more effectively in the Member States. Another nudge 
came from the European Parliament, which in June 2016 voted with an overwhelming majority 
(600 to 48) in favour of a resolution urging the Commission to put forward EU-wide legislation. 
Finally, in December 2016 the Agriculture and Fisheries Council, taking note of the vote in the 
Parliament, called on the Commission to undertake an official impact assessment with regards 
to the issue of UTPs (Council of the European Union 2016). 
With the ball now firmly back in the court of the Commission, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
together with DG AGRI organized an academic workshop to further develop the evidence base 
on UTPs, both from an economic and legal point of view (Fałkowski et al. 2017). Several experts 
argued that the evidence base on UTPs, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view, is 
rather limited and that further research is instrumental. At the same time, they examined the 
regulatory landscape at the EU and Member State levels and detailed how UTP legislation could 
be implemented in terms of types, enforcement and monitoring. In addition, DG AGRI started 
an Inception Impact Assessment (IIA), accompanied by a public consultation, to ascertain the 
levels of support and resistance to EU-wide legislation. 
By the beginning of 2018, the push towards EU legislation had become unstoppable. A first 
official milestone at the European legislative level came when DG AGRI proposed a Directive on 
UTPs in April 2018. The proposal (European Commission 2018) aimed at introducing a common 
standard of protection across the EU. This included the prohibition of four UTPs: (i) late 
payments, (ii) short notice order cancellations for perishable food products, (iii) unilateral or 
retroactive changes to contracts and (iv) the forcing of suppliers to pay for wasted products. 
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Other UTPs would only be prohibited if they were not stipulated in the contract. Crucially, the 
proposal was only meant to apply to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to protect 
them from their (usually bigger in size) buyers. As such, it would not apply to larger food 
processing companies subjected to UTPs by, for example, retail chains. According to the 
proposal, national authorities would become responsible for enforcement and the administration 
of sanctions. It also provided for a confidential complaint procedure.   
The proposal passed, following the rules of the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure, to the 
European Parliament where it would be handled by COMAGRI and its rapporteur on the file, Paolo 
De Castro. Over the summer of 2018, considerable amendments were made to the proposal by 
Parliament. The most crucial amendments related to the expansion of the scope of the proposal. 
First, the legislation would not only apply to food products but to the agri-food sector as a whole. 
Second, UTPs would be prohibited at every step of the supply chain regardless of the size of the 
firms, not only between SMEs and their immediate buyers. Finally, the Development Committee 
of the European Parliament urged the extension of the scope of the proposal to include third-
country suppliers. The parliamentary negotiating position was adopted in October 2018 and 
confirmed by an overwhelming majority in a plenary vote on October 25th (European Parliament 
2018). That same month, the Council adopted its negotiation stance, now broadly in favour of 
maintaining the scope laid out by the Commission Directive Proposal (apart from the expansion 
towards products other than just food).2 With both negotiation positions in place, the so-called 
trilogue meetings between the Commission, Parliament and Council were ready to start, with 
the scope of the legislation becoming the biggest point of contention. 
Eventually, after a series of deliberations between the Commission, Parliament and Council, an 
agreement was reached in December 2018, and the Directive (European Parliament 2019) was 
accepted in a plenary vote on March 12th, 2019, bringing a decade of EU policymaking to a close. 
The Directive was accepted with considerable amendments compared to the Commission 
proposal, significantly enlarging the scope of the legislation. The final text details a list of 16 
UTPs to be outlawed (compared to the original four in the proposal), and the law applies to all 
agri-food companies (including farmers, processors, retailers, input providers, etc.) with a 
turnover of less than €350 million (as opposed to only SMEs). The legislation takes the form of 
a minimum harmonization Directive, which means that every Member State must, at the very 
least, incorporate and implement the stipulations of the EU Directive (within a period of two 
years), but is free to go above and beyond those rules should it wish to do so.  
The UTP Directive outlaws a list of 16 individual UTPs: ten so-called “black” practices (which are 
prohibited regardless of the circumstances) and six “grey” practices (which are only allowed if 
buyer and supplier agree on them in a clear and unambiguous manner). The black practices 
revolve around prohibiting late payments, unduly transfers of costs and risks from buyer to 
supplier and unilateral changes to (or even the absence of) written contracts. The grey practices 
aim at ensuring that payments for marketing, promotion or advertising by the supplier are 
stipulated clearly in the contract. A full list of the outlawed UTPs can be found in Appendix I. 
 
                                         
2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/10/01/better-protection-for-farmers 
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Table 2-1: Thresholds of protection from UTPs based on annual turnover of buyers and suppliers 
Suppliers of … Protected against buyers of … 
< € 2 million  > € 2 million 
> € 2 million & < € 10 million > € 10 million 
> € 10 million & < € 50 million > € 50 million 
> € 50 million & < € 150 million > € 150 million 
> € 150 million & < € 350 million > € 350 million 
 
As mentioned, another striking feature of the new EU UTP Directive is its scope. While the original 
European Commission proposal was primarily aimed at protecting SME suppliers from bigger 
buyers, this was considerably expanded in the final Directive. The principle (namely, protecting 
smaller suppliers from bigger buyers) has remained intact but now applies to all stages of the 
supply chain, not just SMEs. The criterion for who is protected from whom is based on a “step 
approach” using annual turnover and can be summarized using Table 2-1. 
In terms of enforcement, the Directive ensures that every country will have a dedicated national 
enforcement authority to handle complaints and, if needed, impose penalties. Every enforcement 
authority should be able to receive confidential complaints and launch its own (so-called ex 
officio) investigations. In an attempt to diminish the “fear factor”3, suppliers who lodge a 
complaint are given the possibility of doing so anonymously. They may also choose the 
enforcement authority (either where the supplier is located or the buyer is located). Finally, the 
Directive provides a cooperation regime, under supervision of the European Commission, 
between the different national enforcement authorities to ensure continuous exchange of 
information and best practices. 
In the background of the recent legislative push, more research is being done to better 
understand the conceptual workings behind the UTP issue and empirically assess its breadth. Di 
Marcantonio, Ciaian and Falkowski (2018), for instance, examine the drivers of UTPs in the dairy 
supply chain in different EU Member States. They find that UTPs are especially prevalent among 
medium-sized farms and that farms connected to cooperatives, as well as those with more access 
to information, have a lower risk of becoming a victim of UTPs.  
 
2.3  What is “unfair” about UTPs? 
 
A crucial challenge for the ensuing review and analysis will be to address the notion of fairness. 
The existing literature offers clear examples of the difficulties in evaluating the fairness of a 
trading practice. Consider a slotting allowance (see later in section 2.5.2 ) charged for the 
introduction of a new product. The practice is unfair if the amount exceeds the value of the 
service (providing shelf access). Yet, at the same time, the fees transfer the risk of innovation 
to the supplier, who is the agent with more information about the likelihood of the innovation’s 
                                         
3 A particular feature of UTPs and a big argument in favour of specific rules on the issue is the so-called 
‘fear factor’, which prevents victims of UTPs from acting out of fear of losing their business altogether. One 
can imagine that this factor is even more acute in situations of extreme imbalance in market power between 
buyers and suppliers, as is often the case in the food supply chain. 
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success (Sullivan 1997). The example illustrates a crucial point regarding UTPs: A practice can, 
at the same time, be unfair under a given perspective (in this example, cost transferring) and 
fair under a different one (risk allocation). The conceptual (and empirical) model must consider 
this problem explicitly. 
In general, in this report we use Bowie’s (1988) definition of unfairness. According to the author, 
two necessary conditions for fairness are equality of bargaining and non-coerciveness (p. 96). 
In this regard, firm A “intentionally coerces B into doing X, only to the extent that: 
(1) B is strongly inclined not to do X, 
(2) A wants B to do X, even though A knows it is contrary to B's prior 
interests, and 
(3) A intentionally puts B in the position of having no acceptable alternative 
to doing X” (Bowie 1988, p. 96). 
Finally, B has no acceptable alternative to doing X if and only if:  
“(a) all of B's known alternatives to doing X are worse in B's judgment than 
doing X, and 
(b) each alternative involves a significant net hardship either for B, someone 
B cares about, or someone whose interest B has an obligation to protect.” 
(ibidem) 
Although Bowie’s definition is not unanimously accepted in the literature, we found it extremely 
practical and useful for our analysis of UTPs. The definition is a key tool for identifying UTPs in 
the IDEA investigation in Part IV of this report. In that setting, we consider a practice to be unfair 
if all five of Bowie’s conditions are met, regardless of whether it is included in the Directive 
2019/633 list. 
Unfairness is broadly defined in the current UTP regulatory framework. Mainly, it refers to 
overarching criteria such as proportionality, rights to confidentiality or predictability. The 
concrete application of these principles requires a careful case-by-case evaluation, because the 
boundaries between a fair and unfair practice may not be clear. The EU UTP Directive (European 
Union 2019, p. 13) states explicitly:  
“When deciding whether a particular trading practice is considered unfair, it is important to 
reduce the risk of limiting the use of fair and efficiency-creating agreements agreed between 
parties.” 
While some practices (such as excessive payment delays or unilateral retroactive changes) “are 
considered as unfair by their very nature and should not be subject to the parties’ contractual 
freedom” (ibid.), other practices are unfair only if certain conditions apply. A considerable effort 
is made to achieve a workable legal definition that can be used for regulatory purposes. Yet, 
from an empirical and statistical perspective, the definitions are still ambiguous, and clear 
identification is difficult.  
For example, a contract renegotiation may be fair or unfair, depending on whether it was agreed 
upon or unilateral. The mere detection of a change in the contract (objective circumstance) is 
not sufficient. It is necessary to investigate whether it was unilateral, freely negotiated or 
negotiated under a bargaining disadvantage (for example, threat of future trade disruption). 
This challenge suggests that direct surveys aiming at collecting data about the context of the 
practices may be necessary (more on that in the next section). It also limits the usefulness of 
econometric models based on standard secondary data only. Fairness is not only case-specific 
but can be perceived differently by each actor within the food system. Hellberg-Bahr and Spiller 
(2012) empirically show that farmers have different perceptions about the notion of fairness. 
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Recognizing this, Hendrickson et al. (2018) develop a framework for assessing fairness in 
agricultural markets using three conditions: deviations from the expectations of structural 
equivalence, time consistency and basic freedom.  
Another issue is the actual definition of fairness. While it is an inherently subjective concept and 
should probably be addressed as such in an empirical analysis, its conceptual boundaries should 
be made clear beforehand. After all, fairness could be considered in narrow economic terms (cost 
versus benefit, recovering certain investments, etc.) or interpreted in a much broader way (e.g., 
as a sociological construct).  
One way to consider fairness in a broader way is to use prominent general theories of justice. 
These include the principles: i) “according to which resources should be allocated in proportion 
to some pre-existing claims, or rights to the resources that each player has” (Aristotle’s equity 
principle); ii) “to give priority to the players that are the least well off” (Rawlsian justice); or 
simply iii) if both parties are better off engaging in the contract regardless of the distribution of 
surplus (Bertsimas, Farias and Trichakis 2011). The notion of fairness further depends on the 
specific moment or transaction under consideration. For example, fairness can be defined i) in 
the process of determining how resources are allocated (procedural justice); ii) in the distribution 
of resources (distributional justice); iii) in the assignment of punishment for wrongs and 
compensation for injury (restorative justice); iv) in the relative distribution of power within 
network structures of two or more parties (structural justice) (Hendrickson and James Jr 2016). 
A general consensus on the different elements of the notion of fairness would facilitate the 
empirical analyses of UTPs. 
 
2.4  Bargaining power and UTPs 
 
In this section, and before delving into the specifics of the different practices, we explore a 
concept that has been central to the discussion on UTPs in the agri-food value chain: bargaining 
power.  
2.4.1  From market power to bargaining power 
 
Bonanno, Russo and Menapace (2018) review market power and bargaining in the agri-food 
sector. The literature has evolved from focusing on market power to using the broader concept 
of bargaining power. This evolution is central to UTPs. 
Traditionally, the literature on market power concerned itself mainly with investigating the extent 
and effects of consolidation in certain markets (Mason 1939; Bain 1951, 1954). Empirically, the 
focus was on calculating market power through a series of indices (such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)) and regressing a series of outcomes on those indices (Bonanno, Russo 
and Menapace 2018). In the 1980s, this literature developed further with the formalization of 
micro-economic frameworks that allowed the study of market power (Bresnahan 1982; Lau 
1982). It came to be known as the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) and was widely 
applied in agricultural policy analysis (McCorriston 2002; Russo, Goodhue and Sexton 2011). 
Another development was the attempt to create empirically tractable dynamic models of non-
competitive behaviour, which was applied in the agri-food context by Karp and Perloff (1989, 
1993a, 1993b). 
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As a consequence of changing circumstances in agricultural markets, such as the rise in 
importance of quality (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996) and credence attributes (Darby and Karni 
1973), the traditional tools to assess the competitive environment were not sufficient anymore 
(Bonanno, Russo and Menapace 2018). As such, agricultural economists started thinking about 
new ways to model market power taking into account these new evolutions. A first step in that 
direction were demand models allowing researchers to better address the competitive 
implications of increased product differentiation using more game theoretical strategic 
considerations (traceable to Schmalensee 1982). For example, discrete choice demand models—
whereby consumers obtain utility from product attributes rather than the monolithic product 
itself—soon found their way into the analysis of price and promotion competition (Richards 
2007), profit margins and product entry (Di Giacomo 2007) and the welfare appraisal of new 
regulations (Bonanno, Huang and Liu 2015). Refinements of these demand models have also 
been introduced in agricultural economics, such as the Distance Metric (DM) method (Pinkse, 
Slade and Brett 2002) and the nested multivariate logit model, which can take into account 
complementarities between the products of a single retailer (Kwak, Duvvuri and Russell 2015). 
Likewise, collective reputation mechanisms—another dimension of quality that has a clear impact 
on the competitiveness of markets—have been addressed through the introduction of 
institutional concerns into theory (Moschini, Menapace and Pick 2008). 
All aforementioned theories and methods have relied and focused on a traditional definition of 
market power, in the sense of being able to put and maintain prices (or quantities) above the 
expected levels under perfect competition. When considering the context of UTPs, however, such 
a narrow understanding of power in agricultural value chains does not suffice to adequately 
analyse the issue. Likewise, especially in the context of high levels of concentration and 
increasingly coordinated forms of vertical relationships in the food value chain (McCorriston 
2002; Saitone and Sexton 2017; Sexton 2000, 2013; Sexton and Lavoie 2001; Sexton and 
Zhang 2001), traditional tools and definitions to assess market power fall short, in spite of the 
many innovations. Indeed, Bonanno et al. (2018) argue that one has to move beyond these 
definitions and turn to the broader concept of bargaining power (which can be traced to Nash 
1950, 1953). Bargaining power is defined by Kirkwood (2005, p.33) as “the power to obtain a 
concession from another party by threatening to impose a cost, or withdraw a benefit, if the 
party does not grant the concession.”  
Bargaining power manifests itself in many different forms, mostly based on who in the value 
chain exerts power over whom. Buyer power denotes (according to the definition used in 
Bonanno et al. (2018)) the power held by downstream buyers over upstream suppliers, while 
seller power refers to the reverse. Countervailing power is power exerted by a firm with the aim 
to counter another firm’s power (Bonanno, Russo and Menapace 2018), usually referring to a 
weak firm’s power to go up against the stronger party. This last concept is particularly useful in 
the discussion on UTPs, as any type of legislation to protect firms in the agri-food value chains 
could be categorized under this heading. 
The switch from the traditional understanding of market power to bargaining power and its 
related concepts has considerably altered the way in which agricultural markets are analysed. It 
has allowed researchers to disentangle oligopoly and oligopsony situations and assess the 
specific impact of each type of market power. It has also allowed for better analysis of contracts 
in agriculture, which can be considered the most basic form of vertical coordination between 
buyers and sellers. Consider, for example, the so-called hold-up problem, which refers to a 
situation where one party in the contract can exploit the other as a consequence of the latter’s 
contract-specific sunk costs and investments (Swinnen et al. 2015). Bargaining power in this 
framework is approximated by a so-called sharing rule (how surplus is divided in the 
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relationship). Swinnen et al. (2015) make a distinction between ex ante and ex post sharing 
rules, whereby the former characterises the situation under perfect enforcement of contracts 
and the latter denotes what happens when there is a possibility of hold-up. In other words, hold-
up allows the party with the stronger bargaining position to accrue a larger share of the surplus 
in the relationship. Using these and other related concepts, Mérel and Sexton (2017) go on to 
show that—in contrast to what the traditional market power framework suggests—the hold-up 
problem is actually less important in more concentrated industries. The reason is that higher 
concentration allows for easier coordination and in turn a higher internalization of benefits at 
other stages of the value chain. Hence, in this new framework, different forms of power can be 
a force for good and do not necessarily have to be welfare-reducing (Inderst and Valletti 2011; 
Inderst and Wey 2007). 
A final (nascent) strand of literature that attempts to analyse power in agricultural markets is 
the so-called governance framework (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). Instead of immediately 
focusing on certain metrics (as in the traditional framework) or dyadic bargaining between 
different actors (as in the bargaining framework), the governance framework first considers the 
institutional factors of the agri-food value chain. In particular, it assesses which actors, so-called 
leading firms, have the power to set the conditions and create the rules under which bargaining 
in the entire value chain will take place (Ménard 2018). In doing so, it tries to address the 
growing complexity of arrangements and coordination in agri-food value chains. Empirically, this 
new framework manifests itself as a qualitative analysis to inform where, how and, ultimately, 
which variables should be collected.  
Still, the debate about the issue of power in the agri-food sector is far from over (as illustrated, 
among other things, by the debate on UTPs) and is increasingly focused on retailer power. In 
these discussions, retailers are alleged to be misusing their strong position in the market to 
engage in practices that are detrimental to their upstream suppliers. A detailed analysis of these 
different practices (which are, in effect, considered UTPs) will be left for the sections following. 
 
2.4.2  Bargaining power and the UTP discussion 
 
Bargaining power is a central concept in the debate about UTPs. This is not only true in the sense 
that bargaining power is often quoted as the main driver of the occurrence of UTPs, but also 
because it interacts with other factors that play an important role. These include: switching 
costs, information asymmetries, product perishability and contract enforcement  
Switching costs can be defined as the costs of switching from one buyer/supplier to another. 
They are a possible driver of UTPs as they have the potential to create lock-in in any dyadic 
buyer-supplier relationship from which exit is (too) costly. Switching costs often come in the 
form of the loss of a contract-specific investment that cannot be recuperated outside of the 
negotiated agreement. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of hold-up, whereby the stronger 
party in the agreement can demand concessions from the weaker one (Cungu et al. 2008; 
Swinnen et al. 2015). Those concessions can often be earmarked as UTPs. Of course, we should 
also be mindful of the fact that switching costs themselves can be considered a materialization 
of differences in bargaining (or market) power between buyer and supplier. Indeed, as we have 
demonstrated in the previous section, a hold-up situation is more likely to occur when one party 
in a relationship can force the other party to make certain relationship-specific investments. As 
such, switching costs should be considered both a consequence and means of increasing 
differences in bargaining power.  
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Asymmetries in information also affect bargaining power. If one party in the agreement has 
more information about market conditions, final consumers, product attributes (chief among 
which is quality in agricultural markets) or technologies, that party can shift costs and risks to 
the weaker party (Di Marcantonio, Ciaian and Falkowski 2018). 
A good’s degree of perishability influences the likelihood of UTPs. In the terms of Rubinstein's 
(1982) theory, high perishability means high interest rates and therefore low bargaining power, 
a situation that could lead to UTPs. Perishability limits the outside options of actors in the agri-
food chain wanting to sell their produce.  
Contract enforcement institutions and access to dispute resolution mechanisms matter, 
obviously. Contract dispute resolution can be organized in a myriad of ways: through voluntary 
mechanisms (like the Supply Chain Initiative), through the courts or through governmental 
institutions (like the competition authorities). Especially when disputes have to be resolved 
through the courts, there is a possibility of huge discrepancies in the quality of legal services 
that different parties in the agreement can or want to afford. After all, most small farms do not 
have the financial resources to pay the legal fees required to prevail against their (often 
considerably larger) buyers. Related to this is the so-called “fear factor”, which refers to a 
contractual party’s fear of losing business should they complain to third parties about their 
relationship with the other contractual party (Fałkowski et al. 2017; Renda et al. 2014). 
 
2.5  UTP categories 
 
The literature explicitly mentioning UTPs is sparse. However, the literature on different business 
practices, which may or may not constitute UTPs, is large. In this section, we discuss different 
contributions from the literature, organized into four widely recognized categories of UTPs: (i) 
the retroactive misuse of unspecified, ambiguous or incomplete contract terms; (ii) the excessive 
and unpredictable transfer of costs or risks of one trading partner to its counterparty; (iii) the 
misuse of confidential information; and (iv) the unfair termination or disruption of a commercial 
relationship. Within these four broad categories, we attempt to match the different practices and 
findings in the literature to their corresponding UTP categories in the EU UTP Directive, which 
are also listed in Annex I (European Union 2019). 
Per category, we map the state of the art along three dimensions: theory, empirics and pass-
through (if present). The literature included in our review should not be considered exhaustive, 
including all contributions on UTPs. Rather, it constitutes a selection aimed at offering the best 
possible background for the purpose of this project—namely, to develop a conceptual and 
empirical model for measuring the occurrence, impact and pass-through of UTPs in the food 
supply chain. Priority is given to economic contributions using quantitative approaches. Where 
appropriate, several descriptive or exploratory studies are also taken into account. Along the 
way, the most important takeaways for either the conceptual or empirical model in this project 
are highlighted. 
All contributions discussed are summarized in Table 2-2. Here are listed the different categories 
and associated individual UTPS, along with the studies that can be classified within each. The 
type of analysis used in each study is also listed. In particular, it shows whether a particular 
study includes an analysis on occurrence, impact and/or pass-through; whether the study in 
question is directly related to the food value chain; and whether (un)fairness is explicitly included 
in the analysis. 
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Table 2-2: UTP categories and contributions 
O: Occurrence, I: Impact, P: Pass-Through, F: Focus on (un)fairness, VC: Food vale chain 
Type of UTPs Literatures O  I  P  F VC 
(i)   
Retroactive misuse 
of unspecified, 
ambiguous or 
incomplete contract 
terms 
Unilateral 
contract changes 
Bolton (1990)  x    
Bartling and Schmidt (2015) x     
Hart and Tirole (1988)  x     
Herweg et al. (2018)  x     
Kunte et al. (2017) x    x 
Maglaras et al. (2015) x    x 
Morgan et al. (2007) x x x  x 
Provan and Skinner (1989) x    x 
Rokkan et al. (2003) x     
Salas (2016)     x x 
Trada and Goyal (2017)  x     
Wang et al. (2017) x     
Wu and Roe (2007)  x  x x 
Refusal of 
written 
confirmation 
Goodhue et al. (2002)  x    x 
Huo et al. (2016) x     
Roxenhall and Ghauri (2004) x     
 
 
 
(ii) Excessive and 
unpredictable 
transfer of costs or 
risks of a trading 
party to its 
counterparty 
(continues)  
Risk of loss and 
deterioration 
transferred to 
the supplier* 
Ebers and Semrau (2015) x     
Hammoudi et al. (2009)  x   x 
Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006)  x   x 
Wagner and Bode (2014)  x    
Delayed 
payment 
Cungu et al. (2008)  x   x 
Dries and Swinnen (2004) x    x 
Dries et al. (2009) x    x 
Gow et al. (1998)  x   x 
Gow et al. (2000)   x   x 
Return of unsold 
products 
Arya and Mittendor (2004)  x    
Hahn et al. (2004)   x   x 
Padmanabhan and Png (1997)  x    
Pasternack (1985)  x   x 
Shen et al. (2015)  x    
Payment by 
supplier for 
stocking, display 
and listing 
(continues) 
Baake and von schlippenbach (2014)  x    
Bloom et al. (2000) x     
Chambolle and Christin (2017) x x  x  
Foros et al. (2009)  x     
Hamilton (2003)  x x  x 
Hamilton and Innes (2017)   x    
Innes and Hamilton (2006)  x   x 
Klein and Wright (2007)  x     
Maglaras et al. (2015) x    x 
(Continues) 
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Table 2-2 (continued): UTP categories and contributions 
O: Occurrence, I: Impact, P: Pass-Through, F: Focus on (un)fairness, VC: Food vale chain 
Type of UTPs Literatures O I P F VC 
(ii cont.ed) Excessive 
and unpredictable 
transfer of costs or 
risks of a trading 
party to its 
counterparty  
 
(cont.ed) 
Payment by 
supplier for 
stocking, display 
and listing  
Marasteanu et al. (2011) x    x 
Marx and Shaffer (2007)   x    
Miklós-Thal et al. (2011) x     
Piccolo and Miklós-Thal (2012)   x    
Patterson and Richards (2000)  x    
Shaffer (1991)  x     
Sexton et al. (2002) x    x 
Sudhir and Rao (2004)  x     
Sullivan (1997) x x   x 
Wright (2007)  x    
Wang et al. (2012)  x    
Off-invoice 
payment** 
Dimitri et al. (2003) x    x 
Patterson and Richards (2000)  x    
USDA (2001)  x    x 
(iii) Misuse of 
confidential 
information 
Misuse of trade 
secrets by 
buyers 
Bechtold and Hoffler (2011)  x    
Budden et al. (1996) x     
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)   x    
Tan et al. (2016) x     
(iv) Unfair 
termination or 
disruption of a 
commercial 
relationship 
Commerical 
retaliation 
Ganglmair (2009) x x    
Larsen and Lyngsie (2017) x     
Lee et al. (2008)  x  x x 
Lewin-solomons (2000)  x   x 
Wu (2010)  x  x x 
Others 
Cost Pass-
through 
Bonnet et al. (2013)   x   
Kim and Cotterill (2008)   x  x 
Loy et al. (2015)   x  x 
* Studies are concentrated on transaction-specific investment.     
**     Off-invoice payment includes payment by the supplier for the promotion, marketing, advertisement, or staffing of the 
buyer fitting out premises. 
 
2.5.1  Retroactive misuse of unspecified, ambiguous or incomplete contract terms 
 
The first category of UTPs envelops two important “black” practices from the EU UTP Directive, 
namely, unilateral contract changes and refusal to provide written confirmation. The existence 
of these types of UTPs are, in part, a consequence of the high degree of uncertainty inherent in 
agricultural production. Dependence on natural conditions creates unforeseeable contingencies 
in the agricultural contract, and some dimensions of performance are often necessarily omitted 
in the contract because specifying all possible contingencies is costly to design (Salas 2016).  
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Theory 
Theoretically, this category of UTP can best be addressed using background provided by the 
extensive literature on contract renegotiation (Huberman and Kahn 1988; Hart and Tirole 
1988). Renegotiation is defined as a change in a contract after it was signed. Typically, there is 
an incentive to renegotiate an incomplete (or costly-to-enforce) contract if: i) new information 
is discovered or ii) at least one of the parties takes an irreversible decision at some point 
(Dewatripont and Maskin 1990). For example, a contract regulating the transaction between a 
buyer and seller might be renegotiated after consumer willingness to pay is revealed (new 
information) or when the seller invests in highly specific assets such as private standards or 
listing fees (irreversible decision). 
For our purposes, we should be mindful that not every renegotiation is necessarily inefficient. 
For that reason, a distinction between pareto-optimal renegotiation and unilateral renegotiation 
is of paramount importance. Renegotiation can be a useful institution to improve the efficiency 
of transactions under uncertainty. Non-renegotiable contracts (perfect commitment) may lead 
to underinvestment and inefficient allocations under specific circumstances (e.g., Edin and 
Hermalin 2000). A pareto-efficient renegotiation allows the parties business flexibility in an 
uncertain and evolving market. For this reason, banning renegotiation can be a sub-optimal 
policy. An example of pareto-optimal renegotiation is a change in production standards once 
consumer preferences for a new product are revealed (assuming all parties benefit from the 
change). 
Unilateral renegotiation, on the other hand, happens when new information or irreversible 
investments alter the bargaining power of the parties. For example, over time a buyer might 
discover the exact cost structure of a supplier and use this information to renegotiate a price 
reduction (as in Hart and Tirole 1988, p. 3). Once the supplier invests a sizable amount of money 
in building the production capacity required by the buyer, he/she depends on future orders to 
recover the cost of the specific asset and cannot refuse new contract terms (the hold-up problem 
in Williamson 1985; Schmitz 2001). In such an instance, the buyer can decide to behave 
“opportunistically”, defined as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson 1985). Unlike 
pareto-optimal renegotiations, in this case the emphasis of the analysis is on the redistribution 
of the benefits from trade. Unilateral renegotiation is not necessarily efficient and, if allowed, 
can lead to underinvestment and inefficient allocation because the weak party can refuse to 
trade in fear of future unfavourable developments (e.g., Bolton 1990). To arrive at meaningful 
policy implications, the difference between pareto-optimal and unilateral 
renegotiations should be made clear, both conceptually and empirically. Yet, in 
practice, distinguishing between the two might not be simple. 
One attempt to model the distinction between pareto-optimal renegotiation and unilateral 
renegotiation is using non-cooperative trade game approaches. Based on the assumption that a 
buyer is risk (or loss)-averse, Wang, Guo and Wang (2017) propose a coordinating contract 
mechanism for  parties trading bilaterally to reveal their true private information, which 
maximizes profit in the supply chain. Maintaining similar assumptions, Herweg, Karle and Müller 
(2018) expand this analysis to the renegotiation stage and assumesthat the incomplete contract 
at the initial stage shapes a reference point for renegotiation, similar to Bartling and Schmidt 
(2015). Salas (2016) presents an analytical framework featuring aspects of agricultural 
contracting. The model identifies policy effects by demonstrating how the producer’s bargaining 
power affects surplus distribution. It suggests that other factors, such as informal institutions or 
implicit contracts, be considered in policies attempting to balance bargaining power. 
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For this particular category of UTP, it is often emphasised in the conceptual literature 
that regulations, with respect to contract specifications, are as important as (if not 
more important than) soft measures, i.e., informal mechanisms aimed at building trust 
between the different parties. In times of conflict, trading parties can rely on the informal 
procedure instead of solving the problem through contracts (Roxenhall and Ghauri 2004). 
Informal mechanisms may be also useful when the usage of contracts is considered a mere 
formality. The role of informal mechanisms in governing UTPs is also emphasised by other 
authors (Gorton, Lemke and Alfarsi 2017; Fałkowski 2017; Sexton 2017). In particular, Sexton 
(2017) focuses on the difficulty distinguishing UTPs from normal competitive behaviours and the 
risk of rigid enforcement of overregulation. In that context, he mentions informal institutions as 
a potential solution to UTPs. Therefore, how farmers use contracts and the potential 
downsides of regulation may leave room for the involvement of informal institutions. 
In this context, attention should also be paid to auctions, one of the most commonly used 
agricultural market mechanisms. Auctions may stifle communication between buyers and sellers 
(Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2009), hindering the establishment of informal institutions. 
Furthermore, using auction settings in experiments, Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2015) find that, 
under incomplete contracts, buyer opportunistic behaviour on the part of the buyer can occur. 
Such behaviour may trigger strong, negative responses from suppliers, and reaching a resolution 
may be costly. From a slightly different angle, it is claimed that auctions connect small farms 
and consumers directly and therefore may serve as an alternative beneficial marketplace for 
small farmers (Tourte and Gaskell n.d.; Tubene and Hanson 2002). It would be interesting 
to understand the interplay between different market mechanisms and UTPs. 
Empirics 
Empirically, researchers have started conducting surveys based on the definition of opportunism, 
using perceptual scales for measurements. The questionnaire items on the opportunism scale 
differ with each study, but here, we limit ourselves to those scales most closely related to the 
context of UTPs. Provan and Skinner (1989), who have been cited in numerous studies for the 
scale they developed, examine the drivers of opportunistic behaviour between farmers and 
power equipment dealers in the upstream sector of the food supply chain. Interestingly, while 
acknowledging that opportunistic behaviour can arise from either party regardless of the 
strength of its position, the authors assume that the weaker bargaining party (i.e., dealers) 
exhibits opportunistic behaviour as a last resort. This assumption is also found in Rokkan, Heide 
and Wathne (2003), in which the empirical context is the relationship between manufacturers of 
building materials and their distributors. Yet, empirically, it is useful to also examine 
whether the weaker party might engage in opportunistic behaviour as well.  
Two additional relevant studies in this literature are Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003) and Trada 
and Goyal (2017). Although the topics lie outside the agricultural context, the two studies are 
notable as they touch upon the issue of interdependence and multiple dimensions of UTPs. In 
both studies, transaction-specific investments are considered one of the drivers for opportunism, 
showing the interdependence of UTPs. Further, Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003) deal with the 
multiple dimensions of UTPs by testing whether this UTP has an expropriation or bonding effect.  
Liu et al. (2017) also discuss multiple dimensions of UTPs, yet from a slightly different angle. 
They utilize the concept of boundary-spanning interfaces and acknowledge that parties can 
coexisting goals of maximizing their private benefits and mutual collective gains. This is in line 
with the argument of Crespi, Saitone and Sexton (2012) and Fałkowski et al. (2017), who 
question the economic reasoning behind UTPs, examining why buyers whose profits depend on 
relationships with suppliers, would engage in UTPs. However, Liu et al. (2017) do not reveal the 
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patterns of the coexisting goals or explore the mechanisms, but merely show the salience of the 
coexistence. As such, conceptually and empirically, it is important to note that UTPs 
should always be considered in context. A given UTP might in some contexts be seen 
as detrimental to business, but in other contexts be a necessary and even desirable 
price to pay for maximizing the total value in a relationship.  
Many contributions coming from the marketing literature use survey data obtained both from 
buyers and suppliers, taking into account their dyadic relationships in order to assess the 
contracts between them (Trada and Goyal 2017; Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 2003; 
Bhattacharya, Singh and Nand 2015; Liu et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2018; Liu, Luo and Liu 2009). 
This type of data collection requires additional measures to increase the response rate due to 
the limited samples, but the dyadic data—because it obtains information from both suppliers and 
buyers—can provide greater credibility by giving a neutral perspective through parallel analyses 
(Bhattacharya, Singh and Nand 2015). This is particularly important when the survey 
questions involve sensitive issues like UTPs to account for possible response biases.  
Laboratory experiments (in combination with regression analysis) have also been used to assess 
contracts in agriculture (Kunte, Wollni and Keser 2017; Wu and Roe 2007). Kunte, Wollni and 
Keser (2017) examine the role of informal mechanisms of contract enforcement, while Wu and 
Roe (2007) focus on government enforcement. In particular, the latter does not consider the 
unilateral adjustment of contracts as unfair, but rather as an informal contract-enforcing 
mechanism.  
With regards to the refusal of a written confirmation of a supply agreement, the empirical 
literature is scarce. The relevant contributions mostly focus on which contract terms are included 
in written form and which are not. Goodhue et al. (2002) examine the determinants of contract 
terms in relation to the specific production requirements and price provision for wine production 
in California. For instance, the longer the trade history with buyers and the longer the experience 
of the business, the higher the likelihood of the inclusion of specific production terms in a 
contract. Huo et al. (2016) provide support for outlawing this particular UTP by statistically 
showing that a detailed contract can mitigate the occurrence of opportunism.  
Pass-through 
The economic literature has devoted little attention to the pass-through effects of renegotiation 
and the lack of written contracts. However, theory suggests that a renegotiation at any stage of 
the value chain can trigger an adjustment at other stages. The magnitude of the pass-through 
depends on the market characteristics and the ability of the firms to impose contractual changes 
on counterparties. 
One of the few studies on pass-through (or spill-over) in the empirical literature is Morgan, 
Kaleka and Gooner (2007). It contributes to the study of UTPs by attempting to look at the spill-
over (i.e., horizontal) effect of a focal suppliers’ opportunistic behaviour to non-focal suppliers. 
The assumption is that it is the focal supplier, not the retailer (i.e., buyer), who exhibits 
opportunistic behaviours. In a similar vein, Towill (2005) focuses on “category captains”, defined 
as major suppliers who manage their category in partnership with the supermarket, also noted 
in supply chains in the UK. As such, the “focal supplier” approach seems a legitimate way to 
investigate contracts and their design and the pass-through of certain practices (both vertically 
and horizontally) in the food value chain. This implies and confirms again that the pass-
through of UTPs is inextricably linked with the organizational structure of the value 
chain. 
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2.5.2  Excessive and unpredictable transfer of costs or risks from one trading party to 
its counterparty 
 
The second, and by far most encompassing, category of UTPs is the excessive and 
unpredictable transfer of costs and risks. This category contains many different individual 
UTPs, such as the transfer of specific investments, delayed payments, reverse margin practices 
(RMP)4, short-notice cancellations of perishable agri-food products and payments not related to 
a specific transaction. Because of the heterogeneity of these practices, a wide variety of 
approaches, both conceptually and empirically, has developed over the years. 
Theory 
Conceptually, the different practices have been addressed using different models and 
approaches, although not to the same extent. For example, there is a sizable literature and 
debate on service fees (or reverse margin practices), but a lack of contributions on delayed 
payments. Nevertheless, each of these will be discussed here in turn. 
The literature on service fees developed after the emergence of practices such as slotting 
allowances or listing fees (e.g., Shaffer 1991; Klein and Wright 2007). The main focus of the 
debate was the possible anti-competitive nature of the practice, with arguments being made for 
both sides (Bloom et al. 2000). Slotting fees have largely been modelled using insights from 
game theory (Chambolle and Christin 2017; Innes and Hamilton 2006; Hamilton and Innes 
2017; Hamilton 2003; Wright 2007; Baake and von Schlippenbach 2014; Foros, Kind and Sand 
2009; Miklós-Thal, Rey and Vergé 2011; Wang, Lau and Wang 2012; Bloom, Gundlach, and 
Cannon 2000; Sullivan 1997; Patterson and Richards 2000; Sexton, Richards and Patterson 
2002). They have especially been applied in fixed settings, such as vertical food value chains, 
dealing with homogeneous farm products and/or competitive retail sectors. This conceptual 
literature further developed by slightly altering these assumptions and the general context. For 
example, Hamilton (2003) models the effect of slotting allowances on welfare when the 
allowances are initiated by food processors in a competitive retail sector for duopsonistic food 
manufacturers, while Innes and Hamilton (2006) consider what happens when the fee is paid at 
the initiative of retailers under imperfect competition in both the manufacturing and retailing 
sectors for multiple products. Slotting fees seem to have different impacts depending on who 
pays. Sexton, Richards and Patterson (2002) conclude that the fee demanded by retailers is 
beneficial only for those retailers (even though this type of fee may be efficient), and the fee 
voluntarily paid by suppliers to monopolize their distribution channel has an anti-competitive 
effect.  
The conceptual literature on this topic illustrates the typical issues in UTP studies. Usually, the 
service fee is modelled as an upfront payment in a non-linear pricing scheme (Marx and Shaffer 
2007; Bonnet, Dubois and Simioni 2006). Almost all contributions investigate the practice 
(service fees) regardless of its (un)fairness (i.e., whether it is disproportionate). The typical 
study compares the outcome from a profit-maximizing fee with the outcome in the absence of 
any fee. To the best of our knowledge, no contribution uses a “fair fee” as a benchmark. As a 
consequence, although the impact of generic service fees on the agri-food system has been 
thoroughly studied, there is little knowledge about the effects of unfair fees as opposed to fair 
                                         
4 Reverse margin practice refers to “the purchase of goods by buyers with some additional services which 
buyers offer to suppliers for a charge” (Fałkowski et al. 2017). Those include listing fees, slotting 
allowances, negotiation fees, participation to quality programmes, and new store opening etc. However, 
there is only a wealth of contributions on slotting allowances. 
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ones. The study by Chambolle and Christin (2017) is the only one to address the potential 
unfairness of slotting fees in the sense that it acknowledges the fact that retailers can be the 
sole beneficiaries of such practices without paying any of the costs. The lack of consideration 
for (un)fairness in the literature again emphasizes the groundwork that still needs to 
be done to arrive at an operational definition and empirical consideration for the 
concept of fairness in the analysis phase of this project. This is especially important for 
this specific practice, given that slotting fees in the EU UTP Directive are labelled as a “grey 
practice”, meaning they are only deemed illegal when not specified in a contract. As a result, it 
is not the existence per se, but the perceived fairness (however measured or assessed) of 
slotting fees that eventually determines the legality of the practice. 
The vast literature about the strategic use of Private Food Safety Standards (PFSS) provides a 
solid background for the analysis of the transfer of specific investments (Swinnen et al. 
2015; Fulponi 2006). A relevant strand of literature argues that PFSS can improve coordination 
along food supply chains (Hammoudi, Hoffmann and Surry 2009). By transferring specific 
investments, a firm saves costs and at the same time can enforce an implicit threat mechanism 
to compel suppliers to follow directions. Other contributions consider disproportionate, 
transaction-specific investments as a given. This is because of assumptions from transaction 
theory, where the focus is on the governance structure used to deal with the dependency and 
potential hazard created by asymmetric specific investments. In contrast, Ebers and Semrau 
(2015) apply resource dependency theory and identify the drivers of the disproportional 
allocation of the specific investment for the case of the construction industry.  
The role of risk transferring in the vertical organization of agri-food systems has been explored 
by extensive literature (e.g., Boehlje, Hofing and Schroeder 1999; Wever, Wognum, Trienekens 
and Omta 2012). The contractual approach to the problem is particularly promising given the 
research objectives (Allen and Lueck 2002). The vast majority of these contributions concern 
efficient contract design, that is, the design of contracts such that the risk is borne by the least 
risk-averse agent (Stiglitz 1974; Grossman and Hart 1983). Once again, also for this practice, 
further research is needed to qualify the unfairness criterion (Sexton 2017). 
The literature on delayed payments mostly originated in the context of the transition period in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Cungu et al. 2008; Gow, Streeter and Swinnen 2000; Gow et al. 
1998; Dries, Germenji and Noev 2009; Dries and Swinnen 2004). Since the occurrence of 
delayed payments is largely attributed to this economic transition, many of the contributions 
look at their impact. However, often the focus of the studies is not the delayed payments 
themselves: some put potential solutions for delayed payments in the centre (Gow, Streeter and 
Swinnen 2000; Gow et al. 1998), while others are built around the restructuring of the 
agricultural sector during the transition (Dries and Swinnen 2004; Dries, Germenji and Noev 
2009). The former suggests that delayed payments, causing declines in investment, can be 
solved by private contract enforcement and foreign direct investment. The latter mainly concerns 
the emergence of vertical coordination and its impact on farms, and briefly mentions that delayed 
payments are less likely to occur as a result of these restructurings.  
Studies on the practice of the return of unsold products are mostly accumulated in theoretical 
works on the impact of return policies. Padmanabhan and Png (1997) study the effect of return 
policies on retail competition and their effect on the profit of a manufacturer. Under the condition 
of uncertainty in demand, the implication for manufacturer profits depends on the number of 
retailers in the market. When there is a single retailer, a return policy decreases manufacturer 
profits. The change in results by the number of retailers is also found in Pasternack (1985), who 
looks at the optimality of return policies for perishable products.  
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Although it is often the case that suppliers bear at least part of the costs (Shen et al. 2015) or 
have their profits decreased (Padmanabhan and Png 1997) from the return of unsold products, 
some studies take a more positive view of return policies. It is shown using a theoretical model 
that when the retailer holds advance knowledge about the market conditions in highly uncertain 
environments, a manufacturer may be willing to offer a return policy as an efficient means of 
eliciting the retailer’s private information (Arya and Mittendor 2004). The benefits of a new return 
policy are quantified in Hahn, Hwang and Shinn (2004), in which all involved parties are likely 
to see additional benefits from the policy. A new return policy gives suppliers some discount on 
the wholesale price in return for accepting the unsold perishable product.  
Empirics 
Theoretically, the literature on slotting fees is quite dense. Empirical studies on the occurrence 
of slotting fees seem to be equivocal. Sullivan (1997) presents evidence that slotting fees could 
have been caused by an increase in the supply of products rather than retail concentration, 
whereas Bloom, Gundlach and Cannon (2000) provide retailer survey results showing that the 
occurrence of slotting fees has increased as a result of greater retail influence on transactions.  
The empirical analyses of slotting fees are limited to the category of processed food. Marasteanu, 
Jaenicke and Dimitri (2011) and Sudhir and Rao (2004) both manage to conduct surveys and 
regression analyses, in spite of the proprietary nature of the data. Marasteanu, Jaenicke and 
Dimitri (2011) identify the factors that influence the relative size of slotting fees in organic 
packaged and prepared products relative to their non-organic counterparts, without taking 
fairness into account. However, by asking about the magnitude relative to non-organic 
counterparts, it was possible to avoid revealing private information. Opting for binary response 
also allows Sudhir and Rao (2004) to bypass the fear factor. There are two other important key 
takeaways in Sudhir and Rao (2004). First, we should take into consideration the size of 
manufacturers in our analysis, as the role of slotting allowances is different for large 
and small manufacturers. Second, the importance of dyadic data is emphasized as 
“each data point may be a consequence of a particular level of information asymmetry 
that are specific to that transaction” (Sudhir and Rao 2004, p.3).  
The more general literature about off-invoice fees, i.e., payments for promotion, 
marketing or advertising, often discusses the different types of fees, with an emphasis on 
slotting fees. The USDA (2001) relies on interviews and publicly available data to find the 
prevalence of the trade practices, of which promotional fees are the second most frequently 
requested fee.5 Likewise, Patterson and Richards (2000) assess promotional allowances in 
addition to slotting fees with an anti- or pro-competitive viewpoint and suggest further studies 
on the welfare implication. Aside from the off-invoice fees, Dimitri, Tegene and Kaufman (2003) 
identify the occurrence of marketing services requested by retailers by conducting interviews. 
Among the services identified,6 private-label produce items, category management and 
electronic data interchange are found to be the most common practices. The authors do not 
study the drivers of the services; instead, they express the need to determine whether these 
practices are the result of retailer market power. Overall, the research methodology of this type 
of UTP literature is restricted to interviews, owing to difficulty in accessing the data.  
For the impact of transaction-specific investments, Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006) 
empirically show that a higher level of asset specificity leads to the under-investment of growers 
in the broiler industry, where the number of integrators offering contracts is small. There is also 
                                         
5 The most commonly provided type of fee is ‘Volume incentives/discount’ (USDA 2001).  
6 Other services include: ‘Third-party food certification’, ‘Returnable containers/pallets’, and ‘Automatic 
inventory replenishment’.  
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evidence from Wagner and Bode (2014), who study the impact of specific investments on 
product and process innovation in the automotive industry.  
The empirical analysis of the phenomenon of delayed payments relies mostly on descriptive 
analyses and case studies, with one exception: Cungu et al. (2008) conduct a representative 
country-wide survey investigating the impact of delayed payments on capital investment in 
farming enterprises in Hungary. When it comes to dealing with the fear factor, Cungu et al. 
(2008) paraphrase the survey question about the incidence of delayed payments as a perceptual 
question. In order to account for the reluctance in giving responses, respondents are asked 
whether the delayed payment could be an important issue for their business activities, instead 
of being asked directly whether they have been victims of delayed payments. So, as 
emphasized before, the transition period context once again confirms that the 
emergence and occurrence of UTPs cannot be separated from their context, which can 
be temporary or exceptional. 
Finally, regarding the return of unsold products, Ghosh and Eriksson (2019) document the 
occurrence of the practice using evidence from the Swedish bread industry. Their descriptive 
analysis is especially meaningful, as their case study is based on a unique dataset obtained from 
medium-sized bread suppliers. These bread suppliers actually experienced the large costs of the 
returns of unsold bread and eventually had exit the market due to high revenue losses. The 
authors give a warning about increasing concentration in the bread supply chain, where only 
larger players can survive because of their greater negotiating power.    
Pass-through 
As with the previous type of UTPs, there is a lack of conceptual and empirical literature on the 
pass-through of excessive risk and cost transfers in the supply chain. As with the general 
literature on this type of UTP, the most developed insights come from the realm of slotting fees.  
The theoretical framework in Hamilton (2003) covers the pass-through of slotting fees by 
applying three-stage bargaining games. The model shows that the slotting fee paid by food 
processors raises farm and retailer profits as well as consumer welfare. Other authors conclude 
that slotting fees can favour collusion (Piccolo and Miklós-Thal 2012) or exclude smaller suppliers 
(Marx and Shaffer 2007), reducing supply. In general, the outcome depends on the model 
assumptions regarding competition and market parameters (Fałkowski 2017). 
 
2.5.3  Misuse of confidential information 
 
In contrast with the other types of UTPs in this overview, the misuse of confidential 
information category comprises just one UTP outlined in the EU UTP Directive, namely, the 
misuse of trade secrets by buyers. Given the proprietary nature of the information needed to 
conduct analyses on this type of business practice, the existing literature (and the empirical 
literature especially) is limited. 
Theory 
The conceptual economic literature largely debates the protection of confidential information 
with respect to innovation and protection of intellectual property rights (Grunert and Traill 2012). 
The theory can be applied to study the dissemination of a trading partner’s trade secrets 
regarding production technology. However, this approach does not encompass the entire scope 
to which this UTP category applies. The category of confidential information is broader than just 
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technology alone and includes other elements such as trading terms, future strategies, and 
market access. In a trade relationship, a firm may reveal confidential information explicitly (at 
the partner’s request) or implicitly (through business behaviour). This information can be 
exploited by the trading partner to his/her own advantage.  
The literature about the economics of insider trading (i.e., the use of non-public information for 
security trading) is extensive (Ausubel 1990; Macey 1991) but only partially applicable to the 
case of UTPs because of the focus on the effects on stock markets and investors. Instead, the 
UTPs concern trading relationships. The breach of confidentiality in trading relationships is an 
issue explored mainly by legal scholars (e.g., Lederman 1989). Yet, the inherent case-by-case 
approach of legal studies is of limited use for the purpose of this project.  
A promising approach is the application of the vast literature about bargaining with incomplete 
information (Fudenberg and Tirole 1983; Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere 2002). By using 
confidential information, a firm can bargain more effectively with a trading partner and improve 
its bargaining position in other trades. Noticeably, the firm does not need to reveal the 
confidential information to reap benefits. Just using the knowledge in bargaining with a third 
party provides a possibly unfair benefit.7 This literature illustrates a critical issue for the analysis 
of UTPs: UTPs can involve transactions with third parties. Therefore, focusing on the 
analysis of an individual transaction might underestimate the extent of UTPs.   
Empirics 
Concerning empirical analysis of the misuse of trade secrets by buyers, a study by Bechtold 
and Hoffler (2011) seems to be the most relevant. The authors conduct an economic analysis of 
trade-secret protection and show that fines for information leaks increase welfare. Even though 
the optimal size of the fine is less clear in their analysis, it is shown that trade-secret protection 
is desirable when the informed party can undertake relation-specific investments to increase 
their gains from trade. Using case studies, Tan, Wong and Chung (2016) identify two factors 
(natural and human) causing information and knowledge leakage. They find that proprietary 
information and explicit knowledge leakages have significant adverse effects on firms’ 
performances. Finally, Budden, Jones and Budden (1996) provide managerial solutions for 
reducing the risks of information misappropriation.  
Pass-through 
Given the general lack of evidence on this type of UTP, it should come as no surprise that the 
literature on the pass-through of this practice is virtually non-existent. The few contributions 
that do deal with trade secrets in relationships between buyers and suppliers do not go beyond 
looking at the relationship in isolation. Clearly, the absence of any evidence in this field 
(and on the pass-through of business practices more generally) represents a crucial 
challenge for the analysis in this project. 
 
                                         
7 Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) found that, given two parties with independent private valuations, ex 
post efficiency is attainable if and only if it is common knowledge that gains from trade exist. Assume that 
a buyer is negotiating with a supplier A whose cost structure is private information. The information 
asymmetry allows the supplier an information rent. In a bargaining setting, supplier A can claim high 
production costs in order to negotiate a higher price. Confidential information from a competing trading 
partner B can help a firm obtain a more precise estimate of A’s cost structure, reducing the information 
rent. Noticeably, if A is a possible replacement for B, the latter has a disadvantage from the use of 
confidential information, because now A offer goods for a lower price.    
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2.5.4  Unfair termination or disruption of a commercial relationship 
 
The final category of unfair business practice discussed in this literature review is the unfair 
termination or disruption of a commercial relationship. Even though this was always  
treated as an important UTP in the decade leading up to the EU UTP Directive (see, among 
others,  European Commission 2014a), it has not been included explicitly as a UTP in the final 
legislation. The UTP that could most closely be placed in this category is commercial retaliation 
by the buyer. After all, such retaliation would be impossible without some form of disruption (or 
even termination) of the commercial relationship. So, while this category will be treated in a 
general sense, commercial retaliation should be kept in mind as the legislative translation of the 
discussion presented here.  
Theory 
Termination or disruption of commercial relationships is a key threat in agri-food value chains. 
Agri-food value chains, which typically require multiple suppliers to satisfy orders and are thus 
confronted with supplier selection problems (Scott et al. 2015), are more susceptible to this type 
of UTP. Further, agri-food firms with high asset specificity (such as farmers) are particularly 
vulnerable. In a bargaining power framework (see section 2.4), the ability to terminate the trade 
relationship is a key bargaining advantage. A party able to credibly threaten termination can 
obtain sizable concessions, especially if the counterparty is locked into the transaction. 
For this business practice, a key source of models for analysis is a piece of US legislation aimed 
at protecting producers from practices similar to those in the EU UTP Directive. Called the 
Producer Protection Act, it provides a list of regulations designed to protect growers and provide 
them with some bargaining power in the event they are involved in contract disputes with large 
food processors. Unlike the EU UTP regulation, though, the act does not prevent certain practices 
from occurring; rather, it is an aid for farmers when they want to recover damages in court. 
Most contributions dealing with this legislation (and with the unfair termination of commercial 
relationships) are based on game theoretical models (Lee, Wu and Fan 2008; Wu 2010).  
Lee, Wu and Fan (2008) examine the effect of contract termination damages on efficiency and 
redistribution using a principal-agent game. Based on their results, we can expect that UTP 
regulations in the form of awarding damages would result in no efficiency loss, given that 
incomplete contracts are predominant in agriculture and rent will be redistributed from 
processors to growers. The contract-specific investment paid by growers is taken into account 
in their model, but similar to other studies, (un)fairness is of no concern. Wu (2010) develops 
this context further such that i) it is also possible to recover damages for growers in the existing 
contract law but with enforcement errors; ii) the act reduces the enforcement errors; and iii) the 
level of relationship-specific investments is considered both exogenously and endogenously. The 
main conclusion is that new legislation can either protect growers at the expense of decreases 
in efficiency or decrease growers’ welfare with an increase in efficiency, depending on whether 
growers find it difficult to collect damages under the existing law.  
Lewin-Solomons (2000) finds different results, namely that the restriction is generally 
distortionary and could cause harm to growers. Although Wu (2010) extends his model to 
assume the level of relationship-specific investments as endogenously determined and adds 
details to better reflect reality, Lewin-Solomons (2000) studies the impact of direct restriction 
on contract termination (in contrast to the termination damages studied by Wu (2010)). In line 
with this, Ganglmair (2009) shows theoretically that allowing buyer’s an early-termination option 
can be a solution to induce efficiency. It is suggested that the positive effect of early termination 
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on the buyer’s returns on investment could be one economic rationale behind this behaviour. 
This finding shows the risk in regulating efficiency-enhancing practices. Farmers (or 
other actors in the food chain) are not necessarily better off when unfair contract termination is 
deemed illegal. A more efficient solution, one currently not included as an option in the EU UTP 
Directive, could be to allow for damages to be paid in the event of such a termination. 
Empirics 
Empirically, Larsen and Lyngsie (2017) study premature relationship termination in service-
provider industries using regression analysis. However, the authors attribute the premature 
termination of exchange relationships to the contractual parties’ non-conformity with the 
contract, and their survey question regarding the occurrence of termination is not necessarily 
associated with unfairness.   
The question of unfair termination of relationships crucially hinges on how the length of those 
relationships is perceived by the different parties in the relationship and the relevant authorities. 
Recent empirical studies point out that large buyers organize transactions as a sequence of 
short-term (one or two year) contracts, even if the trading relationship spans over a longer time 
period, sometimes decades (Italian Anti-Trust Authority 2013). At each expiration date, the 
parties are free to write a new agreement—if both find that profitable—or let the contract expire. 
Technically, this is not a termination because of the short-term nature of the contract. Yet, recent 
anti-trust decisions consider the refusal to renew such a contract to be an illegal disruption of a 
long-term implicit trading relationship (Italian Anti-Trust Authority 2015). This case suggests 
that a monitoring tool must evaluate the real economic nature of the trading 
relationship and that potential discrepancies in how the length of the trading 
relationship is perceived can lead to difficulties in the enforcement of the rules of the 
EU UTP Directive. 
Pass-through 
While the unfair termination or disruption of a given trading relationship in the supply chain quite 
clearly has an impact on other (mostly upstream) relationships within the chain, the pass-
through of this type of UTP has, to the best of our knowledge, not been addressed explicitly in 
the literature. This might be because of the difficulty in accessing or collecting the types of data 
needed for analysis of this issue, as well as the relative lack of conceptual understanding of the 
pass-through of such practices. Again, this represents a considerable challenge for the 
conceptual and empirical analysis in this project.  
 
2.6  Lessons and implications 
 
In this final section of the literature review, a summary of all takeaways and implications for the 
rest of the project is presented. First, findings relevant for the conceptual model are distilled, 
with a special consideration for the concept of fairness. Second, an overview of the different 
empirical methods identified throughout the literature review is presented, along with an 
assessment of their usefulness for the purposes of this project. Finally, the (limited) insights 
with respect to the analysis of pass-through are summarized and a possible way forward 
suggested. 
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2.6.1  Implications for the conceptual model 
 
The short historical and conceptual overview of bargaining power, outlined in section 2.4 , allows 
us to consider how bargaining power should be addressed when analysing UTPs. Given the 
importance accorded to it in this literature review, any conceptual framework on UTPs would be 
incomplete without the inclusion of bargaining power. Not only here, but also in almost all 
discussions that led to the EU UTP Directive, differences in bargaining power between 
downstream (most notably, retailers) and upstream actors in the agri-food value chain are seen 
as the driving force behind UTPs. Conceptually, this means that it should become clear how and 
through which pathways discrepancies in bargaining power lead to UTPs (establishing a clear-
cut theory of change). Related to this, a conceptual model should allow that causal relationships 
can be established between drivers of UTPs and the occurrence of UTPs themselves, as it has 
been demonstrated that the directionality of the two is not always clear. More specifically, it is 
possible to distil four key findings:  
• First, UTPs could be considered a reflection of the past and the ongoing changes to 
competitive behaviour in the agri-food sector and the analysis thereof. Since the rise of 
coordinated and concentrated value chains and the associated increase in concern for 
unfair practices, the traditional market power toolkit is no longer sufficient to address 
new phenomena, resulting in the rise to prominence of the bargaining power framework. 
As a result, it is inevitable that only techniques and frameworks which go 
beyond a simple analysis of price and quantity are innovative enough to properly 
analyse the bargaining power dimensions of UTPs.  
• Second, the historical overview has demonstrated that bargaining power should by no 
means be dismissed as a driver of UTPs in the agri-food sector. It has also shown, 
however, that it is not clear in which direction UTPs are influenced by this important 
driver. Indeed, as the analysis of Mérel and Sexton (2017) would suggest (even though 
they only focus on price and quantity and not on UTPs explicitly), there is no a priori 
reason to suggest that UTPs would occur more in more concentrated industries 
(even though concentration is consistently given as one of the main reasons for the need 
for UTP legislation).  
• Third, it is clear that, regardless of the size or direction of the impact of (market) power 
on UTP occurrence, impact and pass-through, there is a definite conceptual need for 
an actionable measure, or even a model, for bargaining power in dyadic 
relationships. Inspiration could be taken from Draganska, Klapper and Villas-Boas 
(2010), who define bargaining power as a function of exogenous retailer and 
manufacturer characteristics. Or one could look to Richards, Bonnet and Bouamra-
Mechemache (2018), who use a “shopping-basket” approach to assess retailers’ market 
power over manufacturers.  
• Finally, institutional arrangements matter. A thorough understanding of the 
governance of the value chain under scrutiny is indispensable to adequately assess who 
holds the power over entry, rules and the conditions under which bargaining takes place.  
Considering the role of bargaining power in the discussions on UTPs over the past decade (see 
section 2.4.2), there are three additional insights that need to be addressed in the conceptual 
analysis. First, it is clear that many different drivers of UTPs interact with, are caused 
by or, at the very least, have an impact on discrepancies in bargaining power. As a 
result, conceptually, it will be important how these different drivers interact to ultimately cause 
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the UTPs we are observing. Second, and related to this, there is a fine line between what 
should be considered a UTP and what should be seen as a driver. In terms of the 
conceptual and empirical framework, this means we need to be careful about the differences in 
the cause and effect of different factors and drivers of UTPs. While this is an artefact of the still 
rather vague definition of UTPs, it is crucial to make clear delineations before embarking on the 
empirical analysis to avoid circular argumentations. Finally, since the list of important factors 
should by no means be considered exhaustive, an open mind should be kept to other 
potential factors. This might not only further refine the conceptual model but could potentially 
also inform the empirical analysis. 
Second, if there is one takeaway that follows from the entire analysis in section 2.5 , it is that 
UTPs are highly context-specific. A practice that is patently unfair in one context might 
actually be considered by all parties to the arrangement as a normal way of doing business. This 
is particularly true in the case of UTPs, which have the potential of enlarging total value in the 
buyer-supplier agreement. For example, consider marketing contributions paid by the supplier 
to the buyer: it is not unthinkable that a supplier would be willing to pay such a fee, if the 
benefits attached to it outweighed the contribution itself and especially if the benefits are 
distributed in a fair way across business partners. Thus, for both the conceptual and empirical 
analysis, it is instrumental to always take into account both the costs and benefits attached to a 
given UTP. In particular, because contracts play such an important role in the presence of UTPs, 
it is crucial to identify those actors in the agri-food value chain with the power to determine what 
is included in the contracts. This is confirmed by the analysis in section 2.5 , where the notion 
of “category captains” and “focal suppliers” seems to point in that same direction. As such, an 
important element in determining the context of UTPs is to conceptually and empirically establish 
a clear picture of the value chain and subsequently, who wields power within it.  
Finally, as argued in section 2.5 , no known studies on business practices have put fairness at 
the centre of their analyses. The majority of contributions only look at the practice as given, 
without consideration for the notion of fairness.8 Maglaras, Bourlakis and Fotopoulos (2015), 
who conduct a survey for trade practices similar to the UTPs we are considering, make a clear 
distinction between unfair/fair issues, stating explicitly that it is beyond the purposes of their 
work. Further, it is hard to find any economic studies involving this notion in a straightforward 
way. In the broadest sense, Chambolle and Christin (2017) consider slotting fees unfair because 
retailers take benefits from the by-products of their activity without paying costs. A handful of 
studies find a trade-off between efficiency and distribution of profits for the involved parties. 
Given that UTPs are highly context-dependent, it seems obscure whether the equal distribution 
of profits could be deemed fair. Hence, it is important to define and carefully evaluate fairness 
in the empirical analyses.  
 
2.6.2  Implications for empirical analysis 
 
In this section, the different empirical approaches identified in the literature are listed and, based 
on a set of criteria, evaluated in terms of their applicability to the context of UTPs. In Table 2-3, 
we identify six different methodological approaches among the contributions of this literature 
                                         
8 Trada and Goyal (2017) consider the effect of perceived unfairness explicitly into their analysis. However, 
we consider it less relevant to our UTP literature, as the unfairness is not directly involved with a specific 
practice.   
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review: (i) exploratory descriptive statistics, (ii) surveys, (iii) case studies, (iv) large datasets, 
(v) economic theoretical models, and (vi) lab experiments.  
Among the studies investigated in this literature review, the most common empirical approach 
is surveys, and the survey has been applied to the widest range of UTPs. The second most widely 
used approach for investigating UTPs is not empirical in nature at all, namely the use of 
theoretical models to elucidate certain mechanisms behind the occurrence and impact of UTPs. 
Exploratory descriptive statistics are used in a number of cases, while the use of large datasets, 
lab experiments and case studies is limited overall. Of course, while the presence of certain 
empirical approaches in the setting of UTPs already provides an indication of which approach 
could be taken, it does not offer conclusive evidence on which approach is the most suitable.  
 
Table 2-3: Empirical approaches in the literature 
E: Exploratory descriptive statistics, S: Surveys, C: Case studies, LD: Large dataset, T: Economic 
theoretical models, LE: Lab experiments 
Type of UTPs Literature 
Empirical approach 
E S C LD T LE 
 Bolton (1990)     x  
(i)  Retroactive 
misuse of 
unspecified, 
ambiguous or 
incomplete 
contract terms 
Bartling and Schmidt (2015)      x 
Hart and Tirole (1988)     x  
Herweg et al. (2018)      x  
Kunte et al. (2017)      x 
Maglaras et al. (2015) x x     
Morgan et al. (2007)  x     
Provan and Skinner (1989)  x     
Rokkan et al. (2003)  x     
Salas (2016)      x  
Trada and Goyal (2017)   x     
Wang et al. (2017)     x  
Wu and Roe (2007)      x 
Goodhue et al. (2002)   x     
Huo et al. (2016)  x     
Roxenhall and Ghauri (2004) x      
Continues 
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Table 2-3 (continued): Empirical approaches in the literature 
E: Exploratory descriptive statistics, S: Surveys, C: Case studies, LD: Large dataset, T: Economic 
theoretical models, LE: Lab experiments 
Type of UTPs Literature 
Empirical approach 
E S C LD T LE 
(ii) Excessive 
and 
unpredictable 
transfer of 
costs or risks 
of a trading 
party to its 
counterparty  
Ebers and Semrau (2015)  x     
Hammoudi et al. (2009) x      
Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006)  x   x  
Wagner and Bode (2014)  x     
Cungu et al. (2008)  x     
Dries and Swinnen (2004) x      
Dries et al. (2009)  x     
Gow et al. (1998)   x    
Gow et al. (2000)    x    
Arya and Mittendor (2004)     x  
Hahn et al. (2004)      x  
Padmanabhan and Png (1997)     x  
Pasternack (1985)     x  
Shen et al. (2015)     x  
Baake and von Schlippenbach (2014)     x  
Bloom et al. (2000)  x     
Chambolle and Christin (2017)     x  
Foros et al. (2009)      x  
Hamilton (2003)     x  
Hamilton and Innes (2017)      x  
Innes and Hamilton (2006)     x  
Maglaras et al. (2015) x      
Marasteanu et al. (2011)  x     
Miklós-Thal et al. (2011)     x  
Patterson and Richards (2000)  x     
Piccolo and Miklós-Thal (2012)     x  
Shaffer (1991)      x  
Sexton et al. (2002) x      
Sudhir and Rao (2004)   x     
Sullivan (1997) x      
Wright (2007)    x   
Wang et al. (2012)     x  
Dimitri et al. (2003)  x     
Patterson and Richards (2000) x      
USDA (2001)  x      
 Continues 
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Table 2-3 (continued): Empirical approaches in the literature 
E: Exploratory descriptive statistics, S: Surveys, C: Case studies, LD: Large dataset, T: Economic 
theoretical models, LE: Lab experiments 
Type of UTPs Literature 
Empirical approach 
E S C LD T LE 
(iii) Misuse of 
confidential 
information 
Bechtold and Hoffler (2011)     x  
Budden et al. (1996) x      
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)      x  
Tan et al. (2016)   x    
(iv) Unfair 
termination or 
disruption of a 
commercial 
relationship 
Ganglmair (2009)     x  
Larsen and Lyngsie (2017)  x     
Lee et al. (2008)     x  
Lewin-Solomons (2000)     x  
Wu (2010)     x  
Others 
Bonnet et al. (2013)    x x  
Kim and Cotterill (2008)    x x  
Loy et al. (2015)    x x  
 
The assessment of advantages and disadvantages of methodologies for the empirical 
investigation of the existence, impact and pass-through of UTPs is important in providing 
direction for our own empirical analyses. Based on a mapping of the literature (section 2.5 ), a 
set of criteria is chosen for evaluation. Our preliminary analysis suggests the following five 
criteria: 
• Feasibility. An appropriate methodology must be feasible under a broad set of 
circumstances. In particular, the required information must be available or obtainable at 
a reasonable cost. The computational burden must not be excessive. Methodologies using 
publicly available data rank high in the feasibility criterion, while approaches relying on 
the use of private information rank lower. 
• Cost efficiency. A monitoring tool must be financially sustainable, meaning that the 
overall cost of the assessment is proportional to the benefit (i.e., the value of 
information). Highly cost-efficient approaches are required for regular, periodic 
investigation. Ad-hoc investigations may use more expensive tools, if needed.   
• Completeness. This criterion refers to the ability to capture the many types of UTPs. 
Several existing methodologies focus on a limited subset of practices. In this case the 
completeness score is low. Approaches that are able to investigate all kinds of UTPs have 
a high score.  
• Reliability. Providing accurate assessments of the existence of UTPs and unbiased 
estimations of their impact and pass-through effects is critical. A reliable methodology 
minimizes the probability of missing false positives or false negatives when assessing the 
existence of UTPs (i.e., claiming that a practice is unfair when it is fair or vice versa, 
respectively). A reliable methodology also fully appreciates the consequences of UTPs, 
including the effects of interdependencies. 
• Generality. In order to provide useful policy support, the empirical analysis must grant 
general conclusions, not just case-specific results. Analyses based on special cases may 
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fail to give policymakers useful information. Similarly, models relying on restrictive 
assumptions may be hardly applicable in practice. 
Using these five criteria, in combination with what is available in the literature, it is now possible 
to assess each of the different empirical strategies by their suitability for a full-fledged analysis 
of UTPs.  
Large datasets would score high in terms of feasibility, cost efficiency and generality. But, 
given the conclusion from Table 3 that such datasets are not readily available, the usefulness of 
such an empirical strategy quickly diminishes. After all, in the absence of any datasets, one 
would have to construct them from scratch, reducing the cost efficiency. Furthermore, collecting 
large amounts of data on UTPs would inevitably mean that the information could not be as 
context-specific as required. 
While case studies score highly on feasibility, completeness (it is not difficult to get all 
information from one specific case) and reliability (a case study allows intimate familiarity with 
a certain context), they do considerably worse in terms of generality and cost efficiency. Keeping 
in mind the lack of usage of case studies for the issue of UTPs (see Table 2-3), the applicability 
of this type of empirical strategy becomes questionable. Especially for the purposes of policy 
analysis, one can wonder if a deep understanding of one specific context is enough to design or 
evaluate regulations.  
Exploratory descriptive statistics have been used in quite a number of analyses on UTPs, 
most notably in the many reports and studies published in the lead-up to the approval of the EU 
UTP Directive. Such approaches are feasible and cost-effective because most of the information 
is publicly available and free and the computational burden is minimal. The downside of this 
approach is the low reliability of the results: most studies do not run formal testing, providing 
only stylized facts and time trends. This approach may also suffer from low generality 
(conclusions are hardly applicable for general cases). 
Lab experiments have definitely proven their worth, but only for a limited number of UTPs. 
This empirical approach scores high on feasibility and reliability but does poorly on generality 
and cost efficiency. It should be seen as a useful complementary analysis for some UTPs, but 
not as the chosen way to analyse a multitude of UTPs in real-world circumstances. 
As evident from Table 2-3, quite a few studies employ theoretical models to examine UTPs, 
either as the main contribution or to guide the empirical analysis. Such an approach does score 
well in terms of generality and cost efficiency (no data needs to be collected), but is by no means 
complete. As such, in the study of UTPs, it appears theoretical models play an indispensable role 
in informing the empirical analysis but cannot stand on their own. For the purposes of this 
project, a theoretical model will be used to examine which variables, factors and drivers should 
be included in the empirical analysis. 
The strengths of methodologies based on surveys and interviews are completeness and 
generality of the analysis. These studies can cover the largest set of practices, and their 
conclusions are general (conditional to the sampling design). Whether context specificity can be 
addressed depends to a large extent on how the survey is designed. The approach is definitely 
feasible, but data collection can be costly, especially if general results are sought. A possible 
limitation is reliability, mostly related to response biases. The problem could be addressed by 
using psychometric tools (scale measures) to introduce a degree of subjectivity to the analysis. 
To summarize, over the course of this literature review many insights have surfaced with respect 
to which empirical strategy is the most appropriate for measuring the occurrence, impact and 
pass-through of UTPs. In terms of data collection, it is clear that a trade-off will have to be made 
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between gathering context-specific data at higher cost (and possibly lower sample sizes) and 
gathering more general information from a larger number of respondents. Given the importance 
of context in the case of UTPs, the former certainly seems to win the argument. However, our 
analysis here shows that a survey instrument will be indispensable to assess this issue. 
There are very few large datasets that could be used for UTPs, but as none of them focus on 
fairness, (unstructured) interviews and case studies are too limited for comparability purposes, 
and exploratory studies would not fill the gap we are trying to address.  
Another element important to the empirical analysis that flows quite naturally from the literature 
review is the need to collect dyadic data, i.e., data on the specific relationship between two (or 
more) trading partners. In the case of UTPs, this means collecting data at the level of the 
relationship (and possibly, the contract) between buyers and suppliers. Only in that way is it 
possible to achieve a complete (and potentially less biased) picture of the occurrence and impact 
of UTPs. To assess pass-through of UTPs and their impact, different iterations of dyadic data 
collection would have to occur across the value chain in order to arrive at a complete picture.  
Other empirical factors that should be included for consideration are listed here.  
• UTPs are not unidirectional and could potentially originate with weaker party.  
• We have to make sure to keep an open mind in terms of the potential solutions to UTPs. 
For instance, the UTP Directive rules could be combined with informal mechanisms, and 
it will be important to also ask the different actors in the agri-food value chain about their 
preferences for those types of initiatives.  
• Size and context matter: the literature review has demonstrated that the occurrence and 
impact of certain UTPs may differ considerably between small and large actors, even 
within the same level of the value chain. As such, in the empirical analysis, it will be 
crucial to account for a whole range of variables affecting the incidence of UTPs.  
• Inquiring about UTPs is a sensitive issue, especially for those suffering from them (cfr. 
the ‘fear factor’), which could introduce all types of biases into the analysis. Minimizing 
those biases will be a crucial challenge for the empirical analysis.  
 
2.6.3  Implications for pass-through analysis 
 
Modern agri-food systems are structured as value chains encompassing several vertically inter-
related markets. A well-known characteristic of vertical models is that the equilibria in 
interdependent markets are jointly determined (e.g., Gardner 1975). A perturbation in the 
equilibrium at any stage of the value chains triggers adjustments in all other stages (e.g., Muth 
1964; Holloway 1991). Yet, as demonstrated by the findings in section 2.5 , the literature 
on UTP pass-through is significantly lacking. To our knowledge, the only studies on pass-
through concern multiple-stage games that show theoretically that the impact of certain 
practices can indeed reverberate from one level of the chain to others. Additionally, horizontal 
spill-over effects are empirically shown among focal suppliers and non-focal suppliers.  
In the economic literature in general, the term “pass-through” along the supply chain has been 
largely equated with cost or price pass-through, indicating the transfer of cost and price changes 
from the upstream sector to the downstream sector or consumers (Kim and Cotterill 2008). 
Some estimate the rate across different brands and outlets (Loy et al. 2015), while others take 
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a completely different view and analyse the pass-through of price cuts offered by manufacturers 
to consumers via retailers’ opportunism (Kumar, Rajiv and Jeuland 2001).  
So, while most of the literature focuses on cost or price pass-through, a similar concept 
can be applied to UTPs. For example, consider a retailer asking a supplier cooperative to match 
a lower price offered by a competitor under the implicit threat of termination of the trade 
relationship. This can be considered a UTP under the current definitions (renegotiation and unfair 
termination). The practice is expected to have an impact on farmers, who will receive a lower 
price for their products. An impact on consumers is possible, too, if the buyer lowers consumer 
prices as a consequence of the success of the UTP. Similarly, a trader paying high service fees 
to a retailer without a corresponding benefit can lower the price paid to farmers in order to gain 
enough per-unit margin to recover the fixed cost (Bonnet et al. 2013). We refer to the changes 
in the trade relationships along the value chain due to the adoption of a UTP at a given stage of 
the value chain as “UTP pass-through”. These examples suggest that UTPs may have an impact 
on several agents along the value chain. A comprehensive assessment requires the analysis of 
these different stages.  
A key conclusion of existing literature is that the intensity of price and cost pass-through depends 
on the specific characteristics of the market (such as demand and supply elasticity, the type of 
vertical agreements, the degree of market/bargaining power) (Gaudin 2016). As a consequence, 
the evaluation of the intensity of pass-through is an empirical question requiring a 
careful institutional analysis of the transaction. A similar approach is advisable for the 
analysis of UTP pass-through. 
UTP pass-through differs from price pass-through because of its intrinsic multi-
dimensional nature. UTPs involve several dimensions of the value chain in addition to price 
and quantity. Examples of such dimensions include quality (Yehezkel 2014), variety of the 
assortment (Baake and von Schlippenbach 2014; Hamilton and Innes 2017) market access 
(Marx and Shaffer 2007) and innovation (Sullivan 1997). Consequently, the characterisation of 
the UTP pass-through intensity must be multi-dimensional. Unlike price or cost pass-through, a 
scalar index is not a sufficient measure, and a system of indicators is advisable. 
Our preliminary review suggests that process tracing (PTr) would be a promising 
methodological approach for the empirical investigation of UTP pass-through (George and 
Bennett 2005; Waldner 2012). PTr is defined as “[…] an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and 
causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal 
sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier 2011). 
PTr is an inductive approach using empirical evidence (such as case studies or interviews) to 
investigate a sequence of events with a temporal or logical order. The approach is widely used 
in social science studies to explore complex phenomena from a qualitative perspective. Although 
PTr is not used to address pass-through issues in the economic literature, it proved a useful 
approach for investigating causal relationships in the social sciences when quantitative methods 
(such as econometrics or inference) were difficult to apply (Trampusch and Palier 2016). PTr can 
be used to uncover and specify causal mechanisms, such as the causal relationship between a 
UTP at a given stage of the value chain and the adoption of practices along the chain. Also, the 
method can use diagnostic information to evaluate explanatory hypotheses (Collier 2011). 
In practice, PTr collects information at the various points of the process, and it relates that 
information to (i) existing knowledge (e.g., theoretical framework, stylized facts or theory as 
defined in Waltz (1979)) and (ii) information from other points in the process. The approach is 
based on a characterisation of the key steps in the process (the so-called descriptive inference 
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in Collier (2011)), which in turn permits a solid analysis of change and sequence (the so-called 
causal inference). 
From a PTr point of view, a (fair or unfair) trading practice involving farmers can be considered 
the outcome of a process along the supply chain. For example, a manufacturer might impose a 
unilateral contract change on a farmer because the terms of trade with the final retailer have 
suddenly changed. The application of PTr methodology to UTPs consists in point-analyses of the 
transactions (“snapshots”, in PTr jargon). The data are interpreted using existing knowledge, 
such as economic theory or background analysis, of the supply chains. Then the comparison of 
snapshots is used to infer about causality in the process. In PTr the point-analyses may be 
independent, sequential (when the information from one point is used to guide the analysis of 
another) or iterative. 
Given the multidimensional nature and complexity of UTPs and the limitations of existing 
quantitative studies (section 2.5 ), it is argued here that PTr is a promising framework to guide 
the conceptual and empirical analyses of UTP pass-through.  
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Appendix I: UTPs in the EU Directive 
 
Black practices: 
1. Payments later than 30 days for perishable agricultural and food products 
2. Payments later than 60 days for other agri-food products 
3. Short-notice cancellations of perishable agri-food products 
4. Unilateral contract changes by the buyer 
5. Payments not related to a specific transaction 
6. Risk of loss and deterioration transferred to the supplier 
7. Refusal of written confirmation of supply agreement by the buyer, despite request of the 
supplier 
8. Misuse of trade secrets by the buyer 
9. Commercial retaliation by the buyer 
10. Transferring the costs of examining customer complaints to the supplier 
 
Grey practices: 
11. Return of unsold products 
12. Payment of the supplier for stocking, display and listing 
13. Payment of the supplier for promotion 
14. Payment of the supplier for marketing 
15. Payment of the supplier for advertising 
16. Payment of the supplier for staff of the buyer, fitting out premises 
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3 Review of Existing Data Sources on UTPs 
 
Alessandro Sorrentino, Mara Lai 
(University of Tuscia) 
 
Monitoring unfair trading practices using existing sources of economic data related to the 
organization and functioning of the food supply chain, appears to be complicated at both the 
European and national levels. The analysis of existing sources, other than direct interviews or 
surveys targeting different supply chain’s actors, make clear these sources are not designed to 
collect quantitative and qualitative data that could help identify unfair practices. Despite this lack 
of direct links, data collected systematically about the food sector at a national level might be 
useful for gaining information about those practices related to price developments along the 
supply chain and payments transactions between retailers and suppliers. In this respect, data 
collected by price observatories at a national level (where existing) and national Farm 
Accountancy Data Networks (FADN) could provide some hints about possible transactions or 
relations at risk to be unfair. The national FADNs, for instance, collect a number of data related 
to the movements and balances of farms accounts that, if sufficiently detailed, might give some 
indication about costs and/or delayed payments potentially linked to farmers’ relations with 
retailers. The same applies to data collected by price observatories that outline price 
developments along the supply chain, which also may give some indication about unfair 
practices. However, the main goals of the above-mentioned tools are to ensure transparency in 
the definition of prices (particularly to protect consumers) and, in the case of the national FADNs, 
provide economic and structural information about the farming sector. For this reason, data 
collected are not necessarily appropriate for monitoring UTPs, but they might form a basis for 
setting up a specific platform for this purpose.  
The antitrust authorities at a national level could also be considered relevant sources for 
understanding if relations between actors in the supply chains might be considered unfair. The 
French Antitrust Authority (DGCCRF), for example, publishes annually a report on the occurrence 
of delayed payments in different sectors, including agri-food. The 2018 report mentions the 
following main practices identified in the food sector: invoices issued by food product suppliers 
later than envisaged by the law for payment (30 days); summary invoices listing the reference 
date for payment as the date of issue, not the date of the product delivery, as set by law; and 
lack of knowledge of the payment deadlines that apply to different products. These authorities 
undertake, usually, fact-finding inquiries to investigate some sectors or specific relations that 
can jeopardize regular competition (e.g., the inquiry just started by the Italian AGCM into one 
of the main cereal seed breeding companies). The actions of these authorities are more effective 
when they have the mandate to summon a company for a potential unfair practice without a 
formal complaint from the injured party.  
The activities of these national bodies are relevant mainly because their decisions represent an 
important legal basis that can be used to identify UTPs, particularly those categories related to 
retaliation measures and unilateral renegotiations of contracts. National bodies can identify and 
possibly stop practices that are already happening or that are likely to happen in the near future, 
but they are not necessarily appropriate for preventing and monitoring such practices.  Hence, 
setting up a monitoring system for UTPs would require identification of the key information to 
be collected, both qualitative and quantitative, summing up what is already available and then 
integrating it with that data (which at the moment is not recorded).  
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Table 3-1: Selected sources of data that can contribute to UTP identification 
Database 
Country/ 
Organiz. 
Brief description and possible use for monitoring UTPs 
EUROSTAT EU Eurostat records structural and economic data on agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries, but this does not seem to be relevant for identifying 
unfair practices.  
Food price monitoring tool: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/experimental-statistics/food-
price-monitoring. This tool was introduced in EUROSTAT following the 
period of high price volatility in Europe. It aims to give information 
about how prices develop across the different stages of the production 
chain. This might give some indication on how costs are related to 
potential unfair practices.  
Food-chain 
analysis network 
(FDAN) 
OECD  Launched in 2010 as an expert group within the OECD Committee of 
Agriculture, the food-chain analysis network aims to gather and exploit 
food system data to identify food policy practices, particularly in 
relation to price developments.  
Federal Institute 
of Agricultural 
Economics  
Austria The Federal Institute provides agricultural economic statistics and 
data. It also collects farm accounts data, which might give some 
indications for UTPs (as highlighted for the Italian case).  
SPF Economie, 
P.M.E, Classes 
moyennes et 
Energie  
Belgium Every year, the Federal Public Service for Economy runs an analysis 
(Fonctionnement du marché en Belgique: un screening horizontal des 
secteurs marchands) of the state of the art of the main sectors in the 
country, including the food processing industry. This analysis 
considers the level of concentration in the industry, and this could give 
some insight into the possibility that unfair practices might develop 
within a specific industry.  
France AgriMer – 
Observatoire de 
la formation des 
prix et des 
merges de 
produits 
alimentaires  
France  France AgriMer provides detailed information about the different 
stakeholders active in food chains, with the aim to improve 
stakeholder relations and identify cost transmission mechanisms, 
variations in upstream and downstream prices, and retail trade 
concentrations. It includes the economic results achieved at each step 
in the supply chains in different industries and for different 
commodities. The data is aggregated, making it complicated to gain 
insight into possible unfair practices occurring between players; 
nevertheless, economic performance is analysed at different stages, 
and this might mean material for further investigations.  
(Continues) 
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Table 3-1 (continued): Selected sources of data that can contribute to UTP identification 
Database 
Country/ 
Organiz. 
Brief description and possible use for monitoring UTPs 
RICA – National 
Farm Accountancy 
Data Network 
Italy This database includes extensive data collected from a 
sample of Italian agricultural holdings. Some of the data 
from different sections of the database could be of use to 
identify UTPs.  
In the section “Movements and balances of the accounts”, 
information about the following categories are recorded:  
- Revenues from sales (production, animals, 
revenues from animal husbandries, services 
provided to third parties, etc.) 
- Revenues effectively received 
- Products’ delivery to cooperatives (to be sold 
through it) 
- Operating costs  
This data could help identify possible UTPs, particularly in 
relation to delayed buyers’ payments and extra charges 
passed on to the suppliers. Establishing a direct and strong 
link between this data and UTPs, however, would require 
a thorough examination of the balance sheet of the 
holdings and, possibly, some adjustments to the collection 
of data, which is not performed with the aim to identify 
such practices.  
Autorité Belge de la 
Concurrence 
Belgium  A number of judgements related to unfair practices in the 
food sector, such as abuse of dominant position, are 
reported. The case-law of the Belgian Authority for 
Competition might give some insights about possible 
actions to be undertaken to identify unfair practices.  
DGCCRF - Direction 
générale de la 
concurrence, de la 
consommation et 
de la répression 
des frauds 
 
France  The DGCCRF completes annually a report on delayed 
payments in different sectors, including the food sector. 
The 2018 report identifies the following as main practices 
in the food sector: invoices issued by food product 
suppliers later than envisaged by the law for payment (30 
days); summary invoices listing the reference date for 
payment as the date of issue and not the date of product 
delivery, as set by law; and lack of knowledge of the 
payment deadlines that apply for different products. It 
includes other information not specifically related to the 
food sector but that might be relevant. The DGCCRF also 
publishes the summary of the case-law related to the 
identification of unfair practices in different sectors, 
including the food sector.  
          (Continues) 
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Table 3-1 (continued): Selected sources of data that can contribute to UTP identification 
Database 
Country/ 
Organiz. 
Brief description and possible use for monitoring UTPs 
Hungarian 
Competition 
Authority 
Hungary The Hungarian Competition Authority has been very active 
in the identification of UTPs in the agri-food sector. The 
published case-law can, also in this case, give important 
insights for spotting unfair practices.  
AGCM – Autorità 
Garante della 
Concorrenza e del 
Mercato  
Italy AGCM regularly checks on the state of competition within 
the national markets. It publishes the case-law related to 
the identification of unfair practices. The case COOP 
ITALIA-CELEX appears to be of particular interest because 
it recognises some practices which had been going on for 
years between the two counterparts that were identified 
as unfair, in particular: discounts on the market price and 
fees payed to the retailers but not included in the contract; 
provision of additional discounts, included within the 
national promotion plan of COOP, decided unilaterally by 
COOP and communicated to CELOX only afterwards; the 
unilateral interruption of the contract after several years, 
considering the fact that CELOX undertook specific 
investments to meet the conditions to be a supplier of 
COOP.  
Judgements like this might provide relevant hints for 
identifying and better framing, from a legal point of view, 
unfair practices.  
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PART II: Designing a Monitoring Tool 
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In Part II of this report, we illustrate the design of the UTP monitoring system. We describe two 
approaches: In-Depth Empirical Analysis (IDEA) and Broad Scope Empirical Analysis (BSEA). 
The former is suited to support policy makers in identifying the most important UTPs in specific 
netchains and understanding the possible unintended consequences of regulations. The latter is 
designed to assess occurrence, impact and pass-through of a given list of UTPs in the EU food 
supply chains. 
Both approaches are based on primary data collection such as questionnaires, surveys and 
interviews. Our choice is supported by the results of our review of empirical studies in section 
2.6.2 , where we conclude that direct data collection is the most efficient approach to UTP 
monitoring. 
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4 Investigating UTPs: Past Experiences 
Carlo Russo 
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) 
 
Although several empirical studies on individual practices exist (section 2.6.2 ), there are 
remarkably few comprehensive investigations of the entire set of UTPs. We focus our review on 
three examples: the 2011 CIAA-AIM survey, the YouGov annual survey on behalf of the UK 
Grocery Adjudicator and the JRC 2017 survey on UTPs in the dairy sector. 
 
4.1  The 2011 CIAA-AIM survey 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the 2011 CIAA-AIM survey was the first empirical investigation 
tackling UTPs explicitly (instead of single practices).9 The study surveyed 686 firms in 15 EU 
countries, providing the first estimate of UTP occurrence. The report concluded that 96.4% of 
the sample was exposed to UTPs. The data had a great impact on the public debate and was 
quoted by several official papers as justification for public intervention. 
The empirical strategy was based on a direct question regarding UTPs. Respondents were asked 
if they had been confronted with the following situations (numbers in parentheses report the 
percent of respondents who claimed to suffer from the practice at least once in 2009): 
o The non-respect of contractual terms by some customers (84% of cases) 
o De-listing threats to obtain unjustified advantages (77%) 
o Unilateral deductions on invoices with no solid business reasons (63%) 
o Paying for no services (60%) 
o Providing payments clearly in no relation with the level of services (60%) 
o Paying retrospectively for items not foreseen in the contract (55%) 
o Unilateral disruption of business relationship to obtain advantages (51%) 
o Imposing clearly one-sided contractual provisions (48%) 
o Unilateral cessation of contracts without commercial reasons, notice (32%) 
o Use of privileged information to develop competing brands (28%) 
o Non-respect of confidentiality (23%) 
o Refusal to sign confidentiality agreement without reason (14%) 
Interestingly, respondents were on average subject to six UTPs, suggesting that multiple 
practices emerge at once. The survey detected differences across Member States. For example, 
the most common UTP (breaking contractual terms) was reported by 92% of respondents in 
Germany versus 51% in Finland. 
The study included a report on the self-assessment of the economic impact of UTPs. On average, 
the reported cost of these practices represents 0.5% of the turnover of the sample companies. 
Also, the report provided a first assessment of the fear factor. Data showed that only 13% of 
respondents challenged UTPs. In 65% of cases, the lack of action was due to fear of commercial 
sanctions. 
                                         
9 The study referred to “unfair commercial practices in Europe”. 
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The CIAA-AIM survey provided a first estimate of UTP occurrence and was one of the first studies 
to frame critical issues such as fear factor and economic impact. However, it presented several 
limitations and cannot be used for investigating pass-through. Firstly, it follows a firm-based 
approach. UTPs are detected at firm level, but no information about the organization of the 
supply chain is provided. This approach does not allow researchers to investigate the economic 
determinants of the UTPs, and it does not establish how the practices are passed along to other 
segments of the chain. Secondly, the questionnaire is based on self-reporting. As a consequence, 
the evaluations of occurrence and impact may be subjective. Thirdly, each UTP is investigated 
independently. As a consequence, the measure of the impact might be biased, as the interaction 
effect might have been overlooked. 
 
4.2  The 2018 JRC investigation of UTPs in the dairy sector 
 
In 2018, the JRC published the results of an empirical investigation of UTPs in the dairy sector. 
The study involved 1248 farms in five regions, chosen using a stratified multi-stage sampling 
procedure with random selection of the final sample units. The sample included farmers who 
managed a dairy farm in 2016/2017 and for at least two previous consecutive years. 
The main focus of the survey was i) detection of barriers to change buyer, ii) identification of 
contract characteristics and iii) a set of UTPs. Unlike the CIAA-AIM survey, the JRC dairy project 
aimed at establishing a link between contract characteristics (namely, completeness) and UTPs. 
The list of considered UTPs was the following (Table 20, p. 44): 
o UTPs in the contract content  
o Buyer can refuse or adjust milk delivery conditions  
o Imposition of marketing/supply constraints  
o No protection for farmer if the buyer fails to fulfil the contract  
o Buyer has better contract cancellation terms than farmer  
o Imposed dairy-specific investment in the past 10 years  
o Price is set unilaterally by the buyer  
o UTPs during contract execution  
o Dairy paid lower price than contracted  
o Dairy did not collect milk or refused to accept milk delivery  
o Dairy paid only after a delay  
o Dairy required milk quality or quantity different from that agreed  
o Dairy imposed additional fees/deductions  
o Price changed unilaterally by the buyer  
o Required quality changed unilaterally by the buyer  
o Required quantity changed unilaterally by the buyer  
o Buyer changed other terms of contract (e.g., credit, information provision, milk 
collection)  
o UTPs after contract finalization  
o Contract ended by the buyer unilaterally before expiration  
o Fear factor  
The survey found that UTPs are extremely frequent. More than 97% of respondents reported 
confronting at least one UTP. The analysis showed a weak correlation between the number of 
UTPs and completeness of the contract. 
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The JRC survey provided deep insight into trade practices in the dairy industry. The use of 
ancillary information (contract features, farm characteristics, etc.) allowed researchers to 
compute correlation and speculate about the determinants of UTPs, an important step forward 
compared to the CIAA-AIM survey. However, the approach is based on a farm-level survey and 
not intended as an investigation of pass-through effects. 
 
4.3  YouGov GCA annual survey 
 
The UK Groceries Code Adjudicator commissions YouGov to conduct a yearly survey of the 
groceries sector. This is an example of UTP monitoring over time, and the yearly reports put 
special emphasis on defining trends over time. The survey is presented as a part of the 
Adjudicator’s yearly report. 
The 2018 survey involved 911 direct suppliers of supermarkets, 113 indirect suppliers and 28 
trade associations. The objective of the investigation is to measure the compliance of 
supermarket chains with the UK’s Groceries Code. Firms are asked if they experienced practices 
that might violate the Code and whether they would consider raising issues with the Adjudicator 
(and—if not—why). Also, the survey investigated firm awareness of the code and other related 
issues (such as training and understanding). 
A distinctive characteristic of the analysis is the focus on supermarket chains. Results are 
presented by supermarket chain and provide an implicit “fairness” ranking. The inclusion of 
indirect suppliers in the survey is a clear attempt to include pass-through effects in the analysis. 
Noticeably, the YouGov GCA survey findings are remarkably different from those of the CIAA-
AIM and JRC’s investigations. In 2018, 45% of respondents stated that they had not experience 
of code violations (43% claimed violations, 12% were not sure or refused to answer). When 
asked about a broader set of unfair practices (including a subset not covered by the Code), 35% 
of the sample reported no violations. UTPs are extremely frequent in the YouGov GCA survey 
but not as ubiquitous as reported by other studies. Possibly, the survey’s more precise definition 
of unfairness (due to the reference to the Code) reduced the number of claims. 
The YouGov survey is a monitoring initiative aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of the 
Adjudicator in promoting a fairer and more efficient agri-food supply chain. The focus is on retail 
chains and supermarkets that are considered leading firms in the supply chain. However, the 
survey does not provide an economic interpretation of the practices and ignores 
interdependencies among the practices. 
 
4.4  Lessons from past experiences 
 
The three examples of UTP surveys provide insights into the monitoring strategy. The design of 
our approach is based on such experiences. 
The three surveys are based on interviews with firms that are possibly subjected to UTPs. The 
key part of the questionnaires is asking these firms to look at a list of practices and confirm 
whether they have confronted one or more of them. The approach is particularly useful in the 
case of the YouGov-GCA, where the Code provides an exact reference. When exploring the 
occurrence of generic UTPs, the approach is vulnerable to the possibility of overlooking important 
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practices. When designing a monitoring system, special consideration must be given defining 
objectives. If the objective is to evaluate a specific regulation (such as the Groceries Code or 
Directive 2019/633), a questionnaire concerning the occurrence of practices given in a list may 
be efficient. If the objective is generic assessment of “fairness” along the agri-food supply chains, 
using pre-defined lists might be problematic. The lists are unlikely to be exhaustive, and 
therefore key practices might be missed. 
Interviewing farmers alone does not allow for pass-through analysis. The JRC analysis of the 
dairy sector, for example, assesses the occurrence of UTPs at farm level, without investigating 
the role of downstream industries. Similarly, the CIAA-AIM survey ignores pass-through. The 
YouGov survey considers the possible impact of supermarket practices on indirect suppliers. The 
result is achieved by grouping respondents by supermarket chains. In principle, differences 
across chains might provide enough variation to perform statistical inference. However, the 
approach is limited by the relatively small number of supermarket chains. Pass-through analysis 
requires that an investigation considers the structure of the supply chain.  
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5 UTP Monitoring Systems 
Carlo Russo 
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) 
 
The design of a UTP monitoring system is the core of this research. In chapters 6 and 7, we 
present two approaches to monitoring UTPs: In-DEpth Analysis (IDEA) and Broad-Scope 
Empirical Analysis (B-SEA). 
 
Figure 5-1: Alternative UTP monitoring systems. 
 
 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the different rationales for the two approaches. The difference lies in the 
objective of the investigation. If the goal is to assess whether the regulation is effective in 
reducing the occurrence and impact of a given set of UTPs, a general survey is sufficient. The 
YouGov-GCA annual survey (section 4.3 ) is a typical example of this approach. The investigation 
is based on an existing list of practices (the Code), and respondents are asked whether they 
have experienced such practices. If yes, they are asked about the cost for the firm and what 
was done about it. The survey is an ex post evaluation of a policy already in place, with the clear 
objective of assessing a trend in the occurrence of UTPs. In chapter 7, we illustrate the B-SEA 
survey design that follows this approach. For example, B-SEA can be used to monitor the 
occurrence of the 16 UTPs in Directive 2019/633 over time. The results of a first application of 
B-SEA are reported in Part III. 
The main limitation of the B-SEA is the focus on a predetermined list of UTPs. Obviously, if the 
list is incomplete, B-SEA fails to give an unbiased assessment of fairness, and the level of 
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protection may be overestimated. The survey might miss important features of the supply chain 
or specific UTPs of extreme importance. If the objective of the investigation is an assessment of 
fairness in the supply chain, the alternative IDEA approach is preferable. IDEA derives the target 
UTPs from a background analysis of the specific value chain and considers the governance of the 
value chain explicitly. The objective of the analysis is to identify all relevant UTPs and build 
counterfactual scenarios in order to assess the possible unintended consequences of a ban. IDEA 
is designed as a tool to support policy design. For example, it can provide useful information for 
the implementation of Directive 2019/633 by Member States or future revision of the regulation. 
The details of this approach are provided in chapter 6, and the results of the application to apple 
and kiwi chains are illustrated in Part IV of this report. 
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6 In-Depth Analysis (IDEA) 
Carlo Russo 
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) 
 
The IDEA approach makes extensive use of a priori information to support the design of the 
investigation. The objective is to tailor the analysis to specific characteristics of the netchain in 
order to gain a deep understanding of the underlying economic forces. By construction, IDEA is 
suited to investigate homogeneous and relatively small netchains so that a priori information is 
easy to collect and organize. 
IDEA is designed to support policy decisions regarding possible changes to the list of black or 
grey practices in Directive 2019/633 by Member States or by the European Union. The extensive 
use of economic modelling provides useful information about the possible unintended effects of 
the ban. Because IDEA does not rely on a predetermined list of practices, the survey can 
investigate multiple dimensions of fairness. It can be used to assess if the list from Directive 
2019/633 is complete and relevant and evaluate the cost and benefits of banning additional 
practices. 
In the following sections, we illustrate the theory of the IDEA approach. In Part IV we report on 
its application to the fruit sector, explaining the issues and limitations of the analysis. 
 
6.1  IDEA design 
 
The objective of IDEA is to trace the pass-through and spillover processes along the netchain. 
The approach is derived from a vast literature about process-tracing (PTr) methods (e.g., George 
and Bennet 2005, chpt. 9). PTr is defined as:  
“[…] an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from 
diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence 
of events or phenomena” (Collier 2011). 
PTr is an inductive approach using empirical evidence (such as case studies or interviews) to 
investigate a sequence of events with a temporal or logical order. The approach is widely used 
in social science studies to explore complex phenomena from a qualitative perspective. Although 
PTr is not used to address pass-through issues in economic literature, it proves to be a useful 
approach in investigating causal relationships in social sciences when quantitative methods (such 
as econometrics or inference) are difficult to apply (Trampusch and Palier 2016). PTr can be 
used to uncover and specify causal mechanisms, such as the causal relationship between a UTP 
at a given stage of the value chain and the adoption of practices along the chain. Also, the 
method can use diagnostic information to evaluate explanatory hypotheses (Collier 2011). 
We represent the pass-through effect as a diffusion process along the supply chains. The process 
starts from focus transactions, i.e., transactions where a strong imbalance in the parties’ 
bargaining power determines the first occurrence of UTPs. The UTP exerts pressure on the weak 
firm, which must adjust their business organization and the way it interacts with other firms. 
Such adjustment may determine subsequent adjustments along the supply chain. We define the 
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pass-through effect as the sequence of adjustments along the supply chain that occur due to 
the adoption of a UTP in a focus transaction.  
IDEA identifies focus transactions and traces the sequence of adjustments along the supply 
chain. The core of process-tracing is the comparison of diagnostic evidence collected at various 
stages of the process with a stock of existing knowledge in order to identify and explain the 
causal mechanism of a process. The literature about elite interviews is also applied to the design 
of the point estimate action (e.g., Aberbach and Rockman 2002). 
The application of IDEA is a three-step process: (i) acquisition of a priori information, (ii) point 
estimation and (iii) generalization of results (Exhibit 1). 
Exhibit 1: Provisional organization of IDEA activities 
Acquisition of  information 
• Desk analysis 
• Expert panel 
• Calibration of theoretical model  
• Interview design 
Point estimation 
• Semi-structured interviews 
• Validation of a priori information and theory 
• UTP identification: occurrence and interdependence 
• Impact evaluation and pressure assessment at firm level 
• Comparison of interviews and pass-through assessment  
Generalization 
• Survey design based on point estimation results 
• Estimation of frequency 
• Impact evaluation and pressure assessment at layer, chain and netchain levels 
• Pass-through and spill-over assessment at netchain level 
 
(i) A priori information is acquired from a desk analysis and brainstorming with a panel of 
experts. The organization of the expert panel analysis is illustrated in Figure 6-1. The guided 
interaction considers two main aspects. First, we focus on analysis of the netchain to obtain 
information about opportunities and threats; identify the main drivers of competitive advantage; 
define what efficiency means for the industry; and understand the role and importance of 
performance dimensions such as innovation, sustainability, quality and safety. Second, we 
consider the organization of the transactions along the netchain (governance). This activity has 
two major objectives: (a) identify lead firms, chains and focus transactions and (b) describe the 
way lead firms coordinate transactions (contract features). The first objective is instrumental to 
identify the targets of the semi-structured interviews. The second objective includes listing the 
most common practices with a subjective assessment of their fairness, based on Bowie’s (1988) 
definition (section 2.3 ). These results are used to develop and calibrate a theoretical model 
explaining the economics of UTPs. Insights from the expert panel ensure that the model 
addresses specific issues of the netchain and defines the questions and topic of interest for the 
interviews. 
(ii) The point estimation collects information about UTPs in specific transactions (i.e., the focus 
transactions identified by the panel). Data are collected through semi-structured interviews. 
Based on a priori information, firms’ representatives are asked about existing practices, the 
fairness of these practices, the motivation for their adoption and their impact on business 
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organization and performance. In particular, the interviews collect data about occurrence of UTPs 
(existence and fairness of practices); the impact on the outcome of the transaction (on multiple 
dimensions such as efficiency, redistribution, sustainability and quality/safety); and the pressure 
on trade partners. Given the likely reluctance of lead firms to answer questions regarding UTPs, 
the interviews must be designed to extract sufficient information from trade partners. Indirect 
and qualitative questions are suggested to deal with the fear factor. The semi-structured 
interviews improve understanding of the netchain and measure how the adoption of UTPs affects 
the organization and performance of a trading relationship. The transaction-based analysis is of 
fundamental importance for disentangling the effects of multiple UTPs along the same chain. 
This action has two critical characteristics: 
• Dyadic approach. Both the lead firm and one (or more) trade partners are interviewed. A 
comparison of the two points of view provides key information about the efficiency and 
redistribution effects. As will be mentioned in Part IV, this is one of the most critical and 
difficult features of IDEA. 
• Snowball technique. In order to map the pass-through, the interviewer collects the 
contact information for the respondent’s trading partners. Similar interviews are then 
conducted with the new contacts. Although the limitations of snowball sampling are well-
known, specific goals of process-tracing make this approach preferable to random 
sampling (Sadler et al. 2010). Noticeably, the use of expert panels allows us to start the 
sampling from the focus transactions and then trace the pass-through along the netchain. 
The standard process-tracing technique uses a backward approach, starting from the 
outcome of interest (for example, the consequences of UTPs on farmers or consumers) 
and going back to the original cause (for example, Van Evera 1997). The discussion of 
IDEA application in Part IV illustrates the difficulties due to the fear factor. 
 
Figure 6-1: Illustrative organization of expert panel analysis for IDEA 
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(iii) The third action of IDEA is the generalization of the results of point estimate. The output of 
the interviews gives detailed representation of the transaction of interest, but it does not provide 
any assessment about the general validity of the results. In theory, it is possible that the 
coordination mechanisms in other parts of the netchain are different. The risk of a misleading 
conclusion is particularly high if the number of interviews is limited or the expert panel fails to 
report important information. We propose a survey to validate and generalize the results from 
the point estimate. Most importantly, the survey is necessary to assess the pass-through effects 
to layers of the netchains not directly involved in the focus transactions. We propose a random 
stratified sample by chain and layer in order to (a) avoid sampling bias and (b) place the 
information along the netchain so that the vertical and horizontal links can be exploited for 
interpretation. 
 
6.1.1  Definition of the boundaries of the analysis: A netchain focus 
 
A key element of the IDEA approach is the identification of the set of firms of interest. In a 
typical study, researchers identify the transaction of interest and centre the empirical analysis 
on it. For example, Bonnet and Dubois (2010) investigate the transaction between 
manufacturers and retailers in the French mineral water industry. Wright (2007) focuses on the 
transaction between US military commissaries and their suppliers. The focus on a single 
transaction allows for immediate identification of the parties. 
When the focus of the research is the pass-through effect, the empirical analysis must consider 
a sequence of interrelated transactions. Firms who engage in transactions with the parties 
involved in the UTPs must be included in the domain of the analysis as well. The computation of 
the cascade effect requires expanding the focus of the analysis even further.  
The preliminary analysis suggests addressing the boundary problem using a netchain approach. 
 
An example of a generic netchain 
Source: Lazzarini et al. 2001 
A netchain is a “set of networks comprised of 
horizontal ties between firms within a particular 
industry or group, such that these networks (or 
layers) are sequentially arranged based on the 
vertical ties between firms in different layers” 
(Lazzarini et al. 2001, p. 7). The ability of the 
netchain approach to model the role of PO and 
other forms of horizontal coordination motivates 
the choice. Although the boundaries of the 
netchain can be uncertain, the concept offers an 
analytical tool for identifying the set of firms of 
interest. 
Compared to the standard supply chain approach, netchains provide the theoretical tools for 
assessing the spill-over effect of UTPs. In fact, the adoption of a UTP in a transaction can trigger 
adjustments in other firms in the same layer, in addition to vertically interrelated firms. 
To the best of our knowledge, the use of netchains in UTP studies is an innovative contribution 
of the proposal. It has the advantage of including in the analysis firms that exited a given supply 
chain because of UTPs. These firms are usually ignored by traditional supply chain analyses, with 
a consequent downward bias in the impact assessment. 
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The second boundary issue concerns the set of target practices. There is a consensus in the 
literature that unfairness is a vague and elusive concept (e.g., Sexton 2017). The regulatory 
effort to define unfairness helps in the design of the empirical analysis. Directive 2019/633 
provides a set of 16 black and grey practices (section 2.2.3 ) that are unambiguous, well-defined 
and easily explained to respondents. Yet, limiting the analysis to such practices might provide 
an incomplete representation of the UTP phenomenon. For example, a survey based on a closed 
list might fail to detect the emergence of new UTPs. At the same time, using general definitions 
(such as Bowie 1988) might result in an ambiguous setting, where the response is affected by 
the personal interpretation of the question by the respondent. This preliminary analysis suggests 
that the working definition of UTPs must carefully consider the trade-off between generality and 
clarity. General definitions may be vague, but specific examples may be incomplete. The analysis 
of background information and interaction with the expert panel must provide a working 
definition of a UTP that is a clear statement identifying the practice and defining its fairness.   
The issue is particularly important because the taxonomy of UTPs is expected to evolve over 
time, as new practices emerge in agri-food netchains. Consequently, the working definition of a 
UTP must be flexible over time. Also, Member States may have different definitions of UTPs 
based on national regulation (Cafaggi and Iamiceli 2018). The methodology must account for a 
possibly evolving and heterogeneous legal framework. 
Finally, we remark that the unfairness of given practices may depend on the specific conditions 
of the transaction. The same practice can be fair in one context and unfair in another. For this 
reason, it may be necessary to collect auxiliary information about the transaction. Limiting the 
focus to the objective characteristics of the practices may induce error in measurement. The 
boundaries of the analysis must include auxiliary information regarding relative bargaining power 
and the possible efficiency justifications for the practices.    
 
6.1.2  Definition of a theoretical framework for UTP pass-through 
 
A solid theoretical framework is needed for designing an empirical investigation of UTP impact 
and pass-through. This groundwork activity is necessary to define the information required and 
interpret the results of the analysis. 
The discussion in chapter 2 pointed out two major shortcomings of existing UTP theories: (a) 
the focus on individual practices and (b) overlooking vertical interactions along the netchain. 
The proposed framework must provide a theoretical tool to explain these two components. 
IDEA moves from the assumption that in agri-food netchains “lead firms” may exist. We define 
lead firms as enterprises that “exert the power of setting the conditions for inclusion of economic 
agents in the netchain and the gains that accrue to them” (Lee et al. 2012, p. 12326). Examples 
of lead firms include traders holding the property rights for a club variety, retailers granting or 
denying shelf-access, and monopsonistic buyers in local markets. Lead firms have some degree 
of discretion in granting access and can affect the value distribution among participants. 
Noticeably, netchains can have more than one lead firm, even in the same layer.      
Lead firms use (formal or informal) contracts to coordinate the transactions. The set of contracts 
shapes the governance of the netchain (Gereffi et al. 2005). Contracts are the outcome of a 
bargaining process and determined by relative bargaining power (Sorrentino et al. 2016). UTPs 
can emerge as part of the contract when the distribution of bargaining power is imbalanced. 
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The use of contract theory (and relational contracts in particular) is functional for multiple 
purposes. First, it defines the context of the transaction and, consequently, assesses the actual 
unfairness of the practice. Second, it considers the possible joint effect of multiple practices 
(contract clauses). Third, it allows for vertical interaction since vertical ties can be modelled as 
constraints in contract design. Chapter 12 illustrates the application of contract theory to the 
analysis of UTPs in the EU fruit industry. 
 
6.1.3  Pass-through and spill-over 
 
Modern agri-food systems are structured as value chains encompassing several vertically inter-
related markets. A well-known characteristic of vertical models is that the equilibria in the 
interdependent markets are jointly determined (e.g., Gardner 1975). A perturbation in the 
equilibrium at any stage of the value chain triggers adjustments in all other stages (e.g., Muth 
1964; Holloway 1991). Extensive literature has come about concerning the so-called “pass-
through” problem, which is the measurement of the price change along a value chain due to an 
exogenous price shock at a given stage of the value chain (e.g., Weyl and Fabinger 2013).  
Most of the literature focuses on price pass-through. Yet, a similar concept can be applied to 
UTPs. For example, consider a retailer who charges a supplier PO for product deterioration that 
occurred when the goods were already on the buyer’s premises (a black practice under Directive 
2019/633, see also chapter 0). This practice is expected to have an impact on farmers, who will 
receive a lower price for their products. Similarly, a trader paying high service fees to a retailer 
without a corresponding benefit may lower the price paid to farmers in order gain enough per-
unit margin to recover the fixed cost (Bonnet et al. 2013). We refer to changes in trade 
relationships along the value chain due to the adoption of a UTP at a given stage of the value 
chain as “UTP pass-through”. These examples suggest that UTPs may impact several agents 
along the value chain. A comprehensive assessment requires the analysis of different stages.  
A key conclusion of existing literature is that the intensity of price pass-through depends on the 
specific characteristics of the market (such as demand and supply elasticity, type of vertical 
agreements, degree of market/bargaining power) (Gaudin 2016). As a consequence, the 
evaluation of the intensity of pass-through is an empirical question requiring careful institutional 
analysis of the transaction. A similar approach is advisable for the analysis of UTP pass-through. 
UTP pass-through differs from price pass-through because of its intrinsic multi-dimensional 
nature. UTPs involve several dimensions of the value chain, not just price and quantity. Examples 
of such dimensions include quality (Yehezkel 2014), variety of the assortment (Baake and von 
Schlippenbach 2014; Hamilton and Innes 2017), market access (Marx and Shaffer 2007), and 
innovation (Sullivan 1997). Consequently, the characterization of UTP pass-through intensity 
must be multi-dimensional. Unlike price pass-through, a scalar index is not a sufficient measure, 
and a more comprehensive approach is required. 
Unlike the typical price/cost pass-through studies, PTr does not estimate a parameter. Instead, 
it characterizes a complex, multidimensional process with a mix of descriptive analysis and 
quantitative indicators. This makes the output of PTr more difficult to interpret than, for example, 
a regression output. Nevertheless, PTr ensures more information and reduces the risk of 
misinterpreting the outcome. 
From a PTr point of view, a (fair or unfair) trading practice involving farmers can be considered 
as the outcome of a process along the supply chain. For example, a manufacturer might impose 
a unilateral contract change on a farmer because the terms of trade with the final retailer have 
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suddenly changed (see section 14.4.5 ). The PTr approach is suited for identifying the causal 
relationship in a complex, multidimensional environment. 
We applied IDEA to the Agro-Pontino Kiwi netchain in Italy and to the Lake Constance Apple 
netchain in Germany. The investigation of two netchains in the fruit industry allowed us to 
conclude that UTPs are netchain-specific and to assess the differences. The results of the IDEA 
application are reported in Part IV of this report.  
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7 B-SEA Design 
Carlo Russo 
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) 
 
The IDEA approach is complex, requiring extensive background information and analysis. In 
some instances, the objective of the investigation is such that simpler surveys may be more 
efficient. As discussed in chapter 5, if the goal is just to assess the effectiveness of regulation 
banning a predetermined set of practices, the structure of IDEA is redundant and unnecessary. 
For this reason, we designed the B-SEA survey with the specific objective of testing the list of 
practices in Directive 2019/633. The core of the analysis is a set of questionnaires assessing the 
occurrence and impact of the UTPs on the predefined list. Like the UGov-GCA survey (section 
4.3 ), the B-SEA is designed as a recurring survey, so that trends can be ascertained.   
B-SEA can be more efficient than IDEA in other cases as well. Information regarding the structure 
and governance of a netchain may not be available to researchers or too costly to acquire. Also, 
transaction-level analysis may be unfeasible if the number of transactions to be investigated is 
high. For example, if the scope of the empirical analysis is broad, involving several sectors and/or 
Member States, running IDEA might be not economically feasible. In these cases, the number 
of focus transactions is too high, and the empirical investigation cannot cover enough 
observations to provide a meaningful representation of the netchains.  
B-SEA consists of a sequential, survey-based tracing process: 
• In the first step, we organize prior knowledge under the assumption that only a list of 
UTPs and a general description of the netchain are available. 
• In second step of B-SEA, we design a sequence of surveys for each layer of the netchain. 
The samples are random and stratified by layers only (e.g., farmers, traders, 
manufacturers, retailers), as the chains are unobservable. The survey collects data about 
the occurrence of UTPs and their drivers, as well as firms’ adjustments in their 
organization and relationships with other trading partners (pressure). According to 
standard process-tracing methodologies, we plan a sequence of surveys starting with 
farmers and then moving downstream. The outcome of each survey is used to support 
the design of the next one. Descriptive inference provides a characterization of UTPs at 
each segment of the netchain 
• In the causal inference of B-SEA, information about the individual firms is aggregated in 
order to infer the effects of UTPs on the netchain. The key difference with the causal 
inference in IDEA is that, in B-SEA, individual observations are at the firm level instead 
of transaction level. As a consequence, the UTPs cannot be attached to specific 
transactions, but they are assumed to involve the entire firm. Because of the absence of 
information about vertical links, the estimation of the pass-through can be obtained only 
by an economic analysis of the results of the surveys at the different layers. 
We applied the B-SEA approach to the Slovak fruit industry. The results are discussed in Part III 
of this report. 
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7.1  Comparing IDEA and B-SEA 
 
Because B-SEA uses minimal a priori information to design an investigation, we expect the 
information output to be more limited than the one provided by IDEA. One of the objectives of 
the empirical analysis is to assess the loss of information.  
Figure 7-1 presents a comparison of IDEA and B-SEA. In the assessment step, we conducted an 
auxiliary survey in Slovakia. We administered the IDEA survey questionnaires to a sample of 
Slovak farmers and middlemen. Because those questionnaires were designed based on 
information collected in Germany and Italy, we could assess the generality of the IDEA approach. 
Then, we compared the outcomes of IDEA and B-SEA for Slovakia. In this way we could assess 
the possible information loss with B-SEA. The results of the comparison are reported in chapter 
16.  
  
Figure 7-1: Comparing IDEA and BSEA results 
 
The differences between the B-SEA and IDEA are due to the different sets of information 
available when the empirical analysis is designed. Note that the two procedures describe extreme 
situations in which information is either complete or missing. However, in practice, in-between 
cases of incomplete information may exist. If partial information is available, it is possible to 
develop ad-hoc analyses to limit information loss. For example, if the vertical structure of the 
netchain is unknown but there is information about the lead firms (and the focus transactions), 
a snowball survey structure can be designed to track the chains and solve the identification 
problem. The optimal monitoring strategy depends on the objectives and the scope of the 
analysis. In section 17.1.4  we illustrate an example of a monitoring system built on the results 
of the trial application of B-SEA and IDEA. 
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PART III: Investigating UTPs: B-SEA 
 
Jan Pokrivcak, Katarina Barathova, Miroslava Rajcaniova 
(Slovak University of Agriculture in Nitra) 
 
 
 
 
  
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
70 
 
 
Part III of the report illustrates the results of the B-SEA investigation of the Slovak fruit industry. 
As discussed in chapter 7, the objective of B-SEA is assessment of the degree of protection with 
respect to a predetermined list of UTPs. In this application, we tested the 16 UTPs covered in 
Directive 2019/633. The investigation targets the entire Slovak fruit sector, without focusing on 
specific netchains (unlike IDEA, see Part IV). Because B-SEA does not use specific a priori 
information regarding the organization of a target supply chain, it is possible to run general 
surveys and obtain comparable results. 
The implementation of B-SEA follows a basic process-tracing technique, as described in chapter 
7. The investigation is structured as a sequence of sample surveys, collecting point estimations 
and supporting descriptive inference about the occurrence and impact UTP. For this purpose, we 
surveyed a sample of 66 farmers and six supermarkets. The causal inference and assessment of 
the pass-through effect are based on comparison of the results of the two surveys.  
Part III is composed of three chapters. In chapter 8 we provide a concise description of the 
organization of the Slovak fruit industry. The discussion summarizes the a priori knowledge that 
was used in the process-tracing approach. Chapter 9 illustrates the results of the surveys and 
elaborates on descriptive and casual inference. Chapter 10 discuss the implications of the 
findings for the design of future UTP-monitoring systems and implementation of Directive 
2019/633 by Member States. 
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8 Characteristics of the Fruit Industry in Slovakia 
Jan Pokrivcak, Katarina Barathova, Miroslava Rajcaniova 
(Slovak University of Agriculture in Nitra) 
 
The fruit sector in Slovakia is one of the oldest branches of agricultural production. Slovakia, 
together with Austria and northern Italy, has some of the best conditions in Europe for growing 
temperate fruit. These conditions are the result of a favourable geographic location associated 
with good climatic and irrigation conditions. In addition, significant differences between night 
and day temperatures provide brightly coloured fruits with good flavour characteristics 
(Matoskova et al. 2010). However, this potential is not fully exploited in Slovakia. Despite 
favourable natural conditions, Slovakia has only a 0.32% share of total apple production in the 
EU. For the past several years, there have been labour shortages in the fruit-growing sector. 
Fruit growers are not able to collect all their crops, and for this reason many of them have 
reduced planting area. The Slovak Fruit Union estimates that it could not collect around 20,000 
tons of fruit from its members in 2018. 
8.1  Description of the fruit (apple) supply chain in Slovakia 
The main actors in the fruit value chain in Slovakia are input providers, fruit growers, producer 
organizations (POs), wholesalers and middlemen and retailers.  
Figure 8-1: Stylized representation of the fruit value chain in Slovakia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Explanation: Blue arrows refer to trade flows of unprocessed fruits, yellow arrows are trade flows of processed products. 
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According to data from the register of fruit orchards in Slovakia, there were 442 fruit-growing 
entities as of December 2017. Only 10% of them (45) are members of the Slovak Fruit Union. 
However, these 45 members together produced 85% of the total fruit production in Slovakia. 
The Slovak Fruit Union is an association engaged in the production of quality fruit, fruit plants, 
establishment and restoration of orchards and promotion of integrated fruit production. It also 
supports the association of its members into producer organizations (POs). 
In Slovakia there are two recognized producer organizations which bring together 23 fruit 
growers. Producer organization BONUM has 15 members: Plantex, s.r.o.; Bioplant, s.r.o.; Š. 
Ťažár, SHR; O. Ťažár, SHR; Danubius Fruct, s.r.o.; PD Hrušov; B. Ťažár, SHR; Pomi, s.r.o.; 
Agrislov, s.r.o.; Viliam Kompas, SHR; Dunaj Fruit, s.r.o.; Csicsói Alma, s.r.o; Žitava fruct, s.r.o.; 
Slovberry, s.r.o.; and Boni-fructi, spol. s r.o. These members together manage 800 ha of 
intensive orchards. Their total apple production is at the level of 17,000 t per year. The second 
producer organization, SK Fruit, has eight members: Fructop, spol. s r.o.; PD Trhové Mýto; PD 
Čachtice; PD Tvrdošovce; Agrotop Topoľníky; PD Prašice; Poľnohospodár Nové Zámky, a.s.; OVD 
– Ovocinárske družstvo. Together they manage approximately 700 ha of intensive orchards. 
Annual production of this PO reaches 15,000 t, consisting mainly of apples (93%), peaches (3%) 
and plums (3%). Although these POs together represent only 5% of all registered fruit-growing 
entities, their production in 2017 made up 81% of total fruit production in Slovakia.  
The main activity of producer organizations is concentrating the supply of production of its 
members and placing it on the market. For this reason, they are essential for the realization of 
the Common Market Organization. POs have a better bargaining position with buyers (especially 
supermarket chains) than individual farmers. Moreover, POs provide their members with 
coordination of cultivation practices, advise them in implementation and maintenance of quality 
systems, provide for centralised purchasing of chemicals and—most importantly—provide 
storage facilities and post-harvest treatment. PO BONUM sells fruit to other traders and 
middlemen and also directly to supermarkets. PO SK Fruit sells fruit to food-processing firms 
and other traders and middlemen, who then supply fruit to supermarkets. SK Fruit does not 
trade directly with supermarkets. Producer organizations are committed to buying at least 80% 
of its members’ production. 
Fruit growers who are not members of producer organizations sell their production through 
wholesalers and other intermediaries or use export companies. Wholesalers and other 
intermediaries purchase mainly produce of high quality in pre-specified quantities. Only a small 
proportion of growers who are not members of the POs deliver fruit directly to supermarkets.  
A large proportion of fruit growers, especially small growers, sell their production directly to final 
consumers. The farmers sell directly at the farm, and many farmers offer customers the option 
to self-pick. Some fruit growers process the fruit themselves, producing fruit juices, ciders, dried 
fruits, alcoholic beverages and other products. 
Many fruit growers deliver their products to the processing industry, as well as the HORECA 
sector (hotels, restaurants, catering). Other growers deliver fruit to fruit processing plants. In 
2017, the Slovak Canning Association consisted of only four companies that process fruits. 
Members include Novofruct SK, A+Z Rišnovský Halász, RISO-R, and Tomata, and they are 
primarily focused on the production of compotes and baby food. The main fruit used in their 
production is apples. In 2017 members of the Slovak Canning Association used 2,615 t of apples 
to produce various fruit products. Besides apples, they processed 2,259 t of other types of fruit 
(VUEPP 2018). Fruit in Slovakia is also processed by distilleries. The most important are Gas 
Familia, STOCK Slovensko, St. Nicolaus, Old Herold, and the Fruit Distillery Cooperation. Some 
growers sell non-standard fallen apples abroad (mainly to Austria, where large industrial canning 
plants are built). 
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9 Analysis of Unfair Trading Practices—Results of the 
Sample Survey 
 
Jan Pokrivcak, Katarina Barathova, Miroslava Rajcaniova 
(Slovak University of Agriculture in Nitra) 
 
In order to provide an assessment of the occurrence of UTPs in the fruit industry, we conducted 
a sample survey in the fruit netchain in Slovakia, with the primary focus being apple growers. 
The main objective was to estimate occurrence and pass-through of the 16 UTPs in Directive 
2019/633.  
We surveyed 66 farmers and six supermarket representatives. This chapter reports the results 
of the survey. 
 
9.1  Questionnaire design 
 
Following the B-SEA approach, the questionnaire was not tailored to the specific characteristics 
of the fruit chain but rather included the UTPs from Directive 2019/633 and a selection of 
practices identified during the literature review. 
 
9.1.1  The farmer questionnaire  
 
The farmer questionnaire was designed to cover the following main aspects: 
- general information about the farm and farm manager, 
- information about the trade relationship with the main buyer,  
- information about specific trade practices based on EU Directive on UTP, 
- information about other trade practices, and 
- overall evaluation of the trade relationship with the main buyer. 
The issues were investigated by asking the farmers to rate how often certain practices occurred 
in their relationship with the main buyer. When evaluating the severity and impact of UTPs, a 5-
point Likert scale was used. Questions with the possibility of multiple answers were used to 
identify farmers’ opinions about the reasons why certain practices occur. 
Because the measurement needs to relate to a specific trade relationship, the questions were 
centred on a relationship with the main buyer. The main buyer is the one who buys the largest 
share (in value) of apples/fruits in the current year. 
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9.1.2  The supermarket questionnaire  
 
The supermarket questionnaire has three main sections: information about the firm, the firm’s 
perception about a general overview of the industry and occurrence of UTPs, and information 
about the procurement channel. The structure of the questionnaire reflects general reluctance 
of retailers to participate in surveys and provide information about relationships with their 
suppliers and the practices they engage in. 
To gain a picture about retailers’ general overall perceptions of the industry, the respondents 
were asked to agree or disagree on a set of statements using a 5-point Likert scale. Regarding 
UTPs, they were asked to rate the likelihood of an occurrence of a group of practices also using 
a 5-point Likert scale. The last section of questionnaire was focused on the procurement channel 
of retailers—how it is organized, what are the most important criteria when choosing apple/fruit 
suppliers, information about commitments and delivery obligations, specific requirements and 
whether retailers have de-listed a supplier in the last five years and why.   
 
9.2  Sample description 
 
As a sampling frame we used the register of orchards in Slovakia, provided by the Central Control 
and Testing Institute in Agriculture (UKSUP). The database of UKSUP contains data on orchards 
for all fruit species grown in Slovakia. Many farms in Slovakia grow several fruit species. The 
survey focused on apple growers; however, due to the small number of apple farms and because 
of a low response rate, we included in the sample growers of other fruits. In total, 82% of 
surveyed farmers were apple growers. Data was collected mainly through face-to-face interviews 
(68%). Some farmers (32%) refused personal meetings but agreed to fill out an electronic or 
paper version of the questionnaire. Data was collected for the year 2018. Face-to-face interviews 
lasted on average between 45 minutes and an hour. 
 
9.2.1  Sampling approach 
 
The study implemented a stratified sampling procedure with a random selection of the final 
sample units (i.e., apple/fruit farms). The sample was stratified by orchard size. The sample 
design and data collection involved the following steps:  
1. In the first stage, a list of fruit growers in Slovakia was acquired from the Central Control 
and Testing Institute in Agriculture (UKSUP) which is responsible for the register of 
orchards in Slovakia.  
As of December 2017, there were 442 subjects growing fruit. However, in a majority of orchards 
with areas less than three ha, fruit is grown only for personal consumption; thus, these growers 
do not encounter unfair trading practices. Therefore, based on the data provided and a pilot 
phase, we excluded orchards smaller than one ha.  
2. In the second stage, the sampled fruit farms were randomly selected.  
The contact details for fruit farmers were provided together with database of fruit orchards by 
the Central Control and Testing Institute in Agriculture (UKSUP).  
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Table 9-1: Sample size of B-SEA farm survey 
  
N. of farms  
(in 2017, UKSUP) Sample 
 
Size of Fruit 
Orchard (ha) 
N. of fruit 
growers % 
N. of fruit 
growers % 
Weight 
1 - 10 ha  201 57% 27 41% 7.44 
10 - 50 ha 123 35% 30 45% 4.10 
50 - 100 19 5% 6 9% 3.17 
> 100 ha 9 3% 3 5% 3.00 
Total 352 100% 66 100% 5.33 
 
The sample selection was based on orchard size in order to include fruit growers of different 
sizes and reflect distribution at the national level. Table 9-1 shows the number of fruit farmers 
in Slovakia divided into groups according to fruit orchard size (in ha) and the distribution of the 
sample by fruit orchard size. The final sample consisted of 66 interviews. Fruit growers owning 
an orchard of less than ten ha represent 41% of our sample. Fruit growers with orchards bigger 
than ten but smaller than 50 ha are the most heavily represented in our sample (45%). The 
largest fruit growers, owning orchards of a size greater than 100 ha, represent 5% of our sample. 
They are also the smallest group among all fruit growers in Slovakia.  
The representativeness of a sample was checked by a chi-square test (χ2 test). Because χ2 = 
7.806 < critical value = 7.815 (alfa = 0.05), we fail to reject the null hypothesis, which means 
that the distribution in a sample does not significantly differ from the population distribution.  
In total, 176 farmers were contacted by phone and. They were explained the purpose of the 
survey. If they agreed to participate, the place and time of the interview (usually at home or at 
farm) were agreed. Some farmers preferred an electronic or paper version of the questionnaire 
rather than a personal meeting.  
The response rate was 37.5%. Farmers were reluctant to participate in the survey for several 
reasons. Some farmers did not want to share information about trade relationships with their 
buyers, since they consider this information confidential; moreover, they were afraid that 
participation in the survey could threaten the trade relationship with their main buyer. Therefore, 
the reluctance to participate can be partly attributed to “fear factor”. Fear factor was implied as 
a reason not to participate in approximately 20% of cases. Around 9% of contacted farmers had 
newly established orchards without any harvest yet. Fifteen percent of contacted farmers 
reported that the orchards they own are old and abandoned and do not produce for the market. 
The rest of the contacted farmers declined to participate in the interview mainly because they 
have very small orchards and small production of apples. They organize fruit self-picking at their 
farms. Moreover, 19% of farmers who agreed to a personal meeting sell production to final 
consumers and therefore do not face UTPs. These farmers are small and therefore unable to 
deliver production to shops and retailers.  
For the B-SEA supermarkets questionnaire, all big supermarket chains (11) in Slovakia were 
contacted. The Slovak market is dominated by foreign supermarket chains, which account for 
approximately 80% of total food retail turnover. These chains include Tesco, Lidl, Kaufland, Billa 
and Metro. There are also Slovak supermarket chains which have important positions on the 
market: Fresh Market, CBA Slovakia, Coop Jednota, Terno, Yeme and Nitrazdroj. Six 
representatives of supermarkets (both domestic and foreign) agreed to participate in the survey.  
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9.3  Results of the BSEA farmer sample survey  
 
9.3.1  Farm characteristics 
 
In recent years, the number of fruit farmers has increased slightly in Slovakia. In our survey, 
family farms make up only 20% of all respondents, private corporations make up 62%, and the 
remaining 18% are cooperatives.  
Forty-four percent of fruit growers specialize in apple production, 6% of farms grow various 
types of fruit, and 50% of fruit growers do not specialise specifically in fruit production but also 
cultivate other crops and keep animals, too. The average size of the farms that grow fruits is 
729.8 ha, while the average size of an apple orchard is 28.3 ha. 
Regarding storage facilities, 62% of farms do not have on-farm storage, 12% have on-farm 
storage for the entire production and the rest (26%) have on-farm storage for some portion of 
the output.  
Interviews were conducted with farm managers (94% of cases). Males manage 82% of the 
surveyed fruit farms. Farm managers usually work exclusively and full-time on the farm (91%). 
The average age of farm managers is 51 years. The level of education attained by managers is 
in the majority of cases a university degree or higher (67%), while the rest (33%) received at 
least a high school diploma. 
 
Table 9-2: Selected characteristics of farms in the fruit sector 
Type of farm: 
                 - Family farm 19.7% 
                 - Incorporated 62.1% 
                 - Cooperative 18.2% 
Farm’s turnover (in mil. EUR) 
0 - 2 mil. EUR 66.7% 
2 - 10 mil. EUR 31.8% 
10 - 50 mil. EUR 1.5% 
Specialization of the farm   
Specialized in apple production 44% 
Specialized in fruit 6% 
Not specialized 18% 
Specialized in other 32% 
Apple varieties   
Club 33% 
Free 100% 
Average size of the farm (ha) 729.8 
Average size of apple (fruit) orchard (ha) 28.3 (9.0) 
 
9.3.2  Farmers’ marketing channels  
 
Almost 26% of the fruit growers surveyed are members of POs. Sixty-four percent of the 
surveyed farmers sell their production to private traders. Only 14% of farmers deliver their 
production directly to retailers (either small or large). Thirty-five percent of farmers stated that 
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
77 
 
they deliver their production through other channels, namely processors (e.g., baby food 
producers, juice producers, distilleries). A majority of farmers (84.8%) sell their production 
directly to consumers or at farmer markets. In recent years, a popular form of selling different 
kinds of fruits is organising self-picking. Twenty percent of farms sell their entire production only 
through self-picking. 
Table 9-3: Sales channels used by surveyed farmers 
Sales channels % of farmers 
Local traders 45.45% 
Other traders 18.18% 
Coop/PO  25.76% 
Consumers 84.85% 
Small retailers 1.52% 
Large retailers 12.12% 
Other 34.85% 
 
9.3.3  Main buyer  
 
Investigation of the occurrence of UTPs focuses on the trade relationship between the farmer 
and the main buyer. In this section we describe findings about the trade relationships of farmers 
with their main buyers.  
In Slovakia, members must deliver at least 80% of their production to POs. Therefore, POs are 
the main buyers for all their members (26% of respondents). Small farmers selling directly to 
consumers make up 20% of all respondents. Twenty-eight percent of farmers sell to private 
traders. Less than 10% of farmers deliver directly to retailers. The remaining 17% sell to other 
buyers (baby food producers, juice producers, distilleries, etc.). Farmers deliver to their main 
buyer on average 73% of their production. All apple farmers deliver free apple varieties to their 
main buyer, and 31% reported they also deliver club apple varieties.  
Table 9-4: Type of the main buyer 
Main buyer % of farmers Average orchard size (ha) 
Local traders 16.67% 12.91 
Other traders 10.61% 11.89 
Coop/PO 25.76% 49.08 
Consumers or farmer markets 19.70% 7.94 
Small retailers 1.52% 9.00 
Large retailers 9.09% 11.08 
Other 16.67% 36.05 
Total 100% 24.76 
 
Farmers were asked about the size of their main buyer (Table 9-5). Twenty-four percent of 
farmers were not able to estimate the turnover of their main buyer, while 44% of farmers 
identified their main buyer as a firm with turnover above 10 mil. EUR. Ninety-eight-and-a-half 
percent of farmers have a turnover less than 10 mil. EUR (Table 9-2), which implies buyers are 
bigger and more powerful than farmers. From this point of view, the fear factor can be justified. 
The bigger the imbalance of power between farmer and buyer, the bigger the farmer’s fear of 
possible retaliation.  
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Table 9-5: Size of the main buyer (turnover in mil. EUR) 
Turnover of the main 
buyer in mil. EUR % of farmers 
0 - 2 mil. EUR 1.52 
2 - 10 mil. EUR 10.61 
10 - 50 mil. EUR 28.79 
50 - 150 mil. EUR 9.09 
150 - 350 mil. EUR 0.00 
Exceed. 350 mil. EUR 6.06 
Don’t know 24.24 
Selling to consumers only 19.70 
Total 100.00 
 
Table 9-6: Ranking of two main reasons for a decision to trade with a main buyer 
  
1st main reason 
(% of farmers) 
2nd main reason 
(% of farmers) 
Best price 7.58 7.58 
Best overall terms  16.67 21.21 
Takes large volumes 39.39 13.64 
Reputation 3.03 4.55 
Is the only buyer I can sell to 7.58 13.64 
Proximity 6.06 7.58 
Non-business related reasons 0.00 6.06 
Technical assistance 0.00 0.00 
Services 0.00 6.06 
N.A. 19.70 19.70 
 
Regarding the length of trade relationships, 38% of the surveyed farmers declared their trade 
relationship with the main buyer to last longer than 10 years. Fourteen percent of farmers stated 
they had a trade relationship with the main buyer for less than ten but more than five years; 
48% of farmers have had a trade relationship with the main buyer for less than five years; and 
21% stated they had traded with their main buyer only once.  
 
In the context of the trade relationship’s length, it is interesting to look at the factors which fruit 
farmers consider as the most important reasons to trade with their main buyer. Farmers were 
asked to rank the two most important reasons for trading with their main buyer from a list of 
options (Table 9-6). Most of the surveyed farmers (40%) chose “buyer takes large volumes” as 
the most important reason. “Best overall terms” were chosen by 17% of surveyed farmers. 
Price—one of the most crucial factors in any trade relationship—was chosen by only 8% of 
farmers as the main reason for a trade relationship with a main buyer. The same number of 
farmers chose “best price” as the second most important reason. “Best overall terms” offered 
by a buyer were ranked by 21% of farmers as the second most important reason in a trade 
relationship with the main buyer.  
Concerning farmers’ satisfaction with their main buyer, 24% of farmers stated they are totally 
satisfied. Almost 29% of farmers said they are satisfied but open to new opportunities. By 
contrast, 30% of farmers stated they are not satisfied and thus are either looking for 
alternatives, will change buyer soon, or simply have no other options. Satisfaction considerably 
differs according to the type of main buyer.  
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Table 9-7: Satisfaction with the main buyer 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
N.A.  0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
Yes, totally 22.22 47.06 0.00 14.29 27.27 24.24 
Yes, but I am open to new opportunities 22.22 52.94 0.00 28.57 36.36 28.79 
No, I am looking for alternatives 27.78 0.00 0.00 57.14 0.00 13.64 
No, I will change buyers soon 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.36 10.61 
No, but I have no other options 11.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.03 
No but I have non-business/personal 
reasons to keep the buyer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 9-8: Farmers’ evaluation of main buyer's marketing skills in promoting and selling the 
product to the retailer/consumer 
  Local traders 
Other 
traders Coop/PO Consumers 
Small 
retailers 
Large 
retailers Other Total 
N.A.  0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
Very strong 
negotiator 0.00 14.29 23.53 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 9.09 
Strong 
negotiator 18.18 28.57 23.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.18 15.15 
Average 
negotiator 9.09 14.29 41.18 0.00 0.00 83.33 18.18 24.24 
Poor 
negotiator 9.09 14.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.09 4.55 
Very poor 
negotiator 27.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.55 
Don't know 36.36 28.57 11.76 0.00 100.00 0.00 54.55 22.73 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Farmers were also asked to evaluate the marketing skills of their main buyers (Table 9-8). While 
23% of farmers were not able to evaluate it, 24% of respondents think their main buyer is an 
average negotiator. Looking more closely at the results according to the type of buyer, 47% of 
PO members consider a PO to be a strong or very strong negotiator.  
It is well established in the literature that an imbalance in the bargaining power of trade partners 
is one of the factors for the occurrence of UTPs. The ability to easily replace a trading partner 
can be partly perceived as a sign of more power in a trade relationship. We asked farmers if 
their main buyer could easily find other farmers to replace them, and if farmers could replace 
the main buyer easily. The following two tables report farmers’ perceptions about the ability to 
replace and to be replaced, by the type of main buyer. 
Table 9-9: Can the buyer find other farmers to replace you as a trade partner? 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
N.A.  0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
Yes, easily 50.00 0.00 0.00 71.43 63.64 31.82 
Yes, with some effort 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.09 
Not easily 16.67 0.00 0.00 28.57 36.36 13.64 
Cannot be replaced 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
I am a member of the buyer (coop/PO) 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.76 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 9-10: Can you replace the buyer easily? 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
N.A.  0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
Yes, easily 22.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.06 
Yes, but it would be costly 50.00 17.65 0.00 85.71 36.36 33.33 
No, I cannot 27.78 82.35 0.00 14.29 63.64 40.91 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Our results show that farmers selling to middlemen, retailers and also to other buyers perceive 
themselves as more easily replaceable than those who sell to POs. On the other hand, 41% of 
farmers reported that they cannot replace their main buyer because it would be too costly (81%), 
there is no other buyer (70%) and the farmer has non-business/personal obligations (11%). 
Thirty-three percent reported they can replace their buyer, but it would be too costly—contract 
terms would be worse (59%), on-farm investments would be required (50%), farmer would have 
to pay an exit fee (9%). As these results imply, the costs are higher when trading with private 
traders, retailers and other buyers than with POs. 
 
9.3.4  Information about the trade relationship with the main buyer  
 
Farmers were asked how their transactions with the main buyer are organized. With respect to 
supply agreement, 44% of farmers have no supply agreement with the main buyer, and 3% 
have only an informal agreement. The most prevalent form of organization of transactions is a 
formal supply agreement with no orders. This category consists mainly of PO members.  
When the buyer has a commitment to buy a certain amount of production, farmers enjoy more 
certainty, because they do not have to worry that the buyers will refuse their production. On the 
other hand, buyers (traders, retailers) want to be sure that farmers will deliver the agreed 
amount, and therefore supply agreements may specify this obligation. We asked farmers 
whether their buyer has a commitment to buy products and whether farmers have a delivery 
obligation. 
Table 9-11: Organization of transactions with the main buyer 
  
No Supply 
Agreement 
Informal 
Supply 
Agreement 
Formal 
Supply 
Agreement 
No orders  24.24 0.00 25.76 
Informal orders 18.18 3.03 6.06 
Formal orders 1.52 0.00 21.21 
Total % of farmers 43.94 3.03 53.03 
 
Table 9-12: Does the buyer have a commitment to buy? 
  Private Traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
N.A. 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
Yes, total production 0.00 17.65 0.00 0.00 18.18 7.58 
Yes, a minimum quantity 5.56 82.35 0.00 0.00 9.09 24.24 
No 94.44 0.00 0.00 100.00 72.73 48.48 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 9-13: Do you have a delivery obligation? 
  
Private 
Traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
N.A. 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
Yes, total production 0.00 11.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.03 
Yes, a minimum quantity 5.56 88.24 0.00 14.29 9.09 27.27 
Yes, any quantity the buyer asks for 5.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.45 9.09 
No 88.89 0.00 0.00 85.71 45.45 40.91 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
In 25% of cases, farmers reported that their buyers have a commitment to buy a minimum 
quantity, and another 8% reported that their buyers have a commitment to buy their total 
production. These buyer commitments were mainly reported by members of POs. In 95% of 
cases these commitments are formal.  
On the other hand, all members of POs reported that they have a delivery obligation either for 
total production (12%) or for a minimum quantity (88%). Compared to other buyers, this implies 
a more balanced relationship between POs and their members. In the case of other buyers, 55% 
of farmers reported they have obligation to deliver either a minimum quantity or any quantity 
the buyer asks, but only 25% of farmers reported that the buyer also has a commitment to buy 
their production. Ninety-two percent of farmers reported that they have a formal obligation.  
The price of a product, quantity the buyer is willing to buy and quantity the farmer is able to 
deliver are key elements in any trade relationship. Table 9-14 implies a level of uncertainty when 
it comes to a price, since the majority of farmers have a reliable estimate of the selling price 
after harvest or after the products have been delivered to the buyer.  
Table 9-14: When do you have a reliable estimate of the sale price of your fruit/apples? 
  
Private 
Traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
N.A. 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
When planting the new trees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Before the harvest season 11.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.36 9.09 
After harvest 72.22 0.00 0.00 42.86 63.64 34.85 
After the products have been 
delivered to the buyer 16.67 100.00 0.00 57.14 0.00 36.36 
After the buyer sells the products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Regarding the estimate of the quantity the buyer will buy, only 11% of farmers have a long-
term agreement that specifies quantity, and 29% of farmers have a reliable estimate before the 
harvest of the quantity the buyer will buy every year. This is especially true in the case of POs 
and other buyers. In the case of retailers, farmers tend to receive unpredictable orders 
throughout the year.  
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Table 9-15: When do you have a reliable estimate of the quantity the buyer will buy? 
  
Private 
Traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
N.A. 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
When planting the new trees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
I have a long-term agreement that 
specifies quantity  11.11 17.65 0.00 0.00 18.18 10.61 
Yearly, before harvest season 16.67 58.82 0.00 14.29 45.45 28.79 
Yearly, after harvest 55.56 17.65 0.00 14.29 27.27 25.76 
Receive unpredictable orders 
throughout the year 16.67 5.88 0.00 71.43 9.09 15.15 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Decisions about what and how to produce are exclusively in the hands of the farmer, but buyers 
may have special requirements regarding the product or production process. While 47% of 
farmers reported they have to follow general standards, one third of farmers must follow specific 
instructions and 42% must comply with product standards. Specific instructions are especially 
required by retailers and other buyers, while product standards are required by private traders 
and POs.  
Table 9-16: The farmer follows the buyer’s production specifications (multiple answer) 
  
Private 
Traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
N.A.  0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 19.70 
No, free to produce what and how 
he/she wants  38.89 11.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.64 
Yes, must follow general standards 
(global gap, etc.) 33.33 88.24 0.00 14.29 81.82 46.97 
Yes, must follow specific instructions 
(harvesting, delivery time, etc.)  11.11 35.29 0.00 71.43 81.82 33.33 
Yes, must comply with product 
standards 55.56 64.71 0.00 28.57 45.45 42.42 
Yes, must use buyer’s on-farm 
technical assistance  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Yes, must grow required varieties  0.00 5.88 0.00 0.00 27.27 6.06 
 
However, meeting these requirements is not always easy, with 50% of the surveyed farmers 
finding it difficult to do and 48% saying it is not so easy. Some farmers stated they would not 
be able to comply with these requirements without technical assistance (2%). We asked farmers 
what happens if they fail to comply with product specifications. As Table 9-17 shows, light and 
severe violations lead mainly to price reductions or fines, while repeated violations cause 
reductions in future orders.  
Farmers were also asked to evaluate the consequences for the buyer if they fail to fulfil product 
specifications. Most of the farmers (91%) reported that, in the case of a light violation, the 
consequences for buyer are minimal. According to farmers, severe and repeated violations lead 
to increases in the buyer’s costs.  
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
83 
 
Table 9-17: What are the consequences you might expect if you fail to comply with the product 
specification (if any)? (multiple answer) 
 Light violation Severe violation Repeated violation 
Nothing/minimal 27.27 0.00 0.00 
Price reductions/fines 77.27 52.27 11.36 
Product rejection 2.27 88.64 47.73 
Reduction in future 
orders 0.00 31.82 75.00 
Non-renewal at 
expiration 0.00 2.27 9.09 
Contract termination 0.00 0.00 13.64 
 
Table 9-18: What are the consequences for your main buyer if you fail to comply with the product 
specification? (multiple answer) 
  Light violation 
Severe 
violation 
Repeated 
violation 
Minimal (can reject and replace 
the product easily) 90.91 20.45 15.91 
Cost increase (can reject and 
replace at a cost) 13.64 81.82 65.91 
Critical (cannot reject or replace, 
lost business opportunities) 0.00 0.00 9.09 
Reduction in future orders 0.00 0.00 9.09 
 
A written contract defines and regulates the relationship between trade partners by setting the 
conditions under which fruit will be delivered and clarifying the most important elements (prices, 
quality, and quantity). The written form of a contract is important in order to take legal action 
towards a trading partner in the event of a breach of contract terms. Farmers in our survey have 
with their main buyer either a formal contract (38%) or a contract based on membership in a 
PO (28%). Twenty-six percent of farmers reported they have no agreement with a buyer. These 
farmers sell fruit directly to consumers or trade with private traders.  
Table 9-19: The terms of the contract/agreement are the same for all farmers in the area 
  
Private 
Traders Coop/PO Consumers Retailers Other Total 
A formal contract 61.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 63.6 37.9 
An informal/tacit/customary agreement 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.4 9.1 
Coop/PO membership 5.6 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 
No agreement (spot markets) 22.2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 25.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sometimes, farmers are able to negotiate with their main buyer special terms which are different 
from the contracts of other farmers. Only 22% of farmers reported that the terms of their 
contract are different from those of other farmers in the area. But 59% of farmers stated that 
they actually do not know what type of contract is offered to other farmers. 
The way in which the contract terms are agreed upon between trading partners reflects the 
(im)balance of power of the contracted parties. When the contract terms are imposed by the 
buyer with no room for negotiation, it implies that the buyer is much more powerful. Eighteen 
percent of farmers said that terms of contract are fully imposed by the buyer, while 6% said 
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there is only a little room for negotiation. This way of making agreements occurs particularly in 
the case of private traders.   
Table 9-20: The terms of the contract/agreement 
  
Private 
Traders Coop/PO Retailers Others Total 
Imposed by the buyer (take it or leave) 35.7 5.9 0.0 27.3 18.4 
There is little room for negotiation 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 
Key terms (such as, price, quantity or quality) are 
negotiated 35.7 11.8 42.9 45.5 30.6 
The entire contract/agreement is negotiated 7.1 82.4 57.1 27.3 44.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Regarding the duration of the contract, more than half of farmers (51%) reported that they have 
a contract for a fixed period. Ninety-one percent of these farmers reported a duration of one 
year, and 9% reported a duration of five years. Five percent of farmers stated that the duration 
of the contract is not clear to them. The rest of the farmers stated that there is no expiration 
date (45%). 
Regardless of the form of the contract (formal or informal), farmers were asked if they would 
like to continue trading with the same buyer in the future. Forty-two percent of farmers reported 
they would like to continue, 12% of farmers do not want to continue, and the rest of farmers 
are undecided. Eighty-eight percent of farmers want to continue in a trade relationship with POs. 
The biggest number of farmers (57%) do not want to continue in a trade with retailers. 
 
Table 9-21: Do you expect to trade with the same buyer after the expiration of the contract (or 
in the future, if no contract)? 
 
Private 
Traders Coop/PO Retailers Others Total 
N.A. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.7 
Yes 22.2 88.2 14.3 72.7 42.4 
Maybe  44.4 11.8 28.6 18.2 21.2 
No 16.7 0.0 57.1 9.1 12.1 
I don’t know 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Farmers were asked to choose and rank up to three contract terms they would like to change. 
Fifty-five percent of farmers would welcome a change in pricing rules in the first place. Answers 
are more diverse for the second and third terms they would like to change (Table 9-22).  
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Table 9-22: If you could change one or more terms of the trade relationship, which one(s) would 
you choose? 
  1st term 2nd term 3rd term 
Pricing rules 54.55 12.12 10.61 
Timing of payments (late payments, etc.) 4.55 1.52 15.15 
Buyer’s production requirements 0.00 10.61 4.55 
Product quality standards 9.09 18.18 7.58 
Quality testing/rejection 6.06 9.09 24.24 
Upfront payments 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fines or liabilities for standard violations 0.00 4.55 1.52 
Liability for product wastage 0.00 1.52 4.55 
Short notice on orders 0.00 6.06 0.00 
Buyer’s order cancelation on short notice 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Investment requirement 0.00 1.52 0.00 
Buyer’s lack of commitment to buy the product 4.55 3.03 1.52 
Delivery obligations 1.52 10.61 3.03 
Buyer’s unilateral renegotiations 0.00 0.00 4.55 
Duration of contract: too short 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Duration of contract: too long 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N.A. 19.70 19.70 19.70 
 
9.3.5  Information about specific trade practices (based on EU UTP Directive) 
 
The following section of the questionnaire focused on the occurrence of practices listed in the EU 
Directive on UTPs. For each practice, farmers were asked a series of same/similar questions. 
First, they were asked how often a certain practice occurs and how severe the impact of the 
practice is on their business. In case a practice causes an important problem for them, they were 
also asked whether they are able to give a rough estimate of the cost of this practice for their 
business per year. Farmers were also asked to evaluate the fairness/unfairness of the practice 
on their business with a 5-point Likert scale. Lastly, they were asked to give an opinion why the 
practice is in place.  
Late payments for perishable food 
Fruits are perishable products. A product should be considered perishable if it can be expected 
to become unfit for sale within 30 days from the last act of harvesting, production or processing 
by the supplier. This is regardless of whether the product is further processed after sale and 
regardless of whether after sale the product is handled in accordance with other applicable rules, 
in particular food safety rules. Late or slow payments are a massive problem, especially for small 
businesses. According to the EU Directive on UTP, payments after 30 or more calendar days 
following receipt of the supplier’s invoice, or payments after 30 calendar days following the 
delivery, are prohibited.  
We asked farmers questions related to payments for their products and whether there are delays 
in payments from their main buyer. As Table 9-23 shows, the majority of farmers send the 
invoice to the buyer either at delivery or before (48%) or within 30 days from delivery (27%).  
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Table 9-23: When is the invoice sent to the buyer? 
  N.A. 
At delivery 
or before 
Within 
30 days 
from 
delivery 
After more 
than 30 days 
from delivery 
At the end of 
the season/ 
at agreed 
upon times 
There is 
no 
invoice Total 
Private traders 0.00 83.33 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 47.06 35.29 0.00 17.65 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 57.14 42.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 45.45 54.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 48.48 27.27 0.00 4.55 0.00 100.00 
Table 9-24: How often are payments late? 
  N.A. Never Seldom Sometimes Often  
Very 
often 
Almost 
always Always Total 
Private traders 0.00 50.00 5.56 27.78 11.11 0.00 5.56 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 76.47 17.65 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 0.00 14.29 28.57 14.29 0.00 42.86 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 36.36 9.09 18.18 0.00 9.09 27.27 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 39.39 9.09 15.15 4.55 1.52 10.61 0.00 100.00 
 
Delays in payments seem to be an important issue. Thirty-two percent of farmers reported 
payment from the main buyer is sometimes to always late. This issue is associated primarily 
with retailers and other buyers. There is significant difference between POs and other buyers, 
with 76% of farmers reporting that payments from POs are never late.  
Late payments pose an important problem for 44% of farmers, and for 26% it is an unsustainable 
problem in the long-run. However, when asked to estimate the cost of this practice for their 
business per year, 90% of farmers were not able to answer. The average estimate by the rest 
of the farmers was 12,500 EUR/year. Most of the farmers consider this practice unfair or totally 
unfair.  
 
Table 9-25: How severe is the impact of late payments on your business, and do you consider 
the practice fair or unfair?  
Impact severity of 
practice % of farmers 
 Impact of practice % of farmers 
An inconsequential problem 7.41%  Totally unfair 37.04 
A mild problem 18.52%  Unfair 55.56 
An important problem 44.44%  Neither fair nor unfair 7.41 
A severe problem 3.70%  Fair 0.00 
An unsustainable problem in 
the long-run 25.93%  Totally fair 0.00 
 
Table 9-26: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because:  
  % of farmers 
The buyer wants to increase its profits 29.63 
The buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices 14.81 
It’s customary 22.22 
The buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to his/her customers 0.00 
The buyer knows I cannot do anything about it, although this creates 
problems for me 77.78 
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
87 
 
 
When asked why this practice is in place, 78% of farmers think that buyers are late with 
payments because they know farmers can do nothing about it.  
Short-notice cancelation of orders 
Cancelling orders on short notice does not allow producers to find an alternative to market or 
use their products, posing a significant problem for all producers. This is particularly an issue for 
farmers, since the perishable nature of their products decreases the time they have to find an 
alternative in case the buyer cancels orders. According to the UTP Directive, a notice of less than 
30 days is considered short.  
We asked farmers how often their main buyer cancels orders on short notice. According to the 
results, short-notice cancelation of orders does not seem to be a serious issue in the fruit sector. 
Only 9% reported that it happens often or very often and only in relationship with private traders. 
For a majority of these farmers (54%), this issue poses an important problem. 
Table 9-27: How often do buyers cancel orders on such short notice that it is not possible to find 
another buyer offering similar conditions? 
 N.A. Never Seldom Sometimes Often 
Very 
often 
Almost 
always Always Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 22.22 33.33 11.11 16.67 16.67 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 58.82 35.29 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 28.57 0.00 71.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 81.82 9.09 9.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 37.88 19.70 13.64 4.55 4.55 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 
Table 9-28: How severe is the impact of this practice on your business, and do you consider the 
practice fair or unfair?  
Impact severity of 
practice % of farmers 
 Impact of practice % of farmers 
An inconsequential problem 7.14  Totally unfair  32.14 
A mild problem 25.00  Unfair  53.57 
An important problem 53.57  Neither fair nor unfair 14.29 
A severe problem 10.71  Fair 0.00 
An unsustainable problem in 
the long-run 3.57  Totally fair  0.00 
 
Most of the farmers (68%) think that the practice is in place not only because the buyer is 
reacting to somebody else’s practices, but also because the buyer is aware that farmers can do 
nothing about it (57%). 
Table 9-29: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because:  
 % of farmers 
The buyer wants to increase its profits 7.14 
The buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices 67.86 
It’s customary 25.00 
The buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to his/her customers 0.00 
The buyer knows I cannot do anything about that although this creates 
problems for me 57.14 
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Unilateral renegotiation of the contract/agreement 
When it comes to changes in the supply agreement, 20% of farmers (those who have 
formal/informal multi-order contracts or agreements) reported that every order has its own 
rules. For 35% of farmers there is a change in the supply agreement once a year. Six percent 
of farmers stated there are changes more than once a year.  
 
Changes in the supply agreement are not necessarily considered bad or unfair. It depends how 
these changes are made. In order to consider any change as fair, it should be agreed between 
both parties. However, when changes are imposed, it might be considered an unfair practice. 
The following tables show the changes in different terms of contracts/agreements experienced 
by the surveyed farmers, as per type of buyer.  
 
Table 9-30: On average, how often do the terms of the contract/agreement change? 
 
Any order 
has its 
own rules 
More than 
once a 
year 
Once a 
year 
Less than 
once a 
year 
Less than 
once every 
three 
years 
Only at 
expiration 
(if any) Never Total 
Private 
traders 50.00 0.00 14.29 0.00 0.00 21.43 14.29 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 0.00 76.47 0.00 17.65 5.88 0.00 100.00 
Consumers         
Retailers 42.86 0.00 14.29 0.00 0.00 42.86 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 27.27 9.09 27.27 0.00 18.18 18.18 100.00 
Total 20.41 6.12 34.69 6.12 6.12 18.37 8.16 100.00 
 
Table 9-31: Changes in prices 
 Changes in prices 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Not negotiated (imposed) 20.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 20.00 
Negotiated in part 60.00 41.18 75.00 0.00 37.14 
Entirely negotiated 20.00 47.06 25.00 33.33 37.14 
Not renegotiated 0.00 11.76 0.00 0.00 5.71 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 9-32: Changes in terms of payments and delivery 
  Changes in terms of payments Changes in terms of delivery 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Not negotiated 
(imposed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 17.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 44.44 11.43 
Negotiated in 
part 0.00 5.88 25.00 0.00 5.71 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 2.86 
Entirely 
negotiated 100.00 76.47 75.00 33.33 68.57 80.00 88.24 75.00 55.56 77.14 
Not 
renegotiated 0.00 17.65 0.00 0.00 8.57 20.00 11.76 0.00 0.00 8.57 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 9-33: Changes in quality and quantity 
  Changes in quality Changes in quantity 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Not negotiated 
(imposed) 20.00 0.00 75.00 44.44 22.86 40.00 0.00 0.00 22.22 11.43 
Negotiated in 
part 60.00 29.41 0.00 0.00 22.86 40.00 11.76 25.00 44.44 25.71 
Entirely 
negotiated 20.00 70.59 25.00 55.56 54.29 20.00 70.59 75.00 33.33 54.29 
Not 
renegotiated 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.65 0.00 0.00 8.57 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 9-34: Changes in investments and services 
  Changes in investments Changes in services 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Not negotiated 
(imposed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Negotiated in 
part 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.88 0.00 0.00 2.86 
Entirely 
negotiated 0.00 76.47 25.00 22.22 45.71 80.00 70.59 25.00 0.00 48.57 
Not 
renegotiated 100.00 23.53 75.00 77.78 54.29 20.00 23.53 75.00 100.00 48.57 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
The most problematic is the renegotiation of changes in prices and quality. In the case of prices, 
20% of farmers reported that these changes are imposed on them. In the case of changes in 
quality, 23% of respondents reported that changes are imposed. Specifically, this is a problem 
when the main buyer is a retailer.  
Table 9-35: How severe is the impact of this practice on your business, and do you consider the 
practice fair or unfair? 
Impact severity of practice % of farmers  Impact of practice % of farmers 
Inconsequential 51.43  Totally unfair  0.00 
A mild problem 20.00  Unfair  25.71 
An important problem 17.14  Neither fair nor unfair 60.00 
A severe problem 11.43  Fair 14.29 
An unsustainable problem in the 
long-run 0.00  Totally fair  0.00 
 
Eighty-nine percent of farmers think these practices occur because it is customary. This implies 
that farmers perceive renegotiation as an ordinary practice in the industry, which also explains 
why a majority of farmers consider these changes neither fair nor unfair.  
Table 9-36: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because: 
 % of farmers 
The buyer wants to increase its profits 11.43 
The buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices 11.43 
It’s customary 88.57 
The buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to his/her customers 0.00 
The buyer knows I cannot do anything about that although this creates 
problems for me 34.29 
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Unilateral renegotiation of single orders 
We asked farmers the same questions related to the renegotiation of single orders. The following 
tables report the farmers’ answers. 
Table 9-37: How often are the terms of the order changed, after the order has been placed? 
 Never Seldom Sometimes Often 
Very 
often 
Almost 
always Always Total 
Private traders 27.78 11.11 22.22 38.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 23.53 64.71 11.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 14.29 85.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Other 54.55 9.09 36.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 28.30 28.30 30.19 13.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 
Thirty percent of farmers reported that single orders are changed sometimes, and 13% reported 
that these changes happen often. Again, the way these changes are negotiated is important, 
because the change does not always result in worse conditions.   
Table 9-38: Changes in prices 
 Changes in prices 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Not negotiated (imposed) 69.23 7.69 57.14 0.00 36.84 
Negotiated in part 15.38 61.54 14.29 80.00 39.47 
Entirely negotiated 15.38 7.69 28.57 20.00 15.79 
Not renegotiated 0.00 23.08 0.00 0.00 7.89 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 9-39: Changes in terms of payments and delivery 
  Changes in terms of payment Changes in terms of delivery 
 
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Not negotiated 
(imposed) 30.77 0.00 14.29 0.00 13.16 7.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.63 
Negotiated in 
part 46.15 38.46 57.14 0.00 39.47 53.85 30.77 28.57 20.00 36.84 
Entirely 
negotiated 23.08 61.54 28.57 0.00 34.21 30.77 53.85 57.14 60.00 47.37 
Not 
renegotiated 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 13.16 7.69 15.38 14.29 20.00 13.16 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table 9-40: Changes in quality and quantity 
  Changes in quality Changes in quantity 
  
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Not 
negotiated 
(imposed) 38.46 38.46 0.00 0.00 26.32 38.46 0.00 14.29 0.00 15.79 
Negotiated in 
part 53.85 38.46 57.14 0.00 42.11 53.85 46.15 0.00 20.00 36.84 
Entirely 
negotiated 7.69 23.08 42.86 60.00 26.32 7.69 38.46 85.71 80.00 42.11 
Not 
renegotiated 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 5.26 0.00 15.38 0.00 0.00 5.26 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 9-41: Changes in investments and services 
 Changes in investments Changes in services 
 
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Private 
traders Coop/PO Retailers Other Total 
Not 
negotiated 
(imposed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Negotiated in 
part 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.69 7.69 0.00 0.00 5.26 
Entirely 
negotiated 15.38 0.00 28.57 0.00 10.53 38.46 7.69 14.29 0.00 18.42 
Not 
renegotiated 84.62 100.00 71.43 100.00 89.47 53.85 84.62 85.71 100.00 76.32 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Thirty-six percent of farmers reported that changes in prices are not negotiated (imposed), and 
26% of farmers reported that changes in quality are imposed on them. Imposed changes in 
prices refer mainly to private traders and retailers, while changes in quality refer mainly to 
private traders and POs.  
 
Table 9-42: How severe is the impact of this practice on your business, and do you consider the 
practice fair or unfair? 
Impact severity of 
practice % of farmers 
 Impact of practice % of farmers 
An inconsequential problem 10.53  Totally unfair  10.53 
A mild problem 36.84  Unfair  50.00 
An important problem 36.84  Neither fair nor unfair 34.21 
A severe problem 13.16  Fair 2.63 
An unsustainable problem in 
the long-run 2.63  Totally fair  2.63 
 
Table 9-43: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because: 
 % of farmers 
The buyer wants to increase its profits  13.16 
The buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices  36.84 
It’s customary  57.89 
The buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to his/her 
customers  0.00 
The buyer knows I cannot do anything about that although 
this creates problems for me 52.63 
 
Payments not related to sales of the supplier’s agri-food product 
Another practice which the EU Directive marks as “black” is payments required by the buyer 
which are not related to a specific transaction. We asked farmers whether this is an issue in fruit 
sector.  
As results show, 15% of farmers reported that their buyers require these kinds of payments 
often, and less than 2% reported that it happens always. Only 24% of farmers saw it as an 
important problem, and 60% of farmers consider this practice as fair or totally fair.  
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Table 9-44: How often does the buyer ask for payments not directly related to the sales of 
your product? 
 N.A. Never Seldom Sometimes Often 
Very 
often 
Almost 
always Always Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 88.89 0.00 5.56 5.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 0.00 23.53 41.18 29.41 0.00 0.00 5.88 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 14.29 0.00 28.57 57.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 42.42 6.06 15.15 15.15 0.00 0.00 1.52 100.00 
 
Table 9-45: How severe is the impact of this practice on your business, and do you consider the 
practice fair or unfair? 
Impact severity of practice % of farmers 
 
Impact of practice % of farmers 
An inconsequential problem 28.00  Totally unfair  8.00 
A mild problem 48.00  Unfair  20.00 
An important problem 24.00  Neither fair nor unfair 12.00 
A severe problem 0.00  Fair 48.00 
An unsustainable problem in the 
long-run 0.00  Totally fair  12.00 
 
Table 9-46: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because: 
 % of farmers 
Buyer wants to increase its profits  4.00 
Buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices  0.00 
It’s customary  64.00 
Buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to his/her 
customers  32.00 
Buyer knows I cannot do anything about it although 
this creates problems for me 24.00 
Other (specify) 16.00 
Payments for waste 
The transfer of risk of loss and deterioration to the supplier is listed as another black practice in 
the EU Directive on UTP. An example of such a practice is payments for spoiled or wasted 
products after they were delivered to the buyer, meaning the deterioration or loss occurred on 
the buyer's premises or as the products were already under the buyer´s ownership. We asked 
farmers whether this is also the case in the fruit industry.  
Table 9-47: Are you responsible (must pay) for spoiled/wasted products after goods are 
delivered to the buyer? 
  N.A. Yes No Partially 
Only if the products 
proved to be defective Total 
Private traders 0.00 27.78 55.56 0.00 16.67 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 0.00 5.88 11.76 82.35 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 28.57 0.00 0.00 71.43 100.00 
Other 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 10.61 33.33 3.03 33.33 100.00 
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Eleven percent of farmers stated they are responsible for spoiled/wasted products, and 33% 
said they are responsible only if the products proved to be defective. Although this practice poses 
severe problem for farmers, 35% consider this practice to be fair.  
Table 9-48: How severe is the impact of this practice on your business, and do you consider the 
practice fair or unfair? 
Impact severity of practice % of farmers  Impact of practice % of farmers 
An inconsequential problem 29.03  Totally unfair  16.13 
A mild problem 38.71  Unfair  16.13 
An important problem 9.68  Neither fair nor unfair 32.26 
A severe problem 19.35  Fair 35.48 
An unsustainable problem in 
the long-run 3.23  Totally fair  0.00 
 
Table 9-49: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because: 
 % of farmers 
The buyer wants to increase its profits 16.13 
The buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices 0.00 
It’s customary 70.97 
The buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to his/her 
customers 16.13 
The buyer knows I cannot do anything about it although this 
creates problems for me 19.35 
Refusal of written confirmation of supply agreement by the buyer 
The buyer’s refusal to confirm in writing the conditions of a supply agreement in writing—despite 
request of the supplier—is also listed as a black practice. We asked farmers about this practice, 
but as results show, this does not seem to be a serious problem for farmers in the Slovak fruit 
industry.  
Table 9-50: Refusal to confirm in writing 
 N.A. Never Seldom Sometimes Often Very often 
Almost 
always Always 
I 
never 
asked 
Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 88.89 0.00 0.00 11.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 63.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.09 0.00 27.27 100.00 
Total 19.70 71.21 0.00 0.00 3.03 0.00 1.52 0.00 4.55 100.00 
Table 9-51: How severe is the impact of this practice on your business, and do you consider the 
practice fair or unfair? 
Impact severity of practice % of farmers  Impact of practice % of farmers 
An inconsequential problem 0.00  Totally unfair  33.33 
A mild problem 0.00  Unfair  66.67 
An important problem 33.33  Neither fair nor unfair 0.00 
A severe problem 66.67  Fair 0.00 
An unsustainable problem in 
the long-run 0.00  Totally fair  0.00 
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Table 9-52: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because: 
 % of 
farmers 
The buyer wants to increase its profits  0.00 
The buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices  0.00 
It’s customary  33.33 
The buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to his/her customers  0.00 
The buyer knows I cannot do anything about it although this creates problems for me 66.67 
 
Use or disclosure of trade secrets  
 
Misuse of trade secrets by the buyer, which is listed as a black practice, also did not prove to be 
an issue in the fruit sector. A majority of farmers (75%) reported that their buyer had never 
required them to reveal trade secrets, and small number (5%) reported they do not have any 
secrets.  
 
Table 9-53: Did the buyer require you to reveal trade secrets concerning your business? 
 N.A. Yes No I do not have secrets I don’t know Total 
Private traders 0.00 0.00 94.44 5.56 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 0.00 88.24 11.76 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 0.00 75.76 4.55 0.00 100.00 
 
Retaliation 
When farmers are met with unfairness in trading relationships, they often choose to do nothing 
because buyers threaten acts of retaliation.  
Table 9-54: Is the buyer free to terminate the trade relationship? 
  N.A. 
Yes, 
totally 
free to do 
so at any 
time 
No, the buyer 
must pay 
penalties / incur 
costs / cannot 
replace me 
No, the buyer 
must wait until 
expiration of the 
contract 
No, the buyer 
cannot terminate 
(for example, 
PO/Coop) 
Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 72.22 16.67 11.11 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.41 70.59 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 90.91 9.09 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 45.45 6.06 10.61 18.18 100.00 
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Table 9-55: Can the buyer slow down orders arbitrarily? 
  N.A. 
No, the buyer 
is committed 
to buy a 
minimum 
quantity/the 
entire 
production 
No, there 
are explicit 
rules 
regulating 
orders 
No, there 
are tacit 
rules 
regulating 
orders 
Yes, but 
usually 
orders are 
steady and 
predictable 
Yes, and 
orders are 
unpredictable 
and 
fluctuating 
Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 22.22 0.00 5.56 5.56 66.67 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 70.59 0.00 0.00 29.41 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 42.86 57.14 100.00 
Other 0.00 18.18 9.09 9.09 27.27 36.36 100.00 
Total 19.70 27.27 1.52 3.03 18.18 30.30 100.00 
 
Forty-five percent of farmers reported that their main buyer is free to terminate the trading 
relationship at any time. When it comes to orders, 30% of farmers reported that buyers can slow 
down orders arbitrarily. It happens mainly in cases of farmers delivering to private traders and 
retailers. But when it comes to actual threats from buyers, only 6% of farmers reported that 
their buyers threaten to terminate the contract.  
Table 9-56: Is the buyer threatening to terminate (not renew) the contract or to slow down 
orders in order to obtain concessions or force you to comply with arbitrary requests? 
 N.A. 
Yes, 
explicitly 
Yes, 
implicitly 
No, but it is well 
understood that the buyer 
is in a position to do so No Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 5.56 11.11 50.00 33.33 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 42.86 0.00 14.29 42.86 100.00 
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 72.73 27.27 100.00 
Total 19.70 6.06 3.03 27.27 43.94 100.00 
Table 9-57: How severe is the impact of this practice on your business, and do you consider the 
practice fair or unfair? 
Impact severity of practice % of farmers  Impact of practice % of farmers 
An inconsequential problem 0.00%  Totally unfair 25.00% 
A mild problem 16.67%  Unfair 50.00% 
An important problem 70.83%  Neither fair nor unfair 25.00% 
A severe problem 8.33%  Fair 0.00% 
An unsustainable problem in 
the long-run 4.17%  Totally fair 0.00% 
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Table 9-58: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because: 
 % of farmers 
The buyer wants to increase its profits  50.00% 
The buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices  8.33% 
It’s customary  50.00% 
The buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to 
his/her customers  0.00% 
The buyer knows I cannot do anything about it 
although this creates problems for me 58.33% 
 
Table 9-59: What is the likely impact on your business of termination of the trade relationship 
or slowing down orders? 
 N.A. 
None, I can find 
another buyer 
Moderate 
profit loss 
Severe profit 
loss 
I would go out 
of business Total 
Private traders 0.00 0.00 38.89 61.11 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 0.00 64.71 35.29 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 0.00 14.29 85.71 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 0.00 36.36 36.36 27.27 100.00 
Total 19.70 0.00 34.85 40.91 4.55 100.00 
 
Farmers are afraid to exercise their rights because a termination of the trade relationship may 
cause them significant problems. Our results show that for 41% of surveyed farmers, termination 
means severe profit loss, a situation which may negatively influence the existence of their 
business.  
Post-sale complaints 
We also asked farmers if the buyer requires compensation for the cost of examining customer 
complaints related to the sale of the farmer’s products, even though there is no negligence or 
fault on the part of the farmer.  
Table 9-60: Are you liable for the costs of examining complaints by your buyer’s customers?   
 N.A. No 
Only if the problem is my 
fault (or due to my 
negligence) 
Always Total 
Private traders 0.00 61.11 33.33 5.56 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 29.41 70.59 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 57.14 42.86 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 46.97 31.82 1.52 100.00 
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Table 9-61: How often does the buyer ask payment for examining customer complaints, even if 
you are at fault?  
 N.A. Never Seldom Sometimes Often 
Very 
often 
Almost 
always Always Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 66.67 5.56 11.11 11.11 5.56 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 76.47 17.65 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 57.14 0.00 42.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 60.61 6.06 9.09 3.03 1.52 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 
Thirty-two percent of farmers reported that they are responsible for the costs of examining 
customer complaints if the problem is their fault. When asked how often buyers ask payment for 
examining such complaints, only 4.5% of farmers reported that it happens often or very often.  
Table 9-62: How severe is the impact of this practice on your business, and do you consider the 
practice fair or unfair? 
Impact severity of 
practice % of farmers 
 Impact of practice % of farmers 
An inconsequential problem 0.0%  Totally unfair 38.46% 
A mild problem 38.5%  Unfair 7.69% 
An important problem 53.8%  Neither fair nor unfair 53.85% 
A severe problem 7.7%  Fair 0.00% 
An unsustainable problem in 
the long-run 0.0%  Totally fair 0.00% 
 
Table 9-63: In your opinion, the practice is in place (multiple answers) because: 
 % of farmers 
The buyer wants to increase its profits  23.08% 
The buyer is reacting to somebody else’s practices  0.00% 
It’s customary  23.08% 
The buyer wants to offer a better service/deal to his/her 
customers  46.15% 
The buyer knows I cannot do anything about it although 
this creates problems for me 30.77% 
 
Ambiguous or implicit contract terms 
Apart from above-mentioned practices (which are marked as black practices), the EU Directive 
includes a list of grey practices, i.e., practices which are only allowed if the buyer and supplier 
agree on them in a clear and unambiguous way.  
We asked farmers whether these practices occur in the relationship with their main buyer and if 
so, how they are specified in the contract.  
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Table 9-64: Are the following practices applied and if so, are they included in the 
contract/agreement with clear and unambiguous terms? 
   In place 
  N.A. 
Not in 
place Tacit 
Ambiguous 
or unclear 
Clear and 
unambiguous 
Return/buyback of unsold products 19.70 18.18 4.55 25.76 31.82 
Payments for displaying, listing, or 
stocking products 19.70 59.09 1.52 4.55 15.15 
Participation in promotion of products 
sold by the buyers 19.70 63.64 0.00 0.00 16.67 
Payments for the advertising of 
agricultural and food products by the 
buyer 19.70 60.61 0.00 1.52 18.18 
Payments for the marketing of agri-food 
product by the buyer 19.70 46.97 0.00 1.52 31.82 
Payments for staff for fitting-out 
premises used for the sale of the 
supplier's products 19.70 78.79 0.00 0.00 1.52 
 
Of all the grey practices included in the EU Directive, the most problematic is the return/buyback 
of unsold products, which 26% of farmers reported as an ambiguous or unclear practice included 
in their contract. Looking into the details of this practice shows that the occurrence was reported 
mainly by farmers trading with private traders, retailers and other buyers.  
Table 9-65: Return/buyback of unsold products 
 N.A. No Tacit 
Ambiguous or 
unclear 
Clear and 
unambiguous Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 27.78 16.67 44.44 11.11 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 17.65 0.00 0.00 82.35 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 28.57 0.00 71.43 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 18.18 0.00 36.36 45.45 100.00 
Total 19.70 18.18 4.55 25.76 31.82 100.00 
 
Table 9-66: If the practices were stated in clear and unambiguous terms in a contract, would 
the impact be less problematic? 
 % of farmers 
It would be more problematic 0.0% 
No, it would be the same 76.2% 
Yes, it would be slightly better 19.0% 
Yes, it would be much better 4.8% 
Yes, it would no longer be a problem 0.0% 
 
9.3.6  Information about other trade practices 
The following section of the survey focused on the occurrence of another three trade practices: 
orders on short notice, enforcement of quality standards and specific investments. 
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Orders on short notice 
Orders on short notice are an issue for 17% of farmers, mainly those who trade with private 
traders and other traders. When it comes to the consequences of missing a short-notice order, 
32% of farmers reported that their buyer is less likely to order from them in the future. This is 
especially true with retailers, private traders and other traders.  
 
Table 9-67: The timing of the orders is far enough in advance to allow for efficient planning of 
production 
 N.A. Yes, always 
In general, yes, but 
sometimes I receive 
unexpected orders 
on short notice 
Orders are 
unpredictable, and I 
must meet orders on 
short notice 
Total 
Private 
traders 0.00 22.22 33.33 44.44 100 
Coop/PO 0.00 35.29 64.71 0.00 100 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 
Retailers 0.00 14.29 85.71 0.00 100 
Other 0.00 36.36 36.36 27.27 100 
Total 19.70 22.73 40.91 16.67 100 
Table 9-68: What are the consequences of missing a short-notice order (multiple answers)? 
 N.A. 
Just the missed 
business 
opportunity 
The buyer is 
less likely to 
order from me 
in the future 
I must 
pay a 
fine 
The buyer will 
not renew the 
contract/ 
agreement 
The buyer 
terminates 
the trade 
relationship 
Private 
traders  0.00 44.44 55.56 0.00 5.56 0.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Retailers 0.00 14.29 85.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other 0.00 72.73 45.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 19.70 51.52 31.82 0.00 1.52 0.00 
 
Enforcement of quality standards 
Meeting the required quality standards is not easy; therefore, quality standards should be clear 
from the very beginning of the trade relationship. Results show less than 2% of farmers reported 
that quality standards are not clearly defined in advance. However, regarding the question about 
how quality standards are enforced, 18% reported that enforcement is unpredictable.  
Table 9-69: Quality standards are clear and defined in advance 
 N.A. Yes Partially No Total 
Private traders  0.00 50.00 44.44 5.56 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 88.24 11.76 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 28.57 71.43 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 81.82 18.18 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 53.03 25.76 1.52 100.00 
 
Specific investments 
We asked farmers whether they invested in on-farm assets in order to comply with the buyer's 
requirements. Fourteen percent of farmers invested, mainly members of POs, with 88% of these 
farmers reporting that the investment will be recovered from transactions with the main buyer 
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or other buyers. All farmers reported that, in the event of termination of the relationship, the 
investment can be used in relationships with other buyers. When asked to assess fairness, all 
reported this practice as neither fair nor unfair.  
Table 9-70: Did you invest in on-farm assets only for the purpose of complying with your main 
buyer's requirements? 
 N.A. No Yes Total 
Private traders  0.00 88.89 11.11 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 70.59 29.41 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 85.71 14.29 100.00 
Other 0.00 90.91 9.09 100.00 
Total 19.70 66.67 13.64 100.00 
 
9.3.7  Overall evaluation of the trade relationship 
 
The final section of questionnaire focused on overall evaluation of the trade relationship by 
farmers. Farmers were asked to express their agreement/disagreement with a set of statements 
using a 5-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree). 
Based on the results, 23% of farmers believe their buyers act to benefit themselves—to the 
detriment of farmers (score 4 or 5)—and primarily follow their own interests. This is the case of 
private traders and other buyers and, to a smaller extent, retailers. However, when it comes to 
evaluation of the buyer’s position in the markets, farmers recognize there is a very competitive 
business environment, and buyers care about reputation and quality of products. 
Table 9-71: Results of overall assessment of the trade relationship (1: strongly disagree, to 5: 
strongly agree) 
  N.A. 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Your buyer often acts to benefit 
himself/herself at your expense. 19.70 22.73 21.21 13.64 12.12 10.61 100.00 
Your buyer feels that it is OK to do anything 
within his/her means that will help further 
his/her interests. 
19.70 25.76 21.21 12.12 7.58 13.64 100.00 
Your buyer has sometimes promised to do 
things without actually doing them later. 19.70 28.79 27.27 12.12 12.12 0.00 100.00 
Your buyer sometimes tries to breach 
informal agreements to maximize his/her 
own benefit. 
19.70 37.88 12.12 10.61 10.61 9.09 100.00 
Your buyer will try to take advantage of 
“holes” in contracts to further his/her own 
interests. 
19.70 34.85 7.58 16.67 15.15 6.06 100.00 
Your buyer sometimes uses unexpected 
events to extract concessions from you. 19.70 12.12 21.21 21.21 6.06 19.70 100.00 
Your buyer is worried about losing business 
due to missing products or products of quality 
that do not meet his/her customer 
expectations. 
19.70 7.58 6.06 27.27 25.76 13.64 100.00 
Your buyer is worried about repercussions 
from a bad reputation due to failures or 
scandals. 
19.70 6.06 3.03 25.76 27.27 18.18 100.00 
Your buyer tries to survive in a very 
competitive business environment by 
providing maximum satisfaction for 
customers. 
19.70 0.00 0.00 15.15 34.85 30.30 100.00 
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There is a remarkable difference in overall evaluation of fairness in the trade relationship 
between farmers who are members of POs and other farmers. While PO members consider their 
relationship with the PO decent or fair, results from other farmers are more heterogeneous. A 
quarter of farmers feel some level of unfairness. This is especially true in the case of farmers 
trading with retailers and private traders. 
Concerning the overall evaluation of the trade relationship, results here are in line with results 
about satisfaction with the main buyer (Table 9-7). Those farmers who consider the relationship 
as decent or fair (52%) reported to be either totally satisfied with their main buyer or satisfied 
but open to new opportunities (53%).  
  
Table 9-72: Overall evaluation of the trade relationship 
 N.A. 
Totally 
unfair 
Unfair in 
some 
respects Decent Fair 
Great 
deal Total 
Private 
traders  0.00 0.00 55.56 33.33 11.11 0.00 100.00 
Coop/PO 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.88 94.12 0.00 100.00 
Consumers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Retailers 0.00 0.00 71.43 14.29 14.29 0.00 100.00 
Other 0.00 27.27 9.09 27.27 36.36 0.00 100.00 
Total 19.70 4.55 24.24 16.67 34.85 0.00 100.00 
 
Farmers who considered the relationship with their buyer to be unfair were asked to assess the 
impact of unfairness on several aspects of their business. The majority of farmers feel that there 
are negative impacts on their incomes and efficiency of the entire chain. 
Table 9-73: Evaluation of the impact of unfairness 
 Extremely 
detrimental Detrimental Inconsequential Beneficial Total 
Your income 46.67 40.00 13.33 0.00 100.00 
The efficiency of the entire chain 6.67 73.33 20.00 0.00 100.00 
Environmental sustainability 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Innovation 0.00 16.67 80.00 3.33 100.00 
Food quality & safety 0.00 0.00 83.33 16.67 100.00 
On-farm investments 3.33 36.67 53.33 6.67 100.00 
Labour (wages, conditions) 0.00 23.33 76.67 0.00 100.00 
 
9.4  Results from the BSEA supermarket survey  
 
The sample in the supermarket survey is composed of six supermarket chains operating in 
Slovakia. Data were collected through electronic versions of the questionnaire between July and 
September 2019.  
The questionnaire consisted of three sections: information about the firm, evaluation of general 
overview of the industry and information about the procurement channel of the surveyed firm. 
The questionnaires were filled out by the marketing/procurement managers (83%) or by the 
firm manager/owner (17%).  
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With respect to the small sample size, it is important to be cautious in the interpretation of the 
results and generalization of conclusions; nevertheless, these results provide useful insight into 
the downstream stage of the fruit value chain and enable us to compare the results with findings 
from the farmer questionnaire.  
 
9.4.1  Information about the firm  
 
The following table provides information about the size of the supermarkets that participated in 
the survey.  
Table 9-74: Distribution of sample by revenue class 
Firm’s annual turnover (in mil. EUR) n. % of supermarkets 
0 - 2 mil. 0 0.00 
2 -10 mil. 0 0.00 
10 - 50 mil. 1 16.67 
50 -150 mil. 2 33.33 
150 -350 mil. 1 16.67 
Exceed. 350 mil. 2 33.33 
Total 6 100 
 
An additional two questions in this section were related to the promotion of fruit. Regarding the 
fruit generally on promotion, all respondents (representatives of supermarkets) answered that 
there is always some fruit on promotion. Regarding apples, the results are more heterogeneous. 
Two supermarkets (33%) reported always having some kind of apple on promotion, and another 
two have promotions once a month. One supermarket has a promotion at least once a week, 
and one once every other week.   
Table 9-75: How often do you have apples on promotion? 
  n. % of supermarkets 
We always have some kind of apple on promotion 2 33.33 
At least once a week (e.g., on weekends) 1 16.67 
Once every other week 1 16.67 
Once a month 2 33.33 
Less than once a month 0 0.00 
Total 6 100.00 
 
9.4.2  A general overview of the industry 
 
Respondents were asked how much they agree with a set of statements concerning the situation 
in the industry and their suppliers using a 5-point Likert scale (1: completely disagree, to 5: 
completely agree).  
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Table 9-76: Please rate how much you agree with the following statements on a 1 (completely 
disagree) to 5 (completely agree) scale 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Consumer demand for apples is predictable at 
harvest season 16.67 16.67 0.00 33.33 33.33 100.00 
Changes in the price of other fruits strongly affect 
the demand for apples 16.67 33.33 16.67 16.67 16.67 100.00 
Price promotions strongly affect the demand for 
apples 0.00 0.00 16.67 33.33 50.00 100.00 
I have few selected, trusted suppliers 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 66.67 100.00 
I have a set of suppliers I call only if there is an 
unexpected demand peak 16.67 50.00 16.67 0.00 16.67 100.00 
A key success factor is being able to select and 
motivate the most efficient suppliers 0.00 16.67 16.67 0.00 66.67 100.00 
My suppliers are difficult to replace (in general) 16.67 16.67 33.33 0.00 33.33 100.00 
There are specific suppliers that would be costly to 
replace 16.67 16.67 33.33 0.00 33.33 100.00 
 
Results show that, when it comes to predictability of demand for apples, opinions of the 
supermarkets are heterogeneous. The same situation is observable when it comes to the 
influence of changes in the price of other fruits on the demand for apples. However, 83% of 
respondents (five supermarkets) agree or strongly agree that price promotions have significant 
effect on the demand for apples.  
When it comes to relationships with suppliers, all respondents agree or strongly agree with the 
statement about having a few selected suppliers whom they trust. In a situation of unexpected 
demand peak, some supermarkets may encounter a problem when their suppliers are not able 
to meet the increased quantity requirements. However, only one respondent reported having a 
set of suppliers they call only in cases of unexpected increase in demand. Two-thirds of 
respondents strongly agree that selection and motivation of the most efficient suppliers is a key 
success factor in fruit sales. Concerning the ability to replace trading partners, 67% of 
respondents do not think it is difficult to replace their suppliers. The respondents have the same 
opinion in the case of specific suppliers.  
Within this section of the questionnaire, respondents were also asked to rate how likely UTPs 
(based on EU UTP Directive) were to happen, according to their experience and knowledge of 
the industry. However, these questions were centred on evaluation of general behaviour in the 
industry rather than own firm. The 5-point scale was used as follows: 1 = I am not aware of the 
problem, 2 = It is unusual, 3 = It may happen sometimes, 4 = It happens often, 5 = It is 
customary. The following table summarizes the results.  
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Table 9-77: Please rate how much you agree with the following statements on a 1 (I am not 
aware of the problem) to 5 (It is customary) scale 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Payments are delayed, late and/or unpredictable 66.67 16.67 16.67 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Orders are cancelled on short notice 50.00 33.33 16.67 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Buyers impose unilateral changes to existing contracts or 
agreements (do not keep their word) 33.33 50.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Suppliers must pay for expenses that are not related to 
the sales of their products (for example: opening of new 
stores) 
100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Suppliers must pay (or are denied payments) for loss or 
waste of products that were already delivered to the 
buyer 
83.33 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 100.00 
Buyers refuse to write down contracts or orders 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Buyers take advantage of confidential information they 
obtain from the suppliers 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Buyers cut orders if the suppliers try to exercise their 
contractual rights 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Suppliers must pay for the costs of examining complaints 
by final customers (even if they are not responsible) 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Firms must bear unpredictable costs that are not clearly 
stated in the contract (payments, discounts, etc.) 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Firms must comply with unnecessary quality standards 83.33 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary 50.00 16.67 16.67 16.67 0.00 100.00 
 
Based on the answers of the respondents, the most common unfair practice is unpredictable and 
totally discretionary orders: One respondent reported that it happens often, and another 
reported that it may happen sometimes. There is also some evidence of late payments (one 
supermarket), short-notice order cancellations (one supermarket) and payments for wasted 
products (one supermarket admitted that it happens often).  
Concerning the rest of the practices (misuse of confidential information; refusal of written 
contracts; cutting orders when suppliers want to exercise their contractual rights; paying 
unpredictable costs not specified clearly in the contract; and paying expenses unrelated to the 
sale of farmers’ products), all respondents (100%) stated they are not aware of these problems 
in the fruit industry. 
The list of grey practices in the EU UTP Directive includes practices that are banned only if they 
are not clearly specified in the contract. All supermarket respondents reported to be unaware of 
the occurrence of these practices in the fruit industry.  
 
9.4.3  Information about the procurement channel 
 
In the last section of the survey, respondents were asked questions about the organization of 
the procurement channel.  
First, we asked respondents to rate the three most important criteria they use to select apple 
(fruit) suppliers. Half the respondents chose quality as the most important reason. Quality, along 
with low prices, was also chosen as the second most important reason. The third most important 
reason was between low prices and assortment.  
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Table 9-78: Please rank the three most important criteria that you use to select your apple 
suppliers 
  
1st main 
reason 
2nd main 
reason 
3rd main 
reason 
Low prices 16.67 33.33 33.33 
Reliability 33.33 0.00 16.67 
Reputation 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ability to meet orders on short notice 0.00 16.67 0.00 
Quality 50.00 33.33 16.67 
Assortment 0.00 16.67 33.33 
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
In order to gain a picture of the termination of trading relationships in the industry, respondents 
were asked whether they had de-listed a supplier in the last five year and if yes, why and when. 
Two supermarkets reported de-listing a supplier. As for why, one respondent reported that they 
rotate suppliers from time to time, and another reported that they received better terms from a 
competitor. One supermarket de-listed the supplier at the expiration of the contract, but the 
other one admitted they terminated the contract with supplier.  
Table 9-79: Did you de-list (stop doing business with) a supplier in the last five years and if yes, why? 
  
% of 
respondents  
If yes, why? % of respondents 
Yes 33.33 
 
I rotate/change suppliers every now and 
then when contracts expire 50.00 
No 66.67  I found better terms from a competitor 50.00 
Don’t know/No answer 0.00  I was unhappy with the performances 0.00 
Total 100.00  A serious problem arose 0.00 
   It was the supplier’s decision 0.00 
   Total 100.00 
 
Respondents were asked about organization of the procurement in their firm. The answers were 
diverse, but negotiation of “order by order” was chosen by two respondents (33%). One 
respondent reported “other”, stating that they use unwritten agreements.  
Table 9-80: How is procurement organized? (multiple answer, if different organization for 
different suppliers) 
  n. 
% of 
respondents 
I have long-term contracts (more than one year) 1 16.67 
I have yearly contracts with predetermined prices 0 0.00 
I have yearly contracts and price is negotiated through the year 1 16.67 
I negotiate order by order 2 33.33 
A yearly supply agreement at the beginning of the season and then 
weekly/monthly negotiations 1 16.67 
Other 1 16.67 
Total 6 100.00 
 
As with the farmers, respondents were also asked about commitment to buy and delivery 
obligations. As expected, a majority of respondents (83%) are not committed to buying a 
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minimum quantity from their suppliers. On the other hand, 83% of respondents admitted that 
their suppliers have a delivery obligation, and in majority of cases it is a contractual obligation.  
Table 9-81: Do you have a commitment to buy a minimum quantity from your suppliers, and do 
your suppliers have delivery obligations? 
Commitment to buy: n. % of respondents 
 Delivery obligation of 
suppliers: n. 
% of 
respondents 
No 5 83.33  Yes, a contractual obligation 3 50.00 
Formal for all suppliers 0 0.00  They have an informal commitment 2 33.33 
Formal for some suppliers only 1 16.67  No, they are free to decide whether to supply or not 1 16.67 
Implicit (e.g., there is an ‘usual 
quantity’) for all suppliers 0 0.00 
 It depends on the supplier 0 0.00 
Implicit for some suppliers only 0 0.00  Total 6 100.00 
Total 6 100.00     
 
Table 9-82: Did your suppliers refuse orders or cancel delivery? 
 n. % of respondents 
Yes, often 5 83.33 
Sometimes it happens 0 0.00 
It’s unusual 1 16.67 
It never happens 0 0.00 
Total 6 100.00 
 
Respondents were also asked how often their suppliers refuse orders or cancel delivery. Eight-
three percent of respondents reported it happens often that suppliers refuse orders or cancel 
delivery.  
Respondents were further asked when they decide about discounts. The majority (67%) 
answered that they follow the situation in the market and decide on discounts whenever market 
conditions require them.  
Table 9-83: When are discounts decided? (multiple answers) 
  n. % of respondents 
At the beginning of the year 1 16.67 
At regular intervals (e.g., at the beginning of the quarter) 1 16.67 
Whenever market conditions require them 4 66.67 
Other  0 0.00 
Total 6 100.00 
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Table 9-84: Do you have special requirements for apples (different from other supermarkets)? 
(multiple answer) 
  n. 
% of 
respondents 
No, we ask for the market standard 2 33.33 
Yes, we ask for specific varieties/grade 2 33.33 
Yes, suppliers must comply with OUR product standards 4 66.67 
Yes, suppliers must comply with OUR process standards/instruction 1 16.67 
Yes, we ask for specific packaging 2 33.33 
Yes, they must allow our inspections at their site 1 16.67 
Other  1 16.67 
Lastly, we asked respondents whether they have any specific requirements for apples/fruit 
different from other supermarkets. Results show that 67% of respondents have special 
requirements. The most common requirements are complying with the product standards of 
supermarkets, specific varieties/grades and specific packaging. 
 
9.4.4  Pass-through analysis 
 
Conducting the survey at two stages of the fruit value chain provides us a broader picture and 
enables us to evaluate whether the outcomes of the two sample surveys are consistent.  
Regarding the ability to replace trading partners, retailers and farmers were asked to evaluate 
how easy it is to replace their trading partner and how easily they can be replaced by their 
trading partner. Sixty-seven percent of respondents in the supermarket survey do not think that 
it is difficult to replace their fruit suppliers. These results are consistent with the farmers’ 
perception, since 71% of farmers who are actually trading with supermarkets reported that their 
main buyer can easily replace them. On the other hand, 14% of farmers trading with 
supermarkets reported that they cannot replace the buyer, and 86% reported that they can 
although for different reasons it would be too costly. These results imply that the risk of not 
finding a new or better trading partner is bigger for farmers.  
Based on the answers of supermarket respondents about the general situation in the fruit 
industry ( 
Table 9-77), we can see that the perception of supermarkets and farmers about UTP occurrence 
in the fruit industry is quite different. A small number of respondents in the supermarket survey 
admitted the possible occurrence of certain practices. From the supermarket’s point of view, the 
most common unfair practice is unpredictable and totally discretionary orders. One supermarket 
respondent reported that it happens often, and another reported that it may happen sometimes. 
There is also some small evidence of late payments (one respondent), short-notice cancelation 
of orders (one respondent) and payments for wasted products (one respondent). Farmers’ 
perception of the occurrence of these practices is in the majority of cases much higher. 
Concerning orders, 71% of farmers trading with retailers reported they receive unpredictable 
orders through the year. Late payments are an especially serious issue. In total, 32% of farmers 
reported that they occur at least sometimes. This is a problem in particular for farmers trading 
with retailers, but it also occurs with other buyers and private traders. Payments demanded for 
wasted products were reported by 44% of farmers, although 33% said they are responsible only 
if the products proved defective.  
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For the remaining practices—misuse of confidential information, refusal of written contracts, 
cutting orders when suppliers want to exercise their contractual rights, paying unpredictable 
costs not specified clearly in the contract and paying expenses that are not related to the sales 
of farmers’ products—all supermarket respondents (100%) stated they are not aware of these 
problems in the fruit industry. These results are partly consistent with results from the farmer 
questionnaire. Regarding the misuse of confidential information, farmers were asked whether 
their buyer requires them to reveal trade secrets. The answers were homogeneous, with farmers 
replying they either have no secrets or it has never happened. Refusal to confirm in writing 
conditions of an agreement or a contract also did not prove to be a serious issue for farmers. 
Less than 5% of farmers reported that their main buyer refused to give them a written 
confirmation, however this was the case with private traders or other buyers, not supermarkets 
(Table 9-50). 
Farmers’ perceptions about the demand for payments not directly related to the sales of their 
products differ from those of the supermarket respondents, with 15% of farmers reporting that 
buyers ask for such payments often, especially retailers and POs and private traders. 
Interestingly, the majority of these farmers (76%) consider this practice to be an inconsequential 
or mild problem, and 60% consider this practice to be fair or totally fair. These results might 
imply that payments are agreed upon in a fair manner.  
Regarding payments demanded for complaints from final customers, none of the respondents in 
the supermarket survey were aware of this issue in the industry. When farmers were asked, 
32% of them reported they are responsible for these costs only if the problem is their fault or 
due to their negligence (Table 9-60). Less than 2% reported they always have to pay (these 
were in instances of a relationship with private traders). But when farmers were asked how often 
buyers require these payments, only 4.5% of farmers reported that it happens often or very 
often in relationships with private traders. Nine percent of farmers trading with private traders, 
POs and retailers reported it happens sometimes. However, in an assessment of the fairness of 
the practice, the majority of farmers (54%) consider the practice neither fair nor unfair, which 
might imply that most farmers see this as an “ordinary practice” in the industry.  
When evaluating grey practices (as defined in the EU UTP Directive), all supermarket 
respondents reported to be unaware of their occurrence. Although farmers’ answers were mostly 
in line with this opinion, there was an exception in the case of return/buyback of unsold products, 
for which 26% of farmers reported that such payments are stated in an ambiguous or unclear 
manner (and as results in Table 9-65 show, this happens mainly in relationships with retailers, 
private traders and other buyers). 
Regarding the commitment to buy and delivery obligation, both respondents from supermarkets 
and farmers were asked how their trade relationship is organized. As expected, a majority of 
respondents from supermarkets (83%) do not have a commitment to buy a minimum quantity 
from their suppliers. Yet, 83% of supermarket respondents admitted that their suppliers have a 
delivery obligation (in a majority of cases, it is a contractual obligation). These results imply a 
certain level of imbalance in trading relationships between supermarkets and farmers. Results 
are in line with the farmer questionnaire, where 14% of farmers reported to have a delivery 
obligation for a minimum quantity, but their buyers (retailers) do not have a commitment to 
buy. On the other hand, the contractual obligation of farmers to deliver might be explained as 
an attempt by supermarkets to ensure stable delivery, since 83% of respondents reported that 
it happens often that suppliers refuse orders or cancel deliveries.  
The supermarkets survey confirms the existence and pass-through of certain UTPs but to a lesser 
extent and intensity than the farmer survey, which is an expected result. 
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10 Evaluation 
Jan Pokrivcak, Katarina Barathova, Miroslava Rajcaniova 
(Slovak University of Agriculture in Nitra) 
 
The use of the B-SEA approach enabled us to focus attention on and gain important insights into 
the following areas of interest in UTP research: a) the functioning of the fruit value chain in 
Slovakia, b) evaluation of UTP occurrence and c) evaluation of the methodology used for UTP 
monitoring. This chapter summarizes the main results obtained from the B-SEA survey. 
 
10.1  Designing a UTP monitoring system: Lessons from B-SEA 
 
The B-SEA survey was based on the idea of running three sequential surveys at the farmer, 
middleman and retailer levels. In contrast to IDEA, the survey was not based on the expert panel 
but on general knowledge of the structure of the fruit supply chain. Therefore, the questionnaire 
followed a fixed selection of practices identified in the literature review of this report and in the 
EU UTP Directive. Thus, this approach is broader and more general than IDEA.  
 
10.1.1  Reluctance and fear factor 
 
In the implementation of the B-SEA, we encountered several problems. When farmers were told 
the purpose of the survey, some refused to participate. Some farmers were willing to talk about 
general problems in the supply chain but not willing to discuss specific issues concerning the 
relationship with their trading partners. They were concerned about possible consequences and 
retaliation after publication of the results. Reluctance to participate in the survey was even higher 
at the middleman level. Some middlemen, who at first agreed to participate, changed their mind 
after seeing the questionnaire. They considered the questions too intrusive and to probe too 
deep into the details of their trade relationships. Therefore, the B-SEA survey was eventually 
conducted only at the farmer and retailer levels. Middlemen did participate in the IDEA version 
of the survey (chapter 16), which they considered to be more acceptable and less dangerous. 
 
10.1.2  Questionnaire design 
 
Concerning the design of the B-SEA survey, the complexity of the questionnaires caused a 
reduction in the farmer sample size, and it became smaller than initially planned. The complexity 
was mentioned as one of the possible drawbacks to the B-SEA methodology at the beginning of 
the project and did indeed prove to be a serious issue. Because the B-SEA survey followed the 
broad set of practices identified from the literature review and the EU UTP Directive—without 
tailoring for the fruit industry—many questions were considered irrelevant by respondents. This 
has serious implications for further UTP research—too broad design of the questionnaire without 
running the expert panel, may cause that the real problems in the industry under investigation 
might be overlooked.  
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Another issue with the questionnaire was its strong focus on the farmers’ main buyers. During 
the face-to-face interviews regarding different UTPs, many farmers stated they had not 
encountered these practices in the relationship with their main buyer but had encountered them 
either in the relationships with other buyers they are currently trading with or buyers they traded 
with in previous years. Thus, the main buyer focus of the questionnaire may have led to an 
underestimation of the occurrence of UTPs.  
Moreover, many farmers who currently sell their entire production to final consumers admitted 
they had deliberately chosen to do so to avoid unfair trading practices they had experienced in 
the past. Another reason for selling direct to final consumers is the low price offered by 
middlemen and supermarkets. As a result, many fruit growers today choose to process their fruit 
into products with greater demand (baby food, jams, juice, etc.) rather than sell their fruit fresh.  
 
10.1.3   Measuring the impact of UTPs 
 
The B-SEA survey for farmers was designed to measure the financial impact of UTPs on the 
farmers. Those farmers who identified a certain UTP as at least an important problem were asked 
whether they could provide an estimate of the yearly cost of this practice to their business. 
However, this proved to be a big problem, since the majority of farmers were unable to estimate 
the costs of these practices. As noticed during the face-to-face interviews, farmers had difficulty 
providing even a rough financial estimate of the UTPs. Farmers perceive the impact of UTPs more 
in terms of opportunity costs than in absolute numbers. For example, in the case of delayed 
payments, farmers see costs of this practice as losing the ability to pay their employees or invest 
in needed assets.  
 
10.1.4  Organization of the fruit netchain: The pass-through effect 
 
The results of the surveys provide us with insights into the functioning of the Slovak fruit netchain 
and helped us identify the most serious UTPs. The most concerning UTPs are late payments; 
product standards and specific instructions farmers must follow; renegotiation of contracts and 
single orders (especially of prices and quantity); and return/buyback of unsold products. 
Significant differences in buying commitments and delivery obligations between supermarkets 
and farmers reflect the organization of the netchain. Because the supermarkets want to ensure 
product availability, their suppliers have a delivery obligation (in the majority of cases, it is a 
contractual obligation). However, supermarkets do not have a commitment to buy products from 
farmers. In this way, the risk of not selling the products is passed on to the farmers. Beyond 
that, farmers’ responsibility for wasted products and loss after the products are already under 
ownership of the buyer is another form of risk transfer. In addition, in cases of weak demand, 
unsold products are returned to farmers, or the price the farmers are eventually paid is lower 
than agreed. This organization enables sellers to ensure availability of fruit to consumers but 
transfers significant risks to the farmers and leads to imbalanced trade relationships.  
In comparison, the survey showed that farmers have more balanced relationships with POs. For 
example, 76% of farmers reported that a PO is never late with payments. Generally, 
relationships with POs are based on more trust between trading partners and long-term 
cooperation, which is also reflected in clear and unambiguous contract terms agreed on between 
parties (as reported by a majority of farmers).   
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Compared to the IDEA approach, B-SEA enables better evaluation of practices by asking farmers 
to rate the (un)fairness of specific practices. The effect of trading practices can depend on the 
context, and trading practices cannot be considered unfair or bad a priori without considering 
the context. This was confirmed in the survey. For example, 15% of farmers reported that their 
buyers require payments not related to the sales of products; however, according to the answers 
to questions related to the severity and impact of a practice, 60% of farmers consider the 
practice fair or totally fair, meaning these payments might be agreed on in a fair manner. 
 
10.1.5   Implementation of the 2019/633 Directive 
 
Results of the B-SEA surveys can support implementations of the UTP Directive at a national 
level. However, the survey suggests that implementation of the Directive should be done with a 
sectorial approach to take into account and respect the different structures of various industries. 
As seen in the survey, some practices in the EU UTP Directive might be a serious issue in one 
sector but not in another. This also supports allowing Member States to add other practices to 
the list of already-banned UTPs.  
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PART IV: Investigating UTPs: IDEA 
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The objective of the In-Depth Empirical Analysis (IDEA) is to identify possible unfair practices in 
a given netchain, assessing the overall level of protection from UTPs and the possible unintended 
consequences of regulation. Unlike B-SEA, the approach does not test an a priori list of target 
practices. Instead, it moves from the general definition of fairness by Bowie (1998) reported in 
section 2.3  and identifies possible practices of interest. The approach is based on extensive use 
of economic theory and qualitative data (such as semi-structured interviews), providing an 
assessment of the overall effectiveness of public protection from unfair practices of any kind. 
The IDEA approach is appropriate when the investigator has no priors regarding the unfair 
practices or wishes to test the completeness of predetermined lists of practices. In fact, one of 
the major weakness of the B-SEA approach is that relevant unfair practices might be missed, if 
the set of a priori information is incomplete. 
In theory, IDEA is a five-step approach (chapter 6):  
1. Description of governance and practices in the netchain 
2. Theoretical assessment of the efficiency and fairness of the practices 
3. Quantitative assessment of occurrence of UTP, measuring occurrence and impact 
4. Assessment of the interdependences among practices and the pass-through effects  
5. Evaluation of fairness 
Steps 1 and 2 concern the background analysis of the process-tracing methodology. The 
description of the organization of the netchain is based on the analysis of existing data sources 
and interaction with panels of experts. The economic model provides a systematic illustration of 
the governance grounded in contract theory. The model is of particular importance to understand 
the implications of UTPs for the efficiency of the netchain. Steps 3 and 4 refer to descriptive and 
causal inference. They involve semi-structured interviews with key entrepreneurs and sample 
surveys. The final evaluation organizes the material into meaningful policy advice. 
In this part of the report we illustrate the main findings of the IDEA we ran on the Agro-Pontino 
Kiwi Netchain (APK) in Italy and the Lake Constance Apple Netchain (LCA) in Germany. The 
structure of the presentation is the following. In chapter 11 we illustrate the results of discussions 
with the expert panels and the general characteristics of the governance of the two netchains. 
In chapter 12 we use economic theory to assess the efficiency and fairness of the practices. 
Chapters 13 and 14 report the results of the semi-structured interviews and the sample survey. 
Finally, chapter 15 provides a discussion of the results.  
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11 Results from Expert Panels 
 
Carlo Russo, Antonella Di Fonzo Luisa Menapace, Sebastian Rahbauer 
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) (Technical University of Munich) 
 
11.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we report the results of the interviews with expert panels about the trade 
practices in the fruit industry, with a focus on the target netchains of the empirical analysis: the 
Agro Pontino kiwi (Italy) and the Lake Constance apple (Germany). The goal of this action is to 
provide background information for the process-tracing approach in the empirical analysis.  
The expert panels support the research team by providing a description of the two netchains, 
illustrating the key drivers of the kiwi market, identifying the most important trading practices 
in the netchain, and supporting future research by providing information about key transactions. 
This report summarizes the discussion regarding each point. For easier reading of the reports, 
the experts’ statements used or quoted in the following chapters are highlighted and marked as 
Finding K# for APK and A# for LCA. 
 
11.2  Expert Panel on the Agro Pontino Kiwi Netchain 
 
The discussion was moderated by researchers from the University of Cassino and Lazio 
Meridionale and supported by researchers from Tuscia University and CREA. The moderators 
presented the questions and then let the panellists debate without interference. At the end of 
the discussion, the moderators summarized conclusions, dividing the issues based on whether a 
consensus was achieved. The summary was approved by the panellists. This report illustrates 
the main conclusions of the discussion. 
Because of the number of panellists and difficulties in coordinating the agenda, there were two 
expert meetings. The first meeting was on February 18, 2019, and the second meeting on March 
1, 2019. Although the decision to split the panels limited interaction among experts, it favoured 
participation. The panels included eleven experts: three representatives of POs, five 
representatives of farmers and farmer associations, and three representatives of local 
institutions. A private trader and the representative of Legacoop (retailers) accepted the 
invitation but did not participate in a meeting.  
Participants on Panel 1 (February 18, 2019 at Agrocamera) 
[1] PO association 
[2] Large PO 
[3] Farmer association 
[4] Public stakeholder 
An invited private trader did not participate. 
Participants on Panel 2 (March 1, 2019 at ARSIAL) 
[5] Public stakeholder 
[6] Farmer association 
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
115 
 
[7] Farmer association 
[8] Farmer association 
[9] PGI consortium 
[10] Multinational trader 
[11] Medium-size PO 
 An invited Cooperative Association representative did not participate. 
Research Team: 
TUSCIA UNIVERSITY: Alessandro Sorrentino, Luca Cacchiarelli 
UNIVERSITY OF CASSINO AND LAZIO MERIDIONALE: Carlo Russo, Antonella Di Fonzo 
CREA (Council for Research in Agriculture and Agricultural Economics): Gaetana Petriccione, 
Mara Lai 
 
11.3  Description of the kiwi netchain 
 
The experts agreed on the following stylized representation of the kiwi netchain. They identified 
five main layers: input providers, farmers, first-tier buyers (including POs) who buy from 
farmers, second-tier buyers who buy from first-tier buyers and retailers.  
The netchain can be broken down into several supply chains. The first distinction is between club 
and non-club supply chains. The former refers to varieties with protected intellectual property 
rights under UPOV or TRIPs treaties (mainly yellow- or red-flesh kiwis), the latter trades free 
varieties that can be grown without limitations (mainly Hayward green-flesh kiwis). 
 
Figure 11-1: A stylized representation of the Agro Pontino kiwi netchain 
 
Green arrows refer to trade flows of non-club varieties, yellow arrows to club varieties, purple to processed products 
and red to trade flows of all types. Dotted lines indicate informal trade flows. 
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Club supply chains are centred on patented varieties (yellow arrows in Figure 11-1). In these 
chains the holder of the intellectual property rights (the so-called breeder) allows farmers to 
grow the variety under an exclusive marketing agreement. The breeder is at the same time the 
supplier of the genetic input and the buyer of the harvest. 
In the stylized representation, there are two types of club supply chains (A and B in Figure 11-1). 
In type A, the breeder has an agreement with a producer organization for the cultivation of a 
specific acreage. The PO allocates these rights to members. The breeder provides farmers with 
technical assistance and takes the entire harvest of the club variety. Farmers are allowed to 
grow other non-club varieties and may or may not deliver the unprotected harvest to the 
breeder. The breeder sells the club variety through several marketing channels, including 
wholesalers, supermarket chains worldwide and exporters. Zespri (Sungold club variety) and 
Naturitalia (Jingold club variety) adopt this governance form. 
Type B supply chain of club varieties does not use the support of local POs. The farmers may be 
members of the breeders directly (in the case that the IPR are held by a PO) or independent 
farmers. In any case, the breeder maintains the exclusive marketing rights of production. For 
example, this governance form is used by the Consorzio Europeo Dorì. 
The two types of supply chains of conventional (non-club) varieties are identified by the nature 
of the buyers. In type A, farmers’ products are bought by private traders, while in type B a PO 
is the buyer.  
The four types of supply chains are separated up to the buyer segment, even if interdependence 
exists. Overall, the experts estimated that approximately 70% of the products is traded by POs 
(most of them with their headquarters in Northern Italy), 20% is managed by private traders 
(both local and from Northern Italy) and 10% is sold through other channels that have been 
defined “informal”.  
In the downstream markets the supply chains merge, and it is possible to find kiwis from different 
types of chains in the same outlet. The panels identified several kinds of middlemen and retailers, 
and all experts agreed that each one may have different trade practices. According to some 
experts ([2], [3], [10]) large retailers are tougher negotiators, but fairer and more interested in 
developing long-term relationships than intermediaries and small traders. Other experts 
disagreed ([6], [8], [11]). 
Finding K1: Experts have heterogeneous perceptions of large retailers’ fairness. 
While some ([2], [3], [10]) consider them tough-but-fair buyers (or, at least, better 
than small traders), others ([6], [8], [11]) perceive the relationship as imbalanced 
and unfair.  
Speculation on finding K1: The different perception might be associated with the 
size of the firm. 
A key distinction among the marketing channels downstream is between those with strict quality 
control (such as large supermarkets) and those that do not enforce high quality standards (such 
as informal trade or certain export markets, e.g., Ukraine or Belarus). Such lack of quality control 
is considered a major issue by several experts ([1], [2], [3], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [11]). It 
harms the consumer’s overall perception of the quality of the Agro-Pontino kiwis, while other 
competitors such as Zespri (which is marketing products from the same areas, as well as under 
a New Zealand brand) are gaining a strong reputation for quality. 
Experts ([2], [7], [9], [11]) suggested that UTPs are more likely to occur at the segment where 
storage happens, usually the buyer layer in Figure 11-1. Most of POs take care of product 
storage, and if they do not have facilities of their own they usually rent them. 
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11.4  Key drivers in the kiwi industry 
 
The experts were asked to illustrate the main issues and key drivers of competitive advantage 
in the Agro Pontino kiwi netchain. They concluded that there are great opportunities for the kiwi 
business in general, but they also agreed that specific factors might hinder the economic 
development of the Agro Pontino netchain.  
 
11.4.1  Opportunities and threats 
 
Experts expect an increase in global demand for kiwi, due to consumers’ increasing awareness 
of its health attributes and growing interest in new varieties (especially yellow- and red-flesh 
fruits). Since kiwis are easy to store and transport, firms can target a global demand. 
Nevertheless, limited resources (especially water), historical lack of investments in genetic 
development and diversification might limit production and market access in the future. 
Furthermore, experts (except [10]) note that the lack of coordination in the chain prevents 
production planning and effective quality-enhancing strategies. The problem is particularly 
important in the non-club supply chains, where a large number of small farmers lack the skills 
and resources for joining advanced quality schemes. The experts contrasted the poor 
organization of non-club supply chains with the efficient governance of the Zespri supply chain. 
The list of opportunities and threat is reported in Table 11-1. 
The experts debated on the role Zespri, a world leader in kiwi trading, has in the Agro Pontino 
netchain. The firm is based in New Zealand but has in recent years invested worldwide in order 
to have a year-round supply of kiwi. Zespri owns the IPR on Sungold, one of the most popular 
yellow-flesh kiwi club varieties. They have a branch in the Agro Pontino area that contracts POs 
and farmers (club supply chain type A). Some experts ([2], [10], [11]) consider Zespri 
investments as a great opportunity to learn new skills and replicate the approach of production 
planning. Others ([1], [3], [5]) are concerned about the consequence of possible quick 
disinvestment once demand shifts or other production areas, such as Calabria (Italy) or Greece, 
become more appealing. 
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Table 11-1: Opportunities and threats for the Agro Pontino kiwi netchain 
Opportunities Threats 
Great potential for new export 
markets. Kiwi fruits are easy to store, 
move and transport.   
 
Water salinization and water management might become 
issues, even though in the last two decades water 
consumption has been reduced, thanks to the use of new 
techniques and equipment.  
High demand growth potential. Kiwi 
can be considered a functional food, 
with good nutritional values and effects, 
which people are not aware of yet.  
Lack of genetic research and diversity in variety (non-
club chains only). There is substantially only one non-club 
variety (Hayward) in the area. It finds good agronomic 
conditions, and farmers do not see any need to change or 
improve it. However, the lack of biodiversity lends problems 
in terms of plant protection and competition from emerging 
countries (Greece). Budget cuts to research at the national 
level in the past decades contributed to worsen the situation.  
Great natural habitat. Fruits grown in 
Italy, and Agro Pontino, are of good 
quality and have good organoleptic 
parameters.  
Inefficient coordination and low concentration. Property 
fragmentation, which increases the number of actors, makes 
it difficult to properly organize the chain.  
Increased production and demand 
for the yellow kiwi. This might be 
seen as an opportunity, but could also 
at the same time be seen as a threat for 
the green kiwi, whose market shares 
are stolen by the yellow one. 
Quality issues. Several producers prefer to increase yield at 
the expenses of quality. 
 Knowledge and expertise of farmers. Farmers have 
heterogeneous knowledge and capacities. There is a number 
of highly skilled farmers, many of them related to the club 
chains, and many part-time or “hobbyist” farmers who do not 
have the skills to follow quality standards or the resources to 
invest. 
 Competitors (mainly China and Greece). In the past years, 
Chinese production has increased and experts expect that, 
once the internal demand is covered, China will start 
exporting. Considering the potential production, this could 
create serious threat to Italian producers. Greece is a threat, 
too, because kiwi fruits there have the ideal agronomic 
conditions, the orchards are younger than those in Italy and 
of a different variety.   
 
11.4.2  Drivers of competitive advantage: Quality, flexibility and reputation 
 
The experts agreed that quality is a main driver of competitive advantage. Quality is a 
prerequisite to entering the largest and most profitable markets, such as large retailers or 
exports to high-income countries (such as Germany, Japan or the USA). Quality-based strategies 
require coordination, because farmers must be able to produce according to customers’ 
specifications. This is costly for farmers for two main reasons. Firstly, quality production requires 
the adoption of costly practices and non-negligible investments. Secondly, these practices imply 
lower yield. Therefore, the price premium for quality must be high enough to compensate 
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farmers for the costs (experts [6], [9], [10], [11]). Farmers are heterogeneous with respect to 
the cost of providing quality (expert [4]). Usually, private traders buy products only if they 
comply with a minimum quality standard. POs are committed to accept all member production, 
regardless of quality (experts [6], [11]). As a consequence, private traders usually are able to 
reward quality more, in the form of higher price premiums or larger and earlier down payments 
than POs (expert [6], [8]). This is considered a major issue in PO management and a source of 
possible opportunistic behaviour. Farmers might decide to sell high-quality products to private 
traders and low-quality products to POs, using informal trade to go around the delivery 
commitment ([anonymous expert]).  
According to the experts, quality is observable, and buyers can discriminate low-quality 
products. However, there is still a large production of low-quality kiwis due to the yield incentives 
(experts [3], [6], [7], [8], [9], [11]). Farmers with high costs for providing quality (because of 
lack of skills, lack of capital investments or high discount rate) have an incentive to produce a 
large volume of low-quality fruit and deliver to informal marketing channels or POs.   
The ability to meet consumer demand and comply with downstream firms’ requirements is the 
second main driver of competitive advantage in the kiwi industry, according to all the experts. 
In practice, firms must be able to meet orders on a very short notice, delivering high quality 
fruit at the lowest possible price (experts [2], [3], [11]). The buyer segment of the netchain 
(Figure 11-1) must comply with heterogeneous quality and safety standards, and it is called to 
contribute to retailers’ promotions and marketing activities (such as sales or the opening of new 
stores) typically through granting price discounts. Some experts ([3], [6], [8], [11]) stressed 
the unpredictable nature of such requests, while others ([2]) suggest that historical data can be 
used to predict future requests with sufficient accuracy. 
Some experts ([2], [3]) consider meeting downstream firms’ requests as part of a “customer 
care” strategy, where building a reputation for reliability and a problem-solving attitude is the 
key to building trust and successful long-term relationships. Because firms operate in relatively 
small markets with repeated transactions (experts [3], [10], [11]), reputation is considered a 
key asset and competitive advantage. Having a reputation for reliably delivering high-quality 
products is of paramount importance for firms in the kiwi industry. Partial exceptions to the 
reputation strategy are small traders and intermediaries who seem to have a shorter time 
horizon in their strategies and therefore less use for reputation (experts [3] and [6]). 
 Other experts ([6], [8], [11]) consider pressure to meet demand as the result of downstream 
firms’ bargaining power and stress the unilateral nature of the requests. All experts agreed that 
failing to comply with downstream firms’ requests is likely to result in a reduction of future trade 
or even termination of the contract relationship. While some experts ([2], [3]) consider this a 
normal, tough-but-fair business relationship (e.g., why do business with unreliable suppliers?), 
others feel like they are doing business under continuous threat ([6]). 
Finding K2: Quality, flexibility and reputation are key competitive advantages in the kiwi supply 
chain. In order to compete, firms must have a reputation for reliable delivery of high-quality 
products for unpredictable, short-notice orders. 
 
11.5  Analysis of trading practices 
 
The experts were asked to illustrate the key elements of transactions in the kiwi netchain. In 
particular, they discussed contractual organization and primary trading practices. 
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11.5.1  Organization of the netchain 
 
The netchain is structured according to a demand-push principle, and all firms act in order to 
ensure that the final demand is satisfied. Demand is unpredictable and affected by several 
random factors, including non-systematic shocks such as news about health and safety, food 
fashion or temperature. Also, consumption is sensitive to the prices of kiwi and other fruits. A 
promotion on other fruits can depress the demand for kiwi significantly. Fluctuations in final 
demand generates shocks in the derived demand at the intermediate segments of the supply 
chains. Being able to adjust to such random fluctuations of demand is considered a key 
competitive advantage (section 11.4.2 ). In order to be a reliable trade partner, firms must grant 
product availability even in the presence of demand spikes (“They must show they have the 
product”, experts [2], [3], [6]) and—at the same time—be able to take the risk of falls in demand 
(“They must deliver on demand only”, experts [2], [3], [6], [11]) 
The netchain is organized as a sequence of interdependent transactions. Each firm, when 
bargaining with an upstream supplier, considers the terms and conditions of the contract with 
the downstream. This circumstance originates the pass-through effect. 
Finding K3: Contracts between various segments of netchains are interdependent. 
The bargaining begins at flowering/blooming period, when firms have a reliable estimate of the 
production. Product availability influences negotiations between farmers and their buyers. If 
supply is scarce compared to expected demand, buyers must compete in order to obtain enough 
product to maintain their reputation as reliable suppliers. If supply is abundant, buyers can be 
more selective about quality and offer lower prices. There are two fundamental differences 
between private traders and POs at this stage. POs are committed to trade the entire production 
of all their members, and they pay a down payment at delivery and a settlement at the end of 
the season. Private traders place delivery obligations onto farmers but do not necessarily commit 
to buy a minimum quantity (expert [6]). They offer prices close to those offered by POs, but 
they pay larger down payments before the harvesting season so that farmers can use the money 
to cover expenses. In general, POs are more effective in taking the risk of overproduction away 
from farmers (as they take the entire production), while private traders are more effective in 
taking on the price risk (as they pay earlier and make larger down payments).  
Finding K4: POs are more effective in taking the risk of overproduction away from farmers (as 
they take the entire production), while private traders are more effective in taking on the price 
risk (as they pay earlier and make larger down payments).  
Club variety supply chains have unique features. The breeder can plan production by limiting 
access to the genetic resource and providing technical assistance to help farmers achieve quality 
and quantity targets. Experts ([10]) said that the breeders usually plan to supply a quantity 
slightly lower than expected demand in order to gain bargaining power with downstream firms. 
Breeders buy farmers’ entire production, based on an exclusive marketing agreement. Quality 
enforcement is strict, and fruits that do not comply with the standard are destroyed. This gives 
farmers strong economic incentive to provide high-quality fruits (experts [10], [11]). Experts 
agree that coordination in club variety supply chains is much more effective than in non-club 
chains. Zespri is referred to as the leading example.  
Once a year buyers and other middlemen negotiate a supply agreement with supermarket chains 
(or buying desks). The agreements set the conditions for “shelf access”, that is, for being 
considered a possible supplier of the retailer over the year. There are several access costs to 
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entering into such a transaction with a retailer. Direct entry fees are payments linked explicitly 
and directly to the listing procedure (registration fees, etc.). Some experts estimate such costs 
to be, on average, approximately 2,000 euros (experts [6] and [8], but others did not confirm 
the estimate). Indirect costs may be even more sizable and include specific investments or 
contributions to the retailers’ expenses. For example, some retailers require suppliers to use a 
specific packaging system that can only be rented for a price (and a bank guarantee is required). 
Suppliers may be asked to contribute to the restyling of shelves (approximately every three 
years). During the negotiation of the supply agreements, suppliers have the opportunity to join 
voluntary programs (quality programs, promotion campaigns, etc.). An expert ([6]) stated that 
voluntary participation in promotions/discount programs is expected, and suppliers perceive that 
a sustained flow of orders depends on their willingness to join the voluntary programs. In this 
way, formal discounts and promotions are free actions of the suppliers, but in practice they are 
perceived as a condition for entry into the business. Other experts agreed. The most sizable 
costs are promotions and discounts, considered by the panellists as pay-for-entry and pay-for-
stay costs (experts [2], [3], [6], [8], [11]). 
Supply agreements put a delivery obligation on the suppliers but not a minimum quantity 
commitment on the large retailers. This means that if the retailer orders what is contractually 
agreed, the producer must make it available on demand, with no excuses. Orders, on the other 
hand, are based on market trends and not guaranteed. Having no obligation, a large retailer can 
deny orders without legal reason (just claiming low demand). The suppliers have no grounds (or 
bargaining power) to contest such claims. Renegotiations of the supply agreement are possible. 
Under the guarantee of anonymity, one expert complained that renegotiation often takes the 
form of voluntary “offers” by the producers, while in fact these are elicited by the buyer 
informally. The anonymous expert reported that large retailers will mail suppliers pre-filled forms 
with a “voluntary proposal for a discount or a promotion”. The supplier is expected to sign it, 
under the tacit threat of reduction in future trade. Other experts ([2], [10]), however, stated 
that changes in trade agreements usually happen during the yearly negotiation, while 
renegotiations during the year are rare. All experts agreed that, typically, supply agreements 
are offered by retailers in a “take-it or leave-it” form, and suppliers have little chance of 
negotiating terms. 
Once the supply agreement is signed, orders are negotiated periodically. Some experts referred 
to monthly ([11]) and others to weekly ([2]) negotiations. Weekly prices are relatively 
predictable, but in the case of excess supply due to poor production planning (or unexpected 
fluctuations in markets for substitute fruits), sudden price falls may happen. This circumstance 
might be particularly severe for suppliers if it happens during promotional campaigns. In this 
case, the discount makes prices even lower (experts [6], [11]). During negotiations of orders, 
retailers may ask for “additional discounts” because of special circumstances (such as the 
opening of a new store or unexpected market conditions). Such discounts are additional with 
respect to the ones in the supply agreement. Experts agree that suppliers usually agree to the 
additional discounts because they expect trade reduction in the future if they do not ([3], [6]). 
Suppliers may offer discounts or other benefits in order to elicit orders, if they need to sell-out 
stocks. In fact, especially when production is abundant, suppliers compete for orders with other 
traders, and auction-like mechanisms are possible (experts [2], [6]). The additional discounts 
come on top the planned promotion campaigns in the supply agreements.    
Finding K5: In the netchain, downstream firms usually have more bargaining power than 
upstream firms (with the exception of breeders in club-variety supply chains, who have 
bargaining power over farmers even when acting as input providers). 
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11.5.2  Main trading practices 
 
The main focus of the experts was price determination. Other practices were considered 
ancillary. They expressed concerns about low prices and referred to unexpected discounts as the 
most critical practice. In this regard, the Directive 2019/633 states: 
For contributions by a supplier to the costs of product promotion, marketing or 
advertising, including promotional displays in stores and sales campaigns to be 
considered fair, they should be agreed in clear and unambiguous terms at the 
conclusion of the supply agreement or in any subsequent agreement between the 
buyer and the supplier, otherwise they should be prohibited under this Directive. 
Where such a contribution is agreed, it should be based on objective and reasonable 
estimates. 
Based on the experts’ statements, we concluded that protection offered by the Directive might 
be limited by two factors. Firstly, discounts may be offered by suppliers as a competitive tool for 
obtaining more orders from downstream firms. In practice, it might be very difficult to tell these 
cases apart from discounts that are elicited by retailers under the threat of commercial 
retaliation. Secondly, if we assume that additional discounts (i.e., discounts not considered in 
the supply agreement in clear and unambiguous terms) are banned, then the outcome is a 
possible increase in price volatility if the discount cannot be adjusted to the price. For example, 
suppliers might be required to give discounts when prices are already close to average production 
costs.   
Finding K6: Unpredictable discounts and promotions are the most detrimental practices in the 
kiwi industry. Ex ante specification of promotions may lead to a mismatch between price 
realizations and the pre-planned discount. 
Unilateral renegotiations are considered customary by several experts ([6], [8], [9], [11]). 
Sometimes buyers renegotiate directly, sometimes they press suppliers to offer terms that are 
more favourable than the ones in the original contracts. In any case, it is well understood that 
contract renewal and future orders depend on the ability of suppliers to comply with, and even 
anticipate, buyers’ requests (experts [2], [3], [6]). In this case, too, it might be difficult to tell 
unilateral renegotiations (especially in the absence of explicit requests) from actual competition 
among suppliers. 
All experts agree that threats of commercial retaliation are pervasive. They are never explicit, 
but there is a tacit understanding that they are likely to happen if, for whatever reason, the 
downstream firms are not satisfied with the trade relationships. Experts ([2], [3, [6], [8], [11]) 
stated that sometimes firms do not contest downstream firms’ actions (such as quality 
enforcement or renegotiations) in order to preserve “a good trade relationship”. Although the 
threats are quite common, it is difficult to find evidence of them because they are not 
communicated by email or in any other written form. 
Finding K7: Threats of commercial retaliation are common. Firms might not challenge unfair 
decisions for fear of retaliation. 
Delayed payments are not considered an important problem in the kiwi industry. The timing of 
payment is already regulated by Italian law, and usually large retailers respect the terms of 
payment within 30 days of the invoice. According to an expert ([3]), payments may be less 
timely and regular when small traders or informal channels are involved. Several firms pay 
settlements well after 30 days from delivery, following the PO practices. 
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Finding K8: Settlements at the end of the season and prices to be determined are common 
among POs and private traders alike.  
Orders come with very short notice and only when the buyer is certain there is a demand for the 
product. Consequently, order cancelations are rare. Experts agree that the Directive provision 
in this regard makes little sense for the kiwi industry. 
Some experts ([6], [11]) remarked that retailers do not pay for unsold products. This includes 
cases of deterioration at the retailers’ premises, even if the supplier is not responsible for it (for 
example, waste of kiwis at sale-point due to manipulation by the consumers). Large firms, such 
as Zespri (expert [10]), use plastic packaging in order to prevent the problem. Other experts 
([8], [9], [11]) said that this strategy is possible only because of Zespri’s reputation for quality 
(consumers trust the brand and do not need to choose the individual fruits).  
Experts agreed that contracts with large retailers are all in written form. This is considered a 
guarantee for the retailers for two reasons: i) contracts are typically written by retailers to their 
advantage, and ii) suppliers hesitate to use the contract against the buyer because of the 
possible consequences on future trade.  
Experts agreed that the unclear specification of payments and costs (such as product display, 
marketing cost, etc.) is not a major problem in the kiwi industry. Discounts and promotions are 
an exception, as mentioned above. 
 
11.6  Key transactions 
 
The experts agreed that large retail chains and large traders have a dominant role in the netchain 
because they are the gatekeepers of consumer access. Given the high concentration in the 
downstream industry, these firms have remarkable bargaining power and are often able to 
impose their terms. Upstream firms, such as farmers and buyers, are not well organized (POs 
are relatively small) and often compete with each other for market access. 
The key transactions are those between buyers and the buying desks of retailer chains. However, 
the experts expect that there will be  a low degree of cooperation from downstream firms 
regarding this research.  
 
11.7  Expert panel on the Lake Constance apple netchain 
 
This report summarizes the discussion of an expert panel, which was employed to investigate 
the organization of the Lake Constance apple netchain. Dr. Sebastian Rahbauer of the Technical 
University of Munich moderated the discussion. Specifically, the experts were consulted to 
identify 
• lead firms and their most important trade partners, 
• typical contracts and arrangements in the netchain, 
• drivers of competitive advantage in the netchain, and 
• the most important trade practices and focus transactions. 
The selection of individual experts was made carefully. We aimed to select experts from each of 
the different stages of the netchain. Unfortunately, no representative of a retailer was willing to 
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participate. The following netchain segments were represented in the expert panel. We agreed 
not to divulge the names and companies of the panel participants.  
a. Producer organization 
The first expert (expert A) was the head of one of the largest German producer organizations 
for dessert fruits. More than 450 apple producers around Lake Constance are members of this 
PO. The expert himself had been working in various positions at this PO for about 20 years. 
b. Trader 
The second expert (expert B) was a former manager of a fruit trader, who retired about five 
years prior. Fresh apples represented the largest revenue share for this fruit trader. Until his 
retirement, the expert was active in the fruit trading business for over 40 years. 
c. Marketer 
The third expert (expert C) was the marketing director of a contractual marketer of a producer 
organization for dessert fruits produced in the Lake Constance area. This expert had about 15 
years of experience in the marketing of apples. 
d. Producer 
The fourth expert (expert D) was an apple grower from the Lake Constance area. This participant 
was also a member of the producer organization represented by the first expert and cultivated 
apples for over 30 years.  
 
11.7.1  Description of the apple netchain 
 
The experts identified input providers, farmers, producer organizations (POs), buyers (who buy 
from farmers), other middlemen (who buy from buyers) and retailers as making up the main 
layers of the netchain. The experts approved the representation of the Lake Constance apple 
netchain illustrated in Figure 11-2. 
The Lake Constance apple netchain can be subdivided into two supply chains which are highly 
interconnected: club and non-club. Both club and non-club varieties of apples are produced in 
the Lake Constance area. Non-club varieties make up a large majority (over 90 percent according 
to experts A, C and D) of the apple production in this area, and all farmers are free to grow them 
without limitations. Club varieties are patented, and farmers have to acquire seedlings from the 
patent holder or contractual nurseries. Typically, patent holders do not sell these seedlings to 
single farmers but only to POs. Therefore, POs buy large quantities of seedlings of a club variety 
and pass them on to their members. The members commit to distributing the harvested club 
apples through the cooperative. The vast majority of the apple producers around Lake Constance 
are members of POs and have access to club varieties [expert A]. 
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Figure 11-2: Stylized representation of the Lake Constance apple netchain 
 
Green arrows refer to trade flows of non-club varieties, yellow arrows to club varieties, and blue arrows to both club and 
non-club varieties. Purple arrows indicate processed products. 
 
In addition to providing seedlings of club and non-club varieties, POs function as consultants, 
supporting growers throughout the apple-growing process (e.g., pest monitoring, plant 
protection, harvest control, certification). POs also perform many tasks that single producers 
cannot complete, such as the bundling of supply at a uniform and high-quality level. Unlike POs 
in some other sectors, the POs of apple producers around Lake Constance do not run warehouses 
themselves. 
The handling of the apple harvest is completely outsourced to contractual marketers of POs 
[expert C]. These marketers run warehouses in which they collect, store, sort and package the 
apples that the POs’ members deliver (club and non-club varieties). These marketers sell the 
products through various marketing channels, including wholesalers, processors, exporters and 
retailers. Few contractual marketers combine significant market shares. In the past years, many 
traders have left the market, and a few large contractual marketers of POs adopted their market 
shares [expert B]. The expert estimated that contractual marketers of POs trade around 95 
percent of apple production in the Lake Constance area. Thus, private traders are of minor and 
decreasing relevance in the supply chain. 
Few non-PO members deliver their harvest directly to domestic retailers. According to expert D, 
many farmers try hard to bypass middlemen and cooperate directly with retailers. However, 
retailers rarely put in the effort to cooperate directly with farmers because several farmers are 
usually needed to cover the capacity of one marketer or trader [expert B]. An exception is the 
trade of regional apples, which are sourced directly from smaller producers by some retailers 
with decentralized procurement. However, this is not possible for club varieties, which are 
exclusively marketed by contractual marketers of POs. 
According to all the experts, retailers represent the lead firms in the netchain. The experts said 
retailers are fair on most points but use their dominant position to push down prices for apples 
[experts B, C]. Trade practices are heterogeneous for different retailers but have not been 
labelled as unfair or immoral. They are perceived as a characteristic of the industry.  
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Finding A1: The experts assess retailers as tough negotiators with heterogeneous 
trade practices. For the most part, these trading practices are not perceived as unfair 
but rather accepted as conditions of the industry. 
 
Apples that exceed the retail demand, have flaws or do not meet the quality requirements of 
retailers go to the processing industry. Expert B estimated that under five percent of the apples 
produced in the Lake Constance region are exported.  
 
11.8  Key drivers of the apple industry 
 
The experts were asked to illustrate opportunities, threats and key drivers of competitive 
advantage in the Lake Constance apple netchain. This section presents a summary of the issues 
raised by the experts. 
 
11.8.1  Opportunities and threats 
 
The natural conditions around Lake Constance were assessed as favourable for the production 
of high-quality apples. However, some experts [A, B, C] assessed the presence of a large number 
of small farmers in this area as a difficulty concerning the proper bundling of sales. Retailers 
increasingly demand large quantities of apples of uniform quality. In addition to a number of 
highly-skilled, full-time farmers, many part-time farmers produce apples of inconsistent quality 
that are not desired by retailers and have to be marketed otherwise.  
Expert B predicted a consistent domestic demand for apples in the future. Due to the relatively 
low self-sufficiency rate and present chain structure, the experts did not assume an increase in 
the rate of exported apples in the near future, as German buyers demand most of the domestic 
harvest. However, a main threat was perceived from the import of club varieties such as “Pink 
Lady” and “Jazz”, which are almost exclusively produced at large farms in Southern European 
countries. These varieties are increasingly displacing domestic apple varieties because 
consumers value their appearance and taste. 
An additional threat was perceived from international competitors, which are able to offer low-
price apples of good quality due to their comparatively low production costs. These international 
competitors lower market prices of domestic apples and challenge the profitability of apple 
production in Germany. 
 
11.8.2  Drivers of competitive advantage: Quality, flexibility and liquidity 
 
The experts agreed that quality is a main driver of competitive advantage and determines firms’ 
success in the value chain. It is the prerequisite to enter the largest and most profitable markets, 
such as large retailers. For farmers, this implies being able to produce according to the 
customers’ requirements. This can incur additional costs, e.g., for certification and technology 
adoption. Contractual marketers of POs are committed to accept all member production, 
regardless of quality. Farmers delivering higher quality apples receive a price premium for their 
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products. Therefore, the price premium for quality must be high enough to compensate farmers 
for their additional costs.  
For middlemen, being successful requires being able to consistently provide unpredictable 
quantities of apples of high quality and uniformity throughout the whole year. In addition, it is 
advantageous to trade a broad product spectrum of different fruits and vegetables. Retailers 
rarely cooperate with pure apple suppliers [expert C]. Expert B agreed and added that retailers 
further expect their suppliers to manage tasks they would otherwise have to deal with 
themselves. As an example, he stated that retailers increasingly limit their storage activities, 
relying more on just-in-time delivery. Suppliers are thus selected based on their storage 
capacities and efficient logistics. They have to be capable of processing orders and delivering 
apples on short notice, which constitutes high requirements in terms of their flexibility. 
Another important aspect is suppliers’ liquidity, as retailers use suppliers for bridging finance 
[expert B, C]. Suppliers pay their producers for the purchased goods but receive payment from 
the retailer only after delivery. The supplier carries the financing costs for the period in between. 
Finding A2: Quality, flexibility and liquidity are key competitive advantages in the apple 
supply chain. Firms must be able to cope with unpredictable and short-notice orders from 
retailers. 
 
11.9  Analysis of trading practices 
 
The experts described the key elements of the transactions in the Lake Constance apple netchain 
and discussed the main trading practices. The results are presented in the subsequent sections. 
 
11.9.1  Organization of the netchain 
 
Consumer demand for apples is influenced by several predictable (e.g., seasonal fluctuations) 
and unpredictable factors (e.g., food scares, food fashion). Being able to adjust to fluctuations 
in demand requires flexibility, which was previously described as a key competitive advantage 
in the chain.  
The apple netchain can be divided into a sequence of interdependent transactions that ensure 
final demand is satisfied. Each firm, when bargaining with the upstream supplier, considers the 
terms and conditions in the contract with the downstream firm. 
Finding A3: Contracts between segments of the apple netchain are interdependent. 
The transactions between farmers and their buyers (PO marketers and private traders) are 
governed by delivery contracts. PO marketers are committed to trading their members’ entire 
apple harvests. The prices the farmers receive from the PO marketers are dependent on several 
quality attributes of the delivered apples. Private traders, instead, only conclude contracts for 
specified quantities and qualities. According to expert D, most delivery contracts are concluded 
before the apples are harvested. In this way, producers try to minimize their storage needs as 
they deliver the apples immediately after harvesting. Independent of when or with whom 
delivery contracts are concluded, farmers receive the entire payment for their apples within 30 
days post-delivery, if not explicitly agreed otherwise.  
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Finding A4: POs are committed to accepting their members’ entire harvests, while 
private traders only accept high quality and specified quantities. The timing of the 
payments does not differ between POs and traders. 
 
The relationships between middlemen and retailers can be considered more complex. 
Transactions are governed by supply agreements and delivery contracts. According to expert C, 
confidentiality agreements prohibit middlemen from disclosing any information about the 
contractual features.  
Supply agreements are negotiated once a year between the middlemen and the retailers’ buying 
desks. These agreements set the conditions for a middleman to be “listed” by a retailer, i.e., to 
obtain shelf access for one year. Usually, supply agreements define three dimensions: (1) 
quality, (2) promotions and, for some retailers, (3) services.  
(1) The quality dimension defines the exact quality of the product, the procedure to test it and 
the consequences for failing to deliver the required quality. Retailers have their own residue 
specifications, which regulate the quantities and maximum accepted residues of pesticides and 
contaminants in apples. There are a lot of further quality requirements, e.g., specifications for 
how pallets should be packed or apples must be labelled. Exemplary, expert B referred to one 
specific retailer that requests to label all apples as Class II, although the apples have to comply 
with Class I.  
(2) The agreement about promotion covers all actions needed to ensure steady turnover. These 
include advertising, sales, special offers and in-store promotions. According to expert B, almost 
all retailers also claim reimbursement from their middlemen, e.g., depending on sales volumes.  
(3) The supply agreement of some retailers requires several services that middlemen must buy 
from the retailers. The services are bundled, meaning that shelf access is conditional on the 
purchase of such services. 
The supply agreement can be terminated freely anytime from both sides, but this rarely happens, 
according to experts B and C. According to expert C, retailers are interested in a strong and 
steady supplier base. Retailers only consider listing new suppliers if their current suppliers make 
mistakes. Therefore, the cooperation between middlemen and retailers is often long-term.  
For a middleman, signing a supply agreement is not a guarantee for future orders. According to 
expert B, retailers never commit to a minimum quantity in the supply agreement. Prices are also 
not specified in the supply agreement. Specific orders are based on offers, which retailers request 
from their listed middlemen on a weekly basis. A listed middleman may (or may not) receive a 
request for an offer. If a middleman submits an offer, it may or may not be accepted. If the 
retailer accepts an offer, a delivery contract is concluded. Delivery contracts set quantity, time, 
place and conditions of delivery and can include derogations to the supply agreement. Within an 
agreed-upon period after delivery (usually 14 days), the retailer pays the order. 
Finding A5: In the apple netchain, downstream firms usually have more bargaining power 
than upstream firms (with the exception of breeders in club-variety supply chains). 
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11.9.2  Main trading practices 
 
Expert C was reluctant to discuss trading practices because it violated ongoing confidentiality 
agreements that he had signed with several retailers. Thus, most of the following information is 
based on statements from experts A and B. 
The experts stated that supply agreements and delivery contracts with retailers are all in written 
form. They are very detailed and contain all necessary information about trade practices in clear 
and unambiguous terms. Changes to the initial contract during an ongoing contract period are 
very uncommon, according to the experts.  
Finding A6: Contracts are in written form and include all trade practices. Confidentiality 
agreements prohibit middlemen from communicating any information about the 
contractual features to third parties. 
 
Late payments were not stated to be a problem. Typically, middlemen receive payments within 
14 days after delivery. Disclosure of trade secrets by retailers was not perceived as a present 
practice. Short-notice cancelation of orders is the absolute exception, according to the 
statements of the experts. Orders come with very short notice, only when the buyer perceives 
that the demand for the product is guaranteed. Experts noted that—usually—buyers do not ask 
suppliers for compensation for the cost of examining customer complaints. 
Retailer requirements that suppliers pay for the deterioration of apples that occurs on the 
retailer’s premises are unusual. The long potential shelf life of apples prevents this problem. 
However, this practice is common for more perishable fruits and vegetables, as expert B 
indicated. The expert added that suppliers do not defy these payments out of fear of possible 
negative consequences for the trade relationship. Therefore, implicit threats of commercial 
retaliation are perceived as present. There is a fear that retailers will terminate a business 
relationship if the suppliers do not comply with their claims.  
Finding A7: Implicit threats of commercial retaliation are present. Firms comply with 
retailers’ claims out of fear of possible negative consequences for the trade relationship. 
 
This also applies to a further trade practice, which was perceived as the most detrimental by 
expert B. The expert stated that retailers demand payments from suppliers that are not related 
to the sale of suppliers’ apples. These payments are compulsory, differ between retailers and 
are specified in the supply agreements. They include listing fees, shelf-cleaning fees, registration 
fees and supplier participation in retailers’ quality programs. The expert stated that these 
payments are substantial. 
Finding A8: Demand for payments unrelated to the sale of a supplier’s apples is the most 
detrimental practice in the apple industry.  
 
11.9.3  Key transactions 
 
The combined market share of the four largest German retailers tops 85 percent of the food 
retail market. Due to their great bargaining power, they have the ability to impose their terms 
on upstream actors, as the experts agreed.  
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The key transactions are those between buyers and the buying desks of retail chains. However, 
the experts expect that retailers will not be overly cooperative for this research.  
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12  Economic Modelling 
 
Carlo Russo Alessandro Sorrentino Luisa Menapace 
(Univ. Cassino and L. M.) (Tuscia University) (Tech. Univ. Munich) 
 
12.1  Introduction  
 
The objective of this model is to illustrate the pass-through effect of UTPs along the apple and 
kiwi value chains that we consider in our empirical work. We based our analysis on the literature 
review (chapter 2) and our interviews with the expert panels (chapter 11), and we develop an 
illustration of the key economic issues related to UTPs. In particular, the main focus of the 
analysis is to illustrate the consequences of the UTP Directive on efficiency and value distribution 
in the chain. 
We use the information from the panel of experts to define the institutional context of the value 
chain and identify the key practices to be included in the model. Then, we interpret the results 
based on the economic theory we illustrated in the review.  
In order to provide the simplest illustration possible, we model the fruit supply chain as two 
interdependent industries. In the upstream market, farmers sell their fruit to middlemen. In the 
downstream market, middlemen sell to retailers. In our stylized model, retailers are supermarket 
chains. The middlemen represent the segments “buyers” and “other middlemen” defined by the 
expert panel for the kiwi and apple industries (Figure 11-1 and Figure 11-2).10 They can be POs, 
private traders, processors, exporters, other firms or a combination of these. For convenience 
we assume just one intermediary between farmers and retailers. The model can be easily 
generalized for more complex structures if necessary.11  
Transactions are organized with contracts. In section 12.2  we provide a stylized representation 
of the contracts in the two markets. For simplicity, we use basic principal-agent models, where 
the middleman is the principal in the upstream market and the retailer is the principal in the 
downstream market.12 Our point is that the contracts are interdependent and simultaneously 
determined. Therefore, the practices that are adopted in one contract affect the organization of 
the other transaction. This determines the pass-through effect.  
 
                                         
10 Note that in chapter 11 the term “buyer” was used by the expert panels to indicate POs and private traders who buy 
kiwis from farmers. In this chapter the term is used for a generic firm buying fruits from a supplier. This includes retailers, 
who buy from middlemen. 
11 The expert panels suggested that PO and cooperatives may play different roles in the netchain. Some act as a 
middleman, taking the product from members, storing it and selling it to retailers, in a typical joint selling scheme. Others 
are just associations of producers that share knowhow and provide technical assistance. These POs have trading partners 
that function as the “middlemen” in our context.  
12 This assumption is supported by the panels of experts (findings K5 and A5 from chapter 11).   
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12.2  Characteristics of the fruit industry 
 
The expert panels stressed the importance of three key competitive advantages in the kiwi and 
apple supply chains: flexibility, quality and reputation (findings K2 and A2 in chapter 11). Firms 
must be able to consistently and on short notice supply high-quality fruits at the lowest possible 
price in order to compete. Contracts are designed to ensure these fundamental competitive 
advantages (efficiency goal) and grant the principal the highest profits possible (value 
distribution goal). 
The importance of flexibility derives from the volatility of supply and demand. Consumer demand 
is affected by price promotions and by several unpredictable factors, such as weather conditions, 
food scares, health news, food trends, etc. Supply is determined by nature (such as weather or 
pests) and agronomic variables. Due to the fast and unpredictable fluctuations of demand and 
supply, firms must be able to adjust their strategies as soon as information about trade 
opportunities are revealed. 
Noticeably, the trade of each fruit is affected by shocks in the demand and supply of the entire 
category. In fact, due to high cross-price elasticity in fruit demand, retailers use category 
management techniques (Richards 2000; O’Keeffe and Fearne 2002). Retailers are multi-product 
firms serving basket shoppers. They maximize joint profits over the entire basket, regardless of 
the results from the individual products (e.g., Zenor 1994). This creates interdependence among 
the items in the category, and it might increase volatility and risk in the procurement market 
(Russo and Goodhue 2018). For example, an excess of production of a product in the category 
(for example, pears) may induce retailers to offer consumers a large discount in order to prompt 
consumption. This may result in a demand drop for other fruits (for example, apples or kiwis). 
As a result, firms must be able to react quickly to multiple and unpredictable shocks within the 
entire category.  
An important consequence of category management is that a failure in the supply of one product 
may affect the entire category, and therefore the costs of miscoordination are potentially large. 
For example, failing to support a promotion with the supply of large volumes of fruit might result 
in an overall drop in store traffic, with the consequent loss of profits from the entire consumer 
basket (Russo and Goodhue 2018). 
The limited shelf-life of the products and high inventory costs limit the ability of retailers to use 
stocks to deal with demand shocks. As a consequence, procurement is organized according a 
just-in-time principle, and retailers order fruits only when demand is revealed, for example, with 
weekly orders (sections 11.5.1  and 11.9.1 ).   
Middlemen must meet these orders, providing high-quality products on short notice for an 
extended period (possibly all year round), even if the harvest season is quite short. They 
aggregate the supply of a relatively large number of farmers and then sell the fruit to the retailers 
whenever they receive the order. They incur the inventory costs, they cover the time difference 
between production and sales to the final consumers and bear part of the risk of a mismatch 
between supply and demand. 
Farmers grow the fruit according to the quality specifications of retailers and middlemen. They 
bear the production risk and may share demand risk with the middlemen. 
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12.3  Organization of the supply chain 
 
Running a just-in-time procurement system under unpredictable demand and supply shocks 
requires efficient coordination of the supply chain. The organization of the fruit supply chains is 
a problem with design attributes (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 91): i) retailers have a priori 
information about the optimal solution, and ii) failing to achieve efficient coordination is costly. 
In fact, retailers are able to determine the optimal timing and volume of trade based on category 
management (have a priori information) and suffer profit losses in the entire category if the 
transaction with suppliers fails (i.e., delivery is not timely or products do not comply with quality 
requirements). As a consequence, retailers prefer a coordinated supply chain to spot market 
transactions. 
The just-in-time organization of the fruit supply chain minimizes costs, but it increases the risk 
of transaction failure, because if one supplier fails to deliver there is limited time to find 
alternative solutions. As a consequence, reliability of suppliers is a key competitive advantage. 
An efficient organization of the supply chain requires selecting and motivating the most efficient 
suppliers able to ensure reliable and flexible supply.  
Figure 12-1 illustrates the organization of the transactions along the supply chain. All agents are 
engaged in long-run business relationships. The long-run time horizon is beneficial for all parties. 
Farmers and middlemen have sizable capital investments (orchards, storage facilities, etc.) that 
require time to be recovered. Retailers can observe a supplier’s reputation for reliable provision 
of high-quality products.  
 
Figure 12-1: Timing of the transactions 
 
 
The long-run relationship is broken down into a series of yearly supply agreements in order to 
ensure flexibility. The supply agreement is signed when firms have a reliable estimate for future 
production and uncertainty about supply is resolved (for example, at blooming season). At this 
stage, firms compare estimated production with historical data concerning demand and are able 
to anticipate whether there is an excess or shortage of supply. This knowledge is of paramount 
importance to define the relative bargaining power of the parties and, consequently, the terms 
of the agreement. 
In the downstream industry, supply agreements regulate “shelf access” (sections 11.5.1  and 
11.9.1 ). They state the conditions that the middleman must meet in order to be considered a 
possible supplier by the retailer. Terms include (but are not limited to) lump sum payments such 
as slotting allowances or negotiation fees; adoption of specific quality standards; promotions; 
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general terms of delivery (such as location, notice, packaging); take-back agreements; and 
quality enforcement. Usually at this stage retailers do not commit to minimum quantity 
purchases, and the entire demand risk is on the middlemen. Such agreements can be considered 
option contracts. The retailers gain the option to order from the middlemen, and they can decide 
whether to exercise it or not. 
Supply agreements in the upstream market are production contracts, specifying quality 
standards, quality enforcement and quantity. Prices are determined at the end of the season 
when all production is sold to the consumers (finding K8 in chapter 11) according to agreed-
upon pricing rules (e.g., pay-per-quality schemes, timing of payments). Supply agreements in 
upstream markets are discretionary, and firms may decide to trade at harvest time directly.13 
However, in our model, we assume that both parties have interest in signing a supply agreement. 
In the absence of the agreement, middlemen cannot prove to retailers that they are a reliable 
supplier, and farmers must trade at harvest time when their bargaining power is the lowest (see 
section 12.4 ). 
At the time of the supply agreement, middlemen may (or may not) give a down payment to 
farmers to help them to cover harvesting costs.14 The down payment is considered a sort of 
minimum guaranteed price. Further anticipations may be paid during the year, and settlement 
is paid once the product is sold to retailers or at the end of season. This practice allows 
middlemen to share the demand risk with producers.  
Production is delivered to each middleman at the harvest season. Farmers who did not sign 
supply agreements sell their goods at this stage. Middlemen buy the agreed-upon quantities and 
store the product for future sales. A key difference between private traders and POs is that the 
former can select production based on quality (and therefore reject delivery of non-compliant 
fruits), while the latter are committed to accept the entire production. Both types of middlemen 
can use pay-per-quality schemes, where the price paid to farmers depends on quality. 
Middlemen store the product and wait for the realization of demand.  
Before harvest, retailers may offer middlemen a one-year supply agreement. Only middlemen 
who sign the agreement are allowed to supply the retailer with fruits throughout the year. 
Middlemen are offered a supply agreement only if they can prove they have product available 
(i.e., if they have agreements with farmers) and if they have a reputation for consistently 
supplying high-quality products on short notice (i.e., if they never failed to comply with the 
retailer’s request). 
On a regular basis, retailers obtain short-run estimates of future demand. At this point, they 
negotiate prices with the middlemen they signed the supply agreement with. In the kiwi supply 
chain this happens weekly (usually on Friday). In this stage, retailers and middlemen negotiate 
prices based on market conditions, promotions and discounts (i.e., price reductions with respect 
to the negotiated price). The supply agreements regulate promotions. However, the timing of 
the sale is decided at this stage in order to match marketing actions to demand (and the needs 
of category management). Parties may agree on additional promotions and discounts (section 
11.5.2 ). These further discounts may be elicited by retailers or offered by middlemen in order 
                                         
13 The actual supply agreements in upstream markets may vary depending on the nature of the middlemen (for example, 
private trader vs PO) and their functions (for example, POs that may or may not exercise joint selling on behalf of farmers). 
For simplicity, in our model we assume a stylized agreement covering a generic arrangement. 
14 This practice is mainly used by private traders in the Italian kiwi industry, while POs usually provide down payments at 
the delivery (finding K4, chapter 4). In the Lake Constance apple netchain, payments happen at delivery or later (section 
4.8). 
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to boost sales. In fact, these weekly negotiations can be modelled as informal auctions, where 
middlemen use discounts and other practices to beat the competition. 
Based on the weekly negotiations, retailers place orders to middlemen with very short notice.15 
Changes in prices are still possible. In this way, retailers are able to commit to purchase only 
when demand is revealed. Furthermore, take-back practices are possible. 
 As we pointed out above, if the retailer fails to receive the order, there is very little time to 
organize a new delivery to satisfy the demand. Therefore, the retailer has a strong interest in a 
reliable supply chain.     
Orders are paid at regular intervals, based on the supplier’s invoice. Once middlemen sell the 
fruits to the final buyers, they can settle the payments to the farmers based on the agreed timing 
in the supply agreement. POs usually define the price at the end of the season. 
 
12.4  Bargaining in the netchain 
 
In essence, possible imbalances in the distribution of bargaining power may be explained by the 
Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model. Players take turns making offers to each other until an 
agreement is reached. Each turn, the value of the trade decreases for both parties, but the 
magnitude of the loss is different for the two players (for example, it might depend on the 
individual discount rate). Rubinstein shows that a player’s negotiation power is inversely 
proportional to the relative magnitude of loss. The player who is able to wait the longest gains 
more from the trade.  
If suppliers need to sell the product fast, their discount rate is high and negotiation power low. 
If buyers have no urgent need for the goods, their discount rate is low and negotiation power 
high. Three structural factors in the fruit supply chain contribute to this imbalance: price 
dynamics, category management and retail consolidation.  
Firstly, consumer prices for fruit decline fast over the season. Firstlings are highly priced, but 
then price goes down sharply and steadily. As a consequence, every supplier has a strong 
incentive to be among the first to sell. The buyer is indifferent about who the first supplier is, as 
long as quality and reliability are granted.  
Secondly, category management supports the buyer’s power in the downstream market. In the 
case of possibly unfavourable deals with suppliers, retailers can drive demand toward other items 
in the category using promotions or other marketing tools. Although this is a costly strategy that 
is effective in the short run only, it gives a retailer the opportunity to wait before closing the deal 
with the middleman, increasing their negotiation power. 
Thirdly, downstream sectors are more consolidated than the upstream segments. This implies 
that middlemen’s bargaining positions are relatively weak compared to retailers, and farmers’ 
bargaining positions are relatively weak compared to middlemen (Sorrentino et al. 2016, 2018). 
Suppliers (both middlemen and farmers) have limited trade alternatives and may have incentive 
to close deals with retailers before competitors do. 
 
                                         
15 In the Agro Pontino kiwi netchain, usual delivery is required within 24 hours for the domestic market and within two or 
three days within the EU. In the Lake Constance apple netchain, the notice is up to a week. 
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12.4.1  Bargaining between middlemen and retailers 
 
These three factors allow retailers to organize negotiations with middlemen according to an 
auction principle. Middlemen must offer retailers economic incentives in order to be selected as 
suppliers as soon as possible. As mentioned in section 12.3 , there are two main negotiations 
between a middleman and retailer: the supply agreement and the periodic (weekly) price and 
quantity negotiations. The reason for this two-step procedure is twofold: i) at the beginning of 
the season there is incomplete information about demand, and ii) at harvest time middlemen 
make an irreversible decision about the volume of products they buy. The two facts meet the 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) conditions for contractual renegotiation.16 As a consequence, 
any price that was negotiated in the supply agreement would be subject to renegotiation at a 
later stage. Noticeably, the efficiency of renegotiation-proof contracts might be questionable 
given the complexity of the environment (Segal 1998). 
Given the two-step negotiation, we have two auction processes. A middleman must first 
persuade retailers through economic incentives to be selected as the possible supplier (i.e., to 
sign the supply agreement). This explains why price and quantity range are usually not 
formalized in the supply agreement. Then, the middleman must give the most profitable offer 
so as to be awarded with the order. According to the expert panels (finding K2, section 11.4.2 
), the key element in the first negotiation is a reputation for the reliable delivery of sizable 
quantities of high-quality products on short notice. The key element in the order auction is the 
ability to provide low prices and discounts. 
 
12.4.2  Bargaining between middlemen and farmers 
 
Negotiations between middlemen and farmers happen before harvest, usually during the 
blossoming season (sections 11.5.1  and 11.9.1 ). In fact, both parties have incentive to 
negotiate early. 
Most farmers do not have refrigerated facilities, so they must sell their products right at harvest 
and not wait. This circumstance might shift relative bargaining power in favour of the more 
consolidated middlemen sectors, if negotiation happened at harvest time. Farmers can negotiate 
with less pressure when not simultaneously dealing with harvesting and marketing activities. 
Middlemen are willing to enter early negotiations in order to ensure a reliable supply before 
signing the supply agreements with retailers. Because product availability is a requisite for being 
offered a supply agreement, early negotiations with farmers allow middlemen to be credible 
trade partners.  
Negotiations between middlemen and farmers happen before uncertainty about demand is 
revealed. As a consequence, one of the main issues is how the demand risk is shared between 
the parties. The key element is the share of the final price that is paid (as a down payment) 
before demand is revealed. Clearly, if the full price is paid at delivery (or earlier), the risk from 
an unexpected drop in demand is entirely on the middleman. If price is entirely determined and 
paid after demand is revealed, the risk is on the farmer. 
                                         
16 According Dewatripont and Maskin (1990, p. 311-312), the conditions for renegotiations are: 1) parties acquire new 
information and 2) objectives may change because of the irreversibility of decisions. 
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In the supply agreement or during the harvest sale, the parties agree on quality. This is an 
important contractual dimension because quality is inversely associated with quantity. Therefore, 
the premium must be high enough to compensate the yield loss. The problem is particularly 
important for POs that are committed to take a farmer’s entire production. 
The relative negotiation power is driven by two main factors: product availability and irreversible 
production decisions. If the parties estimate that production will be abundant compared to the 
historical time series of demand, farmers must accept the middlemen’s terms. Instead, if 
production is scarce, competition among middlemen may give farmers greater negotiation 
power.  
Private traders have a negotiation advantage because, at the time of negotiation, farmers are 
already committed to production. Traders’ behaviour is constrained only by the urge to recover 
possible specific investments (which are limited in the case of multi-product traders).  
 
12.5  Incomplete contracts and efficiency 
 
The contracts are designed to guarantee the flexible and reliable supply of high-quality fruit. The 
organization shifts the demand risk onto the upstream firms, while supply risk is shared among 
farmers (volume reduction), middlemen and retailers (volume reduction and procurement price 
increase). 
The key tools for sharing demand risk are weekly (or periodic) price negotiations and short-
notice orders. The retailer buys the goods only when needed and when demand is revealed. 
Middlemen, on the other hand, must buy the product under demand uncertainty.  
From an economic perspective, the retailer-middleman supply agreement is an incomplete 
contract, leaving the parties free to negotiate when demand is revealed. A typical conclusion of 
economic theory is that these contracts may be inefficient because middlemen may prefer to 
reduce trade (i.e., buy less from farmers) because they are worried about future renegotiations 
(the so-called hold-up problem, see literature review section 2.4 , Schmitz 2001). From this 
perspective, a complete (or non-renegotiable) contract would be preferable. In our model this 
concern is partially offset by the middleman’s need to comply with the retailer’s request. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that a complete contract might induce retailers to reduce trade, 
unless all possible states of nature are considered and addressed. In fact, a complete contract 
should include 
• a pricing rule for every possible demand realization of the entire category assortment 
(given the interdependencies due to category management), 
• monitoring of retailer pricing strategies in the entire category (in order to avoid strategic 
pricing aimed at manipulating procurement prices), and 
• penalties for defection and refusing to trade. 
Yet, the complexity of such a contract might reduce the efficiency of the complete contract (Segal 
1998). Thus, the efficiency of the incomplete supply agreement is an empirical question. 
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12.6  An efficiency perspective: Solving information asymmetries 
 
In order to illustrate the coordination issues in the fruit supply chain, we use contract theory. 
We consider the problem of a principal (the buyer) who must select and motivate the most 
efficient agents (the suppliers) in order ensure timely delivery of high-quality fruits. The 
principal’s problem in both markets is to organize the transaction under the constraints that i) 
the possible opportunistic behaviour of the supplier is revealed too late to avoid a sizable profit 
loss and ii) the cost structure of the suppliers is unknown. We assume asymmetric information 
in the form of adverse selection (to illustrate the problem of selecting suppliers) and moral 
hazard (to illustrate the motivation issues) in a setting of stochastic demand and supply.  
The adverse selection originates from the unobservable and heterogeneous costs that a supplier 
must bear in order to meet the buyer’s demand. In the upstream market, these costs concern 
quality provision. Farmers must use proper agronomic practices to provide quality, with a cost 
that depends on the individual characteristics of the farm. The timeliness of delivery depends on 
the harvest timing, which also affects quality. In the downstream market, the heterogeneous 
unobservable costs concern the logistic organization and overall efficiency in delivering the 
products.  
The adverse selection is modelled as a typical problem of “hidden type” (Salanié 2005). The 
supplier type is defined by the magnitude of the unobservable costs. In order to minimize costs, 
the principal must be able to separate the types with an appropriate contract design. 
We model moral hazard in the downstream market as an enforcement problem, where the 
principal cannot enforce quality and timing of the delivery perfectly. We assume that, given the 
just-in-time organization, retailers may be forced to accept late deliveries or low quality because 
they lack the time to find alternatives. Although quality and timing are observable, the supplier 
knows there is a non-zero probability that the opportunistic behaviour (late deliveries and/or low 
quality) is tolerated. 
The enforcement problem in the upstream market concerns quality only. In the fruit industry, 
quality is achieved at the expense of yield. Farmers decide agronomic practices by comparing 
the costs of lower yield with the benefits of higher quality. We assume that middlemen can 
observe quality when it is too late to change agronomic practices. Quality enforcement at 
delivery depends on whether the middleman is a private trader or a PO. Both types of firms can 
identify low quality perfectly, so it is possible to implement quality-based price schemes. We 
assume that private traders can reject low-quality products, while producer organizations 
cannot.  
 
12.6.1  Solving moral hazard: Motivating suppliers with reputation and implicit 
threat 
 
The just-in-time delivery system requires the full cooperation of suppliers, who must be able to 
meet short-notice orders. A “problem-solving” attitude is often cited by middleman 
representatives as one of the main criteria that retailers use to select suppliers. Middlemen know 
that problematic suppliers will not receive many orders, and, as a consequence, they have a 
strong incentive to adopt a problem-solving behaviour. They also know that cooperative 
suppliers may benefit from retailers’ support in trading peaks of production (although at the 
price of sizable discounts). 
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 Suppliers have multiple incentives fully support retailers and meet all orders: 
• Price trends. Prices are declining over time, making early sales more profitable. 
Middlemen have large stocks of products that depreciate fast. Facing an unpredictable 
demand, they have incentive to fulfil orders as soon as they arrive (especially right after 
harvest) and before prices fall.  
• Reputation for reliable supply. Future orders depend on reputation for reliability. Failing 
to meet an order implies less trade in the future. Retailer behaviour is driven by efficiency 
considerations: covering for a rejected order is costly, so reliable suppliers are preferred. 
The importance of reputation is such that middlemen have incentive to deliver, even at 
a loss. In fact, they compare the benefits from rejecting the order with the present value 
of future orders. If the middlemen are expecting large trade volumes in the future, the 
incentive to fulfil the order is high.  
The system of incentives is a typical implicit threat scheme. Middleman incentives are driven by 
the retailer’s threat of restricting trade if reputation is lost. Middlemen are aware they will have 
fewer and less predictable orders in the future—or even termination of the trade relationship—
if they create any problem for buyers. In principle, losing one’s reputation may mean going from 
being a core supplier to a fringe supplier or being excluded from the list of suppliers altogether. 
The threat is credible because of the many alternative suppliers available in the market. 
This setting explains why the long-run business relationship is segmented into a series of yearly 
supply agreements and the agreements—in turn—include independent orders. The implicit threat 
mechanism requires that the retailer can deliver the threat freely and without cost. In the case 
of long-run complete contracts, termination of trade requires rescinding the contract. Such action 
might be challenged by the middleman in court and lead to contractual liability, if the measure 
is considered disproportionate to the violation. Renewing a yearly contract at the expiration date 
is a free decision of the parties involved and cannot be challenged in court.17 Similarly, retailers 
are free to reduce the number of orders because they do not commit to a minimum quantity in 
the supply agreement. 
Contract flexibility has two important roles in the fruit supply chain. It ensures that retailers can 
adjust supply to an unpredictable demand, and it is a prerequisite for managing procurement 
using the implicit threat mechanism.  
 
12.6.2  Solving adverse selection: Choosing the most efficient suppliers with self-
selection and screening 
 
Retailers have a clear interest in contracting the most efficient suppliers. An efficient 
procurement requires middlemen who offer flexibility, high quality and low prices. Although 
reputation is a clear indicator of these characteristics, retailers use a self-selection mechanism 
as well. 
When signing a supply agreement, middlemen agree to sizable specific investments. These may 
include upfront payment for access (listing fees, etc.), adoption of specific standards or even 
tacit trade restrictions (such as an exclusive agreement in an area). The value of this investment 
is lost if for any reason the retailer decides to terminate the relationship or reduce the number 
of orders. 
                                         
17 For a discussion see section 12.7.1  
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
140 
 
As a consequence, middlemen are willing to sign the supply agreement only if they expect to 
receive orders in the future. This implies that middlemen self-assess their ability to meet 
retailers’ expectations before entering the transaction in order to avoid possible losses.  
The system of incentives is a typical screening model (e.g., Ruben et al. 2007) where the retailer 
designs the contract to learn information about the suppliers (in this case, reliability of supply). 
The self-selection of suppliers minimizes the probability of miscoordination when orders are 
placed, increasing the cost-efficiency of the supply chain. 
 
12.6.3  Dealing with stochastic demand 
 
Retailers deal with demand uncertainty by adjusting orders once consumer purchasing intentions 
are revealed. They place additional orders during demand peaks and refrain from ordering when 
demand is low. Expert panels suggested that this system is implemented by dividing suppliers 
into two groups: core and fringe. Core suppliers are highly efficient (and usually quite large) and 
have a reputation for reliability. They receive predictable orders, although they may pay higher 
entrance fees. Fringe suppliers are smaller, easily replaceable and subject to intense fluctuation 
in orders. The screening mechanism can be designed to reveal the cost of production (their type) 
and allocate middlemen to the core or fringe, based on their efficiency (e.g., Russo et al. 2014). 
Fringe suppliers bear a higher share of risk and are more exposed to short-notice, unpredictable 
orders. Their smaller size and ease of replacement suggests that the risk transfer is associated 
with their lower relative bargaining power. The two-tier supply system implies that the welfare 
consequences of trade practices for middlemen may differ depending on the group. This also 
explains why representatives of large (core) suppliers in the expert panels were less concerned 
about UTPs than smaller middlemen. 
 
12.6.4  Motivating and selecting farmers: Incentive compensation and separating 
equilibrium 
 
The issue of asymmetric information in the upstream market is less important than in the 
downstream market. Quality can be tested accurately, and middlemen have time to reject non-
compliant deliveries and find alternatives. Motivation and selection are based on reputation, 
monitoring and incentive payments. 
Middlemen pay prices that are a function of quality in order to elicit supply of high-quality fruits. 
This result may be obtained by conditioning the price to the adoption of specific practices and 
technical assistance. Monitoring of the production process and final output ensure compliance. 
However, low-quality products are still marketed, because the cost of providing quality for 
inefficient farmers is so high that pursuing the price premium for high-quality fruits is not 
profitable. Given the POs’ commitment to buy members’ entire production, these farmers prefer 
to supply large volumes of low-quality fruits.  
This behaviour creates a separating equilibrium where inefficient farmers are still in the market 
and sell to POs or to buyers with low requisites. Efficient farmers produce and sell high-quality 
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fruits. The management of these two tiers of production may be difficult for those middlemen 
(especially POs) who must market a range of fruits of heterogeneous quality.18  
 
12.7  Analysis of unfair trading practices 
 
The model allows us to illustrate the effect of UTPs on the supply chain. The theoretical analysis 
identified several business practices that might be considered UTPs under the current Directive. 
However, in many cases, the fairness of the practice depends on the legal interpretation of the 
contract between buyers and suppliers. Section 12.7.1  illustrates this issue, while sections 
12.7.2  and 12.7.3  debate the interaction between unfairness and efficiency.  
 
12.7.1  Extensive vs. strict interpretation of UTPs 
 
The structure of the business relationship in the fruit industry raises the question of UTP 
interpretation. The underlying economic relationships between agents have a long-term horizon. 
Firms take their investments and business decisions based on long-run expectations. Such 
expectations often are based on historical data and accepted custom rules. Yet, the formal 
organization of the trade is a sequence of yearly contracts. The terms of the long-run trade 
relationship can change every year during the negotiation of new supply agreements. Such 
organization questions the notion of “renegotiation”, that is, a revision of the contract terms 
after the contract has been signed.  
Under a formal interpretation, the only contract is the supply agreement. It is an incomplete 
contract such that parties agree to negotiate quantities, prices and discounts only after demand 
uncertainty is revealed. The contract is incomplete because the parties cannot forecast all 
possible realizations of demand for all items in the fruit category, and therefore they agree on a 
revision mechanism (Hart and Moore 1988). In this case, weekly price negotiations and 
discretional orders can hardly be considered unilateral renegotiations because there were not 
pre-existing agreements and the revision mechanism is agreed upon in the supply agreement. 
Under a more extensive interpretation, the long-run business relationship is disciplined by a tacit 
and informal contract regulating the terms of trade and the specific investments. Based on this 
informal contract, the parties build legitimate expectations about future trade and benefits. The 
investment strategy and decision to enter the long-run transaction are based on such 
expectations. In this context, the supply agreements (or unexpected and unmotivated drops in 
orders) are periodical revisions of the long-run contract. This approach has two consequences.  
Firstly, a refusal to renew a supply agreement can be considered a breach of the long-run tacit 
contract. In the absence of supplier’s misconduct, the termination of the implicit contract might 
be considered unfair. Noticeably, the extensive interpretation was accepted by the Italian 
                                         
18 The expert panel of the Agro Pontino kiwi provide anecdotal evidence of possible consequences of this organization. A 
farmer representative said that farmers sometimes use POs as an outlet for low-quality products while selling the high-
quality fruits to private traders. The delivery obligation of the PO members is allegedly bypassed through informal trade 
among local farmers, so that PO members exchange high-quality fruits to be sold to private traders with a price and low-
quality fruits to be delivered to the PO. Although the example is not substantiated with any proof, it is an illustration of 
possible unfair B2B trade practices with farmers as perpetrators.    
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Competition Authority (AGCOM) in the case Celox trade vs. Coop Italia – Centrale Adriatica 
(provvedimento 25797). According to AGCOM, the length of the business relationship (1998-
2014), and the relatively constant volume of annual trade determined legitimate expectations 
and led the suppliers to accept a condition of dependence and make sizable investments in 
specific assets (logistics, adoption of quality standards, etc.). AGCOM found the buyers guilty of 
UTPs because i) the unbalance in bargaining power allowed them to impose unpredictable 
discounts and terms without negotiation, and ii) the “short notice” before of the refusal to renew 
the supply agreement did not give the supplier enough time to find alternative buyers. 
The example of the Celox trade vs. Coop-Italia – Centrale Adriatica case suggests that extensive 
interpretation of the regulation is possible, encompassing several current practices in the fruit 
business that would be legal under a strict interpretation of the law. This is of particular interest 
from an enforcement point of view. As enforcement of the Directive is a competence of Member 
States, a heterogeneous interpretation of the underlying contract might result in different rulings 
and competition bias across the European Single Market. 
 
12.7.2  UTPs in the downstream market 
 
Table 12-1 summarizes the results of the expert panels and theoretical model. Our analysis 
identified five possible UTPs of importance: payment delays, payments for deterioration at the 
buyer’s premises, unilateral renegotiations, threat of retaliation and ambiguous specification of 
cost of promotions. As mentioned in section 12.7.1 , some practices can be considered UTPs 
only if the extensive interpretation of the contract is accepted. 
Payment delays, unilateral renegotiations, and ambiguous specification of promotion costs play 
a role in allocating the demand-side risk along the supply chain.19 We define “demand risk” as 
the possibility that consumers do not buy the supplied fruit. In the fruit market, sales, 
promotions and discounts are used to clear the market if demand is low or optimize the profits 
from the entire category (such as loss-leader pricing). Consumers are price sensitive, and a price 
reduction is an effective measure to increase turnover. In the absence of vertical coordination, 
the retailers bear the entire cost of the promotion. The adoption of trade practices in the supply 
agreements allows the retailer to share the risk with the middlemen. Noticeably, the negotiation 
happens at the beginning of the campaign when supply estimates become available. At this 
moment, the retailers’ bargaining power is high. Middlemen and farmers already have a stock 
of production and must find a buyer. For this reason, they accept sharing the risk with the 
retailers.  
 
                                         
19 Take-back of unsold products is used in the industry, but those terms are usually well-specified in advance, according 
to the panel of experts. 
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Table 12-1: Existence and possible efficiency role of UTPs  
Practices Existence, based on expert panels Efficiency role, based on 
Upstream Downstream theoretical model 
Practices art. 3.1 
Payment delays w. supply 
agreement 
Late settlements (no 
coop) 
Marginal with large 
retailers 
Alloc. of demand-side 
risk 
Payment delays w/o supply 
agreement 
Not mentioned Not mentioned  
Short-notice cancelation Unusual Unusual  
Unilateral renegotiation 
(extensive contract 
interpretation, section 12.7.1 ) 
Price to be 
determined 
Possible strategic 
quality enforcement 
Weekly pricing 
Discretionary orders 
Possible strategic 
quality enforcement 
Alloc. of demand-side 
risk 
Implicit threat 
Payments not related to sale of 
product 
Registration fees 
(marginal) 
Negotiation fees 
(marginal) 
 
Payments for loss at buyer’s 
premises 
Not mentioned Usual for kiwi, rare for 
apples 
 
Refusal to confirm in writing Not mentioned Not mentioned  
Acquisition and use of trade 
secrets 
Irrelevant Irrelevant  
Threat of retaliation Common Common Implicit threat 
Comp. examining consumer 
complaints 
Irrelevant Irrelevant  
Practices art. 3.2 (only if not clearly specified in the contract) 
Take-back of unsold products Unusual Clearly specified  Alloc. of demand-side 
risk 
Pay-for-access Not mentioned Clearly specified Screening 
Bearing cost of 
promotions/discounts 
Not mentioned Common, sizable Alloc. of demand-side 
risk 
Pay-for-advertising Not mentioned Clearly specified Screening 
Pay-for-marketing Not mentioned Clearly specified Screening 
Pay-for- fitting out Not mentioned Clearly specified Screening 
 
Unpredictable discounts and promotions are the most detrimental practices in the supply chain, 
according to the expert panel (finding K6, chapter 11). These practices facilitate retailers’ 
category management strategies and transfer the demand risk to the middlemen. Imposing clear 
and unambiguous specification of the discounts in the supply agreement might determine 
unintended consequences. Experts said that ex ante complete specification of discounts is 
difficult because of the unpredictable demand. The parties cannot estimate the most efficient 
timing of the discount, therefore a degree of flexibility in the contract must be preserved. 
Furthermore, the parties cannot estimate the optimal discount in advance because the realization 
of consumer price is uncertain. For example, a predetermined percent discount established at 
the time the supply agreement is made may turn out to be excessive if prices (and middlemen’s 
margins) turn out to be low. As a result, a clear determination of the discounts in the supply 
agreement may not be sufficient to ensure that middlemen have a reliable estimate of the costs 
and benefits of the contract, if orders and prices are unpredictable. 
If a ban on unpredictable discounts results in more risk for retailers, the possible outcome might 
be a reduction in trade (e.g., Sandmo 1971) or lower prices. If retailers are unable to counter 
unexpected drops in demand with discounts, they reduce orders when demand is low. In this 
case, middlemen willing to sell their products must use an auction-like approach in order to gain 
market access, with similar results. The net effect of a ban on farmers’ incomes is an empirical 
question. 
The panel of experts considered “threat of retaliation” a common practice in the supply chain 
(finding K7, chapter 11). Retaliation might include refusal to renew supply agreements or a 
reduction in future orders. The theoretical model suggests that credible retaliation is a key 
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coordination tool in the fruit industry, given the importance of implicit threats. UTP regulation 
might reduce efficiency if the discrimination between fair (i.e., due to failure to comply) and 
unfair (i.e., when the middleman wants to exercise a right) termination is difficult. In this case, 
a non-compliant middleman might appeal against retaliation and claim unfairness, and the 
credibility of the retailer’s threat might be undermined. As a consequence, we might expect more 
incentives for middlemen to engage in opportunistic behaviour (less reliable delivery), as the 
fear of punishment decreases. 
 
12.7.3  UTPs in the upstream market 
 
The expert panel identified three common practices in the fruit industry that could be considered 
UTPs: delayed settlements for private traders, unilateral renegotiations, and threat of retaliation. 
POs and private traders give farmers down payments during the growing season or at time of 
delivery. Settlements are determined and paid when the middleman sells the product or 
according to the supply agreement. The UTP Directive explicitly exempts “supplementary 
payments from a cooperative to its member” and, consequently, this practice might be 
considered a UTP only when private traders are involved. Under a strict interpretation of the 
regulation, if the final settlement does not meet the long-term expectations of the farmers, the 
practice might be considered a renegotiation. 
Threat of retaliation is common in the industry, according to the panel of experts. There is a 
common understanding that failing to meet a buyer’s demand (including possible renegotiations) 
has negative implications for future trade. The expert panel confirmed that suppliers often do 
not challenge (allegedly unfair) buyers’ decisions (e.g., questionable enforcement of quality 
standards) on “small-value” transactions in order to preserve the trade relationship. 
 
12.8  Pass-through analysis 
 
The pass-through effect is the result of the interdependence between upstream and downstream 
contracts. Our main findings from the literature and expert panels in this regard are that UTPs 
in one segment of the netchain may trigger several types of strategic adaptations in other 
segments. 
For convenience we identify three degrees of pass-through. We have first-degree pass-through 
(or direct pass-through) when a UTP in a market is associated with the same UTP in another 
market. An example in the fruit industry is unfair refusal to renew the supply agreement. In the 
extensive interpretation of the contract (section 12.7.1 ), this practice might be considered 
unfair. In the organization of the supply chain, these changes may affect the supply agreement 
between the farmer and the middleman, if the latter is forced to break a long-term trade 
relationship with the former. Thus, a unilateral change downstream determines a unilateral 
change upstream. Similarly, unfair threats of termination might determine a first-degree pass-
through. 
We define second-degree pass-through (or indirect pass-though) as the presence of a UTP in 
one segment of the supply chain that is associated with a different type of UTP in another 
segment. In our model the unilateral renegotiations downstream (weekly price negotiations, 
discretionary orders, unpredictable discounts) determine the payment delays and post-delivery 
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price determination. Because retailers transfer demand risk to middlemen, the value of the 
product is not known at the time farmers deliver the product. As a consequence, there are two 
possibilities: either the parties agree on a price to be determined (the down payment—
settlement system), or the middlemen offer farmers a certainty equivalent of the price. The 
expert panel suggested that the former case is more frequent than the latter. 
In a third-degree pass-though (or monetary pass-though) a UTP in one segment of the supply 
chain is associated with a fair practice or a price variation in another segment. For example, a 
middleman who is charged for deterioration of the product on the buyer’s premises may lower 
the settlement price to all suppliers.   
The degree of pass-through depends on actual market conditions and nature of the trade at 
various segments of the supply chain. For example, a first-degree pass-through of an arbitrary 
reduction in orders would be impossible, given that farmers deliver production at harvest time.  
Furthermore, UTPs in one transaction may affect the organization of other transactions. The 
expert panel indicated that the upstream contracts offered by private traders and the 
agreements between POs and members are interdependent. As a consequence, a UTP in one 
may imply more trade for the other. 
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13 Results from Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Alessandro Sorrentino, Luca Cacchiarelli, Mara Lai 
(Tuscia University) 
 
13.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, along with the IDEA methodology, the main findings from the semi-structured 
interviews targeting primary producers and middlemen of the APK and LCA netchains are 
reported. Three farmers and four middlemen from the APK netchain and one farmer and three 
middlemen from the LCA netchain were interviewed.20 All farmers are PO members; four 
middlemen are PO or cooperatives and three middlemen are private firms. The number of 
interviews carried out is overall limited; the main reason for this was potential respondents’ 
reluctance, due to the obligation of confidentiality envisaged in their contracts with retailers or 
marketers, and the possibility of retaliation for disclosing sensitive information. We reckon that 
these factors affected significantly respondents’ answers and opinions expressed during the 
interviews. The extensive fear factor prevented us from implementing the dyadic approach that 
is described in chapter 6. Respondents were extremely reluctant to disclose the identity of their 
trade partners. They refused to provide the information, or they revealed it only on the terms of 
full confidentiality and after obtaining our commitment to not contact the firm. We acknowledge 
that this circumstance greatly hampers the pass-through analysis and that the effect of the fear 
factor on the dyadic approach is the most important issue that future applications of IDEA must 
address.  
The semi-structured interviews were designed to validate the outcomes of the expert panels 
(chapter 11) and gather information based on respondents’ specific transactions. The interviews 
aimed at collecting respondents’ opinions on the occurrence of potential UTPs, the reasons 
behind these UTPs, the perceived fairness of these UTPs and their impact on a firm’s organization 
and viability. As reported in the following paragraphs, amongst the UTPs specifically codified in 
Directive (EU) 2019/633, those effectively in use by traders are rather few. Nevertheless, a 
remarkable number of practices (not mentioned in the Directive and possibly codifiable as unfair 
according to Bowie’s criterion, section 2.3 seem to heavily affect the fairness of trade 
relationships, the distribution among stakeholders and the efficiency of the value chain. 
This chapter is organised as follows: i) paragraph 13.2  reports the results of the farmer 
interviews; ii) paragraph 13.3  reports the results of the middleman interviews; and iii) 
paragraph 13.4  illustrates the perceptions of both farmers and middlemen regarding UTP 
occurrence and compares these perceptions in order to draw conclusions about the pass-through 
of UTPs along value chains.    
 
                                         
20 One retailer was interviewed for the kiwi industry. The interview did not add any specific information to the chapter, 
given the respondent’s reticence, and for this reason details about it were not included. A short summary of this is 
included as an annex. 
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13.2   Analysis of the farmer interviews 
 
The farmer interviews addressed three main topics: general information (including information 
about the main procurement channels); analysis of the business relationship with the main buyer 
(including details about contracts); and perception of UTPs in the industry. Four in-depth 
interviews were conducted; three farmers belonged to the APK netchain and one to the LCA 
netchain.  
As Table 13-1 shows, respondents were homogenous in terms of specialisation, varieties grown, 
procurement channels and sales channels. All respondents deliver their entire production to 
POs/marketers, though further information on other sales channels (e.g., private traders) 
emerged during the interviews. 
 
13.2.1   Description of input providers and sales channels 
 
Farmers’ sources for inputs are different. In the case of non-club varieties, planting 
materials, plant protection products and fertilizers are bought both from private nurseries/shops 
and POs. Since club varieties are patented, farmers may grow them only after signing an 
exclusive agreement with breeders. Breeders provide, often through POs and marketers, 
seedlings and technical assistance to achieve quality and quantity targets.  
Sales channels 
All interviewed farmers are members of POs, and, as such, they sell their production to 
POs/marketers. The farmer [F4] belonging to the LCA netchain sells a residual share of his/her 
production directly (around 5%) in the farm shop, while farmers in the APK netchain sell their 
production exclusively through POs. 
Transactions between farmers and their middlemen (POs/marketers and private traders) are 
regulated by cooperation agreements. Farmers involved in schemes funded by operational 
programmes of the Common Market Organisation (CMO) commit their entire production to POs. 
Detailed contracts discipline the relationship between farmers and POs/breeders when club 
varieties are traded. 
Production planning and quality control 
In the case of club products, POs/marketers and breeders support the dissemination of 
information useful to reach effective quality schemes and plan the available amount of fruit to 
be traded per period. However, with club varieties, if products do not meet the quality 
requirements set by the middlemen, farmers might be charged an additional cost for waste 
disposal [F2]. In case of non-club varieties, one farmer [F4] mentioned the possibility that 
middlemen require heterogeneous and increasingly costly quality standards (e.g., concerning 
residue levels of plant protection products). Another farmer [F1] raised doubts about the 
transparency of the quality control applied by middlemen on purchased products. Farmers’ 
perception is that strict quality standard requirements are used by middlemen and retailers as 
a tool for controlling prices and quantities, particularly when supply exceeds market demand 
[F4]. The interviews confirm the finding (K2) emerged from the expert panels (chapter 11) that 
quality is a main driver of competitive advantage in selected netchains. As a consequence, 
quality-based strategies require coordination, because farmers must be able to produce 
according to customer specifications and bear the high cost of providing quality. 
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Finding F1: Relational agreements usually govern transactions between farmers and their 
middlemen. In the case of club variety products, the relationship between farmers and 
POs/breeders is regulated by detailed contracts, which are useful for reaching effective 
quality schemes and planning the available amount of fruit to be traded per period. 
Prices 
The prices paid to farmers by POs and marketers depend on quality of the delivered fruits and 
actual availability of products on the market. When domestic supply is abundant, middlemen can 
be more selective about quality and offer lower prices if quality standards are not fully met. This 
feeds the farmers’ perception that quality assessment is often used as a means to organise and 
plan production in the market [F4].  
 
Table 13-1. Overview of farmer respondents 
Farmers Netchain Specialisation Grown 
varieties 
Inputs 
providers 
Sales channels 
F1 APK Kiwi Club and 
non-club 
PO, breeder and 
local shops 
PO 
F2 APK Kiwi Club and 
non-club  
PO, breeder and 
local shops 
PO 
F3 APK Kiwi Club  PO, breeder and 
local shops 
PO 
F4 LCA Fruit production 
(apples, pears 
and berries) 
Club and 
non-club 
PO, breeder and 
local shops 
95% PO through 
commercial marketer; 
5% farm shop 
 
Prices are not known at the beginning of the campaign, and they are not specified in the contracts 
or agreements; rather, they depend on market conditions and demand trends. There are 
differences between POs and private traders. POs are usually obliged to trade a member’s entire 
production, and they provide a down payment at delivery. In the case of the APK netchain, an 
additional down payment is provided (typically in February), along with a settlement at the end 
of the season (usually July of the next year) [F1, F2, F3]. Private traders offer prices similar to 
POs, but they give larger down payments before the harvesting season, even though they do 
not necessarily buy the entire production [F2]. The interviews confirm the perceptions of the 
experts (finding K4, section 11.4) who consider POs more effective in taking the risk of 
overproduction from farmers (as they take the entire production) and private traders more 
effective in taking the price risk (as they make earlier and larger down payments). 
Alternative channels 
Although some of the farmers interviewed [F2, F4] are not completely satisfied with the 
marketing skills of the POs/marketers, they prefer remaining with the same middleman for lack 
of more profitable alternatives to their current trade partners. This might have relevant 
implications in terms of imbalances in bargaining power along the value chain (Bowie 1988). In 
order to investigate this issue, in the farmer sample survey (section 14.3 ) we asked farmers if 
they could replace their main buyer as trading partner and whether their main buyer could 
replace them. 
Finding F2: Prices are not known at the time of delivery. POs, usually obliged to trade their 
members’ entire production, pay a down payment at delivery, in some cases another down 
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payment in February, and a settlement at the end of the season (usually in July of the next 
year). Similar features of payment modes arise in agreements with private traders. 
 
13.2.2  Occurrence of UTPs 
 
Payment delays 
As mentioned in section 13.2.1 , farmers receive one or two down payments, respectively, at 
delivery and after four months, along with a settlement at the end of the season, which is almost 
ten months after the delivery of products to POs/marketers or private traders. This practice is 
customary in trade relationships with middlemen (both POs and private traders) and mostly 
accepted in the fruit trade sector. However, as explained in section 12.7.3 , this practice might 
be considered a UTP only when private traders are involved. 
Respondents [F1, F3, F4] complained about the uncertainty and lack of transparency in price 
definitions (which only become known at the end of the season), which is considered an 
extremely relevant issue in the sector. It is worth recalling that, under a strict interpretation of 
the regulation, if the final settlement does not meet the long-term implicit commitment, the 
practice might be considered a renegotiation. 
Short-notice cancellation of orders 
Since all the farmers interviewed sell through POs and delivery is not based on orders, short-
notice cancellation of orders is not a present trade practice in the relationship between the 
interviewees and their middlemen. 
Unilateral renegotiations 
While interviewees from the LCA netchain say they are not aware of this practice, APK netchain 
farmers declare that renegotiation can happen [F2, F3]. In the case of written supply agreements 
or other contracts, it can happen that middlemen (mainly breeders in the case of club varieties) 
impose unilateral renegotiations [F2]. The interviews only partially confirm the presence of 
unilateral renegotiation identified by the expert panels (chapter 11). 
Payments that are not related to sales of the supplier’s agri-food product 
This practice is not considered an issue at this value chain stage.  
Payments for waste 
Since apples that do not meet quality requirements can be more easily sent for processing, this 
practise seems to be more relevant in the kiwi industry. It is strictly related to something that 
might occur during transport.  
The costs related to waste are usually charged to suppliers, even though the products’ 
deterioration was not caused by the supplier [F1, F2, F3]. For club products, in cases where 
middlemen return products and claim insufficient quality, a further cost per kilo is charged to 
the supplier [F2]. The presence of this practice in the upstream market did not emerge as 
relevant during the expert panels (section 12.7.3 ). 
Refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement 
This practice is not reported as an issue.  
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Retaliation 
Since direct retaliation is a rather rare event, respondents declared that retaliation is not an 
issue. However, one interviewee [F1] pointed out that when middlemen want to interrupt the 
trade relationship, they might use other practices—such as unjustifiably claiming low quality or 
imposing high extra costs for waste—to force farmers to quit the trade relationship voluntarily. 
Nevertheless, a lack of alternatives to replace trade partners usually forces suppliers to accept 
not-so-favourable trading conditions. This result is in line with what the experts said (section 
11.5.2 ), which is that threats of commercial retaliation are pervasive and upstream firms do 
not contest buyers’ actions (such as quality enforcement or renegotiations) in order to preserve 
“a good trade relationship”. 
Post-sale complaints 
The interviewees have not experienced this practice. However, one farmer declared that in the 
case of post-sale complaints, the costs would be distributed among all PO members [F3].   
Misuse of confidential information 
This practice is not reported as an issue. 
Costs and payments that are not clearly and unambiguously specified in the contract 
(grey practices) 
These practices are not reported as issues. However, in the event that middlemen did face costs 
not clearly specified in the contract between the middlemen and retailers, the costs would be 
passed on to producers in the form of a reduction in price paid at the end of the season. 
Interviewees were also asked to indicate other virtually unfair practices not included in 
Directive 633/2019. Two issues emerged during the interviews. The first issue concerns 
uncertainty and lack of transparency in price definition [F1, F3, F4]. The low fluctuation of retail 
prices compared to the high volatility of prices supplied to farmers increases farmers’ perception 
of being the weaker actors in the value chain [F4]. The second one, already mentioned above, 
concerns the increasing quality requirements from retailers, perceived by farmers as a strategic 
tool used by middlemen for transferring to suppliers the risk of short-term slumps in demand 
[F4]. Since both issues emerged in the expert panels (chapter 11) and the semi-structured 
interviews (chapter 13), they were investigated as the most important areas where UTPs can 
emerge in the farmer sample survey (section 14.3 ). 
Finding F3: The most common practice appears to be payments, implemented in terms of 
price reduction, for waste strictly related to deterioration of the product that occurred after 
delivery. It seems even more relevant in the case of club varieties, where middlemen might 
refuse products, claiming insufficient quality and charging further costs to supplier. 
Finding F4: Among virtually unfair practices not included in Directive 633/2019, two issues 
emerged: i) uncertainty and lack of transparency in price definition and ii) more binding 
quality requirements from retailers, perceived by farmers as a strategic tool used by 
middlemen to transfer to their suppliers the risk of short-term slumps in demand. 
13.2.3   Incidence and causes of UTPs 
 
The in-depth interviewees enabled us to draw some conclusions on the incidence of certain 
practices, their importance for farmers and their causes. 
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The most common practice appears to be payments for waste. This practice seems even more 
relevant in the case of club varieties, where middlemen might refuse products claiming 
(sometimes without justification) insufficient quality and charge, as a consequence, further costs 
to supplier. These practices are considered more detrimental for suppliers, since they have few 
possibilities to enforce their rights without risk of losing their supply agreements. The detriment 
of these practices is higher in netchains in which products that do not meet quality requirements 
cannot be easily sent for processing or channelled to low-quality segments. The payments for 
waste are usually charged to suppliers through price reductions. 
Unilateral renegotiation of agreements, as well as direct retaliation, are showed to be rare. While 
the former is mainly used in club variety chains, the latter occurs indirectly via use of other 
practices to persuade farmers to interrupt trade relationships.  
Short-notice cancellation of orders, refusal to confirm in writing the terms of supply agreements, 
payments not related to sales of suppliers’ products, misuse of confidential information and “grey 
practices” are not considered important issues.  
Payment delays seem to be strictly related to the structure of the selected netchains, where 
deferred payments to farmers is customary in the trade relationship, including when products 
are sold to private traders. However, the definition of prices, in terms of uncertainty and 
transparency, as well as the increasing quality requirements used as a means to control 
production, induces farmers to perceive these practices as unfair. 
 
13.3   Analysis of the middleman interviews 
 
The middleman interviews addressed four main topics: general information (including 
information about the main procurement channels); analysis of the business relationship with 
the main customer (including details about contracts); analysis of the main suppliers; and 
perception of UTPs in the industry. Seven in-depth interviews were conducted; four middlemen 
belonged to the APK and three to the LCA netchains.  
As Table 13-2 shows, respondents were selected to represent different legal forms, economic 
dimensions and presence in the market as POs, cooperatives or private companies.  
 
13.3.1  Description of procurement and sales channels 
 
Procurement channels can be farmers or other middlemen. There are not substantial 
differences between the two industries. In the case of cooperatives, members are the main 
suppliers, but it is not unlikely to have non-member suppliers, who are contracted if the 
cooperatives face supply shortages or demand spikes. The non-member suppliers typically do 
not change over the years; the relationship is long-term and built on trust. When middlemen are 
private companies, suppliers are farmers with whom they have a long-term relationship. In all 
cases analysed, it can be assumed that transactions between the middleman and suppliers are 
based on a relational type of governance. It should be noted that this type of governance might 
be jeopardized, in certain cases, by the fact that suppliers are easily replaceable. However, all 
respondents, even though aware of the risk of being replaced, did not consider this a concrete 
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possibility. When club varieties are traded, the relationship is governed by detailed contracts 
that, due to confidentiality rules, we could not analyse. Therewith, respondents were generally 
reticent to give details about contracts, both out of respect for confidentiality and to avoid 
potential negative effects on their relationships with middlemen. 
Quality and production control 
Cooperatives are obliged to accept all members’ production, regardless of its quality. In order to 
coordinate the quality of products delivered by members, middlemen try to influence members’ 
individual production decisions (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5). Usually middlemen can estimate with a 
certain degree of precision the more convenient varieties to be planted, based on market 
conditions and information communicated by the main buyers. However, it is not easy to 
influence producers’ decisions, because farmers prefer planting varieties that have been well 
paid in the past over the recommended ones. Hence, cooperatives’ capacity to influence 
producers’ decisions is limited, particularly for non-club varieties. For club varieties, being that 
they are covered by patents, the ability to control farmers’ decisions is concrete; the patent’s 
owner selects farmers, provides them with seedlings and specific advice to grow the variety 
according to the required quality standards. Detailed contracts usually regulate these 
relationships and imply important investments to be realised by farmers; however, no specific 
information was disclosed about the contracts by the respondents. In the kiwi industry, measures 
planned within the operational programmes funded by the CMO are often used as a tool to exert 
an influence over producers. This result led us to use sample surveys (chapter 14) to investigate 
quality practices and the costs necessary to gain market access. 
Middlemen usually provide their suppliers with advice in terms of agricultural practices. This 
happens regularly when club varieties are planted, and it happens frequently within cooperatives 
for both club and non-club varieties. Providing technical advice enables them to control and 
possibly improve quality, which becomes a key element for cooperatives, being that they are 
obliged to accept the entire production of their members.  
Finding M1: Low power to influence farmers’ production choices, together with the cooperatives' 
commitment to trade members’ entire production, can become a critical factor in downstream 
relationships. 
Sales planning 
The long-term relationships, which occur in all the cases examined, between middlemen and 
their buyers allow middlemen to have rather detailed information about the quantities of fruits 
that are usually traded in different periods. This helps them to better plan sales accordingly by 
predicting possible surpluses or shortages and determine whether they will need additional 
storage facilities. Middlemen usually share this information also with their suppliers (farmers 
and/or other middlemen). The interviews are in line with the experts’ statement (findings A3 
and K3, chapter 11) concerning the selected netchains organised as a sequence of 
interdependent transactions.  
So that we could make an in-depth analysis of trading relationships, the interviewees were asked 
to briefly describe their main sales channels and base their answers on their own relationship 
with their main buyer. 
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Table 13-2: Respondent middlemen overview. 
Middleman Country Legal form PO Location Turnover Specialisation Storage 
facilities 
Traded 
varieties 
Procurement 
channels 
Sales channels 
M1 IT Cooperative  Yes  Outside the 
studied area 
50-150 
MEUR 
Fruit and 
vegetables 
trade 
No  Club and 
non-club 
Members and non-
members 
Large national and 
EU retailers; other 
middlemen for the 
extra-EU market 
M2 IT Cooperative Yes  Within the 
studied area 
10 to 50 
MEUR 
Fruit production 
and trade 
Yes Club and 
non-club  
Members and non-
members (only for 
non-club varieties) 
Large retailers 
(national market); 
middlemen for EU 
export 
M3 IT Private No Outside the 
studied area 
… Fruit production 
and trade 
No  Club and 
non-club  
Selected farmers for 
club varieties; other 
farmers for non-club; 
other middlemen 
Large retailers 
M4 IT Cooperative No Within the 
studied area 
4 MEUR Fruit production 
and trade 
Yes Club and 
non-club 
Members Middlemen and a 
few retailers 
M5 DE Cooperative Yes Within the 
studied area 
50 to 80 
MEUR 
Fruit trade No  Club and 
non-club  
Members Middlemen 
M6 DE Private  No  Within the 
studied area 
10 to 15 
MEUR 
Fruit trade Yes Non-club  Large farmers and 
other middlemen 
Large retailers 
and middlemen 
M7 DE Private No Within the 
studied area 
20 MEUR Fruit trade Yes Club and 
non-club  
Farmers and other 
middlemen 
Large and small 
retailers; 
processors and 
middlemen  
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Most of the respondents (M1, M2, M3, M6, M7) have large retailers as their main buyer for the 
national market and other middlemen for the EU and extra-EU markets. Only a few interviewees 
(M1, M5) mentioned the name of a specific buyer (although under full confidentiality), while the 
others preferred to describe their trading relationships in general terms, claiming the obligation 
to respect the confidentiality rules included in their agreements. However, most respondents 
agreed (M1, M4, M5, M6, M7) that often trade relationships between middlemen and buyers are 
not balanced. As also mentioned in the expert panels (findings A5 and K5, chapter 11), buyers 
usually have high bargaining power (efficient marketing and legal departments). As such, they 
can impose requirements that might be considered unreasonable (e.g., setting pesticides residue 
levels much lower than those prescribed by law without scientific justification) by middlemen, 
but the middlemen do not have the capacity to refuse them. This was reported to be a 
particularly serious issue in the apple sector (M1). Setting such requirements is perceived, by 
respondents, as unfair, and this perception increases when these requirements are very strict 
when supply surpluses occur and interpreted more flexibly when there are supply shortages. 
This confirms the heterogeneous perceptions of the fairness of large retailers that emerged in 
the expert panels (finding K1, section 11.2). 
Information provided by respondents was not detailed but rather general since, as evidenced in 
the expert panels (finding A6, section 11.9 ), confidentiality agreements prohibit middlemen 
from communicating any information about the contractual features to third parties. However, 
the analysis of the interviews allows us to assume that a relational type of governance features 
the transaction between middlemen and retailers and/or other traders. Usually, all items of 
trading relations are legally recorded. Transactions might be governed by supply agreements 
and/or delivery contracts (as modelled in chapter 12). Characteristics of contracts (regardless 
of how they are called, whether framework contracts, framework or supply agreements or simply 
contracts) appear to be similar in both industries and are summarised as follows:  
- Duration of these contracts/agreements varies. They might be yearly or multiannual 
contracts (from two to four years). In the apple industry, one interviewee (M1) reported 
the existence of collaboration agreements with no specific duration that become effective 
when orders are placed by buyers.  
- In case of yearly agreements, renegotiation happens every year if both parties are willing 
to renew, while for multiannual contracts, renegotiation might happen irregularly. In both 
cases, changes made during renegotiation are limited. In the kiwi industry, retailers send 
standard pre-filled templates that do not leave room for negotiation. In the apple 
industry, conditions included in the agreements are not negotiable and when refused, the 
middleman might not be listed as a supplier.    
- Agreements include detailed rights and obligations, mainly related to quality 
requirements, for the middleman and the buyer. They also include specific costs. These 
costs are clearly defined in the agreements and are not considered unfair, as long as no 
further additional unexpected payments are required by buyers along the way. All 
respondents pointed out that usually they do not have the possibility to negotiate these 
costs; rather, they must accept them if they want to be listed as suppliers.  
- Contracts do not include any guaranteed quantities, not even minimum ones, and also 
do not include prices. Quantities and prices are defined during the year by the orders 
transmitted on a weekly basis.  
- In principle these contracts can be terminated freely anytime by either party, but this 
happens rarely because the trading relationships are long-term and based on trust and 
reputation.  
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A few interviewees (M1, M2) stated that contracts including details about quantities and prices 
would allow for better trade planning for the year. However, it was pointed out that this might 
be possible for those products that can be stored, as is the case of the two considered industries, 
but it would be highly complicated for more perishable products. Overall, it was recognised that 
fruit and vegetable demand is difficult to predict and even more so when single products are 
considered. It must be noted that, for storable products, including details about quantities in the 
contracts would shift the storage costs amongst the counterparts. Hence, it was highlighted that 
introducing strict rules on quantities in contracts should be evaluated carefully, given the 
concrete risk that retailers could try to overcome this barrier by lowering prices. 
Prices, as already mentioned, are not indicated in the agreements and are not known at the 
beginning of the campaign; rather, they are negotiated weekly based on market conditions and 
demand trends. Once buyers ask for an order, suppliers propose a price and the negotiation 
between the two parties starts. When the negotiation is concluded, the buyer issues a contract 
(it might be as simple as a request sent by email) which includes quantity and price. Accuracy 
in price determination depends on the knowledge middlemen and buyers have about production 
costs. The negotiation is considered the most complicated phase because retailers tend to lower 
the price, and their success rate depends on their professional capacity to negotiate and relative 
bargaining power. The definition of prices is perceived as not entirely transparent by 
interviewees, particularly when the sales channels are other middlemen (M4, M5, M6, M7). 
Usually, middlemen have knowledge about costs related to packaging and transport that might 
influence the price. However, when dealing with other middlemen (instead of directly with 
retailers), they are not aware of the price paid to them by retailers, and this make prices not 
entirely transparent. Being that prices are defined throughout the entire season and can change 
weekly, the average price of the campaign will become known and communicated by middlemen 
to their suppliers only at the end of it. This is when the full production is sold and, in some cases, 
when payments are received from retailers. This procedure for the price definition is considered 
a customary setting in the industry. Suppliers (farmers/other middlemen) know these rules and 
put up with them. In the apple industry, two interviewees (M5, M7) out of three stated that 
suppliers (farmers/other middlemen) are paid only after the whole production is sold in the 
market and payments are received from retailers. This practice affects middleman payments to 
suppliers and transfers uncertainty about price definition to the primary producers (or other 
middlemen). This can occur despite the obligation, when middlemen are cooperatives, to accept 
and trade members’ entire production. The same procedure applies usually to the kiwi industry, 
even though in all cases analysed instalments are paid to suppliers before the product is 
effectively sold to retailers (more frequently when club varieties are traded).  
Finding M2: Contracts/agreements between middlemen and retailers do not include information 
about quantities and prices, which are communicated on a weekly basis when orders are issued. 
This implies that, while quantities can be roughly predicted by middlemen when a long-term 
trading relationship exists, final prices (and therefore final return to producers) become known 
only at the end of the season, transmitting price uncertainty along the chain.   
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13.3.2  Occurrence of UTPs 
 
Payment delays 
This practice was not reported as an issue by most respondents (M1, M3, M4, M5, M6, M7). The 
matter is already legally regulated, and buyers pay usually within a month from the order 
shipment. Only one interviewee (M2) reported delayed payments as an issue and claimed to 
have more problems with buyers operating in the national market. This delay might be 
transferred from middlemen to their own suppliers (farmers/other middlemen). Furthermore, it 
was pointed out that delays can occur in relation to payments to middlemen’s suppliers. Usually, 
as it emerged in the analysis of the farmer interviews (finding F2 section 13.2), producers (or 
other middlemen) are paid when the entire production is sold and payments received. This 
means that farmers might receive full payment up to one year from harvesting and selling their 
production. Farmers might receive intermediate instalments to partially cover their costs related 
to harvesting, sorting, storing and packing products for selling. However, 
middlemen/respondents consider this practice of delayed payments customary, and it is mostly 
accepted in the fruit trade sector.  
Short-notice cancellation of orders 
This practice occurs rarely, and it is not considered an issue for different reasons. As a general 
consideration, it was pointed out that just-in-time orders might be considered customary in the 
sector, being that demand is difficult to predict. Orders are placed weekly, and because of the 
short time period between orders and delivery, the possibility of cancellation is reduced. One 
interviewee pointed out (M1) that this is more common when trading abroad and when other 
middlemen are involved. In the latter case, cancellation due to competitors’ outbidding might 
happen.   
Unilateral renegotiations 
Renegotiation might happen, but different arrangements are reported. In the usual case of 
written supply agreements or other contracts, it can happen that retailers impose unilateral 
renegotiations. Yet, this practice is considered rare and, as such, rather irrelevant. Given that 
contracts or agreements do not include the most important items, such as prices and quantities, 
the significance of possible renegotiations is in any case rather limited.  
Payments that are not related to sales of the supplier’s agri-food product 
Experts (finding A8, section 11.8.2) stated that demands for payments unrelated to the sale of 
the products is the most detrimental practice in the industry. However, all interviewees did not 
consider this practice to be an issue. It might happen that such costs are asked as one-off 
payments, but it is rare.  
Payments for waste 
Most respondents do not consider this practice an issue (M1, M2, M3, M4, M6). However, during 
the interviews numerous elements and examples were mentioned that might suggest this 
practice is more frequent than initially reported. In the apple industry, it seems less important, 
since apples that do not meet quality requirements can be sent for processing. In the kiwi 
industry the practice seems more relevant, and it is usually related to something occurring during 
transport. Retailers may claim the products delivered do not meet the quality requirements and 
refuse to pay, whether suppliers agree or not with the retailer’s evaluation. It might be possible 
that the buyer claims low quality in order to correct for an overestimation of demand. This was 
reported also in the apple industry, where some respondents (M5, M7) stated that buyers set 
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quality standards unrealistically high to give themselves the option to return products for reasons 
of insufficient quality. Hence, retailers transfer to their suppliers the risk of short-term slumps 
in demand. Claiming low quality or product deterioration during transport is considered by some 
respondents as a retaliation measure (M4, M5), particularly when products are sent overseas 
and it becomes complicated for the supplier to verify the buyer’s claim. In some cases, the buyer 
might decide to charge the supplier for waste disposal, even though the product deterioration 
was not caused by the supplier. Respondents stated that often this practice is accepted to avoid 
jeopardizing the trade relationship with the buyer. The presence of this practice emerged during 
the expert panels (section 11.4.2), in which some experts remarked that retailers do not pay 
suppliers for products deteriorated on the retailer’s premises, even if the supplier is not 
responsible (for example, waste of products at sale-point due to manipulation by the 
consumers). 
Refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement 
This practice is not reported as an issue. One respondent (M6) considers contracts unnecessarily 
too detailed.  
Retaliation 
All respondents agreed that direct retaliation is rather rare. More common is the possible use of 
other UTPs to threaten suppliers (e.g., low-quality product claim, charging extra for waste 
disposal). In principle, suppliers refrain from enforcing their rights to avoid retaliation measures. 
Reduction in orders or tough price negotiations are sometimes interpreted as retaliation. In 
addition, the buyers’ high bargaining power combined with suppliers’ replaceability makes 
retaliation a concrete possibility and forces suppliers to accept unfavourable trading conditions. 
However, long-term trading relationships based on mutual trust and reputation help overcome 
the threat of retaliation actions. Therefore, the interviews confirm statements from the expert 
panels (findings A7 and K7, chapter 11) regarding the presence of implicit threats of commercial 
retaliation and situations in which firms comply with retailers’ demands out of fear for possible 
negative consequences for the trade relationship. 
Misuse of confidential information 
One middleman reported under strict confidentiality that the buyer has direct access to his/her 
quality control system in order to ensure that the delivered product meets the desired quality 
requirements. By doing so, the buyer acquires detailed information regarding the middleman’s 
production costs. In principle, this information might be used by the buyer during price 
negotiations. Having full knowledge of the middleman’s costs, the buyer might impose prices 
that are barely enough to grant acceptable margins. This interview adds a relevant piece of 
information on the coordination of quality-based strategies in the selected netchains. 
Cost and payments that are not clearly and unambiguously specified in the contract 
(grey practices) 
None of the respondents reported this practice as an issue. Although according to the expert 
panel (findings K6, chapter 11) unpredictable discounts and promotions are the most detrimental 
practice in the supply chain, from interviews it emerges that all costs are clearly specified in the 
agreements and do not change over the course of the year.  
Interviewees were asked to indicate other possibly unfair practices under Bowie’s definition that 
are not included in the Directive 2019/633. In addition to the above-mentioned practices, such 
as unnecessary quality standards and unpredictable orders, all respondents indicated that price 
determination is a critical practice that could contain elements of unfairness. In the apple 
industry, respondents believe that the definition of prices is not always clear, since often 
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producers do not understand the imputation of certain costs. Hence, they blame lack of 
knowledge about the costs that arise from activities undertaken along the chain. In the kiwi 
industry, on the contrary, the unclear definition of prices is ascribed to a conscious lack of retailer 
transparency. These issues are further investigated in the sample surveys (chapter 14). 
 
13.3.3   Incidence and causes of UTPs 
 
The in-depth interviews enabled us to draw some conclusions about the incidence of certain 
practices, their importance for suppliers and their causes.  
The most common practices appear to be requiring payments for waste and claiming low-quality 
products, together with the possibility of exerting some form of retaliation. These practices are 
considered the most detrimental for suppliers, since suppliers have few possibilities to enforce 
their rights without risking the loss of their supply agreements or orders. This becomes even 
more relevant when middlemen have trading relationships with a few buyers and when their 
own suppliers (primary producers) already undertook specific investments to be listed as 
suppliers (M4, M5). Consequences of these practices might be magnified by the high bargaining 
power retailers have compared to suppliers. However, all interviewees stated that these issues 
should be regulated very carefully, because establishing strict rules to avoid them might result 
in lower prices, which could have even worse welfare consequences for the industry.  
Unilateral renegotiation of agreements is reported to be rare but possible. Even if the agreements 
do not envisage provisions about price and quantity, there may still be consequences, since 
agreements can include obligations related to quality requirements and costs to be borne by the 
suppliers. Quality standards required by retailers might become a way to a) exert pressure on 
middlemen, which might be passed to farmers, and b) put in place potentially unfair practices 
(setting standards unnecessarily high to give themselves the possibility later to claim products 
“low-quality” and therefore refuse/reduce payments). Most respondents (M1, M2, M4, M5), also 
for this case, are unsure whether strict rules would be beneficial for the industry, fearing it could 
lead to lower prices.   
Short-notice cancellation of orders and, to a certain extent, payment delays are considered 
customary in the sector due the characteristics of the products traded. Namely, demand for 
fruits and vegetables is difficult to predict, especially when products are perishable. The 
definition of prices and the transfer of price uncertainty to primary producers seem to be 
practices able to create more relevant and negative effects in the two industries, particularly in 
relation to primary producers.   
Refusal to confirm in writing the terms of supply agreements and payments not related to sales 
of suppliers’ products are not considered important issues. All provisions included in the 
agreements are considered customary in the sector and, as such, they are not considered unfair.  
In some cases (e.g., payments for waste and threat of retaliation) interviewees confirmed the 
presence of these practices that were mentioned by the expert panels (chapter 11). In other 
cases (e.g., payments that are not related to the sale of the products and unpredictable discounts 
and promotions), the middlemen interviewed did not consider practices to be problematic that 
were assessed by the expert panels as very detrimental. A quantitative assessment of UTP 
occurrence to generalise the findings of the expert panels and the results of the semi-structured 
interviews is presented in sample survey (chapter 14). 
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Finding M3. Payment for waste is considered one of the most relevant practices, since it can 
be used as a retaliation measure to reduce payments due to middlemen. When combined with 
low-quality product claims it might become, for retailers, a means for adjusting to unexpected 
fluctuations of demand.  
Finding M4: Unilateral renegotiation of agreements is reported to be rare. However, a change 
in rules about quality standards during renegotiation may produce relevant effects. Unilateral 
imposition of higher quality standards in the agreements might open the door to other UTPs, 
particularly payment for waste and retaliation.  
 
13.4   Pass-through effects 
 
The interviewees at different stages of the value chain confirmed the existence of a pass-through 
effect. The economic model (section 12.7) has identified three degrees of pass-through. In a 
first-degree pass-through (direct pass-through) a UTP in a market is associated with the same 
UTP in another market. Second-degree pass-through (indirect pass-though) exists when the 
presence of a UTP in a segment of the supply chain is associated with the presence of a different 
type of UTP in another segment. In a third-degree pass-though (or monetary pass-though) a 
UTP in a segment of the supply chain is associated with a fair practice or a price variation in 
another segment. 
Semi-structured interviews with farmers and middlemen have evidenced pass-through effects. 
In most cases, middlemen subjected to various UTPs (e.g., payment for waste, post-sale 
complaints, misuse of confidential information) transfer the costs to farmers as a final price 
reduction (third-degree pass-through). However, in other cases middlemen suffering specific 
UTPs (e.g., unnecessary quality standards unilaterally imposed by retailers) impose the same 
practices on suppliers (first-degree pass-through), affecting production costs and productivity 
levels. Finally, a case of second-degree pass-through emerges when high quality standards 
unilaterally imposed by retailers increase the share of products which does not meet quality 
standards (increasing payments for waste). Overall, the most common practices that suppliers 
are exposed to and that are passed to farmers are summarised as follows:  
- Costs related to marketing and management faced by middlemen are passed on to 
producers as price reductions. Marketing costs might also include costs not necessarily 
envisaged in relational agreements.    
- Final prices paid to producers might decrease because of UTPs faced by middlemen, such 
as costs for waste, product deterioration, extra costs imposed and not envisaged in the 
contracts or extra costs resulting from unilateral renegotiation.  
- Demands for higher quality not justified by law or netchain coordination efficiency must 
be met by primary producers through specific adjustments of production techniques. 
These techniques might increase production costs and/or losses for primary producers.   
- Since yearly agreements between middlemen and retailers do not include any 
commitments concerning prices and quantities, the prices received by producers become 
known only at the end of the campaign. This practice is transferred as price/return 
uncertainty to primary producers.     
In order to investigate the pass-through effects in the selected netchains, the sample middleman 
survey (section 14.4.5) asked firms to quantify how unfair practices affect business with their 
suppliers. 
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13.5  Summary 
 
Table 13-3 summarises the occurrence of UTPs according to interviewees. Interviewees were 
also asked to indicate other possibly unfair practices under Bowie’s definition that are not 
included in the directive, in particular higher and not justified quality requirements. Further 
restrictions on quality standards are often imposed to middlemen (often through unilateral 
renegotiations of the agreements) and passed on farmers. They are used as strategic tool to 
reduce orders and payments in face of demand fluctuations.  
 
Table 13-3. UTPs experienced by farmers and middlemen in the trade 
UTP Farmer experience Middlemen 
experience 
Delayed payments Possibly 
(final price is paid at the end of 
the marketing season by private 
traders) 
No 
Orders cancelled with short notice No No 
Unilateral change of the supply agreement 
terms 
Possibly 
(price is determined at end of the 
year; strategic use of quality 
assessment) 
Yes 
Payment of indirect expenses (not related to 
sales) 
No No 
Payment for waste Yes 
(usually through a reduction in 
final price) 
Yes 
Refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a 
supply agreement 
No No 
Retaliation Possibly 
(indirect pressure to leave the 
transaction) 
Yes 
Post-sale complaints No Yes 
Misuse of confidential information No Yes 
Costs and payments that are not clearly and 
unambiguously specified in the contract (grey 
practices) 
No No 
Returns not payed/reimbursed Possibly (usually a reduction in final price) 
No 
Payments to display or list products in the retail 
outlets 
No No 
Discounts to cover buyer's promotions No No 
Reimbursements to cover buyer's expenses for 
promotions 
No No 
Payments for buyer's marketing expenses  No No 
Payments for setting up retail outlets No No 
 
13.5.1  Summary of interviewees’ perceptions 
Farmers’ perceptions: 
- The first issue concerns uncertainty and lack of transparency in price definition, which 
farmers become aware of only at the end of the season. 
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- The second issue concerns the increasing quality requirements of retailers, perceived by 
farmers as a strategic tool used by middlemen to transfer to their suppliers the risk of 
short-term slumps in demand. 
 
Middlemen’s perceptions: 
- Required payments for waste and possible retaliation are considered the most relevant 
issues in both industries. They result in additional costs and/or prices reductions.  
- Post-sales complaints are also considered relevant when complaints are related to low-
quality product claims.  
- Short-notice cancellation of orders and unilateral renegotiations occur, but they are 
considered rare and not particularly relevant for both stakeholders. Unilateral 
renegotiation might affect transaction fairness when involving strict quality requirements, 
which may be used as strategical tool for reducing prices and/or order quantities. 
Pass-through: 
First degree pass-through 
- Unnecessary quality standards unilaterally imposed by retailers are then required by 
middlemen of the farmers. 
Second degree pass-through 
- High quality standards unilaterally imposed by retailers increase the share of products 
which does not meet quality standards (increasing payments for waste).  
Third degree pass-through 
- Middlemen subjected to various UTPs (e.g., payments for waste, post-sale complaints, 
misuse of confidential information) transfer the costs to farmers in the form of a final 
price reduction. 
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14 Results of the Sample Survey 
 
Carlo Russo, Antonella Di Fonzo Luisa Menapace, Sebastian Rahbauer 
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) (Technical University of Munich) 
 
In order to generalise the results of the semi-structured interviews and provide a quantitative 
assessment of UTP occurrence, we ran a sample survey in the APK and LCA netchains. The main 
objective was to estimate the frequency with which firms are subjected to UTPs and validate the 
results of the interviews. 
We surveyed 85 farmers and 15 middlemen in the APK netchain and 71 farmers and 10 
middlemen in the LCA netchain. This chapter reports the results of the investigation. 
 
14.1  Questionnaire design 
 
Following the IDEA approach, the questionnaires did not test an a priori list of practices. Instead, 
we focused on the main issues we identified through the expert panels and semi-structured 
interviews. The questionnaires are included in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
14.1.1  Farmer questionnaire 
 
The farmer questionnaire focused on four issues: price determination, quality determination, 
access costs and renegotiation/retaliation. Such issues were identified by the expert panels 
(chapter 11) and the semi-structured interviews (chapter 13). These were considered the most 
important areas where UTPs can emerge. The issues were investigated by asking respondents 
to agree or disagree on a set of questions using a 5-point Likert scale. 
We centred the questionnaire on the transaction between the respondent farmer and the “main 
buyer”, where the latter is defined as follows:  
The “main buyer” is the one buying the largest share (in value) of apples/kiwifruits in 
the current year. In the case that two or more buyers buy the same share, the main 
buyer is the one the grower has been trading with for the longest time. In the case of 
two or more buyers buying the same share for the same number of years, we ask the 
grower to select one as the main buyer. COOPs and POs are considered buyers.  
The rationale of this approach is that UTPs are transaction-specific. Therefore, the measurement 
must refer to a specific trade relationship. We chose to investigate the most important one for 
the farmer. 
The analysis of price determination focused on three key aspects: i) discretional/arbitrary price 
determination, ii) transparency and predictability and iii) timeliness of payments. The statements 
investigated were the following: 
• P1: The rules for determining prices are clear. 
• P2: Buyers set prices at their discretion. 
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• P3: At delivery, I have a reasonably reliable expectation about price. 
• P4: Payments are timely, I do not need to urge my buyer to be paid. 
• P5: Prices are determined in a fair and transparent way. 
• P6: I believe that my buyer will cheat on prices if they could. 
Items P1, P3 and P5 relate to transparency and predictability. Item P2 measures the perception 
of discretional behaviour, and item P4 investigates late payments. Item P6 is a direct question 
regarding the main buyer’s trustworthiness. 
We used two items to investigate quality determination. 
• Q1: Quality is determined in a fair and transparent way. 
• Q2: I believe that my buyer would cheat on quality if they could.  
The items measure the overall perception of the farmer regarding the fairness and transparency 
of the quality assessment problem. Low values on the Likert scale support the complaints of a 
few farmers during the semi-structured interviews. A question investigating trust in the good 
faith of the buyer was added as a general assessment. 
During the expert panels and semi-structured interviews, we received several complaints about 
the high (and increasing) investments required to gain market access. In the questionnaire, we 
investigated farmers’ perceptions in this regard. We added items measuring the predictability of 
future investments and assessing whether such investments are really necessary, in the farmers’ 
opinion. 
• Z1: I paid for significant investments in order to sell to the most important buyer. 
• Z2: Costs of selling to the most important buyer increase excessively (includes payments, 
investments, certifications, etc.). 
• Z3: I have a reliable estimate of the future investments that will be required by my buyer.  
• Z4: I believe that my buyer asks for investments that are not really necessary. 
Question Z4 is of particular importance, given the results of the theoretical model. In fact, 
unnecessary investments may be used to trigger the self-selection and implicit threat 
mechanisms, as described in chapter 12.  
Finally, we used the following five items to address the issues of renegotiation and retaliation. 
• N1: My business with the most important buyer is predictable.  
• N2: When there is an unexpected event, the buyer changes the contract terms.  
• N3: The buyer changes the terms of trade if it is profitable for them, even in the absence 
of unexpected events. 
• N4: Your buyer always keeps his/her/their word, without using “holes” in the agreement 
to further their own interests.  
• N5: In the past, I have given up my contractual rights to preserve the trade relationship 
(accepted late payments, price reductions, etc.). 
Item N1 is motivated by a few complaints we received about unpredictable buyer behaviour. 
High values on the Likert scale support the conclusion that such concerns are shared by a large 
number of farmers. Items N2, N3 and N4 provide an assessment of renegotiation practices. We 
were interested in assessing whether renegotiation is associated with unpredictable random 
shocks (a sort of risk transfer) or perceived as a general practice.  
Item N5 refers to a blacklist UTP often mentioned during the interviews and by the expert panels. 
Farmers reported that they could not complain about renegotiations due to fear of trade 
retaliation. The high Likert scale values in item N5 support this claim. 
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The farmer questionnaire collected additional auxiliary information about the farm business. In 
particular, the nature of the main buyer (coop/PO, private trader, supermarket representative, 
other) is used as a discriminatory variable for the analysis. Also, we collected information about 
the farmer’s ability to replace their main buyer as compared to the farmer’s perception of the 
buyer’s ability to terminate the trade agreement. These variables can be considered as proxies 
for measuring bargaining imbalances and to assess possible coercion, as defined in Bowie 
(1988).   
 
14.1.2  The middleman questionnaire 
 
The middleman questionnaire is composed of three main sections: general information (including 
characteristics of suppliers and customers), perception of UTPs in the industry and analysis of 
the business relationship with the main buyer. The structure is motivated by the reluctance 
showed by several middlemen to talk about their business. By collecting their opinions about 
general trends in the industry, we obtain three results: 1) we collect a generic assessment of 
UTP occurrence by an expert, 2) we can observe the divergence between the general perception 
and the information regarding the business and 3) we can use the outcome to assess the possible 
bias from our focus on transactions with main buyers. In fact, such focus implies that our analysis 
may overlook UTPs occurring in transactions with other buyers (including UTPs that occurred 
with previous main buyers). Because firms might select main buyers who limit the use of UTPs, 
our analysis might underestimate the actual occurrence rate. In order to control for this bias, 
we asked middlemen to provide their subjective assessment of UTP occurrence in the industry, 
in addition to analysis of the transactions they are involved in. 
The perception of UTPs in the industry is investigated using a set of 5-point Likert scales 
measuring middleman’s perceptions on the likelihood of occurrence of a set of practices (namely, 
the 16 UTPs from Directive 2019/633). Respondents were asked to rate “how likely are those 
practices to happen” both in the upstream and downstream links of the netchain.  
Investigation of the middlemen’s transactions with their main buyers is the core of the pass-
through analysis. Respondents were asked to rate the impact of each UTP in the list on their 
business and, for the relevant UTPs, explain how they act to mitigate the effects on their 
business. Following the theoretical model in section 12.8 , respondents are offered options from 
four groups: i) do nothing (take the hit), ii) rebate the same practice on the suppliers (first 
degree pass-through), iii) adopt other UTPs (second degree pass-through), or iv) use other 
practices such as price reductions or mandatory investments (third degree pass-through). The 
analysis of the results gives us information about how the adoption of UTPs at one stage can 
affect the organisation of transactions at different levels of the netchain. 
Auxiliary information includes the share of export products; structure of the sales channels; 
nature of the main buyer; possibility to replace the buyer; and possibility of being replaced by 
the buyer. Also, we investigated whether middlemen had experienced a trade disruption in the 
past and if so, how he/she was informed by the buyer. 
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14.2   Sampling strategy 
 
We collected 156 farmer questionnaires and 30 middleman questionnaires in total. Eighty-five 
farmers and 15 middlemen belonged to the APK netchain, 70 farmers and 15 middlemen to the 
LCA netchain. 
Table 14-1: Sampling for the APK farmer survey 
 N. of farms  
Size of kiwi 
orchard (ha) 
2010 
Census 
Sample Weight 
Small (<2) 762 8 95.25 
Medium (2|-5) 691 44 15.70 
Large (5+) 855 33 25.91 
Total 2.308 85  
 
The 85 returned APK farmer questionnaires are representative of 2,308 kiwi growers in the 
Latina province (2010 Census data). The sample was stratified by orchard size, and the weights 
were computed according to Table 14-1. Within each stratum, observations were randomly 
selected. First, we drew a municipality randomly (with replacement) and then selected a farm. 
In the frequent case that the farmer refused to participate, another farmer in the municipality 
was chosen. 
The 71 returned farmer questionnaires from the LCA netchain are representative of 701 apple 
growers with at least one ha of apple orchard in the Baden-Württemberg federal state of 
Germany, where most of the Lake Constance producers are located (State Statistical Office of 
Baden-Württemberg). We excluded from the universe 529 farms with apple orchards smaller 
than one ha because such small production is almost always used for self-consumption, gifts or 
direct sale to consumers. Consequently, these farms were outside the scope of this research.21 
The weights are reported in Table 14-2. We selected farmers from every district of the Lake 
Constance area. Within each district, the farms were randomly selected from a classified 
directory. 
 
Table 14-2: Sampling for the LCA farmer survey 
 N. of farms  
Size of apple 
orchard (ha) 
Baden-
Württ. 
Sample Weight 
1-3ha 234 4 58.50 
3-5ha 123 13 9.46 
5-20ha 184 32 5.75 
20ha 160 22 7.27 
Total 701 71  
 
                                         
21 We did not exclude small kiwi producers in the APK survey because they are often engaged in commercial 
activities. 
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The 30 middlemen were selected from lists obtained from merging the results of an analysis of 
local phone directories with information obtained from the expert panels and farmers. Given the 
low rate of response, the actual selection was mainly driven by a middleman’s willingness to 
participate to the survey. 
 
14.3  Results of the farmer sample survey 
 
Table 14-3 illustrates the main characteristics of the APK and LCA samples, both sample-means 
and population estimates. Data show structural differences between the two areas. 
In the APK netchain, orchards are on average smaller, and farmers are older and more likely to 
be full-time than in the LCA netchain. The majority of APK farms are specialised in kiwi 
production, while in LCA the mode is specialisation in fruit production. In both cases, there is a 
non-negligible share of farms producing club varieties. Almost 50% of LCA farms have on-site 
storage facilities, while the share in APK is smaller (18%).  
 
Table 14-3: Selected characteristics of farm operations in APK and LCA netchains 
Farmers’ characteristics 
APK LCA 
Estimate Sample Estimate Sample 
Full-time farmers % 63.34 60.00 33.58 49.30 
Female farmers % 32.21 29.41 7.02 9.86 
Average age years 56.62 54.41 45.38 45.76 
 
Farms’ characteristics 
APK LCA 
Estimate Sample Estimate Sample 
Average kiwi/apple orchard ha 4.78 5.29 10.33 14.14 
Club varieties % 18.68 22.35 24.68 25.35 
Free varieties % 89.62 85.88 100.00 100.00 
Specialised kiwi/apple % 56.37 63.53 28.89 29.58 
Specialised fruit % 28.01 20.00 60.38 54.93 
Not specialised % 10.90 10.59 9.38 14.08 
Other specialisations % 4.73 5.88 1.35 1.41 
On-farm storage facilities % 18.07 17.65 49.55 61.97 
 
14.3.1  Farmers’ sales channels 
 
We characterise the structure of farmers’ sales channels using two key variables: membership 
in a PO or cooperative (a binary variable) and buyer concentration (a categorical variable). 
PO and cooperatives play a key role in both netchains. In LCA, 70% of farmers are members of 
a PO or cooperative. Those farmers account for 82% of apple farmland. In APK, 53% of farmers 
are coop/PO members and hold 62% of kiwi farmland. 
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Table 14-4: Structure of farmers’ sales channels 
PO/ Coop membership 
APK LCA 
Estimate Sample Estimate sample 
% of farmers 52.89 49.41 70.41 78.87 
% of kiwi/apple farmland 62.38 61.09 81.82 84.22 
 
Buyer 
concentration 
APK LCA 
% farmers  avg. orchard 
size  (ha) 
% farmers  avg. orchard 
size  (ha) 
Only one buyer  76.88 5.09 63.17 11.61 
One main buyer  11.26 5.56 14.47 14.11 
Few large buyers 0.00  1.64 10.50 
Many small buyers 5.49 0.87 20.72 3.79 
No resp. 6.37 3.15 0.00  
Total  100.00 4.78 100.00 10.33 
 
The majority of farmers sell their entire production to one buyer (77% in the APK netchain and 
63% in LCA). A small number of farmers has one main buyer and other smaller customers (11% 
in APK and 14% in LCA). The share of farmers who have a few large buyers is negligible. In the 
LCA netchain there is a sizable share (21%) of small farmers who sell to many local buyers. The 
incidence of this group in APK is smaller but still relevant (5%). 
 
14.3.2  Main buyer 
 
The investigation of UTPs focuses on the transaction between the farmer and the main buyer. 
In this section we describe the distribution of farmers by type of main buyer (Table 14-5).   
The data indicate a remarkable difference between the two netchains. In LCA, the majority of 
farmers patronizes cooperatives or POs (70%). Small farmers selling to consumers are 19% of 
the total. The remaining 11% sells to private traders (non-coop/PO) and only a negligible share 
to supermarket chains (1%).  
 
Table 14-5: Type of main buyer 
Main buyer (type) 
APK LCA 
% farmers avg. orchard 
size  (ha) 
% farmers avg. orchard 
size  (ha) 
Supermarket 1.80 5.74 0.82 14.00 
Private middleman 55.01 2.89 9.41 9.76 
Coop/PO 37.26 7.88 70.41 12.17 
Consumers   19.37 3.78 
Missing 5.93 2.66   
Total 100.00 4.78 100.00 10.33 
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In APK, private traders are the most common buyers, taking the production of 55% of farmers. 
Cooperatives and POs are the main buyers for 37% of farmers. Noticeably, the share of coop/POs 
as main buyer is much smaller than the figure in Table 14-4 reporting the percent of farmers 
who are coop/PO members (53%). Almost 30% of coop/PO members report that their main 
buyers are other types of firms. In order to explain the difference, Table 14-6 reports the type 
of services that members obtain from their cooperative/PO. Nine percent of coop/PO members 
use input providing and technical assistance services only (and sell their products without the 
help of the association). In the remaining 21% of cases, cooperatives and POs are mere 
intermediaries and the farmers deliver to other types of buyers. 
 
Table 14-6: Services used by PO/coop members22 
Services used by 
members  
APK 
% members 
Joint selling 91.06 
Input supply 34.18 
Production planning 33.79 
Technical assistance 51.22 
Other services 6.82 
In order to test the association of UTP occurrence with type of buyer, this difference must be 
considered. As a consequence, when investigating UTPs in a cooperative/PO supply chain, we 
consider only the members for whom the cooperative/PO is their main buyer. 
 
14.3.3  Trade replaceability 
 
According to theory, UTPs are associated with imbalances in bargaining power and coercion 
(Bowie 1988). Because bargaining power can hardly be measured with a short questionnaire 
(e.g., Draganska 2008), we used ‘replaceability’ as a gross proxy. We asked farmers if they 
could replace their main buyer as trading partner and whether the main buyer could replace 
them. The coded answers were “yes, easily”, “not easily/it would be costly” and “not at all”.  
By comparing the answers, we can identify possible imbalances in bargaining power. In fact, 
“replaceability” is associated with the value of the disagreement payoff. If a firm can replace the 
trade partner easily, we can infer that the value of the disagreement payoff is close to the payoff 
from the trade. This implies that the firm can walk away from the transaction easily. In this 
setting, coercion is more unlikely to happen, because the firm has feasible alternatives.23 If 
replacing the trade partner is feasible but costly (not easy), the disagreement payoff is lower 
than the payoff from trade but still greater than production cost. In this case, the threat of 
walking away from trade is credible only if coercion results in erosion of profit margins. Finally, 
if replacing the trade partner is not possible, the firm has no alternative and is exposed to 
coercion. 
                                         
22 Data available for the APK netchain only. 
23 In principle, it is possible that the ease of switching trade partners is associated with a set of available alternatives that 
are all equally coercive. Therefore, replaceability can be considered only a gross proxy and not an exact measurement. 
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
169 
 
Table 14-7: Replaceability of trade partners 
Can the main 
buyer replace your 
firm? 
APK LCA 
Superm. Private 
middl. 
Coop/PO Total Superm. Private 
middl. 
Coop/PO Consum. Total 
Easily % 37.74 38.16 25.38 31.13 0.00 8.72 0.00 100.00 20.19 
Not easily % 0.00 28.26 12.14 20.07 100.00 80.25 0.00 0.00 8.37 
Not at all % 62.26 33.58 62.48 42.87 0.00 11.03 100.00 0.00 71.44 
Total % 100.00 100.00 100.00 94.07 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Can you replace 
the main buyer? 
APK LCA 
Superm. Private 
middl. 
Coop/PO Total Superm. Private 
middl. 
Coop/PO Consum. Total 
Easily % 37.74 27.23 13.88 20.83 0.00 48.45 2.64 100.00 25.78 
Not easily % 62.26 14.06 27.21 18.99 100.00 40.51 29.29 0.00 25.25 
Not at all % 0.00 58.71 52.89 52.00 0.00 11.03 68.07 0.00 48.96 
Total % 100.00 100.00 93.97 91.82 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 14-7 reports farmers’ perceptions about replaceability by netchain and type of main buyer. 
As expected, farmers selling to private middlemen perceived themselves as more replaceable 
than those selling to cooperatives and PO. Approximately 50% of farmers in the two netchains 
stated they cannot replace the main buyer. 
Table 14-8 compares farmers’ perceptions about their own replaceability and that of their main 
buyer. The figures in bold font highlight the combinations of possible imbalance in bargaining 
power in favour of the buyer. 
Table 14-8: Asymmetries in perceived replaceability by type of main buyer 
Main buyer is 
private middleman/ 
supermarket chain 
Farmer can be replaced 
APK LCA 
Easily Not easily No Tot Easily Not easily No Tot 
Farmer 
can 
replace 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Easily 22.42 5.15 0.00 27.57 0.00 44.57 0.00 44.57 
Not easily 8.46 5.15 1.98 15.59 8.02 37.26 0.00 45.29 
No 7.26 17.07 32.51 56.85 0.00 0.00 10.15 10.15 
Total 38.14 27.37 34.49 100.00 8.02 81.83 10.15 100.00 
 
Main buyer is 
cooperative / PO 
Farmer can be replaced 
APK LCA 
Easily Not easily No Tot Easily Not easily No Tot 
Farmer 
can 
replace 
Missing 0.00 0.00 6.03 6.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Easily 13.88 0.00 0.00 13.88 0.00 0.00 2.64 2.64 
Not easily 1.83 1.83 23.55 27.21 0.00 0.00 29.29 29.29 
No 9.68 10.32 32.90 52.89 0.00 0.00 68.07 68.07 
Total 25.38 12.14 62.48 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
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14.3.4  Price practices 
Based on the results from the expert panels and semi-structured interviews, we identified four 
areas of possible UTPs: price determination, quality, access costs and renegotiation. We report 
the results in Table 14-9. 
Table 14-9: Results of price practices assessment 
Pricing rules are transparent and clear (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 88.53 0.00 11.47 100.00        
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.26 37.74 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid. 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.96 49.02 12.02 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.35 37.42 48.23 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.36 26.78 53.87 100.00 6.89 11.10 38.71 17.16 15.55 10.58 100.00 
Consum.        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.68 47.32 100.00 
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.89 38.07 28.04 100.00 4.848 7.82 27.26 13.43 25.49 21.15 100.00 
               
Buyers set prices at their discretion (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 NR 
Missing 0.00 11.47 0.00 88.53 0.00 0.00 100.00        
Superm. 0.00 37.74 0.00 0.00 62.26 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid. 0.00 7.50 19.67 24.33 18.20 30.30 100.00 0.00 76.93 23.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 27.85 31.07 17.53 3.01 20.54 100.00 0.00 66.05 29.29 2.33 2.33 0.00 100.00 
Consum.        0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 15.86 22.40 25.16 12.26 24.32 100.00 0.00 73.1 22.79 2.461 1.641 0.00 100.00 
               
At delivery, I have a reasonably reliable expectation about price (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 NR 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 81.07 18.93 100.00        
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid. 0.00 27.60 1.24 31.97 33.87 5.32 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 57.09 5.48 15.70 18.72 3.01 100.00 0.00 29.43 44.57 19.66 6.34 0.00 100.00 
Consum.        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 36.46 2.72 23.44 32.21 5.17 100.00 0.00 20.72 31.38 13.84 4.462 29.59 100.00 
               
Payments are timely (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 NR 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00        
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.26 37.74 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid. 0.00 5.75 0.00 13.69 1.24 79.32 100.00 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.07 68.21 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.55 8.49 67.95 100.00 1.17 13.77 24.46 40.73 10.01 9.86 100.00 
Consum.        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.36 94.64 100.00 
Total 0.00 3.16 0.00 16.31 4.97 75.56 100.00 1.64 9.70 17.22 29.5 10.25 31.69 100.00 
               
Overall, prices are determined in a  fair and transparent way (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 NR 
Missing 0.00 88.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.47 100.00        
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.26 37.74 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Midd 0.00 7.36 0.00 8.66 31.40 52.59 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 54.87 45.13 100.00 
Coop /PO 3.65 13.88 17.53 1.83 3.65 59.46 100.00 4.11 49.12 31.76 6.34 5.59 3.08 100.00 
Consum.        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 1.36 14.47 6.53 5.44 19.75 52.44 100.00 2.90 34.59 22.36 4.462 9.913 25.78 100.00 
               
I believe that the main buyer would cheat on prices if they could (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 NR 
Missing 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00        
Superm. 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Midd 1.24 56.52 18.72 3.71 19.81 0.00 100.00 8.72 45.13 46.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 89.68 3.01 5.48 1.83 0.00 100.00 27.41 40.22 18.50 4.97 6.58 2.33 100.00 
Consum.        47.32 52.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 0.68 72.24 11.42 4.08 11.58 0.00 100.00 29.28 42.76 18.19 3.498 4.631 1.64 100.00 
 
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
171 
 
Our survey concludes that price transparency is an issue in the LCA netchain, especially in 
cooperatives and PO. APK farmers are more concerned about arbitrary price determination, 
especially when private traders are involved. Noticeably, farmers state they do not know the 
final price for their fruit at the time of delivery. This can be a typical consequence of the 
cooperative management that pays members at the end of the year. In APK, this is an issue 
with private traders as well. In fact, in the APK netchain, prices “to-be-determined” are a 
common practice or non-cooperative enterprises. In general, farmers (with a partial exception 
for 38% of LCA cooperatives and a minority of APK private traders) responded that payments 
are reasonably on time.  
There is a remarkable difference in the overall perception of price fairness and transparency in 
the two netchains: 72% of farmers in APK agrees with the statement (scores 4 or 5) versus 36% 
in LCA. In particular, only 9% of coop/PO members gives a positive evaluation in this regard.  
Farmers trust their buyers to a large extent. Only 8% of respondents in LCA believes the buyer 
would cheat on prices. The figure rises to 12% in APK, with a clear concern regarding private 
traders. 
 
14.3.5  Quality practices 
 
Our investigation of quality practices shows that the large majority of farmers agrees with the 
statement: “Overall, quality assessment is fair”. The share is 96% in the APK netchain and 94% 
in LCA. Similarly, very few farmers agree with the idea that buyers would cheat on quality. 
Partial exceptions are the 26% APK farmers who sell to private traders who worry about the 
trustworthiness of their buyers. 
 
Table 14-10: Results of quality practices assessment 
Overall, quality assessment is fair (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.93 0.00 81.07 100.00        
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Midd 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.28 21.05 75.67 100.00 14.35 0.00 0.00 8.72 14.35 62.58 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 0.00 3.01 0.00 10.86 86.12 100.00 1.17 5.72 7.19 5.72 47.38 32.82 100.00 
Consum.        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 0.00 1.12 2.93 15.63 80.33 100.00 2.17 4.03 5.07 4.85 35.53 48.36 100.00 
               
I believe that my buyer would cheat on quality if they could (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00        
Superm. 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Midd 0.00 56.96 16.53 0.00 8.23 18.28 100.00 14.35 76.93 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 88.50 8.49 0.00 0.00 3.01 100.00 14.11 44.71 25.08 7.74 1.17 7.19 100.00 
Consum.        90.41 9.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 72.04 12.26 0.00 4.52 11.18 100.00 28.80 40.57 19.30 5.45 0.82 5.07 100.00 
 
Unlike what we found in a few semi-structured interviews, quality seems to be a minor concern 
for farmers. However, the relatively high share of missing answers in the LCA might indicate 
reticence or a fear factor. 
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14.3.6  Access costs 
 
During the expert panels and the interviews, concerns were raised about the large and increasing 
investments necessary to gain market access. We tested these claims in a section of the 
questionnaire. Table 14-11 reports the results. 
 
Table 14-11: Results of the investigation of access costs 
I paid for large investments in order to sell to the most import buyer (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.47 0.00 88.53 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 25.79 14.86 21.34 18.20 19.81 100.00 0.00 14.35 28.47 8.72 37.42 11.03 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 14.61 18.72 47.96 0.00 18.72 100.00 6.44 32.50 39.23 8.50 4.94 8.40 100.00 
Consumers        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 90.41 9.59 100.00 
Total 0.00 19.63 15.15 32.09 10.01 23.12 100.00 4.62 24.61 30.71 6.88 23.60 9.57 100.00 
               
Selling to the main buyer is increasingly costly (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 81.07 18.93 0.00 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 13.25 17.34 35.91 33.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 23.07 57.18 19.75 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 48.39 5.48 26.78 4.84 14.52 100.00 0.00 28.50 56.29 7.30 3.80 4.11 100.00 
Consumers        0.00 0.00 47.32 47.32 5.36 0.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 25.32 11.58 36.34 21.35 5.41 100.00 0.00 22.23 54.17 16.16 4.54 2.90 100.00 
               
I have a clear estimate of future investments (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 88.53 0.00 11.47 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.26 37.74 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.28 38.67 21.05 100.00 0.00 8.72 23.07 0.00 23.07 45.13 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 3.65 0.00 3.01 47.96 45.38 100.00 28.88 10.38 7.50 4.66 44.77 3.80 100.00 
Consumers        43.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 47.32 9.59 100.00 
Total 0.00 1.36 0.00 28.53 40.27 29.85 100.00 28.68 8.13 7.45 3.28 43.68 8.78 100.00 
               
I believe that my buyer is asking for unnecessary investments (1: strongly disagree - 5: strongly agree)  
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 98.76 1.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 11.03 80.25 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 92.15 1.83 0.00 0.00 6.03 100.00 6.89 59.71 29.60 0.00 0.00 3.80 100.00 
Consumers        6.89 59.71 29.60 0.00 0.00 3.80 100.00 
Total 0.00 96.39 1.36 0.00 0.00 2.25 100.00 11.03 80.25 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 
Farmer perception in this regard is heterogeneous. In the APK netchain, 35% of farmers 
disagrees with the statement “I paid for large investments in order to sell to the most important 
buyer” and 33% agrees with it. In the LCA netchain, the figures are 55% and 33%, respectively. 
Similarly, there is no consensus about whether access costs are increasing over time. 
Almost all farmers have a clear estimate of the future investments that will be necessary to keep 
market access. Also, with a few exceptions, they do not consider the investments to be 
unnecessary costs. However, in both cases, the high share of missing answers in the LCA 
netchain might be the result of reticence or a fear factor. 
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14.3.7  Renegotiation 
 
Renegotiation was considered a main issue in the netchains. We investigated the problem with 
a set of five items regarding the predictability of the business (in general), trustworthiness and 
past experiences of giving up contractual rights. The results are summarised in Table 14-12. 
 
Table 14-12: Results of the assessment of renegotiation practices 
My business with the most important buyer is predictable (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 69.59 0.00 11.47 18.93 0.00 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 0.00 62.26 37.74 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 20.32 14.06 29.06 33.27 3.28 100.00 0.00 17.44 0.00 23.07 48.45 11.03 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 22.37 8.49 13.88 43.76 11.50 100.00 1.17 30.36 39.57 21.41 6.03 1.47 100.00 
Consumers        0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 23.64 12.02 22.52 35.73 6.09 100.00 0.82 42.38 28.68 17.24 8.80 2.07 100.00 
               
My main buyer uses unexpected events to obtain concessions (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 0.00 18.93 69.59 11.47 0.00 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 63.29 15.73 12.82 4.08 4.08 100.00 0.00 62.58 23.07 0.00 14.35 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 48.60 26.02 13.88 3.65 7.85 100.00 0.00 47.93 41.38 2.64 3.80 4.25 100.00 
Consumers        0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 54.72 19.47 16.35 4.29 5.17 100.00 0.00 59.00 31.31 1.86 4.85 2.99 100.00 
               
My main buyer changes contract terms even in the absence of unexpected events (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly 
agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 18.93 11.47 0.00 0.00 69.59 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 37.74 0.00 62.26 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 40.78 15.30 17.34 24.55 2.04 100.00 0.00 71.30 14.35 14.35 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 63.12 14.52 9.68 4.84 7.85 100.00 2.64 53.03 34.80 0.00 4.11 5.41 100.00 
Consumers       100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 47.75 14.50 14.26 15.31 8.18  1.86 63.41 25.85 1.35 3.72 3.81 100.00 
               
My main buyer always keeps their word (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.93 81.07 0.00 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.26 37.74 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 14.86 2.04 10.78 23.15 49.16 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.35 23.07 62.58 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 19.36 9.68 7.85 29.03 34.08 100.00 2.95 8.36 3.80 7.06 50.60 27.23 100.00 
Consumers        0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 0.00 15.39 4.73 11.10 29.04 39.74 100.00 2.07 5.89 3.50 6.32 37.79 44.43 100.00 
               
I had to give up contractual rights in order to keep the business relationship (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly 
agree) 
 APK LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing 0.00 11.47 0.00 18.93 69.59 0.00 100.00        
Supermarket 0.00 0.00 37.74 0.00 62.26 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 47.49 3.71 16.97 11.58 20.24 100.00 11.03 60.27 14.35 0.00 14.35 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 31.07 22.37 32.05 6.66 7.85 100.00 33.44 52.93 12.47 0.00 0.00 1.17 100.00 
Consumers        43.09 56.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 0.00 38.38 11.06 22.40 14.11 14.06 100.00 32.92 53.96 10.13 0.00 1.35 1.64 100.00 
 
A sizable share of farmers perceives their business as unpredictable (overall, 36% in APK and 
71% in LCA). The difference in perceptions between the two netchains is consistent with the 
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different sentiments about price transparency (section 14.3.4 ). LCA farmers have more trouble 
understanding price trends and, consequently, perceive a riskier business environment than APK 
farmers. 
The share of farmers complaining that the buyer renegotiates contracts when unexpected events 
occur is 9% in APK and 8% in LCA. Interestingly, the figures are lower than the share of farmers 
claiming that the buyer renegotiates in the absence of unexpected events (23% and 8%, 
respectively). This might imply that farmers perceive renegotiation as an “ordinary practice” that 
does not require justification. 
The majority of farmers considers their buyer a trustworthy partner. The share of farmers 
disagreeing with the statement “My buyer always keeps his/her word” is similar to that of 
farmers complaining about changes in contract terms. The two results are consistent and suggest 
that renegotiation can be an issue for a non-negligible number of farmers.  
Finally, 28% of APK farmers and 3% of LCA farmers complained about having to give up 
contractual rights to preserve their trade relationships. The issue is associated primarily with 
private traders and supermarkets, but 14% of farmers selling to cooperatives experienced the 
problem as well. 
 
14.4   Results from the middleman survey 
 
The middleman sample is composed of 15 firms from the APK netchain and 15 firms from LCA. 
Data were collected with computer-aided telephone interviews (CATI) between July and 
September 2019. 
 
14.4.1  Firm characteristics 
 
Table 14-13 and Table 14-14 report descriptive statistics of the sample. On average, firms in 
the LCA sample are larger and have a longer business history than those in the APK sample. The 
share of firms with own or rented storage facilities is 87% in LCA and 73% in APK. All firms in 
LCA trade free apple varieties, and 40% of them trade club varieties also. In the APK netchain, 
60% of firms trades free kiwi varieties only, 27% specialises in club varieties and 13% trades 
both types. 
All firms in LCA use multiple sales channels. The most common trade partners are independent 
retailers (93% of the sample), supermarket chains (73%) and processors (73%). Twenty-seven 
percent of the sample sells to consumers directly. The majority of APK firms uses only one sales 
channel (53% of the sample). The most common sales channels in APK are other middlemen 
(80%) and supermarkets (20%). Table 14-15 reports the statistics.   
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Table 14-13: Characteristics of the middleman sample 
  APK LCA 
Observations n. 15 15 
Avg. time in business years 6.13 25.06 
Share of coop/PO % 33.33 13.33 
Share of firms specialised in kiwi/apple trade % 26.67 6.67 
Share of firms specialised in fruit trade % 66.67 73.33 
Share of firms trading club varieties % 40.00 40.00 
Share of firms trading free varieties % 73.33 100.00 
Share of firms with own storage facilities % 33.33 86.67 
Share of firms with rented storage facilities % 40.00 13.33 
Share of firms with no storage facilities % 26.67 13.33 
Table 14-14: Distribution of sample by revenue class 
  APK LCA 
N.R % 6.67 6.67 
0-| 2 mil % 53.33 20.00 
2 -| 10 mil % 20.00 46.67 
10 -| 50 mil % 13.33 26.67 
50 -| 150 mil % 6.67 0.00 
150 -|350 mil % 0.00 0.00 
Exceed. 350  % 0.00 0.00 
Total % 100.00 100.00 
Table 14-15: Sales channels 
  APK LCA 
Share of firms selling to other middlemen % 80.00 53.33 
Share of firms selling to independent retailers % 0.00 93.33 
Share of firms selling to supermarkets % 20.00 73.33 
Share of firms selling to processors % 13.33 73.33 
Share of firms selling to consumers % 6.67 26.67 
 
14.4.2  Perception of UTPs in the industry 
 
Respondents were asked to state how likely a listed UTP was to happen, based on their 
knowledge of the industry. This general question did not refer to their firm specifically; only a 
general assessment of the industry was required. The five-point scale was 1: I am not aware of 
the problem, 2: It is unusual, 3: It may happen sometimes, 4: It happens often and 5: It is 
customary. Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of the UTP occurring in the upstream 
market (i.e., transactions between firms such as their own and their suppliers) and downstream 
market (i.e., between firms such as their own and their buyers). The list of UTPs is based on the 
Directive 2019/633 (grey practices are considered as one), with two additional list items gleaned 
from the results of the expert panels and interviews: unnecessary quality standards and arbitrary 
orders. Table 14-16 summarises the results. 
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Table 14-16: Perception of UTPs in the APK and LCA netchains 
Likelihood of selected UTPs in upstream and downstream 
industries on 1-to-5 scale (1 = not aware, 5 = it is customary) 
APK LCA 
Average 
score 
% of  
scores > 2 
Average 
score 
% of  
scores > 2 
Upst. Down. Upst. Down. Upst. Down. Upst. Down. 
Payments are delayed, late and/or unpredictable. 2.60 2.27 40.00 33.33 1.60 1.53 13.33 6.67 
Orders are cancelled on short notice. 1.67 1.67 13.33 6.67 1.07 1.47 0.00 6.67 
Buyers impose unilateral changes to existing contracts or 
agreements (do not keep their word). 2.13 1.87 33.33 33.33 1.13 1.53 6.67 6.67 
Suppliers must pay for expenses that are not related to the 
sales of their products (for example: opening of new stores). 1.86 1.93 20.00 26.67 1.00 2.07 0.00 40.00 
Suppliers must pay (or are denied payments) for loss or waste 
of products that were already delivered to the buyer. 2.13 2.13 26.67 26.67 1.40 2.27 20.00 46.67 
Buyers refuse to write down contracts or orders. 1.60 1.57 13.33 0.00 1.00 1.60 0.00 13.33 
Buyers take advantage of confidential information they obtain 
from the suppliers. 2.53 2.57 53.33 46.67 1.00 1.40 0.00 6.67 
Buyers cut orders if the suppliers try to exercise their 
contractual rights. 1.64 1.62 6.67 6.67 1.00 2.13 0.00 40.00 
Suppliers must pay for the costs of examining complaints by 
final customers (even if they are not responsible). 2.60 2.14 60.00 40.00 1.40 1.20 20.00 0.00 
Firms must bear unpredictable costs that are not clearly stated 
in the contract. 2.43 2.43 33.33 33.33 1.00 2.20 0.00 33.33 
Firms must comply with unnecessary quality standards. 2.20 2.07 33.33 20.00 2.47 3.53 53.33 80.00 
Orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary. 1.79 1.79 20.00 20.00 2.67 4.60 46.67 100.00 
According to the respondents, the five most common unfair practices in the APK netchain are 
misuse of confidential information; late payments; bearing unpredictable costs that are not 
clearly stated in the contract; paying for examination of complaints by final customers; and 
complying with unnecessary quality standards. In the downstream industry, the issue of paying 
for after-delivery loss or waste is among the most common practices as well.  
This result is consistent with the common arrangement in the APK netchain of paying suppliers 
after the kiwifruits are sold to the consumers. This might result in delayed payments. 
Furthermore, the supplier’s price is a function of the buyer’s net margin and unexpected costs 
(such as waste, loss or even promotions) can be transferred to the suppliers.  
Middlemen’s perceptions about unnecessary quality standards are different from farmers’ one. 
The farmer survey (14.3.6 ) showed that 96% of farmers strongly disagrees with the statement 
“I believe that my buyer asks for investments that are not really necessary”. Thirty-three percent 
of middlemen consider unnecessary quality standards to at least “happen sometimes”. The 
difference is explained by the consideration that such investments and standards are imposed 
by the retail industry. Farmers know that such investments are necessary in order to sell the 
kiwifruits to retailers, but middlemen doubt that such requirements are important for consumers. 
In the LCA netchain, the main concerns are unnecessary standards and discretionary orders. 
Almost all respondents gave a score higher than 2 for the likelihood of such practices occurring 
in the downstream market. The share of respondents stating that these practices are not 
infrequent (i.e., score greater than 2) in the upstream market is approximately 50%. The result 
suggests that middlemen’s main concerns regard practices not directly related to those on the 
list in Directive 2019/633. 
Middlemen consider other practices unlikely to occur in the upstream market. Payments for 
examining consumer complaints and post-delivery waste or loss are considered not infrequent 
only by 20% of respondents. Other items have average scores close to 1, meaning that 
middlemen consider them unusual or non-existent. 
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In the LCA downstream market, there are concerns regarding payments for post-delivery loss 
or waste (47% of respondents), unpredictable costs (40%) and retaliation (40%). Thirty-three 
percent of respondents stated that expenses not related to product sales may be incurred. 
The perception of the likelihood of UTPs occurring in the industry differs across netchains. This 
result suggests that running general, cross-netchain surveys might underestimate the local 
impact of UTPs. 
 
14.4.3  The trade relationship with the main buyer 
 
Respondents were asked to assess the occurrence and impact of UTPs in their trade relationship 
with their main buyer. Unlike the general assessment in section 14.4.2 , the question is specific 
to their firm. This made respondents wary (especially in the APK netchain), despite the strict 
confidentiality agreement. As a consequence, results must be interpreted with caution. 
Table 14-17: Types of main buyer 
 APK LCA 
Trader/middleman 80.00 13.33 
Retailer 13.33 80.00 
Other 6.67 6.67 
 
Table 14-18: Distribution (% of firms) by revenue class of the firm and main buyer (millions of 
euro) 
APK 
 Revenues of main buyer 
NR 0-2 2-10 10-50 50-150 150-350 Exc. 350 Total 
R
ev
en
u
es
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
 
NR  6.67      6.67 
0-2  33.33 13.33 6.67    53.33 
2-10   6.67 6.67 6.67   20.00 
10-50 6.67   6.67    13.33 
50-150     6.67   6.67 
150-350        0.00 
Exc. 350        0.00 
Total 6.67 40.00 20.00 20.00 13.33 0.00 0.00 100.00 
          
LCA 
 Revenues of main buyer 
NR 0-2 2-10 10-50 50-150 150-350 Exc. 350 Total 
R
ev
en
u
es
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
 
NR       6.67 6.67 
0-2 20.00       20.00 
2-10 26.67      20.00 46.67 
10-50       26.67 26.67 
50-150        0.00 
150-350        0.00 
Exc. 350        0.00 
Total 46.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.33 100.00 
 
Firms in APK primarily sold to other traders and middlemen (including cooperatives). Only 13% 
of respondents had a retailer as their main buyer. In the LCA netchain, retailers are the most 
common main buyers (Table 14-17). 
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Table 14-18 compares the size (revenue class) of the firms and their main buyers. In the LCA 
netchain, buyers are remarkably larger than the firms. In the APK netchain, buyers are smaller, 
and the size of the two parties is comparable in the majority of cases. 
Table 14-19: Asymmetries in replaceability 
  APK LCA 
  Buyer can replace  Buyer can replace  
  Easily Not 
easily 
No Total Easily Not 
easily 
No Total 
Firm Easily 6.67 0.00 0.00 6.67 6.67 6.67 6.67 20.00 
can Not easily 0.00 40.00 6.67 46.67 6.67 40.00 0.00 46.67 
replace No 6.67 20.00 20.00 53.33 6.67 26.67 0.00 66.67 
 Total 13.33 60.00 26.67 100.00 20.00 73.33 6.67 100.00 
 
The analysis of asymmetries in mutual replaceability suggests that asymmetric distribution of 
bargaining power is possible in both netchains. The firms exhibiting a higher degree of 
replaceability than that of their buyers are 27% in APK and 40% in LCA (bold figure in Table 
14-19). 
 
14.4.4  UTPs in transactions with main buyers 
 
Respondents were asked to assess the rate of occurrence of UTPs in transactions with their main 
buyer using a 5-point Likert scale. In order to ensure comparability, the list of UTPs and 
assessment scale were the same as in Table 14-16.  
Table 14-20: Distribution (% of firms) by rate of occurrence of the most frequent UTP 
 APK LCA 
 Total 
Practices 
Dir. 
19/633 
Other 
Practices Total 
Practices 
Dir. 
19/633 
Other 
Practices 
Never 0.00 0.00 6.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rarely 53.33 53.33 80.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sometimes 33.33 33.33 0.00 13.33 73.33 13.33 
Frequently 6.67 6.67 6.67 20.00 6.67 20.00 
Customarily 6.67 6.67 6.67 66.67 20.00 66.67 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 14-20 reports the percent distribution of firms by the rate of occurrence of the most 
frequent listed practice they experienced. In the APK netchain, 47% of firms experienced at least 
one UTP at least “sometimes”. In the LCA netchain, all firms were exposed to one (or more) 
UTP(s) at least “sometimes”. In 87% of cases, the UTP occurrence was “frequent” at the very 
least. 
Because the UTP list included two practices not listed in Directive 2019/633, we computed the 
occurrence of the additional ones separately in order to assess the impact of incomplete lists. If 
we consider the practices in Directive 2019/633 only, the occurrence estimation in the LCA 
netchain is biased downward (columns 5 and 6 in Table 14-20).  
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Figure 14-1: Sample distribution (% of firms) by number of UTPs occurring at least “sometimes” 
 
Figure 14-1 illustrates the distribution of firms by number of UTPs occurring at least 
“sometimes”. In the APK netchain, 53% of firms stated that the practices in the list occurred 
“never” or “rarely”. The mode of the number of UTPs for the firms who experienced them is 2.5. 
In the LCA netchain, 60% of firms stated they experienced three practices in the list at least 
“sometimes”. The data suggest that UTP occurrence is higher in LCA than in APK. However, it 
must be considered that we are reporting subjective assessment and that different degrees of 
reticence between the two netchains might affect results. 
Figure 14-2: Perception of UTP occurrence in transactions with main buyers  
 
1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
Payments are delayed, late and/or unpredictable.(*)
Orders are canceled on short notice
Buyers impose unilateral changes to existing contracts or agreements (do
not keep their word) (*)
Suppliers must pay for expenses that are not related to the sales of their
products
Suppliers are held responsible for loss or waste of products that were
already delivered to the buyer
Buyers refuse to write down contracts or orders
Buyers take advantage of confidential information they obtain from the
suppliers (*)
Buyers cut orders if the suppliers try to exercise their contractual rights
Suppliers must pay for the costs of examining complaints by final
customers (even if they are not responsible) (*)
Firms must bear unpredictable costs that are not clearly stated in the
contract
Firms must comply with unnecessary quality standards (*)
Orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary (*)
APK
LCA
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Customarily
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(*) the average occurrence of the practice in APK and LCA is statistically different at 95% confidence level 
 
Figure 14-2 summarises the results of the investigation. The two netchains present with different 
results, suggesting that occurrence may be netchain specific. The overall average occurrence 
scores in APK (1.92) and LCA (1.93) are not statistically different. However, the score standard 
deviation is higher in LCA (1.33) than in APK (0.96). In LCA, the only practices having an average 
score greater than 2 (“rarely”) on a 5-point scale concern arbitrary orders, unnecessary 
standards, unpredictable costs and being held responsible for post-delivery loss or waste. In 
APK, the average scores exceeding 2 refer to late payments, unilateral contract changes, misuse 
of confidential information and unnecessary standards. Table 14-21 reports the distribution of 
the sample percent frequency by occurrence rating.  
Table 14-21: Perceptions of UTP occurrence in transactions with main buyers (percent frequency 
of sample distribution on a 1-to-5 scale)  
Practices 
% of firms by rate of occurrence 
APK LCA 
1 2 3 4 5 NR 1 2 3 4 5 NR 
Payments are delayed, late and/or 
unpredictable. 6.67 66.67 20.00 6.67 0.00 0.00 73.33 20.00 6.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Orders are cancelled on short notice. 60.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 6.67 0.00 53.33 40.00 6.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Buyers impose unilateral changes to 
existing contracts or agreements. 26.67 53.33 13.33 0.00 6.67 0.00 80.00 13.33 6.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Suppliers must pay for expenses that are 
not related to the sales of their products. 33.33 66.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 26.67 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Suppliers are held responsible for loss or 
waste of already delivered products. 40.00 33.33 20.00 0.00 6.67 0.00 40.00 20.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Buyers refuse to write down contracts or 
orders. 60.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 6.67 0.00 80.00 6.67 6.67 0.00 6.67 0.00 
Buyers take advantage of confidential 
information they obtain from the suppliers. 0.00 66.67 26.67 0.00 6.67 0.00 93.33 6.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Buyers cut orders if suppliers try to 
exercise their contractual rights. 33.33 60.00 0.00 0.00 6.67 0.00 66.67 6.67 26.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Suppliers must pay for the costs of 
examining complaints by final customers. 33.33 46.67 6.67 0.00 6.67 6.67 86.67 13.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firms must bear unpredictable costs that 
are not clearly stated in the contract. 26.67 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 53.33 53.33 13.33 13.33 6.67 13.33 0.00 
Firms must comply with unnecessary 
quality standards. 13.33 80.00 0.00 0.00 6.67 0.00 26.67 6.67 20.00 13.33 33.33 0.00 
Orders are unpredictable and totally 
discretionary. 46.67 40.00 0.00 6.67 6.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.33 20.00 66.67 0.00 
The Likert scales are defined as: 1: Never, 2: Rarely, 3: Sometimes, 4: Frequently, 5: Customarily 
 
14.4.5  Pass-through analysis 
 
Firms stating that a listed practice happened at least “sometimes” were asked to explain how 
this affected their business with suppliers. APK firms were extremely reticent in this regard and 
unwilling to admit possible UTPs toward their suppliers. Only six firms answered the pass-
through section of the questionnaire, while the others refused to consider the questions stating 
that there was no pass-through effect. All firms in LCA were willing to answer the questionnaire 
section. However, we found that for eight out of ten practices, the most common answer was 
that the firm took on the cost of the practice and did not pass it through. The implications of 
possible reticence are discussed in the conclusion to this report.  
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Table 14-22 reports the results of the investigation. The low rate of response and small sample 
of respondents suggest caution in interpreting the results and drawing general conclusions. 
However, the data provide useful insights and support the findings of the interviews. 
In the APK netchain, a middleman exposed to delayed payment is likely to do the same to the 
suppliers or use vague and informal contracts to adjust the terms of transaction with suppliers. 
In the LCA netchain, the only respondent stated that trade with suppliers is not affected by the 
practice. The result is consistent with the information provided by the expert panels and the 
interviews. In APK, it is customary that farmers receive the price after the middleman (including 
private traders) has sold the product. This is a clear example of first-degree pass-through. In 
the LCA, middlemen usually pay at delivery and are therefore subject to the full consequences 
of buyers’ delayed payments. 
The data are consistent with the outcome of the farmer sample survey (Table 14-9). In APK, 
farmers perceive price determination as arbitrary (37% of total respondents) and unpredictable 
(37%), but also timely (81%) and transparent (66%). In LCA, only 2% of farmers perceive 
prices as arbitrary. Concerns regard lack of transparency (35%), unpredictability (52%) and 
payment delay (27%). Noticeably, the results are driven by a bad assessment of LCA 
cooperatives. The comparison with private middlemen (who pay at delivery) changes LCA 
farmers’ perceptions of transparency in cooperatives and PO businesses. In APK, payments after 
delivery are customary and acceptable.  
The effects of unilateral changes in middlemen’s contracts are different in the two netchains. In 
the APK netchain, they may trigger the use of informal contracts (that can be easily modified) 
or—if changes concern quantities—cutting orders from suppliers. This can be considered an 
example of first-degree pass-through. In the LCA netchain, the middlemen affirm that there is 
no pass-through. Again, this is consistent with the different arrangements at the time of delivery. 
If prices are determined at the end of the season (or in any case, after delivery), there is the 
opportunity to renegotiate. If the deal is closed at harvest time, there is no room for retroactive 
changes. 
The results are consistent with the outcome of the farmer sample survey (Table 14-12). Farmers 
in APK rate middlemen’s trustworthiness lower than farmers in LCA. This may be connected with 
the APK middleman strategy of passing-through renegotiation. Again, in LCA, middlemen are 
considered more reliable than cooperatives and POs. 
The pass-through of practices related to the middlemen’s responsibility for post-sale loss and 
deterioration is similar to the one for renegotiation. In APK, middlemen use informal, flexible 
contracts to transfer loss to suppliers or cut orders with problematic suppliers. LCA middlemen 
state there is no pass-through. The result is consistent with expectation, because the practice 
can be considered a form of ex post renegotiation. 
A set of practices in LCA have a mixed effect on pass-through. Firms state they take (part of the 
cost) while at the same time passing the practice onto suppliers. The result is consistent with 
cost pass-through theory. According to standard theory, the share of cost that is passed 
upstream depends on supply/demand elasticity and the degree of market power. As a 
consequence, full pass-through is rational only under restrictive circumstances. These practices 
include “paying expenses that are not related to the sale of the product”, “buyer cuts trade 
relationship as retaliation” and “bearing costs that are not clearly stated in the contract”. The 
partial pass-through may include cutting prices, contract renegotiation, payment delay or using 
prices that are to be determined.  
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Buyers insisting on unnecessary production standards is a clear concern of LCA middlemen. Such 
a practice can trigger a variety of pass-through effects. In 50% of cases, it results in suppliers 
making on-farm investments. Noticeably, such investments are not considered “unnecessary” 
by farmers (Table 14-11), because they know they are necessary to gain market access. Other 
pass-through effects may include holding suppliers responsible for any failure in meeting the 
unnecessary standards and cutting trade with uncompliant suppliers. 
Unpredictable and discretionary orders are considered a customary practice by LCA middlemen 
with strong (although partial) pass-through effects. The consequences for suppliers include 
payment delays, prices that are to be determined and first degree pass-through. The only 
middlemen admitting a pass-through effect in the APK netchain use informal and flexible 
contracts to adjust supply to sudden fluctuations in demand. 
The middleman survey confirms the existence of UTP pass-through from upstream to 
downstream. The measurement of the intensity is difficult because of middlemen’s reticence to 
admit enforcing UTPs  
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Table 14-22: Pass-through analysis 
APK Netchain  How does the practice affect the trade relationship with the firm’s suppliers? 
Practices suffered by the firm 
N. of 
respond. 
No effect Use the 
same 
practice 
Payment 
delay 
Hold 
supplier 
respons. 
Use 
informal  
contracts 
Cut 
orders 
Cut 
suppl. 
prices 
Ask for 
on-firm 
investm. 
Price to 
be 
determ. 
Payments are delayed, late and/or unpredictable. 4  75.00   50.00     
Orders are cancelled on short notice. 1     100.00     
Buyers impose unilateral changes to existing contracts/agreements. 3     66.67 33.33    
Suppliers pay for expenses that are unrelated to product sale.           
Suppliers are responsible for loss/waste of product after delivery. 3     66.67 33.33    
Buyers refuse to write down contracts/orders.           
Buyers take advantage of confidential information.  3 100.00         
Buyers cut orders if suppliers try to exercise contractual rights.           
Suppliers must pay for cost of examining final consumer complaints. 1  100.00    100.00    
Firms must bear costs that are not clearly stated in the contract.            
Firms must comply with unnecessary quality standards.           
Orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary. 1     100.00     
 
LCA Netchain  How does the practice affect the trade relationship with the firm’s suppliers? 
Practices suffered by the firm 
N. of 
respon. 
No effect Use the 
same 
practice 
Payment 
delay 
Hold 
supplier 
respons. 
Use 
informal  
contr. 
Cut 
orders 
Cut 
suppl. 
prices 
Ask for 
on-firm 
investm. 
Price to 
be 
determ. 
Payments are delayed, late and/or unpredictable. 1 100.00         
Orders are cancelled on short notice. 1 100.00         
Buyers impose unilateral changes to existing contracts /agreements. 3 100.00         
Suppliers pay for expenses that are unrelated to product sale. 5 60.00      80.00  80.00 
Suppliers are responsible for loss/waste of product after delivery.  5 100.00         
Buyers refuse to write down contracts/orders. 2 100.00         
Buyers take advantage of confidential information.            
Buyers cut orders if suppliers try to exercise contractual rights. 4 100.00    25.00 25.00    
Suppliers must pay for cost of examining final consumer complaints.           
Firms must bear costs that are not clearly stated in the contract. 6 83.33     16.67 66.67  33.33 
Firms must comply with unnecessary quality standards. 10 30.00   10.00  10.00  50.00 20.00 
Orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary. 15 60.00 20.00 33.33      20.00 
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15  Evaluation 
Carlo Russo 
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) 
 
The application of the IDEA approach allowed us to draw conclusions in three main areas of 
interest: i) design of a UTP monitoring system, ii) functioning of the fruit value chain and iii) 
implementation of Directive 2019/633 by Member States. In this chapter we summarise the 
main results. A general evaluation can be found in this report’s conclusion. 
 
15.1   Designing a UTP monitoring system: Lessons from IDEA 
 
The IDEA approach is based on subsequent implementation of an expert panel, in-depth 
interviews and a sample survey. The core of IDEA is the joint use of economic theory, 
background information and direct data collection to provide a complete representation of the 
organisation of the value chain. The UTPs are identified and assessed ad-hoc using general 
economic principles instead of a predetermined list of practices. Compared with previous surveys 
(chapter 4) and B-SEA (chapter 7), this gives two important benefits: It allowed us to identify 
additional unfair practices not considered under current regulation and understand the possible 
efficiency implications of banning specific practices. As a consequence, IDEA is suited to support 
the design of new regulation and understand how netchains react to policy. However, IDEA 
proved to be costly and difficult to implement. Also, it is best suited to relatively homogenous 
netchains. 
 
15.1.1   From theory to practice: Reticence and fear factor 
 
The practical implementation of IDEA was more complicated than running a B-SEA survey. 
Reticence and fear factor are key obstacles. Stakeholders may be willing to discuss the general 
problems of the netchain, but they are extremely wary of talking about specific issues with their 
trading counterparts. We found strong reluctance in sharing details regarding financial 
information (such as the monetary impact of a practice). A similar behaviour was found during 
the B-SEA survey. Middlemen refused to answer the “too detailed and invasive” B-SEA 
questionnaire, although they were willing to take the less detailed IDEA questionnaire (section 
10.1.1 ). 
This attitude had two major impacts on our IDEA implementation. Firstly, we found that the 
results of the expert panels and outcomes of the interviews are not fully consistent. While the 
expert panelists described critical situations, individual interviews provided a more nuanced 
representation. Panelists were immediately made aware of the possible use of the research for 
supporting public intervention, so it is possible there was some strategic behaviour. It was easy 
to involve farmer and PO representatives in the panel. Private middlemen and large retailers 
simply refused to participate. As a consequence, the panelists might have overstated the 
occurrence or impact of UTPs. 
When asked about their specific business, entrepreneurs were unwilling to speak ill of their trade 
partners, even if full confidentiality was assured. Especially in relatively small netchains, such as 
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APK and LCA, there was major concern about possible consequences once the report would be 
published. Even when there was no fear of direct retaliation (such as in the case of coop 
members), the respondents were worried to lose reputation or social capital. In addition to the 
classical fear factor, we suspect a possible self-representation bias. During in-depth interviews, 
the interviewers reported that respondents tried to avoid representing themselves as “victims” 
or “unsuccessful businessmen”. A possible example of the bias is the farmers’ assessment of the 
possibility of being replaced by the buyer (Table 14-7). Data collectors reported that farmers 
were reluctant to admit they were easily replaceable (and therefore “just another farmer”) while 
the buyer was unreplaceable. Another example is self-assessment of the pass-through effect. 
Middlemen were extremely reluctant to admit engaging in UTPs on their side, even if determined 
by the misbehaviour of other. Such self-representation bias reinforces the fear factor effect and 
must be carefully considered in all types of surveys. 
A second effect of reluctance was the extreme difficulty of pursuing a dyadic approach to 
interviewing. According to the IDEA theory (chapter 6), interviews should focus on buyer-seller 
pairs. By collecting information separately from both parties, it is possible to obtain a complete 
characterisation of the transaction. The practical implementation confirmed the approach: When 
we were able to interview the pair, our understanding of the trade relationship increased 
dramatically. Unfortunately, we were able to interview only one pair in the entire IDEA and only 
under strict confidentiality (meaning we cannot compare the two interviews directly). The reason 
is that firms are extremely reluctant to disclose the identity of their trade partners. Farmers are 
worried of possible impact on future trade with the buyer. Middlemen were unwilling to facilitate 
an obvious double-checking on their behaviour.  
Implementing the dyadic approach requires the active cooperation of expert panels. Experts’ 
support was of paramount importance to facilitation of the interviews and overcoming 
respondents’ reticence. For this reason, the choice of panelists is one of the most critical issues 
in IDEA. 
 
15.1.2   Questionnaire design and interaction with entrepreneurs  
 
Entrepreneurs in the netchain may have different perspectives and use very different language 
from the one in Directive 2019/633. When we first confronted APK panelists with the list of UTP 
from the Directive, their immediate reaction was to dismiss it as ‘irrelevant’. Their only focus 
was on price determination (price, discounts and promotions) and quality. Yet, after explaining 
the UTPs into details, the panelists agreed on the importance of the Directive (at least for a set 
of practices).  
Such difficulty is reflected in the questionnaires. Unlike in-depth interviews, questions in the 
sample survey must be as self-explanatory as possible. As a consequence, the wording of each 
item must keep in mind that farmers, middlemen and retailers may use specific jargon or have 
unique points of view. We realised that the same questions were received differently in different 
netchains. For example, the same issue—price being determined after delivery—was perceived 
as a transparency problem by LCA farmers and a discretionary practice by APK farmers.  
Communication and perception have two main consequences for IDEA. Firstly, researchers must 
draft a questionnaire that is immediately understandable by the respondents while minimizing 
the time of response. Respondents tire rapidly when confronted with a long and complex 
questionnaire (such as B-SEA), and response rates and information quality drop as well. 
Therefore, we had to design an easy and fast questionnaire, using—when possible—the netchain 
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jargon. The support of the expert panels was of paramount importance in this regard. The 
downside of this approach is a compromise in the precision of the information. We had to use 
subjective assessments, which open up the possibility of biased information. Also, quantifying 
occurrence or impact was difficult because we had to use generic evaluations of frequency and 
severity. We concluded that detailed and precise information can be obtained from the in-depth 
interviews, while a sample survey can be used to obtain general evaluations. 
A second issue concerns comparability of the results. Being that UTP are contextual, the same 
practice can be received very differently across netchains. This makes cross-netchain 
comparison quite difficult. 
 
15.1.3   Measuring impact: Reticence, knowledge and counterfactual 
 
Obtaining a correct measure of the financial impact of UTPs was difficult. We encountered three 
main issues. The well-known reticence of entrepreneurs to share financial information made 
them unwilling to discuss the topic. This resulted in a strong preference for qualitative 
statements over the provision of precise figures. Furthermore, several managers stated that 
their accounting system did not support that kind of information, so they could only give us 
personal estimates. Although this might be an excuse to cover reticence, the expert panels 
confirmed that many firms do not run a specific assessment of the cost of UTPs. Instead, they 
have an overall appraisal of the profitability of the trade. 
A third issue concerns the reliability of respondents’ evaluations. When answering about the cost 
of UTPs, respondents usually referred to the financial impact of the current practice, without 
considering the possible counterfactual. Banning a given practice results in a change in the trade 
relationship. New—and possibly worse—practices can emerge. In principle, the correct 
evaluation of the UTP cost is given by the difference between the financial impact of the UTP 
under consideration and the impact of the alternative. If the counterfactual is ignored, 
respondents’ evaluations might be biased upward. For example, when asked to provide a 
financial evaluation of a blacklist UTP (paying for post-delivery waste), an APK middleman stated 
that it was a “few percent points of the total revenue”. However, when the interviewer asked 
about using the new regulation to prevent such important loss, the middleman said no, because 
that would result in a possibly greater price reduction. Therefore, the stated cost of the UTP was 
biased upward, as the alternative would be even costlier. 
A precise measure of the financial impact of UTPs can be obtained from in-depth interviews so 
that the possible counterfactual can be estimated. A sample survey might overestimate the 
issue. 
 
15.2  The organisation of the fruit netchain: The pass-through effect 
 
Figure 15-1 summarises our findings about the organisation of the EU fresh fruit supply chain. 
Our research confirmed the double nature of UTPs: They can improve efficiency of the supply 
chain and extract profits from weak firms at the same time.  
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Figure 15-1: Summary of IDEA findings 
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The efficiency effect is represented on the left-hand side of Figure 15-1. The current governance 
is shaped by the need of leading firms (usually large buyers) to ensure a timely, consistent and 
reliable supply of high-quality fruits at the lowest price possible (we refer to this objective as the 
core goal of the leading firm). This objective is motivated by the intense competition in the 
downstream industry. A highly-efficient supply chain is an important competitive advantage, and 
leading firms pursue it. Asymmetries in the distribution of bargaining power allow these firms to 
impose such arrangements on the entire netchain. The occurrence of several UTPs is explained 
in this perspective. 
A leading firm faces four major sources of risk: production risk (i.e., harvest losses and bad 
production years); demand risk (i.e., unpredictable demand fluctuations); risk of failing to 
provide consumers with high-quality fruits (i.e., short shelf-life, deterioration or quality 
inconsistency); and procurement risk (i.e., suppliers failing to deliver the product). A key 
principle guiding the organisation of the fruit netchains is that risk must be borne by the firm in 
the best position to prevent the possible damage. It is a classical moral hazard argument. If 
such a firm bears the cost of failure, it takes all the necessary actions to prevent the loss. If 
other firms bear the cost, opportunistic behaviour may emerge. In order to cover such risks, 
leading firms create an extremely flexible supply chain where suppliers are responsible for 
successful delivery and ensuring quality and safety. 
The supply risk is managed with yearly contracts that are stipulated when a reliable estimate of 
production is available. As discussed in section 12.7.1 , this practice may motivate UTPs if an 
extensive interpretation of the contract is considered. Demand risk is managed with a just-in-
time procurement system. Retailers order fruits only when they are reasonably sure they can 
sell them to consumers without keeping stocks. Because of rapidly fluctuating demand, orders 
can be placed only with limited notice. As a consequence, the just-in-time procurement system 
may be associated with UTPs such as unpredictable, short-notice orders and short-notice 
cancellations. 
The just-in-time procurement system requires a high degree of cooperation from suppliers. The 
buyer must be sure that every short-notice order is met rapidly and that suppliers do not behave 
opportunistically. Leading firms use relational contracts to manage the procurement risk. It is in 
the clear interest of all parties to build long-term trade relationships so that a firm can cover the 
cost of the sizable investments. In a relational setting, leading firms must give suppliers the 
incentive to accept the contract and must prevent possible opportunism. In particular, leading 
firms use two key tools: implicit threat and self-selection.  
Suppliers operate under the implicit (but clear) threat that trade relationships can be disrupted 
if they fail to contribute to the core goal of the leading firm. Standard contract theory finds that 
the threat must be credible in order to be an effective coordination tool. Credibility requires that 
disrupting trade must be (relatively) costless for the leading firm. This means that contracts 
must be such that disrupting trade does not result in litigation and that the supplier must be 
replaceable.  
Self-selection of suppliers minimises the risk of failure in the netchain. Suppliers must pay high 
access costs (investments, adoption of quality standards, reverse margin practices) in order to 
trade with the leading firm. Because they know that a failure in ensuring the core goal of the 
leading firms will result in trade disruption, they are willing to pay the access costs only if they 
are reasonably sure to be successful. 
The organisation of trade between retailers and middlemen affects the transactions upstream 
between middlemen and farmers. The expert panels and the semi-structured interviews 
identified four vectors of impact. 
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• Sales with price to be determined. Because of the unpredictable demand and UTPs such 
as renegotiations, unclear and ambiguously specified costs, payments for 
loss/deterioration and retaliation, middlemen discover their net revenues only after the 
product is sold to the final consumer. To manage this risk, they pay farmers partial 
instalments only at harvest time. The final price determination happens later, possibly 
even at the end of the year. As a consequence, farmers suffer from unpredictable 
business, the farmgate price is unknown at the time of delivery, and its final 
determination is perceived as arbitrary and non-transparent because it depends on 
several unobservable factors that are beyond the farmers’ control. This impact vector 
includes unilateral renegotiations of price and delivery conditions. 
• Strategic quality determination. During the semi-structured interviews, respondents 
complained about middlemen using strict standards as an excuse to adjust to decreases 
in orders or in response to buyers’ renegotiations (chapter 13). However, the IDEA farmer 
survey did not support these findings.  
• On-farm investments. Retailers’ unnecessary production requirements, the incentive to 
minimise loss and increase shelf-life (due to UTPs) require sizable on-farm investments. 
As a consequence, farmers face high access costs. 
• Price pressures. Several UTPs may results in lower price for farmers. Buyers and 
middlemen acquire production information in order to ensure quality. Yet, this knowledge 
reveals production costs at any segment of the netchain. Leading firms can use this 
information to reduce suppliers’ margins. Similarly, grey practices and payments not 
related to the transaction can be used to reduce suppliers’ net margins. 
In chapter 14, we reported the analysis of occurrence, impact and pass-through of UTPs in the 
Agro-Pontino Kiwifruit (APK) and in the Lake Constance Apple (LCA) netchains. Our results are 
consistent with the overall theoretical model and the outcome of the expert panel, validating the 
IDEA approach. Also, we found that the use of an economic model for the interpretation of UTPs 
provides important insights. The economic analysis showed that leading firms can use the same 
set of practices to ensure that risk is allocated to the firms that can prevent it and—at the same 
time—extract profits. 
We found remarkable differences between the netchains, supporting the conclusion that UTPs 
are context-dependent (section 0). Differences concern UTP occurrence and pass-through. Just 
like UTPs, the pass-through effect is transaction-contingent and the use of economic perspective 
allowed us to understand the causal effect. 
In the APK netchain, late payments and unilateral contract changes are used to transfer the risk 
of demand fluctuations to middlemen and, ultimately, farmers. In order to ensure product 
availability, middlemen must have large stocks. In this way, kiwifruits are immediately available 
on request, and the contingency of having unsatisfied demand is prevented. However, in the 
case of drops in demand, renegotiations ensure supply matching (transferring risk upward). 
Holding the supplier responsible for post-delivery waste and loss is another blacklist UTP that 
plays a similar role. In the case of slow sales, deteriorated (or unsold) products are returned. In 
this way, buyers can order the products while transferring the risk of demand drops to suppliers. 
In both cases, the UTP ensures the constant and full availability of kiwifruits to consumers. The 
pass-through effect on farmers results in a mix of first-, second- and third-degree practices such 
as payment delays, delivery with price to be determined, contract/price renegotiations and 
arbitrary orders/pricing. 
The expected effects of a ban on such practices are a reduction in orders and/or prices 
proportional to the leading firm’s degree of risk aversion. Furthermore, consumers might see 
price increases (due to reduced availability) or empty shelves.  
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In the LCA netchain, the most concerning practices are the imposition of unnecessary standards 
and arbitrary/unpredictable orders. In this case as well, leading firms ensure availability by 
adjusting orders to unpredictable market conditions. Furthermore, they enforce self-selection 
and implicit threats by increasing middlemen’s access costs. The pass-through effects include 
on-farm investments by farmers and—in the case of a cooperative—post-delivery price 
adjustments. 
If a ban on such practices were imposed by national authorities when implementing the 
2019/633 Directive, unintended effects are possible. Such consequences may include trade 
reduction and the emergence of opportunistic behaviour by upstream firms. 
 
15.2.1  Implementation of the 2019/633 Directive at the national level 
 
IDEA results can be used to support national implementations of the UTP Directive. The 
difference between LCA and APK corroborates the decision to give Member States the 
opportunity to add UTPs to the list of banned practices. For example, German regulators might 
consider mitigating unmotivated order fluctuations, while this same issue is not a priority in the 
kiwi netchain. However, imposing unnecessary standards could be considered an additional UTP 
in both countries. 
Also, the economic model suggests the possibility that banning practices might affect the 
efficiency of the netchain. IDEA provided several examples in this regard. The consequences of 
regulation should be considered carefully, possibly based on counterfactual scenarios. A trade-
off between efficiency and fairness might be necessary. 
Finally, comparing the results of IDEA with the JRC investigation of the dairy industry, we found 
for these case studies that the fruit and dairy industries have extremely different structures, and 
emerging UTPs are different across countries. A cross-section implementation might fail to cover 
sector-specific or country-specific practices. At the same time, care should be taken to avoid 
overregulation and possible unintended consequences of banning efficiency-enhancing practices.  
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15.3  Appendix to Chapter 14: Survey Questionnaires 
Farmer Survey Questionnaire 
Questionnaire n. ____      Code:_____ 
The respondent is the farm manager:  Yes   No   
 
1. General information about the farm and the farm manager 
1.1 Farm manager 
1.1.1.Age: _____________________ (years) 
1.1.2.Gender:  Male    Female   
1.1.3. The farm manager is: Part-Time   Full-Time   
1.2. Farm 
1.2.1 Size of farm ___________ Ha 
1.2.2. Is the farm an independent business?  Yes   No   
1.2.3. Size of Apple orchard  ___________ Ha   
1.2.4. Specialization:   
Specialized in Apple/Kiwi Production    
Specialized in fruit    
Not Specialized    
Specialized in other productions   
1.2.5. Apple/kiwi varieties are (multiple answer):  
Club Yes    No   
Free  Yes    No   
1.2.6. There is on-farm apple/kiwi storage:  
Yes, for the entire production   Yes, for part of the production   No   
 
2. Marketing & governance 
2.1 Marketing channels 
2.1.1. Is the farmer a member of a producer organization or cooperative?  
Yes   No   
2.1.2. Last year, did the farmer sell/deliver the entire production to one buyer? 
Yes, only one buyer   
I have a main buyer (at least 50% of production)   
I have one of few important buyers (between 33% and 50% of prod.)   
No, I sell/deliver my production to many buyers   
2.2 Governance 
The following questions in this section refer to the ‘most important buyer’ 
2.2.1. Is your most important buyer: 
Coop/Po        
Private (non coop) traders/middlemen    
Supermarket representatives     
Consumers, farmer markets, neighbors, etc.   
Self-consumption, gifts, etc.     
2.2.2. Can the most important buyer find other farmers to replace you as trade partner? 
  
Yes easily   Yes, with some 
effort   
Not easily 
  
Cannot be 
replaced   
I am a member of the buyer 
(coop/PO)   
2.2.3. Can you replace the most important buyer easily?  
Yes, easily   Yes, but it would be costly   No, I cannot   
2.2.4. Was there a pre-harvest agreement (e.g. contract, verbal agreement) with the buyer? 
Yes, for one year only     
Yes, for more than one year (past of future, including PO membership)   
No, the deal was closed at harvest.   
IF THE ANSWER TO 2.2.4 IS 1 OR 2 
2.2.5. Did the buyer give specific direction on how to produce the fruits? (including: adoption 
of standards, instructions about harvesting, etc.) 
Yes, complying with directions is costly    
Yes, complying with direction is not costly   
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No   
3. Practices 
The questions in this section refer to the ‘most important buyer’ 
3.1 Prices 
3.1.1. State how much you agree with the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree), 6 = don’t know / no reply  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
P1 The rules for determining prices are clear        
P2 Buyers set prices at their discretion       
P3 At delivery, I have a reasonably reliable expectation about price       
P4 Payments are timely, I do not need to urge my buyer to be paid       
P5 Prices are determined in a fair and transparent way       
P6 I believe that my buyer will cheat on prices if they could       
 
3.2 Quality 
3.2.1. Quality is tested (multiple answers) 
 By the buyer By a third party It is not tested I do not know 
On the field        
At delivery        
After delivery        
It is not tested      
I do not know        
 
3.2.1. State how much you agree with the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree), 6 = don’t know / no reply 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Q1 Quality is determined in a fair and transparent way       
Q2 I believe that my buyer would cheat on quality if they could        
 
3.3 Access costs 
3.3.1. State how much you agree with the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree), 6 = don’t know / no reply 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Z1 I paid for significant investments in order to sell to the most important 
buyer 
      
Z2 Costs of selling to the most important buyer increase excessively 
(includes payments, investments, certifications, etc.) 
      
Z3 I have a reliable estimate of the future investments that will be 
required by my buyer  
      
Z4 I believe that my buyer asks for investments that are not really 
necessary 
      
 
3.4 Renegotiation and retaliation 
3.4.1. State how much you agree with the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
5 (strongly agree), 6 = don’t know / no reply 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
N1 My business with the most important buyer is predictable        
N2 When there is an unexpected event, the buyer changes the contract 
terms  
      
N3 The buyer changes the terms of trade if it is profitable for them, even 
in the absence of unexpected events 
      
N4 Your buyer always keeps his/her/their word, without using “holes” in 
the agreement to further their own interests  
      
N5 In the past, I have given up my contractual rights to preserve the 
trade relationship (accepted late payments, price reductions, etc.) 
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Questionnaire on Unfair Trade Practices 
MIDDLEMEN  
Questionnaire n. ____      Code:_____ 
The respondent is:   
1. the firm manager/owner   2. the marketing/procurement manager   3. Other    
 
1. Information about the firm 
1.1. How long has your firm been into apple/kiwi trading?  ________________ (years) 
1.2 Type of firm:     
1. Personal business   2. Incorporated business  3. Public enterprise   
4. PO and cooperative    5. Cooperative no PO   6. PO no cooperative   
7. Other   (specify) 
1.3 Firm’s annual turnover (in million of euros) 
0-| 2 mil   2 -| 10 mil   10 -| 50 mil   50 -| 150 mil   150 -|350 mil   Exceed. 350   
1.4 Specialization:   
Specialized in apple trading     Specialized in fruit trading   
Specialized in other products    Not Specialized      
1.5 The traded Apple varieties are (multiple answer):  
1. club     2. royalty     3. free    
1.6 The firm is an independent business: 
 Yes     No, it is part of a group    other    (specify)  ______________________ 
1.7 There is on-firm apple/kiwi storage (multiple answers):  
1. Own Storage    2. Rented Storage    
3. No storage (suppliers deliver to customers directly)   
1.8 The firm is member of associations (APO, consortia etc.) Yes   No   
1.9 Marketing Channels (Multiple answers) 
Other Traders / Middlemen   
Small retailers   
Large retailer   
Processors   
Consumers   
Other (specify) ______________________________   
1.10 What percentage of your product is exported (approximately)? _______% 
 
2. Perception of UTP in the industry 
A recent analysis by the European Commission pointed out several problematic practices in the agri-food 
supply chain. In your experience how likely are these problems to happen in the apple industry?  
NOTE: the question does not refer to the interviewed firm, it is an evaluation on the general behaviour in 
the industry. 
 
2.1 Please rate the how likely are the following problem to happen in the industry using the 
following 1-5 scale 
1. I am not aware of the 
problem 
2. It is 
unusual 
3. It may happen 
sometimes 
4. It happens 
often 
5. It is 
customary 
 
 Between Middlemen 
(such as your firm) 
and their Suppliers 
Between Middlemen 
(such as your firm) 
and their Buyers 
Payments are delayed, late and/or unpredictable. 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Orders are canceled on short notice 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Buyers impose unilateral changes to existing contracts or 
agreements (do not keep their word) 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Suppliers must pay for expenses that are not related to the sales 
of their products (for example: opening of new stores) 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Suppliers must pay (or are denied payments) for loss or waste of 
products that were already delivered to the buyer 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Buyers refuse to write down contracts or orders 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Buyers take advantage of confidential information they obtain 
from the suppliers 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
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Buyers cut orders if the suppliers try to exercise their contractual 
rights 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Suppliers must pay for the costs of examining complaints by final 
customers (even if they are not responsible) 
1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Firms must bear unpredictable costs that are not clearly stated in 
the contract  
If yes (values 4 & 5), please specify whether they concern:  
Returns of unsold products  
Payment for stocking, display and listing 
Payment for promotion 
Payment for marketing and advertising 
Payment for staff of the buyer, fitting out premises 
Others, specify___________________________________ 
1   2   3   4   5  
 
 
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
 
 
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
1   2   3   4   5  
Firms must comply with unnecessary quality standards 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
Orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary 1   2   3   4   5  1   2   3   4   5  
 
3. Business relationship with your suppliers 
3.1. When is suppliers’ final price determined? (even if it is not paid)  
Before harvest         At delivery    
When the prod. is sold to the middl.’s customers    At the end of the year   
3.2 When is quality tested? (multiple answers) 
On field    by a third party    by my firm  
At delivery  by a third party    by my firm  
After delivery by a third party    by my firm  
It is not tested   
Other specify ____________________________________ 
3.3 can you replace your suppliers easily? 
Yes, easily    Yes, but it would be costly    No, I cannot   
 
4. Business relationship with the main buyer 
4.1 Your main buyer for Apple/Kiwi is: 
 Domestic Export 
Other Traders / Middlemen     
Small retailers     
Large retailer     
Processors     
Consumers     
Other (specify) ____________     
4.2 What variety of apple/kiwi do you supply to the main buyer (multiple answer):  
Patented (club, royality)     free      I don’t know  
4.3 Share of total turnover from apple/kiwi with the main buyer  
______ (% of total apple value that is bought by the main buyer) 
4.4 Size of the main buyer (turnover in millions of euros) 
0-| 2 mil   2 -| 10 mil   10 -| 50 mil   50 -| 150 mil   150 -|350 mil   Exceed. 350     Don’t know   
4.5 How long have you been trading with this buyer? ______ (years)  
4.6 Can the buyer find other supplier to replace you as trade partner?   
Yes, easily   Yes, with some effort   Not easily / it would be costly for the buyer   No   
4.7 Can you replace the buyer easily?  
Yes, easily    Yes, but it would be costly    No, I cannot   
4.8 Do the buyer have special requirements (different from any other buyer, such as 
packaging, quality standards, etc.):   
1. No    2. Yes, but they are not costly   3. Yes and they are costly   
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For each of the following practices, states how severe are they for your business and how your firm reacts to mitigate the effects. 
Rate severity as follows 1. Never happens 2. It is unusual 3. It may happen sometimes 4. It happens often 5. It is customary 
 
Existence  Pass-Through Analysis (only if severity is at least 3) 
  No PT I degree II degree III degree 
 
 
 
 
 
How 
severe is 
this 
practice? 
(on a 1-
5 scale) 
Nothing 
/ I take 
the hit 
I rebate 
the 
practice 
onto my 
suppliers 
I delay 
payments 
to 
suppliers 
I hold my 
suppliers 
responsible 
for any 
problem 
with the 
products at 
any stage 
I use 
informal 
agreements 
that can be 
adjusted to 
unexpected 
circum-
stances 
I ask 
for 
pay-
ments 
I reduce 
future 
trade if 
problems 
arise 
Other II 
degree 
PT 
practices 
(n.) 
I offer 
lower 
prices 
 to 
suppliers 
I ask my 
suppliers 
for on-
firm 
invest-
ments  
Suppliers’ 
price is 
determi-
ned after 
I know 
my net 
revenues 
Other III 
degree 
PT 
practices 
Payments are delayed, late and/or 
unpredictable. ___ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Orders are canceled on short notice ___ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Buyers impose unilateral changes to 
existing contracts or agreements (do not 
keep their word) ___ 
⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Suppliers must pay for expenses that 
are not related to the sales of their 
products (for example: opening of new 
stores) ___ 
⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Suppliers must pay (or are denied 
payments) for loss or waste of products 
that were already delivered to the buyer ___ 
⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Buyers refuse to write down contracts or 
orders ___ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Buyers take advantage of confidential 
information they obtain from the 
suppliers ___ 
⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Buyers cut orders if the suppliers try to 
exercise their contractual rights ___ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Suppliers must pay for the costs of 
examining complaints by final customers 
(even if they are not responsible) ___ 
⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Firms must bear unpredictable costs 
that are not clearly stated in the contract  
If yes (values 4 & 5), please specify 
whether they concern:  
Returns of unsold products  
Payment for stocking, display and listing 
Payment for promotion 
Payment for marketing and advertising 
Payment for staff of the buyer, fitting out 
premises 
Others, specify__________ 
 
___ 
 
 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
 
___ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ 
 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
 ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Firms must comply with unnecessary 
quality standards ___ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
Orders are unpredictable and totally 
discretionary ___ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ ⃞ 
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5. Past experience 
 
5.1 Has a buyer of your company ever terminated the business relationship with your 
company? 
yes     no      don’t know / n.a.   
5.2. If  yes, how were you informed about the termination of the business relationship? 
Not at all, I simply did not receive any more orders   
In written  stating a reason   
In written without justification   
Informally (by telephone, verbally)   
I was not offered a new contract at expiration   
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PART V: Conclusions 
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16 Comparing IDEA and B-SEA 
Luisa Menapace, Sebastian Rahbauer 
(Technical University of Munich) 
 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, IDEA is tailored to a specific netchain. The expert panels 
provided specific information about the netchain used to guide the semi-structured 
interviews and design the surveys. This approach allowed researchers to run precise 
investigations and greatly reduced the size of the survey questionnaires because relevant 
information was identified ex ante. The downside of using specific information in the 
investigation design is the loss of generality. Because interviews and surveys are tailored 
to a given netchain, IDEA results may not be used to infer about other netchains. 
In this chapter, we investigate three questions: 
1. To what extent can we extend the IDEA results to other, similar netchains? 
2. Can we use information from a netchain to design surveys on other, similar 
netchains? 
3. What is the loss of information we may incur if we use B-SEA instead of IDEA? 
The three questions are important when assessing a trade-off between generality and 
completeness of the UTP monitoring system. IDEA provides a more complete 
representation of the UTP in a netchain than B-SEA, but the results are not general. B-SEA 
has a more limited scope than IDEA, but the same survey can be applied to several 
netchains at once and results are more general and comparable. 
In order to evaluate the trade-off, we conducted an additional survey (IDEA 2). This survey 
used the IDEA questionnaires designed for the LCA netchain to investigate the Slovak fresh 
fruit sector. By doing so, we could test if the application of IDEA surveys to a different 
netchain provides meaningful results. For this purpose, we compare the results of the IDEA 
2 survey with the results from the LCA netchain survey. The comparison of the IDEA 2 
results with the B-SEA output allows us to assess possible information loss.    
 
16.1  Testing the application of the LCA-tailored IDEA design to other 
netchains and industries 
 
The LCA netchain analysis was based on three main statements supported by the expert 
panels (Section 11.7 ) and verified with the semi-structured interviews (chapter 0): 
i) Downstream firms usually have more bargaining power than upstream firms in the 
LCA netchain. 
ii) The UTPs described in Directive 2019/633 happen more frequently at the 
middleman level, while farmers (especially coop members, as the majority of LCA 
producers) suffer from other practices such as low prices, arbitrary quality 
determination, high access costs, renegotiations (including ex post price 
renegotiation) and retaliation.  
iii) Two additional practices are identified as possible UTPs: imposition of unnecessary 
production standards and arbitrary and strategic orders. 
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The IDEA farmer and middleman questionnaires were drafted based on these statements. 
An application of IDEA questionnaires to the Slovak fruit industry (SLF) requires that the 
three statements were applicable. Our analysis concludes that only statements i) and iii) 
apply to Slovakia, while statement ii) does not. As a consequence, the LCA design cannot 
be used to run an investigation in Slovakia. In the following section 16.1.1  we address the 
issues related to statement i). Sections 16.1.2  and 16.1.2  address statements ii) and iii). 
 
16.1.1  Comparing possible imbalances in bargaining power 
 
The LCA design of IDEA assumes a possible imbalance in bargaining power in favour of 
downstream industries. As explained in section 14.3.3 , we used ”replaceability” as a gross 
proxy for bargaining power in the IDEA farmer survey. 
Table 16-1 reports farmers’ perceptions concerning replaceability by netchain and type of 
main buyer. In both netchains, the outcomes concerning the perceived replaceability of 
farmers by the type of main buyer are relatively similar. Farmers selling to private 
middlemen or supermarkets perceived themselves as more replaceable than those selling 
to cooperatives and POs.  
The perceptions of farmers’ abilities to replace their main buyer also show similar 
tendencies in both netchains for farmers selling to supermarkets, cooperatives, POs and 
final consumers. However, farmers selling to private middlemen in the LCA netchain felt 
they could replace their buyers more easily than farmers in the SLF netchain thought. 
Specifically, 50% of the surveyed farmers in the SLF netchain selling to private middlemen 
felt they could not replace their main buyer, while only about 11% of the farmers in the 
LCA netchain was of the same impression.  
 
Table 16-1: Replaceability of trade partners 
Can the main 
buyer replace 
your firm? 
SLF LCA 
Superm. Private 
middl. 
Coop/PO Consum. Total Superm. Private 
middl. 
Coop/PO Consum. Total 
Easily % 0.00 12.50 0.00 100.00 40.91 0.00 8.72 0.00 100.00 20.19 
Not easily % 100.00 62.50 0.00 0.00 31.82 100.00 80.25 0.00 0.00 8.37 
Not at all % 0.00 25.00 100.00 0.00 27.27 0.00 11.03 100.00 0.00 71.44 
Total % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Can you 
replace the 
main buyer? 
SLF LCA 
Superm. Private 
middl. 
Coop/PO Consum. Total Superm. Private 
middl. 
Coop/PO Consum. Total 
Easily % 0.00 25.00 0.00 100.00 45.45 0.00 48.45 2.64 100.00 25.78 
Not easily % 100.00 25.00 75.00 0.00 31.82 100.00 40.51 29.29 0.00 25.25 
Not at all % 0.00 50.00 25.00 0.00 22.73 0.00 11.03 68.07 0.00 48.96 
Total % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 16-2 compares farmers’ perceptions concerning their own replaceability and their 
ability to replace their main buyer. The figures in bold font highlight the combinations of 
possible imbalances in bargaining power in favour of the buyer. The results show for both 
netchains that farmers selling to cooperatives or POs perceive that they cannot be replaced. 
Thus, there is no indication of crucial imbalances in bargaining power in favour of the buyer 
in these constellations.  
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In both netchains, the vast majority of farmers selling to private middlemen or 
supermarkets perceive that they can be replaced. Furthermore, combinations indicating 
possible imbalances in bargaining power in favour of the buyer exist in both netchains, 
which is consistent with the predictions of the IDEA expert panels. Since imbalances in 
bargaining power are considered an important precondition for the occurrence of UTPs, we 
expect meaningful results from survey 2 in the SLF netchain. 
 
Table 16-2: Asymmetries in perceived replaceability by type of main buyer 
Main buyer is 
private middleman/ 
supermarket chain 
Farmer can be replaced 
SLF LCA 
Easily Not easily No Tot Easily Not easily No Tot 
Farmer 
can 
replace 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Easily 0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 44.57 0.00 44.57 
Not easy 0.00 30.00 10.00 40.00 8.02 37.26 0.00 45.29 
No 10.00 20.00 10.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 10.15 10.15 
Total 10.00 70.00 20.00 100.00 8.02 81.83 10.15 100.00 
 
Main buyer is 
cooperative / PO 
Farmer can be replaced 
SLF LCA 
Easily Not easily No Tot Easily Not easily No Tot 
Farmer 
can 
replace 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Easily 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.88 0.00 0.00 2.64 2.64 
Not easy 0.00 0.00 75.00 27.21 0.00 0.00 29.29 29.29 
No 0.00 0.00 25.00 52.89 0.00 0.00 68.07 68.07 
Total 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
 
16.1.2  The four areas of concern for farmers 
 
The expert panels and the semi-structured interviews in the LCA netchain identified four 
areas of possible UTPs that concern farmers: price determination, quality, access costs and 
renegotiation/retaliation. Consequently, the scope of the farmer survey was limited to 
these areas, which were investigated by asking respondents to agree or disagree to a set 
of statements using a 5-point Likert scale. The statements and average scores of 
respondents in both netchains are summarised in Table 16-3.  
Notably, the perceptions of the farmers often coincide in both netchains, as average scores 
frequently show similar tendencies towards agreeing or disagreeing with the statements. 
However, greater deviations in farmers’ perceptions are found in the area of price practices 
and business predictability. The statements with the highest deviations in average scores 
between SLF and LCA netchains are marked in bold font. SLF farmers perceive their 
business with the main buyer to be more predictable (also with regard to their expectations 
about prices at delivery) than LCA farmers do. However, SLF farmers more frequently 
believe that buyers set prices at their discretion.  
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Table 16-5 to Table 16-8 in the appendix compare farmers’ perceptions in each UTP area, 
distinguishing between the different types of main buyer. This more elaborate comparison 
illustrates further discrepancies between both netchains, for example, concerning the 
perceptions of pricing fairness. While almost 50% of the LCA farmers selling to cooperatives 
and POs strongly disagreed that prices are determined in a fair way, all surveyed SLF 
farmers agreed on the respective statement.  
Overall, the four areas of concerns proved to be relevant for farmers in the SLF sector, too. 
Quality practices are an exception, but the area was not considered an issue by LCA 
farmers. Differences in the average scores of specific items reflect the dissimilarities in the 
two industries. The application of the LCA design is able to capture such differences. 
 
Table 16-3: Average scores of practice assessment (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly 
agree) 
Area Statements 
SLF LCA 
Average 
score 
Average 
score 
Price 
practices 
Pricing rules are transparent and clear. 4.13 3.32 
Buyers set prices at their discretion. 3.20 1.39 
At delivery, I have a reasonably reliable expectation about price. 4.20 2.52 
Payments are timely. 3.80 3.14 
Prices are determined in a fair and transparent way. 3.33 2.59 
I believe that my buyer would cheat on prices if they could. 2.00 2.75 
Quality 
practices 
Overall, quality assessment is fair. 3.47 4.06 
I believe that my buyer would cheat on quality if they could. 1.87 2.69 
Access costs I paid for large inv. in order to sell to the most important buyer. 2.13 2.56 
Selling to the main buyer is increasingly costly. 2.53 2.11 
I have a clear estimate of future investments.   3.60 3.89 
I believe that my buyer is asking for unnecessary investments.   1.40 2.08 
Renegotiation My business with the most important buyer is predictable. 3.80 2.08 
My main buyer uses unexpected events to obtain concessions. 2.47 1.76 
Main buyer changes contract terms in the absence of unexpected 
events. 
2.06 1.80 
My main buyer always keeps their word. 3.40 4.04 
I had to give up contr. rights in order to keep the business rel. 2.73 2.56 
 
 
16.1.3   Occurrence of UTPs listed in Directive 2019/633 and additional 
UTPs 
 
Middlemen were asked to look at a list of UTPs and use a 5-point Likert scale to state how 
likely each UTP was to happen, according to their knowledge of industry. This general 
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question did not refer to their firms specifically; only a general assessment of the industry 
was required. Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood in the upstream market (i.e., 
the transaction between firms such as their one and their suppliers) and downstream 
market (i.e., between firms such as their own and their buyer). The list of practices is 
based on the Directive 2019/633 (grey practices are considered as one), with two 
additional items from the results of the IDEA expert panels and interviews: unnecessary 
quality standards and arbitrary orders. Table 16-4 summarises the results. 
Table 16-4: Perception of UTPs in the SLF and LCA netchains 
Likelihood of listed practices occurring in upstream 
and downstream industries on a 1-to-5 scale (1 = not 
aware, 5 = it is customary) 
SLF LCA 
Average 
score 
% of  
scores > 2 
Average 
score 
% of  
scores > 2 
Upst. Down. Upst. Down. Upst. Down. Upst. Down. 
Payments are delayed, late and/or unpredictable. 3.53 4.20 100.00 100.00 1.60 1.53 13.33 6.67 
Orders are cancelled on short notice. 2.73 2.73 73.33 80.00 1.07 1.47 0.00 6.67 
Buyers impose unilateral changes to existing contracts 
or agreements (do not keep their word). 2.60 2.47 60.00 53.33 1.13 1.53 6.67 6.67 
Suppliers must pay for expenses that are not related to 
the sales of their products (for example: opening of 
new stores). 
2.87 2.47 86.67 53.33 1.00 2.07 0.00 40.00 
Suppliers must pay (or are denied payments) for loss 
or waste of products that were already delivered to the 
buyer. 
3.20 3.00 100.00 86.67 1.40 2.27 20.00 46.67 
Buyers refuse to write down contracts or orders. 2.27 2.47 33.33 53.33 1.00 1.60 0.00 13.33 
Buyers take advantage of confidential information they 
obtain from the suppliers. 2.33 2.13 33.33 20.00 1.00 1.40 0.00 6.67 
Buyers cut orders if suppliers try to exercise their 
contractual rights. 2.00 2.60 86.67 66.67 1.00 2.13 0.00 40.00 
Suppliers must pay for the costs of examining 
complaints by final customers (even if they are not 
responsible). 
2.60 2.20 33.33 73.33 1.40 1.20 20.00 0.00 
Firms must bear unpredictable costs that are not 
clearly stated in the contract. 3.73 3.80 73.33 93.33 1.00 2.20 0.00 33.33 
Firms must comply with unnecessary quality standards. 2.80 3.26 60.00 86.67 2.47 3.53 53.33 80.00 
Orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary. 2.87 2.53 86.67 53.33 2.67 4.60 46.67 100.00 
 
In the relationships between middlemen and their buyers (downstream), all of the 
investigated trade practices of the Directive 2019/633 show higher average scores in the 
SLF netchain compared to the LCA netchain. Exemplary, all survey participants in the SLF 
netchain indicated that late payments from buyers happen at least sometimes, while less 
than 7% of the LCA middlemen indicated this happens. Major discrepancies between the 
perceptions of LCA and SLF middlemen are further found for the practices “unpredictable 
costs” and “short-notice order cancellations”. Thus, legislation designed to tackle UTPs in 
downstream business relationships in the LCA netchain would potentially be insufficient in 
the SLF netchain. 
This problem becomes even more obvious when comparing the results concerning the 
relationships between middlemen and their suppliers (upstream). While most of the LCA 
middlemen were unaware of the presence of almost all practices listed in Directive 
2019/633, many SLF middlemen indicated that these practices are indeed relevant 
upstream. Thus, these practices should have been investigated in the SLF farmer 
questionnaire as well, which was not the case. Examples are “unpredictable costs” and 
“payments for loss or waste”, both of which show average scores of 3.73 and 3.20, 
respectively.  
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This point is particularly severe because the LCA design of the IDEA farmer questionnaire 
is unable to capture several relevant practices at farm level. The assessment that we 
obtained from the analysis in section 16.1.2  is biased and misleading because we failed 
to detect the occurrence of common UTPs. 
Notably, all survey participants in the SLF netchain indicated that late payments happen 
at least sometimes upstream, while most SLF farmers stated that payments are timely 
(see Table 16-5). This apparent inconsistency might be interpreted as farmers who accept 
late payments consider them “timely”. 
We further find that the additional two monitored practices (“firms must comply with 
unnecessary quality standards” and “orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary”) 
are relevant in the SLF netchain. There is a possibility that other relevant practices in the 
LCA chain were disregarded due to missing prior analysis in this netchain.  
We conclude that the farmer questionnaire, which was designed based on the results of 
IDEA expert panels and semi-structured interviews, is insufficient for the SLF netchain. 
Therefore, we conclude that using information from one netchain to design surveys for 
other similar netchains can involve crucial information losses. As expected, omitting prior 
analyses might result in ignoring relevant netchain-specific practices. 
 
16.2  Comparing B-SEA (SLF) and survey 2 (SLF) 
 
IDEA survey 2 gives an estimate of the occurrence, impact and pass-through of UTPs in 
the B-SEA netchain using a design based on information about the LCA netchain. B-SEA 
has the same objective but does not use a priori information. The comparison between the 
results of B-SEA and survey 2 provide an estimate of the bias in the two cases. 
 
16.2.1  Bias in IDEA 2 surveys 
 
As previously outlined, the results of the IDEA expert panels and semi-structured 
interviews were used to limit the scope of the IDEA questionnaire to four areas of potential 
UTPs that were found relevant. As explained in section 16.1.2 , this approach has 
potentially caused us to overlook several practices of relevance for farmers in the SLF 
netchain that are irrelevant for farmers in the other investigated netchains. SLF middlemen 
that participated in the IDEA survey stated that farmers are affected by “unpredictable 
costs” and “payments that are unrelated to the sale of their products”, in addition to other 
practices not considered by the IDEA farmer questionnaire. Indeed, 33% of farmers willing 
to answer the respective question of the B-SEA questionnaire stated that unpredictable 
costs are a problem. Furthermore, 38% indicated that their buyers sometimes or more 
frequently demand payments that are unrelated to the sale of their products. Thus, the 
comparison with the B-SEA questionnaire confirmed that IDEA overlooks UTPs with a high 
rate of occurrence. We conclude that the IDEA questionnaire based on expert panels and 
semi-structured interviews in the APK and LCA netchains is insufficient for the SLF 
netchain. 
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16.2.2  Bias in B-SEA analysis 
 
The farmer questionnaire for the B-SEA approach was not based on a priori information 
and thus not limited to the practices that were deemed relevant. However, the B-SEA 
questionnaire did not include any questions regarding the importance of the two additional 
practices that were found relevant in the IDEA expert panels and semi-structured 
interviews: unpredictable orders and unnecessary quality standards. The IDEA survey 
showed that these practices are indeed evaluated as relevant by middlemen, both 
upstream and downstream. Thus, using B-SEA instead of IDEA incurs an information loss 
with regard to the relevance of these practices that were failed to be considered a priori. 
Our comparison of B-SEA and IDEA shows that a trade-off between generality of results 
and completeness of information exists. The issue is discussed in section 17.1.2  of this 
report.  
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16.3  Appendix 
Table 16-5: Results of price practices assessments 
Pricing rules are transparent and clear (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Super. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Pr. Mid. 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 62.50 12.50 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.35 37.42 48.23 100.00 
CoopPO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 6.89 11.10 38.71 17.16 15.55 10.58 100.00 
Cons. 87.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.68 47.32 100.00 
Total 31.82 0.00 0.00 9.09 40.91 18.18 100.00 4.848 7.82 27.26 13.43 25.49 21.15 100.00 
               
Buyers set prices at their discretion (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Super. 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Pr. Mid. 0.00 12.50 0.00 37.50 50.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 76.93 23.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
CoopPO 0.00 0.00 75.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 66.05 29.29 2.33 2.33 0.00 100.00 
Cons. 87.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 4.55 13.64 22.73 18.18 9.09 100.00 0.00 73.1 22.79 2.461 1.641 0.00 100.00 
               
At delivery, I have a reasonably reliable expectation about price (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Super. 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 00.00 50.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Pr. Mid. 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 37.50 37.50 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
CoopPO 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 75.00 100.00 0.00 29.43 44.57 19.66 6.34 0.00 100.00 
Cons. 87.50 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 0.00 0.00 18.18 18.18 31.82 100.00 0.00 20.72 31.38 13.84 4.462 29.59 100.00 
               
Payments are timely (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Super. 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Pr. Mid. 0.00 12.50 0.00 25.00 25.00 62.50 100.00 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.07 68.21 100.00 
CoopPO 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 1.17 13.77 24.46 40.73 10.01 9.86 100.00 
Cons. 87.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.36 94.64 100.00 
Total 31.82 4.55 0.00 22.73 18.18 22.73 100.00 1.64 9.696 17.22 29.5 10.25 31.69 100.00 
               
Overall, prices are determined in a fair and transparent way (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Super. 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Pr. Mid. 0.00 12.50 12.50 37.50 37.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 54.87 45.13 100.00 
CoopPO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 75.00 25.00 100.00 4.11 49.12 31.76 6.34 5.59 3.08 100.00 
Cons. 87.50 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 4.55 4.55 27.27 27.27 4.55 100.00 2.90 34.59 22.36 4.462 9.913 25.78 100.00 
               
I believe that the main buyer would cheat on prices, if they could (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Super. 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Pr. Mid. 0.00 0.00 62.50 37.50 0.00 0.00 100.00 8.72 45.13 46.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
CoopPO 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 27.41 40.22 18.50 4.97 6.58 2.33 100.00 
Cons. 87.50 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 100.00 47.32 52.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 22.73 22.73 22.73 0.00 0.00 100.00 29.28 42.76 18.19 3.498 4.631 1.64 100.00 
 
Table 16-5 illustrates the results of the assessment of practices related to price 
determination. The results show that price transparency is more an issue in the LCA 
netchain, while SLF farmers are more concerned about arbitrary price determination. 
Farmers in both netchains state they do not know the final price for their fruits at the time 
of delivery. While this seems to be typical for POs and cooperatives, the issue is raised in 
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the SLF netchain for private middlemen and supermarket chains as well. In general, the 
majority of farmers responded that payments are reasonably on time.  
There are clear discrepancies between both netchains concerning the perceptions of pricing 
fairness. While almost 50% of the LCA farmers selling to cooperatives and POs strongly 
disagreed that prices are determined in a fair way, all surveyed SLF farmers agreed with 
the respective statement. Some farmers in the SLF netchain criticised private middlemen 
for price unfairness, while none of the LCA farmers did. Most farmers in both netchains do 
not believe their buyers cheat on prices.  
Table 16-6 illustrates the results of the assessment of practices related to quality 
determination. The results show for both netchains that most of the surveyed farmers 
perceive quality assessment as fair. No SLF farmers and very few farmers in the LCA 
netchain believe that their main buyer would cheat on quality if they could. As described 
in section 10, this outcome is inconsistent with the semi-structured interviews. 
Table 16-6: Results of quality practices assessment 
Overall, quality assessment is fair (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 00.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid 0.00 12.50 12.50 37.50 37.50 0.00 100.00 14.35 0.00 0.00 8.72 14.35 62.58 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 75.00 25.00 100.00 1.17 5.72 7.19 5.72 47.38 32.82 100.00 
Consum. 87.50 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 4.55 4.55 18.18 31.82 4.55 100.00 2.17 4.03 5.07 4.85 35.53 48.36 100.00 
               
I believe that my buyer would cheat on quality if they could (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Superm. 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid 0.00 50.00 25.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 14.35 76.93 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 14.11 44.71 25.08 7.74 1.17 7.19 100.00 
Consum. 87.50 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 100.00 90.41 9.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 27.27 13.64 22.73 0.00 0.00 100.00 28.80 40.57 19.30 5.45 0.82 5.07 100.00 
 
Table 16-7 illustrates the results of the assessment of practices related to access costs. 
We find heterogeneous perceptions across both netchains in this regard. Most of the SLF 
farmers that were able or willing to answer the question disagreed or strongly disagreed 
on the statement implying that large entry investments are necessary. In the LCA netchain, 
there is also a slight majority who disagree with the corresponding statement. The 
assessment of whether access costs are increasing over time shows a similar tendency. 
Most farmers in both netchains indicate a clear estimate of the future investment necessary 
to keep market access. None of the respondents considers the required investment an 
unnecessary cost.  
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Table 16-7: Results of the investigation of access costs 
I paid for large investments in order to sell to the most important buyer (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Supermarket 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 50.00 25.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 14.35 28.47 8.72 37.42 11.03 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 0.00 50.00 25.00 25.00 0.00 100.00 6.44 32.50 39.23 8.50 4.94 8.40 100.00 
Consumers 87.50 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 90.41 9.59 100.00 
Total 31.82 27.27 18.18 13.64 4.55 0.00 100.00 4.62 24.61 30.71 6.88 23.60 9.57 100.00 
               
Selling to the main buyer is increasingly costly (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Supermarket 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 12.50 25.00 50.00 12.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 23.07 57.18 19.75 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 28.50 56.29 7.30 3.80 4.11 100.00 
Consumers 87.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 47.32 47.32 5.36 0.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 9.09 27.27 18.18 13.64 0.00 100.00 0.00 22.23 54.17 16.16 4.54 2.90 100.00 
               
I have a clear estimate of future investments (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Supermarket 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 12.50 12.50 25.00 12.50 37.50 100.00 0.00 8.72 23.07 0.00 23.07 45.13 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 28.88 10.38 7.50 4.66 44.77 3.80 100.00 
Consumers 87.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 100.00 43.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 47.32 9.59 100.00 
Total 31.82 13.64 4.55 9.09 9.09 31.82 100.00 28.68 8.13 7.45 3.28 43.68 8.78 100.00 
               
I believe that my buyer is asking for unnecessary investments  (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree)  
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Supermarket 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Private Middl. 0.00 50.00 25.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 11.03 80.25 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 6.89 59.71 29.60 0.00 0.00 3.80 100.00 
Consumers 87.50 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 6.89 59.71 29.60 0.00 0.00 3.80 100.00 
Total 31.82 50.00 9.09 9.09 0.00 0.00 100.00 11.03 80.25 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 
Renegotiation was considered by a set of five items. The items and results for both 
netchains are illustrated in Table 16-8. Most SLF farmers perceive business with their main 
buyer as predictable, while 71% of the LCA farmers perceives their business as 
unpredictable. The vast majority of farmers in both netchains do not feel their main buyers 
use unexpected events to obtain concessions or, in the absence of unexpected events, 
change contract terms. Consequently, most farmers in both netchains agreed that their 
main buyer always keeps his/her word.  
Finally, 13% of the SLF farmers indicated to have given up their contractual rights in order 
to keep the business relationship with their main buyer. In the LCA netchain, 3% of the 
farmers responded correspondingly.  
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Table 16-8: Results of the assessment of renegotiation practices 
My business with the most important buyer is predictable (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid 0.00 12.50 0.00 25.00 50.00 12.50 100.00 0.00 17.44 0.00 23.07 48.45 11.03 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 1.17 30.36 39.57 21.41 6.03 1.47 100.00 
Consum. 87.50 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 4.55 4.55 13.64 22.73 22.73 100.00 0.82 42.38 28.68 17.24 8.80 2.07 100.00 
               
My main buyer uses unexpected events to obtain concessions (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Superm. 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid 0.00 25.00 12.50 25.00 25.00 12.50 100.00 0.00 62.58 23.07 0.00 14.35 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 47.93 41.38 2.64 3.80 4.25 100.00 
Consum. 87.50 0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 22.73 9.09 22.73 9.09 4.55 100.00 0.00 59.00 31.31 1.86 4.85 2.99 100.00 
               
My main buyer changes contract terms even in the absence of unexpected events (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly 
agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Superm. 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid 0.00 12.50 12.50 62.50 12.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 71.30 14.35 14.35 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 2.64 53.03 34.80 0.00 4.11 5.41 100.00 
Consum. 87.50 0.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 27.27 13.64 22.73 4.55 0.00 100.00 1.86 63.41 25.85 1.35 3.72 3.81 100.00 
               
My main buyer always keeps their word (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.50 37.50 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.35 23.07 62.58 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 25.00 100.00 2.95 8.36 3.80 7.06 50.60 27.23 100.00 
Consum. 87.50 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Total 31.82 9.09 0.00 22.73 27.27 9.09 100.00 2.07 5.89 3.50 6.32 37.79 44.43 100.00 
               
I had to give up contractual rights in order to keep the business relationship (1: strongly disagree, to 5: strongly agree) 
 SLF LCA 
 NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total NR 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Missing               
Superm. 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Priv. Mid 0.00 12.50 12.50 50.00 12.50 12.50 100.00 11.03 60.27 14.35 0.00 14.35 0.00 100.00 
Coop /PO 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 33.44 52.93 12.47 0.00 0.00 1.17 100.00 
Consum. 87.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 100.00 43.09 56.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
 31.82 13.64 13.64 27.27 4.55 9.09 100.00 32.92 53.96 10.13 0.00 1.35 1.64 100.00 
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17 Conclusions 
Carlo Russo 
(University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale) 
 
In this chapter we illustrate the implications of our research for two important policy issues: 
the monitoring of UTPs in EU food supply chains and the implementation of Directive 
2019/633 by Member States. 
 
17.1  Monitoring UTPs in EU food supply chains 
 
Directive 2019/633 emphasises the importance of monitoring UTPs over time. Article 12 
requires an evaluation by 2025 assessing—in the very least—the effectiveness of the 
measures implemented at the national level and cooperation among enforcement 
authorities. Member States must publish an annual report and inform the commission 
about their activities (Article 10). In this perspective, monitoring of the occurrence, impact 
and pass-through of UTPs is necessary. 
In this report we described the design and test implementation of a monitoring system. In 
the following sections, we illustrate our findings and advice for future assessment of the 
effectiveness of regulation. 
 
17.1.1  Objective of the investigation 
 
The first issue we met in planning the system was definition of the objective. The 
effectiveness of regulation can be interpreted in two ways: Objective A is a reduction in 
the occurrence and impact of the target practices (the 16 UTPs in Directive 2019/633, plus 
those that will be identified by each Member State) and objective B is an increase in overall 
fairness and protection from any form of UTP. The choice between these two objectives 
informs the design of the monitoring system.  
Objective A is straightforward and consistent with previous investigations of UTPs. A time 
trend of UTP occurrence and impact is a clear and simple measure of the effectiveness of 
regulation. If recurring investigations show that occurrence is declining over time, it is 
possible to conclude that public intervention was successful. The main advantage of this 
approach is that effectiveness can be measured with a limited number of parameters and 
results are easy to interpret. The B-SEA approach (chapter 7 and Part III) was designed to 
achieve this objective. 
Objective B is more complex than objective A, and it is an innovative contribution of this 
research. According to theory, any constraint imposed on trading practices causes a 
reorganisation of the business relationship, being that such practices are interdependent 
and jointly determined (chapters 2 and 12). Consequently, a ban on UTPs is expected to 
determine changes in the organisation of EU food supply chains. Expert panels and semi-
structured interviews confirmed this finding. Measuring the effects of regulation on the rate 
of occurrence of UTPs chosen from a list results in an incomplete assessment because the 
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consequences for the business relationships are ignored. In this perspective, appraisal of 
possible unintended consequences—including the emergence of new types of unfair trading 
practices—is necessary for effective assessment. Ex ante policy evaluation (e.g., before 
including new UTPs in the regulation) needs a detailed counterfactual assessment in order 
to consider all consequences. Ex post evaluations (such as the 2025 analysis) require an 
extensive analysis of the change in business relationships determined by the regulation. 
The IDEA approach (chapter 6 and Part IV) is designed to meet objective B. The strategy 
uses a mix of surveys, panels, interviews and economic analyses to provide a complete 
analysis of UTPs, including possible counterfactual scenarios. Nevertheless, the complexity 
of this approach results in an equally complex output that cannot be summarised in simple, 
scalar indicators. The outcome of the investigation may be a set of qualitative assessments. 
 
17.1.2  Comparing B-SEA and IDEA  
 
IDEA and B-SEA are different approaches aiming at different objectives (section 17.1.1 ). 
Consequently, the primary criterion for the choice between the two strategies is the 
motivation underlying the investigation. Nevertheless, in comparing the two strategies, a 
trade-off between generality and completeness of information emerges. 
The design of IDEA is based on information about specific netchains. In particular, expert 
panels are a major driver for the planning of surveys and interviews and the development 
of the economic model (Part IV). The entire investigation is conditional on such specific 
knowledge. As a consequence, IDEA results and design cannot be applied directly in 
different contexts. In chapter 16, we showed that applying the IDEA design developed for 
the LCA netchain to the Slovak fruit industry leads to incorrect conclusions. Similarly, we 
showed that B-SEA overlooked important practices.  
In this section we summarise the comparison between the two empirical strategies using 
four criteria: completeness, generality, feasibility and cost. 
• Completeness. IDEA provided a more exhaustive representation of UTPs than B-
SEA. In our application, B-SEA did not detect issues concerning unnecessary 
standards or strategic orders. Furthermore, the IDEA economic model supported an 
understanding of the economic role of UTPs and their impact on efficiency. 
Investigating these issues with B-SEA required a complex questionnaire that proved 
to be tiring for respondents and elicited fear factors because of the detailed 
information required. Even so, it was not able to give a complete representation of 
the netchain. 
• Generality. A B-SEA aiming at measuring the occurrence and impact of a 
predetermined set of practices provides general and comparable results. Our 
application concluded that IDEA results are specific to the netchain.  
• Feasibility. Both approaches presented important feasibility issues. The dyadic 
approach of IDEA was almost impossible to implement, at least with the limited 
resources of the project. Firms were extremely reluctant to provide the contact 
information of their trading partners. In many cases, we obtained an explicit refusal 
because a respondent did not want their trading partner aware of their involvement. 
As a consequence, in many cases it was impossible to cross-check and compare the 
interviews of respondents. The B-SEA questionnaire was extremely long and difficult 
to administrate. The problem emerged because we tried to investigate multiple 
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issues of UTPs at once (including occurrence, determinants, impacts in several 
dimensions, pass-through). The problem had already been detected during the 
design activities. Nevertheless, we decided not to trim down questions in order to 
test the approach in the field. We found that the questionnaire was feasible for 
farmers but unacceptable for middlemen. We conclude that a feasible B-SEA 
requires a careful selection of the target issues to be investigated. 
• Cost. The use of expert panels and interviews allowed to design light questionnaires 
for the IDEA approach. This results in reduced survey costs (especially when 
professional agencies are used). The cost of B-SEA increases rapidly with the 
number of target issues. Investigating multiple dimensions requires a high number 
of questions resulting in costly surveys. The costs of B-SEA can be comparable (or 
even smaller) than IDEA only if the focus of the approach is limited to a few items. 
 
17.1.3   Measurement issues: Objective vs. subjective measurement 
 
Both IDEA and B-SEA face measurement issues. The first choice when measuring UTPs is 
whether to use objective or subjective assessments of occurrence, impact and pass-
through. With objective measurement, the investigator collects observable data regarding 
the practices and their costs (for example, the bills for loss/waste of products at the buyer’s 
premises or the notifications of changes in contract terms). Objective measurement is 
accurate but requires a high degree of cooperation from the respondents and is extremely 
costly. Subjective measurement is based on the respondent’s personal assessment of 
UTPs. It requires concise and general evaluation. Although subjective evaluation is less 
costly and easier to obtain than objective data, its reliability is questionable, and it can be 
considered only a crude approximation of the respondent’s perception.  
In our applications we used subjective evaluation. The choice is consistent with existing 
studies on UTPs, fairness and business practices. The complexity of the study topic required 
a large amount of objective data in order to achieve meaningful results. Furthermore, the 
semi-structured interviews confirmed respondents’ extreme reluctance in sharing 
accounting data. Upon request, they answered that the data are “not collected/available” 
or private information. Objective measurement was unfeasible in B-SEA as well, because 
it would result in excessively long surveys. 
The subjective evaluation in IDEA and B-SEA surveys was based on 5-point Likert scales 
asking respondents to agree or disagree with a set of statements regarding issues of 
interest. Similarly, respondents were asked to rank impact on a 5-point scale. This 
approach greatly improved the feasibility of the survey, compared to objective 
measurements. However, the result was a set of personal and heterogeneous assessments. 
As a consequence, the aggregation in descriptive statistics must be considered with 
caution. 
In particular, we identified three main biases in the subjective assessment of UTPs: fear 
factor, self-representation and strategic response. 
• The fear-factor is a well-known issue in UTP investigation. It results in an 
unwillingness to participate in surveys and interviews, reticence and an 
understating of the severity of practices. As a consequence of the fear factor, 
surveys can be biased because of non-random participation/missing answers and 
respondents who might downplay UTPs in their subjective assessments. The 
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support of local stakeholders was important in attenuating the fear factor. Also, 
almost all respondents required strict anonymity, asking that their statements be 
reported with no reference to their firms and that they not be included in the list of 
participants. 
• Strategic response is the propensity of respondents to provide information 
supporting their point of view and objectives, instead of truthful answers. We found 
two types of strategic responses. On the one hand, leading firms that might impose 
UTPs might downplay the issues. On the other hand, weak firms (when willing to 
participate) might have interest in overstating the problems in order to make a 
stronger case for public intervention. The strategic response bias was evident in the 
semi-structured interviews. We found that the use of closed-answer questions in 
the sample surveys was useful to balance the bias. 
• The issue of self-representation arises when a respondent provides answers that 
are consistent with an image of themselves that they want to project. Farmers may 
be unwilling to admit they are “easily replaceable” by their buyers. A middleman 
representative may suggest that he/she is less exposed than others to UTPs 
because of his/her advanced managerial skills. Experienced interviewers with a solid 
background are required to deal with this issue. 
The fear factor and self-representation bias can be attenuated if respondents are asked to 
provide their general evaluation of UTP occurrence in the industry (as in Table 14-16). By 
focusing on the entire industry, instead of on the firm, the respondent does not represent 
his/her own condition and does not disclose sensitive information regarding the trade 
relationship with their main buyer. At the same time, we expect that the respondent’s 
estimate of UTP occurrence at the industry level is affected by the actual UTP occurrence 
at the firm level. Then, the former can be used as a proxy for the latter. 
 
Table 17-1: Comparison between the average perception of UTP occurrence at the industry 
level and firm levels 
 APK LCA 
 Ind. Firm Diff. Ind. Firm Diff. 
Payments are delayed, late and/or unpredictable 2.27 2.27 0.00 1.53 1.33 0.20 
Orders are cancelled on short notice 1.67 1.60 0.07 1.47 1.53 -0.06 
Unilateral changes to existing contracts or agreements 1.87 2.07 -0.20 1.53 1.27 0.26 
Payments for expenses that are not related to product sale 1.93 1.67 0.26 2.07 1.93 0.14 
Payments for loss or waste of already-delivered products  2.13 2.00 0.13 2.27 2.00 0.27 
Buyers refuse to write down contracts or orders 1.57 1.60 -0.03 1.60 1.47 0.13 
Misuse of confidential information  2.57 2.47 0.10 1.40 1.07 0.33 
Buyers cut orders if suppliers try to exercise their rights 1.62 1.87 -0.25 2.13 1.60 0.53 
Payments for examining complaints by final customers  2.14 1.93 0.21 1.20 1.13 0.07 
Unpredictable costs that are not clearly stated in the contract  2.43 1.43 (*)1.00 2.20 2.13 0.07 
Firms must comply with unnecessary quality standards 2.07 2.07 0.00 3.53 3.20 0.33 
Orders are unpredictable and totally discretionary 1.79 1.87 -0.08 4.60 4.53 0.07 
(*) the difference is statistically significant at 90% confidence level. 
Table 17-1 compares the mean value of middlemen’s estimates of UTP occurrence at the 
industry level (from Table 14-16) and firm level (Figure 14-2). The figures in the table 
report the average score on a 5-point Likert scale. The average scores at the industry and 
firm levels are significantly different at the 90% confidence level in only one case (grey 
practices in the APK netchain). All other differences are not statistically significant. The 
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results support the conclusion that middlemen’s estimates of UTP occurrence at the 
industry level are a possible proxy for actual occurrence at the firm level.24  
   
17.1.4  Implementing a UTP monitoring system 
 
The trial investigation of the EU fresh fruit industry provided a clear analysis of the 
strengths and weakness of IDEA and B-SEA. We conclude that although each approach has 
limitations, there are important complementarities that can be exploited for the design of 
an efficient monitoring system. Figure 17-1 illustrates the organisation. 
The system is based on the integration of the two approaches. B-SEA provides a general 
assessment of occurrence, impact and pass-through over time.  
In this setting, B-SEA consists in a large sample survey of farmers, middlemen, processors 
and retailers across sectors and Member States. A key characteristic of B-SEA is 
consistency over time, so that time trends can be identified. IDEA is structured as a set of 
ad-hoc investigations of specific netchains. It is used to define a complete list of UTPs and 
assess the consequences of regulation. The results of IDEA can be used to update B-SEA 
questionnaires. 
Expert panels are in charge of the calibration of B-SEA and IDEA. In addition to the typical 
IDEA tasks (chapter 6), expert panels can be used to validate the B-SEA questionnaires. 
Recurring expert panels can identify the emergence of new UTPs, assess possible 
unintended consequences and propose updating of survey questionnaires. 
The combined monitoring system is designed to provide intelligible, flexible and complete 
information to stakeholders and policymakers. The assessment of policy effectiveness is 
based on the analysis of B-SEA time trends, ad-hoc IDEA studies and the evaluation of 
unintended consequences by expert panels. 
 
                                         
24 We acknowledge that the robustness of the conclusion is limited given the small sample size. It must be noted 
that the sign of the difference between the two indicators is positive in 80% of cases. This result suggests that – 
although the differences regarding individual practices are not statistically significant – industry level estimates 
might overestimate occurrence compared to firm level estimates. A systematic upward bias might be consistent 
with a partial correction for fear factor and self-representation bias in industry level estimates. However, the issue 
needs further investigation because the available data are not sufficient for drawing general conclusions. 
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Figure 17-1: Complementarities of IDEA and B-SEA 
 
 
17.2  Implementation of Directive 2019/633 by Member States 
 
An EU Directive is a legislative act setting forth a goal that all EU Member States must 
achieve. It is left to the individual Member States to devise their own regulation on how to 
reach these goals. The goal of Directive 2019/633 is “[…] laying down of a minimum Union 
standard of protection by harmonising Member States’ diverging measures relating to 
unfair trading practices, […]” and supporting Member States in tasks that are better 
achieved at the Union level (Consideration 44 of the Directive). Member States must adopt 
all necessary changes to their existing national regulation by May 1, 2021 (Article 13). The 
national implementation can be complicated because the Directive interacts with 
heterogeneous regulations and different degrees of protection. The EU regulator 
recommend strong cooperation among enforcement authorities in order to overcome such 
difficulties (Article 8). 
Our investigation provides insights that can support the implementation of the Directive 
by Member States. In particular, we focused our attention on two main issues: the 
definition of UTPs in addition to the list provided by the Directive and the design of the 
enforcement system.   
 
17.2.1   Additional UTPs in Member State regulations 
 
The ban of the 16 practices in Directive 2019/633 is a minimum degree of protection for 
all firms in the food supply chains. Member States can include restrictions on additional 
practices in their national regulations, if it will support fairer organisation of the food 
system. Our research supports a flexible system allowing differences across Member 
States. Our comparison of the German, Italian and Slovak netchains found non-negligible 
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differences in organisation and governance between countries and across products. 
Imposing one Member State’s additional UTPs on another Member State might result in 
sub-optimal regulation. There is a consensus among scholars and policymakers (e.g., 
Falkowski et al. 2017) that the inclusion of a practice in the UTP national list requires 
careful consideration. Banning trading practices might result in unintended effects, 
including efficiency loss and trade distortion. The economic model in chapter 12 and the 
semi-structured interviews in chapter 13 confirm this conclusion. Implementation of the 
Directive by Member States requires a detailed analysis. The IDEA approach is suited to 
this task, providing the necessary economic background for informed design. 
Our implementation of IDEA found that UTPs can be netchain-specific. Because of 
differences in product characteristics and governance, there might be remarkable 
heterogeneity in the trading practices adopted by different sectors. Furthermore, because 
of UTP interdependence, similar practices might have different impacts or different degrees 
of fairness, depending on the sector. 
Our results suggest that a sectoral approach be considered in Member States’ 
implementations. In fact, the EU Directive proposes a minimum degree of protection. Such 
an approach minimises the risk of overregulation because it focuses on the minimum set 
of UTPs. If Member States want to expand protections by increasing the number of 
regulated practices, the risk of efficiency-reducing overregulation increases. Because UTPs 
are heterogeneous with respect to sectors, it is possible that extensive protection of all 
farmers in all sectors may result in a ban of a large number of practices. As a consequence, 
firms might face regulatory constraints for practices that operators in other sectors 
consider unfair.25 Sector-specific additional regulation might be considered by Member 
States to attenuate possible overregulation if additional UTPs are added. 
 
17.2.2   Coordination of enforcement 
 
Directive 2019/633 explicitly considers the risk that differences among Member States in 
how they implement UTP regulation might undermine the Single Market. A strong 
protection in a Member State might distort trade, favouring leading firms operating under 
a different and more tolerant regulation in another Member State. For this reason, the 
Directive asks for cooperation among national enforcement authorities regarding cross-
border cases, sharing of best practices and implementing measures they have adopted 
(Article 8). The enforcement authorities may adopt recommendations in order to encourage 
consistent application of the Directive and improve enforcement. Our research supports 
this approach. We conclude that differences in implementation and enforcement may lead 
to very different degrees of protection.  
                                         
25 IDEA results in Part IV offer a clear example of this risk. Expert panels, interviews and sample surveys confirm 
that imposing unnecessary production standards is a possible specific UTP in the fruit industry. However, this 
might not be the same in other sectors such as cereals. Banning the practice in all sectors might result in 
unnecessary regulation of netchains that do not suffer from the problem. Retailers and middlemen in these 
netchains might be required to prove that standards are necessary, even if there was no evidence of unfair 
behaviour.    
 
Pass-through of Unfair Trading Practices in EU food supply chains: Methodology and Empirical Application 
Final Report 
 
 
216 
These differences are not limited to the number and type of banned UTPs or to the power 
of initiative of the enforcing authority (ex-officio vs. on a complaint). Instead, they can 
concern the general principles of the national law. In section 12.7.1  we found that the 
adoption of a strict vs extensive interpretation of a contract may lead to remarkable 
differences in the degree of protection for weak firms. If the legal system considers only 
the formal yearly contract, several practices are admissible. If the overall, long-term 
economic trade relationship is considered, the same practices are banned as UTPs. 
Differences among Members States regarding these general principles are difficult to 
address, because they have an impact that goes beyond the UTP problem. Coordination of 
enforcement authorities may not be sufficient in these cases. 
Effective enforcement requires harmonisation of the legal frameworks of Member States. 
In this perspective, coordination during the adoption period would be highly advisable. 
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre 
nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting 
Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 
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